Congress's national-security legislation will often require clear and specific congressional authorization before the executive can undertake certain actions. The War Powers Resolution, for example, prohibits any law from authorizing military hostilities unless it "specifically authorizes" them. And the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 required laws to amend FISA or repeal its "exclusive means" provision before they could authorize warrantless electronic surveillance. But efforts to legislate clear-statement regimes in national-security law have failed to induce compliance. The Clinton Administration inferred congressional (...) "authorization" for the 1999 Kosovo War from an appropriations statute that failed to specifically authorize the conflict. And the Bush Administration inferred congressional "authorization" for the NSA surveillance program from ambiguous language in the post-September 11th Authorization to Use Military Force. In both situations, executive-branch lawyers employed expansive theories of implied repeal and constitutional avoidance to evade the codified clear-statement requirements, and Congress and the courts acquiesced to the President's actions. Recent proposals to strengthen the clear-statement requirements in Congress's national-security framework legislation are unlikely to be effective without institutional mechanisms, such as points of order, that can deter future legislators from enacting vague or ambiguous legislation from which the executive might claim implicit congressional "authorization," and that can induce Congress to confront Presidents that act without specific congressional authorization. Simply enacting more narrow or explicit clear-statement requirements, or adding funding restrictions to Congress's framework legislation, fails to counter the aggressive interpretive doctrines that executives of both political parties have used to concoct congressional "authorization" from vague or ambiguous statutory language. (shrink)

We should now be able to come to some general conclusions about the main lines of Cuvier's development as a naturalist after his departure from Normandy. We have seen that Cuvier arrived in Paris aware of the importance of physiology in classification, yet without a fully worked out idea of how such an approach could organize a whole natural order. He was freshly receptive to the ideas of the new physiology developed by Xavier Bichat.Cuvier arrived in a Paris also torn (...) by many overlapping debates on the nature of classification, and in particular that between the natural and artificial systems. The very validity of the enterprise of classification was questioned in many quarters. Cuvier's achievement on his entry into the Parisian world of science was not simply to establish himself as a highly competent anatomist: far more important, he also began to use ideas from many different specialties to change completely the notion of what was involved in natural history.124 At the same time that he himself swung away from the guiding image of the field naturalist as the ideal of the specialty, he took ideas from the new physiology to answer questions about the order of the animal world, and from comparative anatomy to resurrect extinct creation — and to come to conclusions from that creation about the history of the forms of life and the manner of their succession. He showed himself able to alter the relationships between natural history and many other fields of study in a way that implied, rightly or wrongly, his own complete mastery over such a movement. Partly he was able to do this because the ideas he borrowed were not themselves logically articulated and thus could be easily adapted and refocused for many different specific purposes. The value of the heuristic possibilities inherent in the idea of life, for example, far outweighed its inability to generate full systems of classification. Cuvier also consistently refused to consider in science matters relating to the first causes of events. Freed from the consideration of first-order phenomena, he was able to use second-order explanations across a far wider field of applicability. Personal doubts about the validity of a theology that had used science in order to bolster its own claims were combined here with the strong influence of the Kantian critique of the limits of human reason.125Cuvier's characteristic mode of procedure was that of intellectual appropriation and a bold capacity for altering the relationships between different fields of knowledge, rather than, with the exception of taxonomy, the technique of expanding their subject matter. His claims to originality came, first, from this reappropriation and reorientation and, second, from the sheer scope of his work, which aimed at nothing less than the cataloging and classification of all animate objects.126 They rested also on his acute use of his assertion of a certain relationship with the past of his subject. Very often he would present this history in such a way as to obscure his own intellectual genealogy, and often too he would give differing accounts of the priority of use of an idea in order to distract attention from the questionable exactitude of his own claims to originality. Cuvier came to Paris at precisely the time when society and institutions were most profitably malleable for a newcomer; it was also a time when many scientific disciplines had reached a stage advanced in terms of their factual content, yet relatively inadequate in conceptual organization. They were ripe for takeover by large-scale organizing ideas such as the animal economy and the subordination of characteristics. Paleontology is a particularly good example of a specialty in this particular form of underdevelopment in 1795.Cuvier paid a high price for his initial success. His electic applications of large-scale organizing ideas tended to mean that little of his own work had complete coherence at all levels. Ideas, as we have seen, that proved capable of providing a complete reform of the larger groups of the animal kingdom were incapable of producing its detailed working-out in the taxonomy of smaller groups, which had to be supplied from observed analogical correlations. Further, his physiological approach to classification involved the breakdown of strict correspondence between organs and functions, which left the way open for workers such as Geoffroy St. Hilaire gradually to tilt the balance away from the study of the correlations of hierarchies of functions, and toward morphology as the basis of the order of nature. Cuvier's brilliant appropriations from physiology from the beginning, therefore, contained the seeds of conflict with Geoffroy.Cuvier's eclectic approach made it very nearly impossible for him to present a clear idea of the ways in which the life sciences could be said to be lawful. In spite of his efforts to assimilate them to the position of the physical sciences in this respect, he was forced in the end to accord only an ambiguous status as “laws” to observational correlations. From this area of failure came much of the attempt to give his own two laws — the correlation of parts and the subordination of characteristics — predictive qualities, particularly in relation to paleontological research.It is not surprising that Cuvier's title as the “legislator” of natural history should represent more a claim than a reality. How, then, was he able to emerge as the leading French naturalist of his day? First of all must be adduced the sheer scale of his undertakings. Then comes his expertise as a practical anatomist, and the range of different topics toward which he turned his interest. His collaborators cannot be given credit for his output nor, as we have seen, for slavish adherence to his ideas. Cuvier was able to successfully claim to have dominated the underdeveloped specialties, such as paleontology, and turned them into a major heuristic input into both geology and comparative anatomy; but in other fields, such as physiology, he appropriated concepts and encouraged research but made little impact on the field himself. His attempts in 1812 to head off, or neutralize and absorb the growth of morphological studies landed him in a dangerously rigid position, which despite his encouragement of the new physiological research under the Restoration made further elaboration of his own conceptual underpinnings almost impossible.Cuvier's authority in the scientific world would in any case have been great because of his substantive achievement in taxonomy, but the rest of his work had enough ambiguities and dislocations for it to need the support of his political and social power. Cuvier's detractors seized on a vital fragment of the truth when they accused him of finding the political dimension all-important: it obscured the disjunctions in his theories and at the same time gave him the authority to make new claims for the status of the observational sciences - and for their relations of power with their surrounding specialties. Cuvier's science both thrived on and was halted by the power games of intellectual appropriation, manipulation of the past to confirm the present, and continual claims for hegemony. (shrink)

According to the Standard Picture of how law works, the content of the law that is created by legal texts such as statutes and constitutional provisions is determined by the meaning of these texts. Most proponents of this picture claim more specifically that the relevant notion of meaning in play is the communicative content of legal texts and that communicative content is itself determined by considerations of the intentions of legal authorities. In recent years, the Standard Picture has become the (...) subject of heated philosophical debate. Focusing on statutes as the paradigmatic type of legal texts, this thesis aims to contribute to this debate in two central ways. First, it argues that the aforementioned ‘intention-based’ versions of the Standard Picture lack convincing responses to three important objections that have been raised by critics. First, they lack an adequate account of how legislative bodies can be reasonably ascribed the intentions that they would need according to such versions. Second, they fail to explain important aspects of legal practice. Third, they provide at best a parochial theory of the content of the law that is generated by statutes. The second contribution is to provide a more sustained defence of the Standard Picture by developing a new ‘commitment-based’ version of this view. This version is based on an alternative theory of communication and claims that communicative content is not determined by considerations of intentions but rather by the commitments that are incurred by means of communicative acts. It is argued that this version can deal with the objections that have been raised by critics and therefore provides a more robust version of the Standard Picture. (shrink)

This article considers Dworkin's influential argument against legislative intent in chapter 9 of Law's Empire. The argument proves much less than is often assumed for it fails to address the possibility that the institution of the legislature may form and act on intentions. Indeed, analysis of Dworkin's argument lends support to that possibility. Dworkin aims to refute legislative intent in order to elucidate his own theory of statutory interpretation. That theory fails to explain plausibly legislative action. Dworkin's argument does not (...) refute legislative intent but instead suggests there is reason to think that the legislature is capable of intentional action. (shrink)

HIV-related state laws are being created transnationally though the use of omnibus model laws. In 2004, the US Agency for International Development funded the creation of one such guidance text known as the USAID/Action for West Africa Region Model Law, or N'Djamena Model Law, which led to the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS laws, including the criminalisation of HIV transmission, across much of West and Central Africa . In this article, I explicate how an epidemic of highly problematic legislation spread across (...) the region as a result of a text-mediated work process enabled through model laws. I theorise the textual genre of model laws arguing that these texts are best understood as ‘preoperative documents’ which, when activated, can lead to swift legislative reform in and beyond the field of HIV/AIDS governance. The legislative process being investigated was made visible through participant observation, archival research, textual analysis and informant interviews with national and international stakeholders . This involved ethnographic research in Canada, the USA, Switzerland, Austria, South Africa and Senegal . The untold policy processes and narratives explored in this article make evident how the work of contesting problematic HIV/AIDS model laws and newly drafted state laws involves both creating new texts and contesting the legitimacy and efficacy of others. (shrink)

It would be unproblematically correct to say "the laws of Pennsylvania have it that a person is eligible to vote at age eighteen." But whether someone is actually mature enough to exercise his electoral franchise appropriately will very much depend on the individual. In setting the voting age by fiat, Society leaps in where Nature fears to tread. Many quantities that figure importantly in shaping our conduct of affairs are not specified by nature but are artifacts of human contrivance. At (...) what age, for example, is a person old enough to marry, drink alcoholic beverages responsibly, handle fireworks safely, manage his own property, enter into contracts, see a violent movie, serve on a jury, or hold a public office? These are not quantities writ large in nature's impersonal scheme of things but matters of social decision made for reasons of public polity and administrative convenience. They are legislated quantities. (shrink)

0n a lucid, concise volume, Jeremy Waldron defends the role of legislation, presenting it as an important mode of governance. Aristotle, Locke and Kant emerge as proponents of the dignity of legislation. Waldron's arguments are of obvious importance and topicality, especially in countries that are considering the introduction of a Bill of Rights. The Dignity of Legislation is original in conception, trenchantly argued and very clearly presented, and will be of interest to a wide range of scholars and thinkers.

This chapter contains section titled: Images of Legislation Legislation in Legal Theory Analytics of the Legislative Process Interpreting and Applying Legislation A Forum of Principle? References.

Kant famously insisted that “the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will” is the supreme principle of morality. Recent interpreters have taken this emphasis on the self-legislation of the moral law as evidence that Kant endorsed a distinctively constructivist conception of morality according to which the moral law is a positive law, created by us. But a closer historical examination suggests otherwise. Kant developed his conception of legislation in the context of his opposition to (...) theological voluntarist accounts of morality and his engagement with conceptions of obligation found in his Wolffian predecessors. In order to defend important claims about the necessity and immediacy of moral obligation, Kant drew and refined a distinction between the legislation and authorship of the moral law in a way that precludes standard theological voluntarist theories and presents an obstacle to recent constructivist interpretations. A correct understanding of Kant's development and use of this distinction reveals that his conception of legislation leaves little room for constructivist moral anti-realism. (shrink)

The article analyzes the system of legal regulation of the higher education in Lithuania with the purpose to determine the boundaries of exercising the discretionary powers of the executive institutions in the field of higher education. The article is made of two parts. Discretionary powers of the executive institutions in legislative field are discussed in the first part. The power of legislative discretion is described as a right to set the legal regulation by way of a subject who is granted (...) such discretionary power. Problems may arise in cases when the law granting such discretionary powers is too abstract or declarative. The main criteria in determining the boundaries of exercise of discretionary powers are the provisions of Constitution and laws, and constitutional law principles. The system of delegation of legislative powers in the field of regulation of the higher education in Lithuania is analyzed in the second part of the article. The permanent changes in administrative legal regulation of higher education and studies determined by a vast amount of subjects issuing post-legislative legal acts in this field, as well as rather tedious legal regulation which, in turn, calls for frequent changes in legal acts, raises doubts regarding a possibility to implement main principles of the studies, such as freedom of creation and scientific research or academic freedom and autonomy. (shrink)

A comprehensive account of English legal thought in the age of Blackstone and Bentham for nearly a century, The Province of Legislation Determined advances an ambitious reinterpretation of eighteenth-century attitudes to social change and law reform. Professor Lieberman's bold synthesis rests on a wide survey of legal materials and on a detailed discussion of Blackstone's Commentaries, the jurisprudence of Lord Kames and the Scottish Enlightenment, the chief justiceship of Lord Mansfield, the penal theories of Eden and Romilly, and the legislative (...) science of Jeremy Bentham. The study relates legal developments to the broader fabric of eighteenth-century social and political theory, and offers a novel assessment of the character of the common law tradition and of Bentham's contribution to the ideology of reform. (shrink)

This article develops an account of the nature and limits of the state’s legislative authority that closely attends to the challenge of harmonizing Kant’s ethical and juridical theories. It clarifies some key Kantian concepts and terms, then explains the way in which the state’s three interlocking authorities – legislative, executive, and judicial – are metaphysically distinct and mutually dependent. It describes the emergence of the Kantian state and identifies the preconditions of its authority. Then it offers a metaphysical model of (...) the Kantian state and uses it to argue that the activity of juridical lawgiving is an act of the omnilateral will itself. Legislative authority is limited in the sense that it does not include the capacity to create juridical laws that are conceptually incompatible with the idea of universal external freedom. I argue that my proposed account of the legislative authority is wholly consistent with that authority’s exclusive lawgiving capacity and does not threaten the possibility of ‘distributive justice’ – the legal finality that is the sine qua non of a civil condition. (shrink)

In the last years of his life, Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., defied illness to continue his work on the philosophy of law. This book is a monument to MacCallum’s effort, containing fourteen of his essays, five of them published here for the first time. Two of those previously published are widely admired and reprinted: “Legislative Intent,” certainly one of the best papers ever published on its topic, and “Negative and Positive Freedom,” which offered a new way of looking at a (...) distinction that had been canonical for the last two centuries. To complete MacCallum’s unfinished pieces, Marcus G. Singer and Rex Martin painstakingly consulted MacCallum’s notes for planned revisions. MacCallum discusses legal reasoning, the application of rules, the interpretation of statutes and constitutional provisions, and the relation of these matters to morality and justice. In the last decade of his working life, he became greatly concerned with the interrelated themes of integrity, autonomy, conscience, and violence. He wished to relate competition to morality and justice to adversarial systems of law. These themes are woven together in Legislative Intent and constitute the main subject of some of the essays. MacCallum was engaged in a constant search for truth and understanding, and in his life and work lived up to Emerson’s vision of the “American Scholar” as a “human being thinking.” These essays are informed by the author’s deep curiosity, penetrating intelligence, wide knowledge, and outstanding character. They will be treasured wherever these characteristics and true philosophy are treasured. (shrink)

On September 22, 1998, California Governor Pete Wilson signed Senate Bill 1785 into law, dramatically affecting the entire California animal sheltering community. Dubbed the "Hayden law" by the animal protection community after the bill's sponsor, it represents the state of California's attempt to legislate a solution to both the companion animal overpopulation problem and the friction between the agencies trying to end it. The persistence of the bill's primary supporters, a Los Angeles veterinarian and a UCLA law school professor and (...) the overall lack of opposition to it helped SB 1785 sail through the California legislature. Because of the scope of the bill and the immense cost of implementation, its passage shocked many in the sheltering community. This case study highlights the consequences of legislation that was crafted based on worse case scenarios and over which there was little collaborative effort. It concludes with suggestions that might be useful to other states contemplating similar such legislation. (shrink)

This article analyzes the epistemological aims and justification of character education legislation passed by the North Carolina General Assembly. I take this specific state law as representative of the broader national trends in the character education movement. I primarily use the work of Richard Rorty as the theoretical lens for the analysis and critique. I conclude by commending aspects of the legislative effort, but I suggest that greater emphasis must be placed on strengthening students' ethics through democratic action inside and (...) outside schools and not on a right-leaning, conservative, and didactic curriculum. Further, as social foundations educators, it is imperative to make strides in our classrooms to expose preservice teachers to the apparent and hidden contradictions of using character education as a tool of educational reform. (shrink)

Battles against domestic violence in the People’s Republic of China have been carried out since 1995. In this study, legislative progression of laws related to domestic violence is first examined and clarified; second, findings from the legislative review are investigated on the basis of civil and criminal cases; third, the interaction among social and traditional norms, legislation, and judicial outcomes is explored and interpreted from a sociosemiotic perspective. It is found in this study that: 1) legislation and judicial practices of (...) domestic violence in the P. R. C. are closely intertwined with social and traditional norms; 2) there is a gap between judicial practices dealing with domestic violence and the legislation; 3) the Anti-Domestic Violence Law offers a notch for state powers to embrace the familial relationship and to safeguard a victim. (shrink)

In this thesis I outline a view of primary legislation from a systems perspective. I suggest that systems theory and, in particular, autopoietic theory, as modified by field theory, is a mechanism for understanding how society operates. The description of primary legislation that I outline differs markedly from any conventional definition in that I argue that primary legislation is not, and indeed cannot be, either a law or any of the euphemisms that are usually accorded to an enactment by a (...) parliament. I cite two reasons for such a conclusion. The primary reason for my conclusion is that I see primary legislation as being an output of a particular subsystem of society, while the law is the output of another subsystem of society. I argue that these outputs are the discrete products of separate subsystems of society. I argue that primary legislation should be viewed as a trinity. The first state of this trinity is that, upon enactment, primary legislation is a brute fact in that it is but a thing and the only property of this thing is that of being a text. The second state of this trinity is that following the act of enactment, the thing enacted will be reproduced and this reproduction is a separate thing that will sit in some repository until used. The third state of this trinity is that, upon use, this thing that is primary legislation will be transformed into an object and the user will attribute such functions and attributes to that object as are appropriate to the context within which the object is used. The thing has therefore become an object and an institutional fact. The second reason for my conclusion that primary legislation is not a law relates to the fact that the thing that is primary legislation is a text and the only function of a text is that it is available to be read. That is to say, of itself, a text is incapable of doing anything: it is the reader who defines the status of the text and attributes functions and attributes. Upon use, primary legislation thus becomes a censored input for future action and one of these actions may be some statement by a court of law. I assert that the view of primary legislation that has been accepted within the body politic is the product of the discourse of a particular subsystem of society that I have designated 'the legal practice', and I outline why and how this has occurred. Outlining a view about primary legislation also necessitates outlining a view as to the nature of the law. I assert that the law is a myth and I see this myth as a product of the discourse of the legal practice. I have asserted that although it is the judges that state the law, such statements flow from the discourse of those who practise the law. (shrink)

There is a widely held view that legislative intention determines the meaning of a statute. The focus of this article is meaning in the sense of full linguistic content, which may not be the same as legal content. Linguistic intentionalism appears to have its greatest appeal when a statute has a partly implied linguistic meaning. It seems natural to suppose that the part of the meaning that is implied by the explicit wording in the statute is determined by an intention (...) of the legislature—roughly, what the legislature intended to imply. The purpose of this article is to present some new reasons to doubt linguistic intentionalism and to offer an alternative for a particular kind of implied statutory meaning that some philosophers of language call implicitures. Rather than legislative intention, the meaning of implicitures is metaphysically determined by intention-free pragmatic linguistic norms, the grasp of which is part of the language competence of ordinary law subjects. The use of these norms, in combination with certain facts about background social practices and other conventions, generates implicitures that may be inconsistent with actual communicative intentions. These intention-free pragmatic norms, and the implicitures they generate, are explanatorily prior to the fact—if there is such a fact—of what impliciture it is reasonable to infer that the enacting legislature (or the legislators collectively) intended. Reference to legislative linguistic intention (actual or reasonably imputed) is thus explanatorily inert. (shrink)

Review of the 2022 book by Yann Ardagna and Anne Chaillou, Les restes humains : législation, intérêt scientifique et enjeu éthique des ensembles anthropobiologiques.

This book discusses how Plato, one the fiercest legal critics in ancient Greece, became – in the longue durée – its most influential legislator. Making use of a vast scholarly literature, and offering original readings of a number of dialogues, it argues that the need for legal critique and the desire for legal permanence set the long arc of Plato’s corpus—from the Apology to the Laws. Modern philosophers and legal historians have tended to overlook the fact that Plato was the (...) most prolific legislator in ancient Greece. In the pages of his Republic and Laws, he drafted more than 700 statutes. This is more legal material than can be credited to the archetypal Greek legislators—Lycurgus, Draco, and Solon. The status of Plato’s laws is unique, since he composed them for purely hypothetical cities. And remarkably, he introduced this new genre by writing hard-hitting critiques of the Greek ideal of the sovereignty of law. Writing in the milieu in which immutable divine law vied for the first time with volatile democratic law, Plato rejected both sources of law, and sought to derive his laws from what he called ‘political technique’. At the core of this technique is the question of how the idea of justice relates to legal and institutional change. Filled with sharp observations and bold claims, Platonic Legislations shows that it is possible to see Plato—and our own legal culture—in a new light “In this provocative, intelligent, and elegant work D. L. Dusenbury has posed crucial questions not only as regards Plato’s thought in the making, but also as regards our contemporaneity.”—Giorgio Camassa, University of Udine “There is a tension in Greek law, and in Greek legal thinking, between an understanding of law as unchangeable and authoritative, and a recognition that formal rules are often insufficient for the interpretation of reality, and need to be constantly revised to match it. Dusenbury’s book illuminates the sophistication of Plato’s legal thought in its engagement with this tension, and explores the potential of Plato’s reflection for modern legal theory.”—Mirko Canevaro, The University of Edinburgh. (shrink)

Excerpt from Traites de Legislation Civile Et PenaleMais ce n'est pas un panegyrique que je fais. Il faut bien avouer que le soin d'arranger et de polir a peu d' attraits pour le genie de l'auteur. Tant qu'il est pousse par une force creatrice, il ne sent que le plaisir de la composition. S'agit-il de donner des formes, de rediger, de finir, il n'en sent plus que la fatigue. Que l'ouvrage soit interrompu, le mal est irreparable: le charme disparait, le (...) degout succede, et la passion eteinte ne se rallume que pour un objet nouveau.La meme disposition l'a eloigne de contribuer a la redaction que je donne au public; je n'ai pu Obtenir que rarement les eclaircissements et les secours dont j'avais besoin il lui en coutait tr0p de suspendre le cours actuel de ses idees pour revenir sur d'anciennes traces.About the PublisherForgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.comThis book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In Rousseau’s political theory, the Legislator’s task is to draft the best possible Constitution for a given people. His goal is to maintain the public liberties and to ensure the preservation and prosperity of the State. However, the main problem is “to put law above men” – that is: above the citizens in general and the members of the executive in particular. This paper examines how the Legislator takes up the problem by educating the citizens. The process of education implies (...) the development of reasonable thinking as well as the education of desire. Reasonable thinking is achieved through the formation of the general will. Education of human desire must be understood with respect to the distinction between amour-propre and amour-de-soi. The extension of amour-de-soi to a communityof fellow citizens plays a central role in the formation of the general will and contributes to the development of solidarity among the different social classes. Education of amour-propre plays a role in the development of a national identity. It plays also a role in the political governance of individual desires by means of an administration based on a hierarchy of functions, supervised by public opinion. However, the political governance of desire is challenged by the invisible power of money, which Rousseau tried to neutralize by limiting and slowing down the monetary circulation. (shrink)

The metaphysics of legalism -- The individual in context -- Rationality in context -- Freedom in context -- Strong legalism or the absent theory of legislation -- Legitimacy and legitimation : from strong legalism to legisprudence -- From proxy to trading off : the principles of legisprudence -- Legisprudence and the duties of power : a legisprudential assessment of rational legislation.

Modality and negation, as two important linguistic features used to realise subjectivity, have been investigated within various disciplines, such as logic, linguistics and philosophy, and law. The interaction between modality and negation, as a relatively new and undeveloped domain, has however not been paid due attention in scholarship. This corpus-based study investigates three aspects of their interaction: the differentiation of the deontic value by negation, the categorization of deontic modality in Hong Kong legislation via negation, and distribution patterns of deontic (...) modality, especially distribution patterns of the negation of modality, in Hong Kong legislation. This study shows that negation is a powerful linguistic mechanism not only for determining the nature and functions of modality, but also for determining the value of modality. This study also reveals that negation helps us to investigate the distribution of deontic modality in Hong Kong legislation and hence revisit the legal framework in Hong Kong. A study taking into account the discursive and professional aspects of the interaction between deontic modality and negation will provide a theoretical basis for the natural language processing of modality and negation in legislation and also offer important implications for the study of negation and modality in general contexts. (shrink)

Natural death act legislation which is intended to assist patients who wish to refuse or limit medical treatment may actually erode patients' rights. By use of a 'living will' the legislation intends to extend the patients' role in decision-making to the time when patients can no longer speak for themselves. However, the legislation erodes and constricts the right of refusal. The erosion is the result of two sets of conditions found in the legislation. The first requires that the patient be (...) qualified and certified by others before interventions can be withdrawn or withheld. The second delineates the physical condition which must be present before a living will can be followed. Patients have had to seek the assistance of the courts to enforce their common law rights of refusal of treatment against these requirements. Legislation is needed, but greater care must be taken to avoid the creation of a Kafkaesque legal nightmare for those we intend to assist. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Legislative sovereignty is often discussed with one eye on the past and one eye on the procedural functions of law-making in the present. This limits the scope for a conceptual understanding of legislative sovereignty and hinders its theoretical progress. This article argues that legislative sovereignty contains within it the concept of an idol and that understanding the scope and impact of the idol of sovereignty is necessary for future development in this field. Theories from Kant, Nietzsche, von Mises and (...) Derrida are used to offer a divergent critique of legislative sovereignty while the author calls for a move towards a nuanced view of legislative and Parliamentary Sovereignty to account for its idolism. The key factor preventing the development of a truly nuanced and reflective theory of sovereignty is the devotion to former idols which are inoperable and inconsistent with modern geopolitical, inter-state relationships. The author also argues that our knowledge of sovereignty is synthetic a priori and that development in this area can only be by reason, as knowledge derived experientially is subject to the Kantian Transcendental Idealism. (shrink)

The question of the moral status of AI and the extent to which that status ought to be recognised by societal institutions is one that has not yet received a satisfactory answer from lawyers. This paper seeks to provide a solution to the problem by defending a moral foundation for the recognition of legal personhood for AI, requiring the status to be granted should a threshold criterion be reached. The threshold proposed will be bare, noumenal agency in the Kantian sense. (...) Agency has been identified by Alan Gewirth as the source of the rights claims of our own species and, at risk of contradiction, is a foundation that must be expanded to all agents or else we contradict the foundation of our own rights. This is something that ought to be recognised through the granting of legal personhood to all noumenal agents by any system that requires such personhood for the enforcement of rights, or else the rule restricting legal personhood cannot be seen as a valid legal norm. Having laid out the case, the paper will move on to defend this natural law conception against the narrower definition of legal personhood proposed by Bryson et al. with regards to AI. It will argue that bare agency is a sufficient, though not necessary, criterion for the ascription of legal personhood in any system that sees the status as necessary for the ascription of legal rights. The paper will conclude by analysing the proposals currently making their way through the legislatures of the UK and European Union. They will be assessed for their compatibility with the claim that a functioning legal system necessarily must recognise the legal personhood of all noumenal agents regardless of their origins, and whether they are future-proofed for the possibility that AI may meet this threshold. (shrink)

Purpose of this article is to tell foreign readers about novels made in Russian intellectual property law in 2014. As is known modern Russian revolution in the field of intellectual property legislation occurred January 1, 2008 when Russian intellectual property legislation was codified, included in the text of part fourth of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. Part fourth of the Russian CC entered into force on January 1, 2008. At the same day seven sectoral intellectual property laws were (...) repealed. Second Revolution in this field took place during 2014: Federal law №35-FZ, 2014, substantially amending the Fourth part on the CC, entered into force on October the 1st of 2014. Scientific aim: The essence and evaluation of these amendments is the subject matter of this paper. Methods: The research is based on the analysis of the new amendments and articles added to the part fourth of the CC. Findings: Codification of the sectoral legislation en bloc in CC is a unique phenomenon. The author believes that such a construction of intellectual property law was made correctly and at the proper time. Factually the Federal Law №35-FZ is the eleventh law amending the text of the part fourth of the CC. But all previous amendments were small and not substantial. As far as amendments introduced by the law №35-FZ are concerned, they are numerous and very, very substantial. Before entering into force of the law №35-FZ, the Part fourth of the CC contained 328 articles. The law 35-FZ amends 169 articles of it and adds seven new articles. I am convinced that the law is a rather big step towards building a modern system of intellectual property legislation in Russia. Conclusions: More than 150 amendments were introduced by the law №35-FZ. Author estimates about 80% of them as positive and about 20% as negative and erroneous. These amendments do not contradict the international intellectual property agreements signed by the Russian Federation. Generally their purpose is to enhance and clarify the Russian intellectual property legislation and to narrow the gap between Russian and European intellectual property laws. The author of this article deals with intellectual property laws more than 50 years on. This paper is a short English version of various articles on this topic published in Russian, in journals: «The business and the law» and «The patents and licenses». (shrink)

Over the last years, Norway has revised its animal welfare legislation. As of January 1, 2010, the Animal Protection Act of 1974 was replaced by a new Animal Welfare Act. This paper describes the developments in the normative structures from the old to the new act, as well as the main traits of the corresponding implementation and governance system. In the Animal Protection Act, the basic animal ethics principles were to avoid suffering, treat animals well, and consider their natural needs (...) and instincts. In addition, a principle for balancing our duties towards animals with the needs and interests of humans was expressed by the formulation unnecessary suffering. These principles (only with slightly different formulations) are retained in the new act. The novelty of the new act is shown by its explicit intention to promote respect for animals and its recognition of animals’ intrinsic value. Whereas intrinsic value is only given a symbolic function, the notion of respect is intended to have practical consequences. One interpretation of respect for animals is taking the animal’s integrity—and not only welfare—into account. Another is to see the introduction of respect as a call to animal keepers to provide animals with welfare exceeding the minimum requirements. In several respects, the legal system now seems to leave more responsibility to the individual animal keeper—and to citizens in general. I argue that if the authorities really do want to promote respect for animals, they must at the same time initiate activities to achieve this. In my perspective the challenge is to provide adequate measures to achieve in practice the intended respect for animals expressed in the new act. (shrink)

The main purpose of legal interpretation is to create conditions for the effective functioning of law and its components by clarifying their true content, which eliminates any doubts and ambiguities. The purpose of this article is: first, to analyze the provisions of current Ukrainian legislation for identifying the general approaches embodied in it and the principles for the implementation of legal interpretation activities by state power bodies; secondly: presentation on the basis of modern achievements and developments of legal science of (...) the system of measures for standardization of such activity, bringing it in line with the needs of law enforcement practice. The solution of the set tasks was carried out using the method of philosophical dialectics, a system of general scientific and special scientific methods of cognition, which are based on the principles of objectivity, comprehensiveness, complexity. Based on the analysis of the normative material, it is concluded that there is no single harmonized approach in the Ukrainian legislation on the procedure for providing clarifications of the content of normative-legal acts. The authors give arguments on the need to clarify and streamline the legal interpretation activity by state bodies and propose a number of measures to achieve this goal. Based on the conducted analysis of the normative material, the authors outline the main problematic issues of the legislative definition of the basics of legal interpretation and provide specific proposals for improving the current legislation in this area. (shrink)

In the Laws, Plato argues that legislation must not only compel, but also persuade. This is accomplished by prefacing laws with preludes. While this procedure is central to the legislative project of the dialogue, there is little interpretative agreement about the strategy of the preludes. This paper defends an interpretation according to which the strategy is to engage with citizens in a way that anticipates their progress toward a more mature evaluative outlook, and helps them grow into it. This paper (...) shall refer to this strategy as proleptic engagement. While the virtuous ways of life required by law are intimately connected to happiness, the preludes do not persuade by spelling out this connection. Rather, they persuade by telling citizens what they need to hear so that they can come to appreciate this connection for themselves, in the context of their own lives. While the preludes are many and varied, this paper argues that all preambular material can be understood as proleptic engagement. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:Cardinal Sforza Pallavicino, SJ (1607–67), conceived a procedure for determining natural moral laws by voting under a veil of ignorance. Behind this veil, imagined possible people who are ignorant of their social position, personal characteristics, nation, and the historical period in which they live vote as equals. These possible people are asked to establish a moral law in pursuit of their own and collective happiness, which they are obligated by God to follow. This article discusses Pallavicino's innovative approach to natural (...) law and examines its reception in Southern Germany and (what is now) Austria. (shrink)

Theories of aggregated legislative intent posit that the legislative intent of parliament is what a significant enough proportion of legislators intended (e.g., legislative intent is p if a majority intend that p). After all, many think the same way about democracy (‘votes reveal the will of the people’) and about courts (‘a court decision is based on judicial voting’). The existing literature on aggregated legislative intent, however, tends to make two undefended assumptions: (i) Informed Assumption: all legislators have policy intentions; (...) and (ii) Group Intent Assumption: the existence of an aggregated intent entails the existence of a group intent. Despite these assumptions being subject to great scrutiny, they largely remain undefended. This paper defends the Group Intent Assumption and shows that aggregated theories can survive with a weaker version of the Informed Assumption. (shrink)

On January 18, 2006, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the constitutional challenge to New Hampshire's Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act would be remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, to determine whether the Court of Appeals could, consistent with New Hampshire's legislative intent, formulate a narrower remedy than a permanent injunction against enforcement of the parental notification law in its entirety.In 2003, New Hampshire enacted the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act. (...) The Act specifies, in pertinent part, that “No abortion shall be performed upon an unemancipated minor or upon a female for whom a guardian or conservator has been appointed… until at least 48 hours after written notice of the pending abortion has been delivered....” The Act allows for three exceptions where a physician may perform an abortion on a minor child without parental or guardian notification. (shrink)

This article defends the classical liberal view of human interactions that gives strong protection to associational freedom except in cases that involve the use of force or fraud or the exercise of monopoly power. That conception is at war with the modern antidiscrimination or human rights laws that operate in competitive markets in such vital areas as employment and housing, with respect to matters of race, sex, age, and increasingly, disability. The article further argues that using the “human rights” label (...) to boost the moral case for antidiscrimination laws gets matters exactly backwards, given that any program of forced association on one side of a status relationship (employer, not employee; landlord, not tenant) is inconsistent with any universal norm governing all individuals regardless of role in all associative arrangements. The articled also discusses the tensions that arise under current Supreme Court law, which protects associational freedom arising out of expressive activities (as in cases involving the NAACP or the Boy Scouts), but refuses to extend that protection to other forms of association, such as those involving persons with disabilities. The great vice of all these arrangements is that they cannot guarantee the stability of mandated win/lose relationships. The article further argues that a strong social consensus against discrimination is insufficient reason to coerce dissenters, given that holders of the dominant position can run their operations as they see fit even if others do otherwise. It closes with a short model human rights statute drafted in the classical liberal tradition that avoids the awkward line drawing and balancing that give rise to modern bureaucracies to enforce modern antidiscrimination laws. (shrink)

Can passing antidiscrimination laws ever be a bad idea? Yes, if broad policy reform is abandoned in favor of genetic‐specific legislation. But in spite of its serious flaws, both in concept and in practice, genetic‐specific legislation is sometimes worth passing anyway.

This corpus analysis of linguistic and semantic features in French parliamentary debates concerning online hate speech regulation, highlights tensions between state powers and private rights. Two key themes are identified: first, the _problem of definition_: how such online content is defined in the debates, and second, the _problem of regulation_: how the debates negotiate the supra-jurisdictional and individual jurisdiction issues involved, in regulating both the global online content and the responsibilities of the owners of the platforms who manage the content. (...) For this analysis, the authors created a corpus of French National Assembly Examination Committee discussions and public sessions between July 2019 to January 2020 discussing the _Loi Avia _(Avia Law). The corpus was analysed using quali-quantitative methods. Overall, the study combines a top-down (global) and a bottom-up (local) analysis of the data, applying corpus semantic approaches (Lecolle et al. in Langages 210(2):35–54, 2018; Rastier in The Routledge handbook of semantics, Routledge, pp 507–522, 2015) to contextualize the analysis of the meta-discourse (Hyland in Meta-discourse: exploring interaction in writing, 1st ed. Bloomsbury Academic, Bloomsbury Collections, 2018. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350063617 ). The analysis highlights the linguistic features revealing the power dynamics inherent within the discourse and counter-discourse of the dominant and opposition political parties respectively. (shrink)

In an effort at ethical reform, Taiwan recently revised the Hospice Palliative Care Law authorising family members or physicians to make surrogate decisions to discontinue life-sustaining treatment if an incompetent terminally ill patient did not express their wishes while still competent. In particular, Article 7 of the new law authorises the palliative care team, namely the physicians, to act as sole decision-makers on behalf of the incompetent terminally ill patient's best interests if no family member is available. However, the law (...) fails to provide guidance as to what constitutes the patient's best interests or what specific procedures the treating physicians should follow, and so has raised constitutional concerns. It may be difficult to translate ethical reform into law but it is not impossible if essential requirements are carefully followed. First, there must be substantial nexus between the purpose of the statute and the measures provided under the statute. Second, advocates need to convince the public that futility or waste has amounted to a public health emergency so as to justify lower procedural requirements. Third, a remedy or compensation should be available if the surrogate decisions have not been appropriately made. Fourth, minimum procedural safeguards are necessary even though the statute is intended to reduce the procedural burdens of making surrogate decisions on behalf of incompetent patients who lack family members and did not express their wishes while still competent. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article investigates a virtue-centered approach to normative legal theory in the context of legislation. The core idea of such a theory is that the fundamental aim of law should be the promotion of human flourishing, where a flourishing human life is understood as a life of rational and social activities that express the human excellences. Law can promote flourishing in several ways. Because peace and prosperity are conducive to human flourishing, legislation should aim at the establishment and maintenance of (...) these conditions. The human excellences are developed in childhood and young adulthood by stable and nurturing families and by educational institutions: therefore, the law should support and foster families and schools. Although some critics have argued that an aretaic theory of legislation must support so-called “vice laws,” this is not the case. A virtue-centered approach must take into account the effects produced by criminalization of alcohol, drugs, gambling, and prosti... (shrink)

BAIL JURISPRUDENCE in India (as in other common law countries) has evolved laying emphasis on the right to liberty of the accused as opposed to the requirement of the State to keep him/her under custody...The mechanism for cancellation of bail is provided in law in order to ensure that justice will be done to the society by preventing the accused who had been set at liberty by the bail order from tampering with the evidence in a heinous crime. At the (...) same time, cancellation of bail takes away the liberty granted by the Constitution and affirmed by an order of the Court, which granted bail. Taking note of the fact that cancellation of bail necessarily involves the review of a decision already made, it has been emphasized that the same should always be exercised very sparingly by the court of law. (shrink)