According to generally accepted views every material body has always just as much North as South magnetism, meaning that the total value of the North and South magnetism is always zero. One says therefore that there is no “true magnetism”. A body directs itself in the direction of the magnetic lines of force like a compass needle but it does not move from its place. On the other hand, it is known that there are electrically charged bodies which move in (...) homogeneous electric fields along the lines of force. There is thus a preponderance of positive or negative electricity on ions. One says also that there exists “true electricity”. A movement of charged matter in a homogeneous field is called a current. Consequently until now electric currents were known to exist, but no magnetic currents. (shrink)

In this unconventional article, Sarah Banet-Weiser, Rosalind Gill and Catherine Rottenberg conduct a three-way ‘conversation’ in which they all take turns outlining how they understand the relationship among postfeminism, popular feminism and neoliberal feminism. It begins with a short introduction, and then Ros, Sarah and Catherine each define the term they have become associated with. This is followed by another round in which they discuss the overlaps, similarities and disjunctures among the terms, and the article ends with how each (...) one understands the current mediated feminist landscape. (shrink)

This uniquely fascinating volume is not merely a learned treatise in historical semantics; it is itself a stupendous display of world harmony as a creed-a vivid demonstration that "all is all.".

The present paper elaborates a deductivist account of natural language argu-ment in the context of pragma-dialectics. It reviews earlier debates, criticizes some standard misconceptions in the literature, and argues that the identification and analysis of deductive argument schemes can be the basis of a compelling theory of argumentative discourse.

This volume provides an unequaled introduction to the thought of chief contributors to the Western tradition of political philosophy from classical Greek antiquity to the twentieth century. Written by specialists on the various philosophers, this third edition has been expanded significantly to include both new and revised essays.

In the pioneering article and two papers, written jointly with McKinsey, Tarski developed the so-called algebraic and topological frameworks for the Intuitionistic Logic and the Lewis modal system. In this paper, we present an outline of modern systems with a topological tinge. We consider topological interpretation of basic systems GL and G of the provability logic in terms of the Cantor derivative and the Hausdorff residue.

In this paper we define an augmentation mHC of the Heyting propositional calculus HC by a modal operator ?. This modalized Heyting calculus mHC is a weakening of the Proof-Intuitionistic Logic KM of Kuznetsov and Muravitsky. In Section 2 we present a short selection of attractive (algebraic, relational, topological and categorical) features of mHC. In Section 3 we establish some close connections between mHC and certain normal extension K4.Grz of the modal system K4. We define a translation of mHC into (...) K4.Grz and prove that this translation is exact, i. e. theorem-preserving and deducibility-invariant. We have established (however, in this note we do not present a proof of this) that the lattice of all extensions of mHC is isomorphic to the lattice of normal extensions of K4.Grz (a generalization of the Kuznetsov and Muravitsky theorem). (shrink)

According Philip Pettit, suitably organised groups not only possess ‘minds of their own’ but can also ‘make up their minds’ and 'speak for themselves'--where these two capacities enable them to perform as conversable subjects or 'persons'. In this paper I critically examine Pettit's case for group personhood. My first step is to reconstruct his account, explaining first how he understands the two capacities he considers central to personhood – the capacity to ‘make up one’s mind’, and the capacity to ‘speak (...) for oneself’ – before showing how he thinks these can be manifested in groups. With Pettit’s account duly reconstructed, I then turn to criticism, arguing that Pettit’s construal of making up one’s mind does not do proper justice to our first-personal self-understanding, nor to our characteristic interpersonal forms of engagement. This leads me, finally, to consider an alternative construal of ‘making up one’s mind’ and ‘speaking for oneself’ that is associated with the work of Richard Moran and whichargue, could usefully be exteextended to groups. (shrink)

Trans of Color inclusion is not simply a gesture of affectionate commitment to María Lugones's theory of impure communities. Rather, it is required for the enactment of her liberatory theory within and across communities of color. While María Lugones's historico-theoretical analysis of the colonial/modern gender system relies upon anthropological citations of Native gender and sexual diversity, she argues that we must bracket gender for the benefit of [cis]women of color feminisms. However, if this bracketing does not first carefully uncover cisgender (...) histories of violence, then this decolonial feminist praxis reinscribes the invisibility of transphobia, racism, and colonialism's violent intersections, performing another mode of erasure and silence on Trans, Two-Spirit, and Nonbinary Native, Black, and Latinx peoples. In placing Lugones's texts into conversation with the voices of Two-Spirit and Trans of Color theorists, I argue that the mutilation of trans flesh makes possible the integration of [cis]People of Color into the gender–sex binary even if as failures. More important, this essay offers the beginnings of a phenomenological account of Trans World-Traveling, where the unruliness of Two-Spirit and Trans of Color bodies cocoons decolonial worlds from within the spiraling folds of abject flesh—always already in infra-communication with ancestral pasts, presents, and futures. (shrink)

This article discusses “auditory” arguments: arguments in which non-verbal sounds play a central role. It provides examples and explores the use of sounds in argument and argumentation. It argues that auditory arguments are not reducible to verbal arguments but have a similar structure and can be evaluated by extending standard informal logic accounts of good argument. I conclude that an understanding of auditory elements of argument can usefully expand the scope of informal logic and argumentation theory.

The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, I visit the Fogelin–Geach-dispute, criticizeMiller''s interpretation of the Geachian notationN(x:N(fx)) and conclude that Fogelin''s argumentagainst the expressive completeness of the Tractariansystem of logic is unacceptable and that the adoptionof the Geachian notation N(x:fx) would not violate TLP5.32. Second, I prove that a system of quantificationtheory with finite domains and with N as the solefundamental operation is expressively complete. Lastly, I argue that the Tractarian system is apredicate-eliminated many-sorted theory (withoutidentity) with finite domains (...) and with N as the solefundamental operation, and thus is expressivelycomplete. (shrink)

In “Image, Evidence, Argument,” Ian Dove defends an intriguing ‘middle ground’ between those who argue that there are “visual arguments” and skeptics who argue that there are not. I discuss one of Dove’s key examples, proposing a different analysis of it, arguing that there are problems with the “verbal repackaging” of the argument he suggests.

A new logic is presented without predicates—except equality. Yet its expressive power is the same as that of predicate logic, and relations can faithfully be represented in it. In this logic we also develop an alternative for set theory. There is a need for such a new approach, since we do not live in a world of sets and predicates, but rather in a world of things with relations between them.

A theory of relations is presented that provides a detailed account of the logical structure of relational complexes. The theory draws a sharp distinction between relational complexes and relational states. A salient difference is that relational complexes belong to exactly one relation, whereas relational states may be shared by different relations. Relational complexes are conceived as structured perspectives on states ‘out there’ in reality. It is argued that only relational complexes have occurrences of objects, and that different complexes of the (...) same relation may correspond to the same state. (shrink)

The eukaryotic genome is a mosaic of eubacterial and archaeal genes in addition to those unique to itself. The mosaic may have arisen as the result of two prokaryotes merging their genomes, or from genes acquired from an endosymbiont of eubacterial origin. A third possibility is that the eukaryotic genome arose from successive events of lateral gene transfer over long periods of time. This theory does not exclude the endosymbiont, but questions whether it is necessary to explain the peculiar set (...) of eukaryotic genes. We use phylogenetic studies and reconstructions of ancestral first appearances of genes on the prokaryotic phylogeny to assess evidence for the lateral gene transfer scenario. We find that phylogenies advanced to support fusion can also arise from a succession of lateral gene transfer events. Our reconstructions of ancestral first appearances of genes reveal that the various genes that make up the eukaryotic mosaic arose at different times and in diverse lineages on the prokaryotic tree, and were not available in a single lineage. Successive events of lateral gene transfer can explain the unusual mosaic structure of the eukaryotic genome, with its content linked to the immediate adaptive value of the genes its acquired. Progress in understanding eukaryotes may come from identifying ancestral features such as the eukaryotic splicesome that could explain why this lineage invaded, or created, the eukaryotic niche. BioEssays 28:57–64, 2006. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to offer an interpretation of the Tractatus’ proof of the unity of logic and language. The kernel of the proof is the thesis that the sole logical constant is the general propositional form. I argue that the Grundgedanke, the existence of the sole fundamental operation N and the analyticity thesis, together with the fact that the operation NN can always be seen as having no specific formal difference between its result and its base, imply (...) that NN is intrinsic to every elementary proposition. I also argue that the picture theory of proposition is an account of the generation of propositions via naming, and that its crucial idea is that naming is the instantiation of the form of a name, which consists in arbitrarily picking out an object as the meaning of the name from those objects sorted out by the form of the name. It follows that the existential quantifier, that is, NN, is intrinsic to naming (and therefore to every elementary proposition). It is then proven that the sole logical constant is the general propositional form. This, together with the truth‐functionality of logical necessity, implies that logic and language are unified via a general rule – logical syntax. (shrink)

Abstract: In responding to the cases that motivate epistemic contextualism, invariantists sometimes use a warranted assertability maneuver (WAM), according to which we mistakenly judge an assertion to be true because we confuse conversational propriety with truth. I argue that no invariantist WAM against Stewart Cohen's Airport Case can succeed. The problem is that such a WAM is inconsistent with the known ways of accounting for the evidence that motivates the knowledge account of assertion.

A class of toposes is introduced and studied, suitable for semantical analysis of an extension of the Heyting predicate calculus admitting Gödel's provability interpretation.

Explores the impact on Jews and Judaism of the crisis of modernity, analyzing modern Jewish dilemmas and providing a prescription for their resolution.

INTRODUCTION Philosophical theology is the systematic inquiry about God's existence and being. We find it in Aristotle's Metaphysics, in Cicero's De natura ...

A reissue of the 1975 edition, with four added essays, this collection offers a clear introduction to Strauss' views regarding the nature of political ...

This essay offers a critique of Larry Temkin’s seminal new book, Rethinking the Good, at the heart of which is the highly counterintuitive claim that all things considered judgments are not transitive. I evaluate Temkin’s claims through the lens of social choice theory, pursue some of its larger implications and applications, and conclude with a very general worry having to do with the intimate connection between transitivity and logical consistency, namely whether, if Temkin is right, this would not bring all (...) moral reasoning to an abrupt halt. (shrink)

Arthur O. Lovejoy made rather grand methodological statements about the nature of history of ideas in his Great Chain of Being (1936). These statements were, it is argued, rhetorical declarations, intended to produce the conviction in the minds of his readers that history of ideas was distinct from history of philosophy and thus deserved institutional independence; they were not adequate descriptions of the method actually practiced. Instead, Lovejoy's historiographical practice can be contextualized within nineteenth-century general histories of philosophy. His studies (...) on Giordano Bruno, dating from 1904 and 1936 respectively, illustrate this historiographical continuity. (shrink)

I explore the possibility and rationality of interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-control, that is, ways in which individuals can make use of other people in order to get themselves to stick to their beliefs. I look, in particular, at two ways in which people can make interpersonal epistemic commitments, and thereby willingly undertake accountability to others, in order to get themselves to maintain their beliefs in the face of anticipated “epistemic temptations”. The first way is through the avowal of belief, (...) and the second is through the establishment of collective belief. I argue that both of these forms of interpersonal epistemic commitment can function as effective tools for doxastic self-control, and, moreover, that the control they facilitate should not be dismissed as irrational from an epistemic perspective. (shrink)

A description of the free cyclic algebra over the variety of Solovay algebras, as well as over its pyramid locally finite subvarieties is given.

The present issue of Science in Context comprises a collection of articles dealing with various, specific aspects of the history of mathematics during the last third of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. Like the September issue of 2003 of this journal, which was devoted to the history of ancient mathematics, this collection originated in the aftermath of a meeting held in Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem in May 2001, under the title: “History of Mathematics in the Last (...) 25 Years: New Departures, New Questions, New Ideas.” Taken together, these two topical issues are meant as a token of appreciation for the work of Sabetai Unguru and his achievements in the history of mathematics. (shrink)