Results for 'Legal 'ought''

971 found
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  1. Legal oughts, Normative Transmission, and the Nazi Use of Analogy.Carolyn Benson & Julian Fink - 2012 - Jurisprudence 3 (2):445-463.
    In 1935, the Nazi government introduced what came to be known as the abrogation of the pro- hibition of analogy. This measure, a feature of the new penal law, required judges to stray from the letter of the written law and to consider instead whether an action was worthy of pun- ishment according to the ‘sound perception of the people’ and the ‘underlying principle’ of existing criminal statutes. In discussions of Nazi law, an almost unanimous conclusion is that a system (...)
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  2. Legal transactions and the legal ought.Jaap Hage - 2011 - In Jerzy Stelmach & Bartosz Brożek, The normativity of law. Kraków: Copernicus Center Press.
  3.  31
    How to Do “Ought” with “Is”? A Cognitive Linguistics Approach to the Normativity of Legal Language.Mateusz Zeifert - 2025 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 38 (1):73-98.
    The paper addresses the question how descriptive language is used to express legal norms. Sentences we find in legislative acts, i.e. statutes, constitutions and regulations, express legal norms. Linguistically speaking, there are various grammatical and lexical ways of expressing norms, such as imperative mood, modal verbs, deontic verbs, etc. However, norms may also be expressed by descriptive sentences, namely sentences in present or future tense and indicative (declarative) mood (i.e. _The minister determines the tax rate_). In many civil (...)
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  4. Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Baker - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
    There are many different oughts. There is a moral ought, a prudential ought, an epistemic ought, the legal ought, the ought of etiquette, and so on. These oughts can prescribe incompatible actions. What I morally ought to do may be different from what I self-interestedly ought to do. Philosophers have claimed that these conflicts are resolved by an authoritative ought, or by facts about what one ought to do simpliciter or all-things-considered. However, the only coherent notion of an ought (...)
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  5.  21
    Grasping an Ought. Adolf Reinach’s Ontology and Epistemology of Legal and Moral Oughts.Lorenzo Passerini Glazel - 2020 - Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Iuridica 90:29-39.
    We almost every day direct our actions with reference to social, moral or legal norms and oughts. However, oughts and norms cannot be perceived through the senses: how can we “grasp” them, then? Adolf Reinach distinguishes enacted norms and oughts created through a social act of enactment, from moral norms and oughts existing in themselves independently of any act, knowledge or experience. I argue that this distinction is not a distinction between two species of oughts within a common genus: (...)
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  6.  16
    The Shadow of Affectivity Inside the ‘Is/Ought’ Debate’: Siniscalchi, Fuller, Manderson and Vico’s Ghosts in the Legal Machine.Paolo Heritier - 2022 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 36 (1):105-127.
    The article reconstructs the is/ought debate in legal theory through a phenomenological reading of the concept of normality. An analysis of Siniscalchi, Fuller and Manderson looks at the issue from the perspective of law and literature, and then applies Giambattista Vico’s rhetorical methodology within the contemporary debate. The question: “is Hume’s law really visible within Hume’s thought?” also paradoxically poses the figure of phantoms and fictions at the heart of the current theoretical debate on law. A history of the (...)
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  7.  88
    Does Kelsen’s Notion of Legal Normativity Rest on a Mistake?Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco - 2012 - Law and Philosophy 31 (6):725-752.
    Kelsen advanced a sophisticated naturalist conception of intention and adumbrated a methodological strategy that would enable the transformation of the sophisticated naturalist conception of ‘intention’ into a cognizable object of legal science while simultaneously providing an explanation of the legal ‘ought’. The methodological strategy is the ‘inversion thesis’ which establishes that legal norms enable us to objectively identify and determine the ‘will’ or the intention of legal authority. Contrary to nineteenth century psychologism, Kelsen argues that it (...)
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  8.  88
    Stringency of Rights and "Ought"The Realm of Rights.Fundamental Legal Conceptions.Gilbert Harman, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld & Walter Wheeler Cook - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):181.
  9. ‘Ought implies Can’ and the law.Chris Fox & Guglielmo Feis - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):370-393.
    In this paper, we investigate the ‘ought implies can’ thesis, focusing on explanations and interpretations of OIC, with a view to clarifying its uses and relevance to legal philosophy. We first review various issues concerning the semantics and pragmatics of OIC; then we consider how OIC may be incorporated in Hartian and Kelsenian theories of the law. Along the way we also propose a taxonomy of OIC-related claims.
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  10. Legal Obligation and Ability.Samuel Kahn - 2024 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 32 (3):333-350.
    In Wilmot-Smith’s recent “Law, ‘Ought’, and ‘Can’,” he argues that legal obligation does not imply ability. In this short reply, I show that Wilmot-Smith’s arguments do not withstand critical scrutiny. In section 1, I attack Wilmot-Smith’s argument for the claim that allowing for impossible obligations makes for a better legal system, and I introduce positive grounds for thinking otherwise. In section 2, I show that, even if Wilmot-Smith had established that impossible obligations make for a better legal (...)
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  11.  56
    `Is' and `ought' in legal philosophy.Robert S. Summers - 1963 - Philosophical Quarterly 13 (51):157-161.
  12.  51
    The Normative Force of the Factual: Legal Philosophy Between is and Ought.Frederick Schauer, Christoph Bezemek & Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac (eds.) - 2019 - Springer Verlag.
    This book explores the interrelation of facts and norms. How does law originate in the first place? What lies at the roots of this phenomenon? How is it preserved? And how does it come to an end? Questions like these led Georg Jellinek to speak of the “normative force of the factual” in the early 20th century, emphasizing the human tendency to infer rules from recurring events, and to perceive a certain practice not only as a fact but as a (...)
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  13.  16
    Legal Obligation and Ability.Usa Indianapolis - 2024 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 32 (3):333-350.
    In Wilmot-Smith’s recent ‘Law, “Ought”, and “Can”,’ he argues that legal obligation does not imply ability. In this short reply, I show that Wilmot-Smith’s arguments do not withstand critical scrutiny. In section 1, I attack Wilmot-Smith’s argument for the claim that allowing for impossible obligations makes for a better legal system, and I introduce positive grounds for thinking otherwise. In section 2, I show that, even if Wilmot-Smith had established that impossible obligations make for a better legal (...)
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  14.  55
    Law, ‘Ought’, and ‘Can’.Frederick Wilmot-Smith - 2023 - Ethics 133 (4):529-557.
    It is commonly held that “ought implies can.” If so, what constraints does that place on the law? Having provided an argument which allows the maxim to be used by lawyers, I consider the application of that argument to both primary and remedial legal duties. This, it turns out, gives us some reason to reconsider whether the maxim is sound. Further, even if the maxim is sound, it has less purchase on remedial duties than is commonly supposed.
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  15.  31
    Ought the State Use Non-Consensual Treatment to Restore Trial Competence?Sebastian Jon Holmen - 2023 - Res Publica 29 (1):111-127.
    The important question of the legality of the state obliging trial incompetent defendants to receive competency-restoring treatment against their wishes, is one that has received much attention by legal scholars. Surprisingly, however, little attention has been paid to the, in many ways more fundamental, moral question of whether the state ought to administer such treatments. The aim of this paper is to start filling this gap in the literature. I begin by offering some reasons for thinking it morally acceptable (...)
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  16.  42
    Facets of 'Ought' in Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law.Carsten Heidemann - 2013 - Jurisprudence 4 (2):246-262.
    Any correct assessment of Hans Kelsen's conception of Ought must take into account, first, that Kelsen's theory evolved over some 60 years which saw several major changes of its fundamentals; and second, that the Pure Theory must basically be understood as a meta-theory of institutionalised legal science. With these provisos, Kelsen's explanation of the Ought oscillates between two extremes: at one extreme, the legal Ought is just a formal semantic marker delimiting the realm of the law; at the (...)
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  17. Just plain "ought''.Owen McLeod - 2001 - The Journal of Ethics 5 (4):269-291.
    Is there any sense to the idea of an ``ought''''that is not relative to any particularnormative framework? This ``ought'''' would not bea moral, prudential, legal, aesthetic, orreligious ``ought,'''' but rather an unqualified or just plain ``ought.'''' Thispaper (i) argues for the existence andusefulness of just plain ``ought''''; (ii) locatesthe concept of just plain ``ought'''' within amajor strand in the history of ethics (namely,the perennial attempt to demonstrate thatmorality and prudence are in harmony); and(iii) challenges David Copp''s recent attempt toshow (...)
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  18.  38
    Ought-Sentences and the Juristic Description of Rules.Riccardo Guastini - 1991 - Ratio Juris 4 (3):308-321.
    Abstract.According to the normative theory of legal science, juristic ought‐sentences describe rules, since legal science just deals with rules, and rules cannot be described but by means of ought‐sentences. The author challenges this view. Two different constructions of “describing rules” are proposed: Namely, either interpreting or stating the validity of rules. “Interpreting rules,” in its turn, can be understood in three different senses: listing all the possible meanings of rule‐formulations, reporting the different interpretations a rule‐formulation has in fact (...)
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  19.  64
    'Ought' and Institutional Obligation.J. R. Cameron - 1971 - Philosophy 46 (178):309 - 323.
    An obligation may take either of two forms, each form being reported in a different way. For example, when we report the obligation of parents to care for their children, if it is the moral obligation we mean, we will say ‘Parents ought to look after their children’ but if we mean the legal obligation, we will say ‘Parents have to look after their children’. The law specifies that people shall do thus and so, not that they ought to (...)
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  20.  53
    Legal Positivism and Deontic Detachment.Robert Mullins - 2018 - Ratio Juris 31 (1):4-8.
    I consider a puzzle that arises when the logical principle known as “deontic detachment” is applied to the law. It is not possible to accept the principle of deontic detachment in a legal setting while also accepting that the so-called “social facts thesis” applies to all legal propositions. According to the social facts thesis, the existence and content of law is determined by the attitudes or practices of legal officials. Abandoning deontic detachment is not an appropriate solution (...)
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  21.  74
    Legal Coercion, Respect & Reason-Responsive Agency.Ambrose Y. K. Lee - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):847-859.
    Legal coercion seems morally problematic because it is susceptible to the Hegelian objection that it fails to respect individuals in a way that is ‘due to them as men’. But in what sense does legal coercion fail to do so? And what are the grounds for this requirement to respect? This paper is an attempt to answer these questions. It argues that legal coercion fails to respect individuals as reason-responsive agents; and individuals ought to be respected as (...)
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  22. Legal personhood for artificial intelligences.Lawrence B. Solum - 1992 - North Carolina Law Review 70:1231.
    Could an artificial intelligence become a legal person? As of today, this question is only theoretical. No existing computer program currently possesses the sort of capacities that would justify serious judicial inquiry into the question of legal personhood. The question is nonetheless of some interest. Cognitive science begins with the assumption that the nature of human intelligence is computational, and therefore, that the human mind can, in principle, be modelled as a program that runs on a computer. Artificial (...)
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  23. Legality of Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics: A Case of “Ultra-Sinoism”.Ammar Younas - 2020 - Russian Law Journal 8 (4):53-91.
    The legal progression in China is portrayed negatively by western scholars who often argue that the state institutions in China are subordinate to the control of Chinese Communist Party’s leadership which makes these institutions politically insignificant. We consider that the legal progression in China has an instrumental role in achieving “Harmonious Socialist Society.” The purpose of this thesis is to provide an analytical literature review of scholastic work to explain the legality of rule of law in China and (...)
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  24.  64
    Legal insanity and moral knowledge: Why is a lack of moral knowledge related to a mental illness exculpatory?Katrina L. Sifferd - 2022 - In Matt King & Joshua May, Agency in Mental Disorder: Philosophical Dimensions. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter argues that a successful plea of legal insanity ought to rest upon proof that a criminal act is causally related to symptoms of a mental disorder. Diagnosis of a mental disorder can signal to the court that the defendant had very little control over relevant moral ignorance or incompetence. Must we draw the same conclusion for defendants who lack moral knowledge due to miseducation or other extreme environmental conditions, unrelated to a mental disorder? Adults who were brainwashed (...)
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  25. Legal obligation and reasons.Christopher Essert - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (1):63-88.
    Legal rationalist: law claims to give its subjects reasons for action. Normative reasons intuition: Reasons for action being key, the obvious way to establish that law makes a practical difference in people's deliberations is by arguing that the law claims to give reasons for action to its subjects. Explanatory Reasons Intuition: "And while it is possible to be confused about our normative reasons, it seems unlikely that everyone is confused all the time; so the fact that people consistently take (...)
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  26. A journey to the center of the legal form : Kelsen's ought as the missing piece to the master-signifier of the legal form.Peter Čuroš - 2025 - In Evgeniĭ Bronislavovich Pashukanis, Legal form and the end of law: Pashukanis's legacy. New York, NY: Routledge.
     
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  27.  61
    The Legal Status of Body Parts: A Framework.Jesse Wall - 2011 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31 (4):783-804.
    There is legal uncertainty and academic disagreement as to the legal status of biological material that has become separated from the person. This article sets out the two criteria upon which the assessment of the legal status of ‘separated biological material’ ought to be made. It is suggested here that any argument concerning the legal status of separated biological material needs to (i) assess which ownership entitlements in the material the law ought recognize and (ii) assess (...)
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  28.  35
    Legality and Irony.Alexander Somek - 2016 - Jurisprudence 7 (3):431-448.
    Modern legal positivism tries to preserve the normativity of law while abstaining from generally viewing positive laws as reasons for action. This effort is epitomised, in particular, in Raz' idea that the substance of positive law can be imparted from the detached perspective of the ‘legal man’. From that perspective, it is not stated what one ought to do, all things considered, but merely what one ought to do from the legal point of view. The first part (...)
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  29. The Legal Ambiguity of Advanced Assistive Bionic Prosthetics: Where to Define the Limits of ‘Enhanced Persons’ in Medical Treatment.Tyler L. Jaynes - 2021 - Clinical Ethics 16 (3):171-182.
    The rapid advancement of artificial (computer) intelligence systems (CIS) has generated a means whereby assistive bionic prosthetics can become both more effective and practical for the patients who rely upon the use of such machines in their daily lives. However, de lege lata remains relatively unspoken as to the legal status of patients whose devices contain self-learning CIS that can interface directly with the peripheral nervous system. As a means to reconcile for this lack of legal foresight, this (...)
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  30. Interpreting Action with Norms: Responsibility and the Twofold Nature of the Ought‐Implies‐Can Principle.Sebastián Figueroa Rubio - 2024 - Ratio Juris.
    This article examines the application of the ought‐implies‐can principle in the legal domain, especially in the relationship between obligations and responsibility. It addresses the challenge of cases in which an agent cannot do what is required of her, and yet it seems plausible to say that she has an obligation. To deal with these cases, two parallel distinctions are made: between rules of conduct and rules of imputation, and between doings and things done. It is proposed that these distinctions (...)
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  31. Legal Empiricism, Normativism, and the Institutional Theory of Law.George Mousourakis - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (2).
    Much of contemporary British legal theory has its roots in the tradition of philosophical empiricism—the philosophical position that no theory or opinion can be accepted as valid unless verified by the test of experience. In this context normativity, both in law and morals, is understood and explained in terms of social practices observable in the world. The nineteenth-century jurist John Austin, for example, defined law in terms of a command supported by a sanction and as presupposing the habitual obedience (...)
     
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  32.  68
    Legal Audiences.Fábio Perin Shecaira & Noel Struchiner - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (2):273-291.
    This paper approaches legal argumentation from a rhetorical perspective. It discusses the nature of the audiences that are targeted by judges in the legal process. Judicial opinions reach diverse groups of people with very different attitudes and expectations: other judges, lawyers, litigants, concerned citizens, etc. One important way in which these groups differ is that some of them are more likely to be persuaded by legalistic, precedent or statute-based arguments, while others expect judges to decide on grounds of (...)
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  33. Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification.Torben Spaak - 2003 - Ratio Juris 16 (4):469-485.
    In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather (...)
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  34.  63
    Legal moralism reconsidered.Carl F. Cranor - 1979 - Ethics 89 (2):147-164.
    In section i, I sketch the main arguments to date for legal moralism, And show the ways in which they are unpersuasive. In sections ii and iii, I sketch and evaluate a seemingly compelling argument, Dependent on the concept of wrongful conduct, For the weak thesis that the immorality of conduct is a reason, But not a sufficient reason for making it illegal. Despite the apparent persuasiveness of this argument, The particular conclusions of the legal moralist, That various (...)
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  35. Legal positivism and 'explaining' normativity and authority.Brian Bix - 2006 - American Philosophical Association Newsletter 5 (2 (Spring 2006)):5-9.
    It has become increasingly common for legal positivist theorists to claim that the primary objective of legal theory in general, and legal positivism in particular, is "explaining normativity." The phrase "explaining normativity" can be understood either ambitiously or more modestly. The more modest meaning is an analytical exploration of what is meant by legal or moral obligation, or by the authority claims of legal officials. When the term is understood ambitiously - as meaning an explanation (...)
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  36.  29
    On the Legal Status of Human Cerebral Organoids: Lessons from Animal Law.Joshua Jowitt - 2023 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 32 (4):572-581.
    This paper will ask whether the legal status presently afforded to nonhuman animals ought to influence regulatory debates concerning human cerebral organoids. The New York Courts recently refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus to Happy the Elephant as she was property rather than a legal person while at the same time accepting that she is a moral patient deserving of rights protection. An undesirable situation has therefore arisen in which the law holds a being with moral (...)
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  37.  14
    The legal status of infant male circumcision.Patrick Lenta & Jacqui Poltera - 2020 - Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 45 (1):27-48.
    We present an argument in support of the legal prohibition of infant male circumcision (IMC) in developed Western countries. We submit that all IMC, irrespective of whether the motivation behind it be secular or religious, violates children’s rights to self-determination (autonomy) and bodily integrity and is therefore morally illegitimate. And while IMC’s being morally wrong does not entail that it ought to be criminalised, we contend that it should be legally proscribed so as to protect children against harm and (...)
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  38.  52
    Legal Reasoning as a Special Case of Moral Reasoning.Aleksander Peczenik - 1988 - Ratio Juris 1 (2):123-136.
    Moral statements are related to some ought‐ and good‐making facts. If at least one of these facts exists then it is reasonable that an action in question is prima facie good and obligatory. If all of these facts take place, then it is reasonable that the action is definitively good and obligatory. Yet, moral reasoning is relatively uncertain. The law is more “fixed”. Legal interpretatory statements ought to express a compromise between the literal sense of the law and moral (...)
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  39. Legal Statements and Normative Language.Luís Duarte D’Almeida - 2011 - Law and Philosophy 30 (2):167-199.
    Can there be a non-reductivist, source-based explanation of the use of normative language in statements describing the law and legal situations? This problem was formulated by Joseph Raz, who also claimed to have solved it. According to his well-known doctrine of ‘detached’ statements, normative legal statements can be informatively made by speakers who merely adopt, without necessarily sharing, the point of view of someone who accepts that legal norms are justified and ought to be followed. In this (...)
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  40.  79
    Why the law is what it ought to be.T. R. S. Allan - 2020 - Jurisprudence 11 (4):574-596.
    When legal practice satisfies certain modest conditions of legitimacy, affirming the equal dignity of persons, the law is what it ought to be. It provides the morally appropriate basis for the reso...
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  41. Evaluating Medico-Legal Decisional Competency Criteria.Demian Whiting - 2015 - Health Care Analysis 23 (2):181-196.
    In this paper I get clearer on the considerations that ought to inform the evaluation and development of medico-legal competency criteria—where this is taken to be a question regarding the abilities that ought to be needed for a patient to be found competent in medico-legal contexts. In the “Decisional Competency in Medico-Legal Contexts” section I explore how the question regarding the abilities that ought to be needed for decisional competence is to be interpreted. I begin by considering (...)
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  42. Legal Facts and Reasons for Action: Between Deflationary and Robust Conceptions of Law’s Reason-Giving Capacity.Noam Gur - 2019 - In Frederick Schauer, Christoph Bezemek & Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac, The Normative Force of the Factual: Legal Philosophy Between is and Ought. Springer Verlag. pp. 151-170.
    This chapter considers whether legal requirements can constitute reasons for action independently of the merits of the requirement at hand. While jurisprudential opinion on this question is far from uniform, sceptical views are becoming increasingly dominant. Such views typically contend that, while the law can be indicative of pre-existing reasons, or can trigger pre-existing reasons into operation, it cannot constitute new reasons. This chapter offers support to a somewhat less sceptical position, according to which the fact that a (...) requirement has been issued can be a reason for action, yet one that is underpinned by bedrock values which law is apt to serve. Notions discussed here include a value-based conception of reasons as facts ; a distinction between complete and incomplete reasons ; and David Enoch’s idea of triggering reason-giving. Following a discussion of criticism against the view adopted here, the chapter concludes by considering some more ‘robust’ conceptions of law’s reason-giving capacity. (shrink)
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  43. Legal ontology and the problem of normativity.Leo Zaibert & Barry Smith - 1999 - The Analytic-Continental Divide, Conference, University of Tel Aviv.
    Applied ontology is the attempt to put to use the rigorous tools of philosophical ontology in the development of category systems which can be of use in the formalization and systematization of knowledge of a given domain. In what follows we shall sketch some elements of the ontology of legal and socio-political institutions, paying attention especially to the normativity involved in such institutions. We shall see that there is more than one type of normativity, but that this fact that (...)
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  44.  35
    Legal Philosophy and the Study of Legal Reasoning.Torben Spaak - 2021 - Belgrade Law Review 69 (4).
    In this short paper, I argue that legal philosophers ought to focus more than they have done so far on problems of legal reasoning. Not only is this a field with many philosophically interesting questions to consider, but it is also, in my estimation, the field in which legal philosophers can contribute the most to both the study and the practice of law. For even though reasoning and interpretation are at the center of what legal practitioners (...)
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  45.  29
    Global Legal Pluralism: What’s Law Got To Do With It?Michael Giudice - 2014 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 34 (3):589-608.
    This review article examines the conceptual possibility of ‘cosmopolitan pluralism’, a jurisprudential theory developed by Paul Schiff Berman in his recent book, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders. Cosmopolitan pluralism is presented as a conceptual framework for understanding and managing situations of multiple legal orders which overlap and conflict. It seeks to avoid the pitfalls of both sovereigntist territorialism, which attempts to solve all legal disputes by exclusive application of the norms of some single (...)
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  46.  1
    Legality and Commitment.Felipe Jiménez - 2025 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 29 (3).
    Many philosophers believe there is no general, content-independent duty to obey the law. Yet at least some (and perhaps many) citizens and officials believe law makes a real difference—independently of its content and of prudential considerations—regarding what they should do. This paper offers an argument that vindicates the latter belief, even if skeptics are right in thinking that law cannot generate a general duty to obey. Under this argument, whether law makes a real practical difference, independently of its content and (...)
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  47.  43
    Drug Legalization: A Philosophical Analysis.Chris Meyers - 2023 - Springer Verlag.
    This textbook introduces students to the various arguments for and against the prohibition of recreational drugs. The arguments are carefully presented and analyzed, inviting students to consider the competing principles of liberty rights, paternalism, theories of punishment, legal moralism, and the social consequences of drug use and drug laws. Meyers extends this examination by presenting alternatives to the prohibition/legalization dichotomy, including harm reduction, decriminalization, and user licensing or on-premise use. The presentation invites readers to think clearly about the reasons (...)
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  48.  47
    Legal Right in Scandinavian Analyses.Nils Kr Sundby - 1968 - American Journal of Jurisprudence 13 (1):72-107.
    It is characteristic of many discussions in jurisprudence that the questions group around a relatively small selection of so-called basic legal concepts. Some authors explicitly maintain that the main task of a philosophy of law should be conceptual analysis. Authors expressing this view are usually classified as exponents of “analytical jurisprudence.” Within analytical jurisprudence itself there is considerable disagreement over such questions as what “analysis” is, what kind of methods the analyst ought to employ, etc. Most writers representing this (...)
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  49.  82
    Hart, legal rules and Palm tree justice.WilfridJ Waluchow - 1985 - Law and Philosophy 4 (1):41 - 70.
    In this paper I defend a liberal theory about how legal rules can and ought to be interpreted. The theory emerges from a critical examination of H. L. A. Hart's influential views on the limited but unavoidable indeterminacy of legal rules. I begin with a brief sketch of Hart's early theory (as it is traditionally understood) offering various suggestions as to how it might usefully be modified. Next, several possible objections to my modifications are sketched and criticized. Finally, (...)
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  50. Lon Fuller's Legal Structuralism.William Conklin - 2012 - In Bjarne Melkevik, Standing Tall Hommages a Csaba Varga. Budapest: Pazmany Press. pp. 97-121.
    Anglo-American general jurisprudence remains preoccupied with the relationship of legality to morality. This has especially been so in the re-reading of Lon Fuller’s theory of an implied morality in any law. More often than not, Fuller has been said to distinguish between the identity of a discrete rule and something called ‘morality’. In this reading of Fuller, however, insufficient attention to what is signified by ‘morality’. Such an implied morality has been understood in terms of deontological duties, the Good life, (...)
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