Paternalistic leadership, which is not Western origin, that combines benevolence and authority, is prejudiced and associated with traditionality by Western researchers. In the context of Hofstede's cultural dimensions, the dominant view in the literature is that the paternalistic leadership is more prevalent in feminine, collective, high power distant, and high uncertanity avoidance organizations. Based on literature, this study analyazes the relationship between these dimensions of culture and paternalistic leadership tendency of employee. For that purpose, research was carried out in Sakarya (...) University, where both traditional and Western administration approaches are assumed to be integrated. As a result of the questionnaire applied to both academic and administrative staff of the university, it was determined that individualism-collectivism, power distance and masculinity-femininity dimensions are effective on paternalist leadership tendency. Also, it was found that there is a statistically significant relationship between the participants’ gender and their paternalist leadership tendency. (shrink)

Głównym celem artykułu jest problematyzacja paternalizmu i dyrektywności w kontekście różnic między psychoterapią a poradnictwem. Często przyjmuje się, że psychoterapia dotyczy zaburzeń psychicznych, poradnictwo zaś kryzysów rozwojowych i innych problemów u osób zdrowych. Przyjęcie takiej perspektywy oraz etyki psychoterapeutycznej jest równoważne z przyjęciem dyskursu interwencji medycznej i wiąże się z traktowaniem pacjenta w sposób paternalizujący i dyrektywny. Jest to problematyczne, gdyż sama kategoria „zaburzeń psychicznych”, jak i kryteria diagnostyczne poszczególnych diagnoz, krytykowane są z wielu różnych pozycji. Przykład Soterii, podejścia terapeutycznego (...) dla osób z diagnozą psychozy lub schizofrenii, pokazuje, że nawet w przypadku takiej „ciężkiej choroby psychicznej” model pomocy bliższy poradnictwu, pozwalający na zachowanie większej autonomii i podmiotowości pacjenta, może być równie – a nawet bardziej – skuteczny niż konwencjonalne podejście medyczne i psychoterapeutyczne operujące w aksjologii medycyny. Artykuł stanowi punkt wyjścia do rozważań dotyczących sformułowania właściwego obszaru zainteresowań poradnictwa i psychoterapii, celów tych interwencji oraz konsekwencji etycznych takich decyzji. (shrink)

Libertarian paternalism is often considered as an oxymoron that uses the means of libertarianism to meet the ends of paternalism. It is considered as paternalistic as it covertly transforms into a paternalistic apparatus through the endorsement of the choices the State/authority wants people to make. It is argued that since libertarian paternalism invokes incentives which works differently than coercion, this paper and various other scholars reiterate and respond by arguing that the mere replacement of coercion with incentives does not make (...) libertarian paternalism less paternalistic. A libertarian paternal State exploits the malleability of men to mould their behaviour according to the propositions of the ruling class which the rulers often assert to be in the best interests of the masses. In this article, Orwell‟s Animal Farm, would be used as an analogy to unpack and conceptually analyse the ethical implications of libertarian paternalism. (shrink)

Recognizing the immense purchasing power of children, marketing researchers often gather information from them. Given the vulnerability of these children as research subjects, this paper explores the different ethical standards that marketing researchers could adopt in their research efforts. The Paternalistic Ethical Standard and the Limited Paternalistic Ethical Standard are discussed and the ethical quandary known as the Pontius Pilate Plight is identified in the context of the latter standard. An enhanced version of the Limited Paternalistic Standard is suggested as (...) an ethical guide for marketing researchers. Based on interviews with professional marketing researchers to gauge the applicability of the proposed standard, managerial implications are identified. (shrink)

.........................Turkish ....................... Çalışmanın konusu dindarlık eğilimi ile meslekî tükenmişlik arasındaki ilişkidir. Dindarlık eğilimine göre meslekî tükenmişlik düzeyinde herhangi bir farklılık olup olmadığı ise çalışmanın temel problemini oluşturmuştur. Bu bağlamda meslekî tükenmişlik düzeyini ve dindarlık eğilimini belirlemek için kolayda örnekleme yöntemiyle Gümüşhane il merkezindeki ilkokul, ortaokul ve liselerde görev yapan farklı branşlardaki öğretmenlerden bir örneklem grubu oluşturulmuştur. Elde edilen meslekî tükenmişlik ve dindarlık eğilimi verilerinden yola çıkarak bu iki değişkenin ilişkisi araştırılmıştır. Çalışmada Frekans, Bağımsız t-Testi, Tek Yönlü Varyans AnaliziANOVA testleri kullanılmıştır. (...) Bunun yanında hesaplanan değerleri ve elde edilen verileri değerlendirmek için SPSS (16.0) istatistik paket programı kullanılmıştır. Araştırma iki bölümden oluşmuştur. İlk bölümde dindarlık eğilimi ile meslekî tükenmişlik ilişkisine teorik bir yaklaşım sunulmuştur; meslekî tükenmişlik ve dindarlık kavramı, meslekî tükenmişlikle ilgili yurt içinde ve yurt dışında yapılan araştırmalar ve son olarak da meslekî tükenmişlik ile dindarlık eğilimi arasındaki ilişkiden bahsedilmiştir. İkinci bölümde uygulama kısmı, çalışmanın problemi ve alt problemleri, hipotezler, evren ve örneklem, kullanılan ölçekle ilgili sınırlıklar, çalışma bulgularının analizi, bulguların tartışılması, sonuçlar ve çalışmanın önerileri sunulmuştur. Çalışmanın sonuçlarına göre meslekî tükenmişlik puanları cinsiyet değişkenine göre farklılaşmazken, sosyo-ekonomik durum değişkenine göre anlamlı farklılık göstermiştir. Bunun yanında dindarlık eğilimine yönelik anket maddeleri ile meslekî tükenmişlik puanları arasında anlamlı düzeyde farklılaşmalara ulaşılmıştır. Sonuç olarak dindarlık eğiliminin meslekî tükenmişliğe etki eden faktörlerden biri olduğu tespit edilmiştir. -/- ...................................English ...................... Subject of this study is correlation of occupational burnout with the tendency of religiosity. Our main problem consists of that whether to be any differences in occupational burnout level according to the tendency of religiosity. In this context, it has been propounded that the levels of occupational burnout and tendency of religiosity of a sample group which consists of teachers chosen convenience sampling method from primary schools, secondary schools and high schools in Gümüşhane province. Based on the resulting occupational burnout and tendency of religiosity, investigated the correlation between these two variables. In the study the Frequency, Independent t-Test and One Way Variance Analysis-ANOVA tests were used and the evaluation of data and finding calculated values, SPSS (16.0) statistics software package were used. According to the results of the survey, the occupational burnout scores a differentiation has not been shown according to gender when has been established a significant difference according to socioeconomic status variable as independent variables. Besides, have been established a significant difference between tendency of religiosity of items and occupational burnout scale scores. The study consists of two main parts. In the first part, to provide a theoretical approach to the relationship of occupational burnout and tendency of religiosity; the concept of occupational bornout, the studies made on occupational burnout in domestic and abroad, and finally the relation of occupational burnout and tendency of religiosity have been mentioned. In the second part, considered as part of practice, the problem of the study and sub problems, hypothesis, population and sample, limitations information about the scale used in the study, analyzing the findings of the study, discussing the findings and conclusions and recommendations of the study have been presented. (shrink)

Bu araştırmada dini tutum, paranormal inanç ve eleştirel düşünme eğilimi arasındaki ilişkiler incelenerek bu ilişkiler arasındaki değişkenler anlaşılmaya çalışılmıştır. Çalışma nicel desenli ve ilişkisel tarama yöntemi ile hazırlanmıştır. Araştırmanın örneklemi, Sivas Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi ve Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi’nin ilahiyat, eğitim ve sağlık bilimleri/tıp fakültelerinde öğrenim gören 626 gönüllü katılımcıdan oluşmaktadır. Veriler, katılımcıların demografik özelliklerine ilişkin kişisel bilgi formu ile Ok-Dini Tutum Ölçeği, Paranormal İnanç Ölçeği ve Eleştirel Düşünme Eğilimi Ölçeği kullanılarak sahada anket yöntemi vasıtasıyla toplanmıştır. Elde edilen verilerin analizleri yapmak için (...) IBM SPSS Statistics-26 kullanılmış; değişkenler arası ilişkileri belirlemek maksadıyla korelasyon ve basit doğrusal regresyon analizi uygulanmıştır. Araştırmada dini tutum ile paranormal inanç arasında pozitif yönde (r=0.418; p=0.000) anlamlı bir ilişki tespit edilmiş olup bununla birlikte dini tutumun paranormal inançtaki değişimin yaklaşık %17’sini (Düzeltilmiş R2=0,173) açıkladığı tespit edilmiştir. Bu bulgular, dini tutumun paranormal inancı destekleyen önemli bir faktör olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Dini tutum ile eleştirel düşünme eğilimi arasındaki ilişkide anlamlı bir ilişki olmayıp dini tutum eleştirel düşünme eğilimindeki değişimin yaklaşık %1’ini (Düzeltilmiş R2=0,003) açıkladığı görülmektedir. Eleştirel düşünme eğilimi ile paranormal inanç ilişkisinde düşük düzeyde negatif ilişkilerin olduğu saptanmıştır (r=-0.111, p. (shrink)

In contemporary paternalism literature, persuasion is commonly not considered paternalistic. Moreover, paternalism is typically understood to be problematic either because it is seen as coercive, or because of the insult of the paternalist considering herself superior. In this paper, I argue that doctors who persuade patients act paternalistically. Specifically, I argue that trying to persuade a patient (here understood as aiming for the patient to consent to a certain treatment, although he prefers not to) should be differentiated from trying to (...) convince him (here understood as aiming for the patient to want the treatment) and recommending (the doctor merely providing her professional opinion). These three forms of influence are illustrated by summaries of video-recorded hospital encounters. While convincing and recommending are generally not paternalistic, I argue that persuasion is what I call communicative paternalism and that it is problematic for two reasons. First, the patient’s preferences are dismissed as unimportant. Second, the patient might wind up undergoing treatment against his preferences. This does not mean that persuasion always should be avoided, but it should not be undertaken lightly, and doctors should be aware of the fine line between non-paternalism and paternalism. The fact that my analysis of paternalism differs from traditional accounts does not imply that I deem these to be wrong, but rather that paternalism should be considered as a more multi-faceted concept than previous accounts allow for. (shrink)

Epistemic paternalism is the thesis that in some circumstances we are justified in interfering with the inquiry of others for their own epistemic good without consulting them on the issue. This paper addresses the issue of who is rationally entitled to undertake paternalistic interferences, and in virtue of which features one has this entitlement. First, it undermines the view according to which experts are the most apt people to act as paternalist interferers. Then it argues that epistemic authorities are in (...) a better position to satisfy the requirements of justified epistemic paternalism, when conceived according to the service model of epistemic authority. Finally, it offers a virtue‐based account of paternalist interferers and shows how it can apply to cases in which the interferer is a group or an institution. (shrink)

Epistemic paternalism is the practice of interfering with someone’s inquiry, without their consent, for their own epistemic good. In this chapter, I explore the relationship between epistemic paternalism and two other epistemological theses: epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology. I argue that examining this relationship is fruitful because it sheds light on a series of cases in which epistemic paternalism is unjustified and brings out notable similarities between epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology.

يهدف هذا البحث، إلى بناء مقياس للاتجاه المذهبي والتأكد من صلاحيته وتطبيقه على عيّنة من طلبة جامعة اليرموك الأردنيّة، من خلال استخدام مسائل فقهيّة مشتهرة الاستعمال في بابي: الطهارة والصلاة، من فقه المذاهب الأربعة: الحنفي والمالكيّ والشافعيّ والحنبليّ، وقد اعتمد البحث منهجيّة الاستقراء في اختيار القضايا الفقهيّة المشتهرة في الاستعمال، من القول المعتمد في فقه المذاهب الأربعة، من بابي: الطهارة والصلاة. والمنهجيّة الوصفيّة التحليليّة، واستخدام الاستبانة أداةً لبناء مقياس الاتجاه المذهبيّ، وتطبيقه على عينة الدراسة. وقد خلصت الدراسة، إلى وجود تمايزات (...) مذهبيّة للطلبة؛ بناء على الدولة التي قدموا منها، كما بيّنت الدراسة أنّ أغلب الطلبة يخلطون بين أكثر من مذهب فقهيّ في تطبيقهم لمسائل الطهارة والصلاة. وقد أظهرت الدراسة أنّ الطلبة الأردنيين يتّجهون في أدائهم وتطبيقاتهم إلى المذهبين: الحنبليّ والشافعيّ، في حين كان توجّه الطلبة الأتراك إلى المذهبين: الحنفيّ والشافعيّ، وكشفت الدراسة عن أنّ توجّه الطلبة الصينيين كان إلى ثلاثة مذاهب هي: الحنبليّ والشافعيّ والحنفيّ، بينما ظهر أنّ توجّه الطلبة من دول جنوب إفريقيا كان إلى المذهب الشافعيّ وبدرجة مرتفعة ثمّ المالكيّ والحنبليّ بدرجة متوسطة، وأن الطلبة الماليزيين والتايلنديين يتّجهون إلى المذهب الشافعي بدرجة متوسطة مع انخفاض استجاباتهم نحو المذاهب الثلاثة الأخرى. (shrink)

I take as my starting point the “one very simple principle” proclaimed by Mill in On Liberty … “That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do (...) or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.”. (shrink)

This essay focuses on conceptual engineers who aim to improve other people's patterns of inference and attention by shaping their concepts. Such conceptual engineers sometimes engage in a form of epistemic paternalism that I call paternalistic cognitive engineering: instead of explicitly persuading, informing and educating others, the engineers non-consultatively rely on assumptions about the target agents’ cognitive systems to improve their belief forming. The target agents could reasonably regard such benevolent exercises of control as violating their sovereignty over their own (...) belief formation. This is a pro tanto reason against such engineering. In addition to the relevant projects of conceptual engineering, paternalistic cognitive engineering plausibly includes certain kinds of nudging and evidence suppression. I distinguish the sovereignty-based concern from other ethical worries about conceptual engineering and discuss how one might justify the relevant conceptual engineering projects despite the sovereignty-based reason against them. (shrink)

The unconscionability doctrine in contract law enables a court to decline to enforce a contract whose terms are seriously one-sided, exploitative, or otherwise manifestly unfair. It is often criticized for being paternalist. The essay argues that the characterization of unconscionability doctrine as paternalist reflects common but misleading thought about paternalism and obscures more important issues about autonomy and social connection. The defense responds to another criticism: that unconscionability doctrine is an inappropriate, because economically inefficient, egalitarian tool. The final part discusses (...) more interesting but neglected questions about the scope of accommodation necessary to support fully meaningful autonomous activity. (shrink)

In general, we think that when it comes to the good of another, we respect that person’s will by acting in accordance with what he wills because he wills it. I argue that this is not necessarily true. When it comes to the good of another person, it is possible to disrespect that person’s will while acting in accordance with what he wills because he wills it. Seeing how this is so, I argue, enables us to clarify the distinct roles (...) that the wills of competent and incompetent people should play in third-party deliberations about their welfare. (shrink)

Concerns over medical paternalism are especially salient when there exists a conflict of values between patient and clinician. This is particularly relevant for psychiatry, the field of medicine for which the phenomenon of conflicting values is most present and for which the specter of medical paternalism looms large. Few cases are as glaring as that of anorexia nervosa (AN), a disorder that is considered to be egosyntonic (meaning its symptoms are reflectively endorsed by the patient) and maintained by the presence (...) of pathological values. One might think, given this, that an approach to medicine that foregrounds the role of values in clinical encounters would be particularly well suited to address the problem of medical paternalism in treating AN. As it happens, this is precisely the goal of values-based medicine, an approach to medicine that prioritizes the integration of patients’ unique values into the aims of treatment and that has been touted as being particularly applicable to psychiatric conditions such as AN. Although this strategy may initially appear promising, in this paper I will argue that the directive to incorporate patient values (as dictated by values-based medicine) cannot do the work of mitigating medical paternalism in the treatment of egosyntonic disorders such as AN. Rather than chalking this up as a failure due to AN being a particularly challenging case, I will instead conclude that the failure of values-based medicine in this context cuts to the heart of the limitations of rectifying medical paternalism within psychiatry as it currently exists. (shrink)

The principle of legal paternalism justifies state coercion to protect individuals from self-inflicted harm, or in its extreme version, to guide them, whether they like it or not, toward their own good. Parents can be expected to justify their interference in the lives of their children on the ground that “daddy knows best.” legal paternalism seems to imply that since the state often can know the interests of individual citizens better than the citizens know them themselves, it stands as a (...) permanent guardian of those interests in loco parentis. Put in this blunt way, paternalism seems a preposterous doctrine. If adults are treated as children they will come in time to be like children. Deprived of the right to choose for themselves, they will soon lose the power of rational judgment and decision. Even children, after a certain point, had better not be “treated as children,” else they will never acquire the outlook and capability of responsible adults. (shrink)

Donald VanDeVeer probes the moral complexities of the question: under what conditions is it permissible to intervene invasively in the lives of competent persons--for example, by deception, force, or coercive threat--for their own good? In a work with broad significance for law, public policy, professional-client relations, and private interactions, he presents a theory of an autonomy-respecting" paternalism. Originally published in 1986. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist (...) of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

What makes paternalism wrong? I give an indirect answer to that question by challenging a recent trend in the literature that I call the exclusionary strategy. The exclusionary strategy aims to show how some feature of the paternalizee’s normative situation morally excludes acting for the paternalizee’s well-being. This moral exclusion consists either in ruling out the reasons for which a paternalizer may act or in changes to the right-making status of the reasons that (would) justify paternalistic intervention. I argue that (...) both versions of the exclusionary strategy fail to explain the wrongness of paternalism and that they struggle to accommodate the mainstream view that paternalism is only pro tanto wrong. Their failure consists either in being implausibly strong expressions of antipaternalism or in struggling to spell out the scope of exclusion in an uncomplicated way. After discouraging this exclusionary strategy, I suggest we can capture what is appealing about it—as well as avoiding its pitfalls—by sketching a philosophical model in which we compare the weights of reasons for and against paternalistically interfering. To precisify this sketch, I introduce some conceptual tools from the literature on practical reasoning—in particular, the concept of modifiers—and suggest that these tools offer a better starting point for figuring out what makes paternalism (pro tanto) wrong. (shrink)

According to rational will views of paternalism, the wrongmaking feature of paternalism is that paternalists disregard or fail to respect the rational will of the paternalized, in effect substituting their own presumably superior judgments about what ends the paternalized ought to pursue or how they ought to pursue them. Here I defend a version of the rational will view appealing to three rational powers that constitute rational agency, which I call recognition, discrimination, and satisfaction. By appealing to these powers, my (...) version of the rational will view can rank the wrongfulness of paternalistic acts in terms of the extent to which such acts (a) amount to supplanting the paternalized individual’s identity as a rational agent with that of the paternalist, and (b) the degree of mistrust the paternalistic act shows in the paternalized individual’s rational agency. My rational powers account thus provides a more complete account of why paternalism is a powerful, but not decisive or absolute, objection to an act or policy. My rational powers account also provides powerful explanations of why rational suasion deflects charges of paternalism; why consenting to intercessions in one’s rational agency negates paternalism; why we ordinarily believe that strong paternalism is more objectionable than weak paternalism; and why we ordinarily believe that hard paternalism is more objectionable than soft paternalism. (shrink)

Epistemic paternalism involves interfering with the inquiry of others, without their consent, for their own epistemic good. Recently, such paternalism has been discussed as a method of getting the broader public to have more accurate views on important policy relevant matters. In this paper, I discuss a novel problem for such paternalism—what I call epistemic spillovers. The problem arises because what matters for rational belief is one’s total evidence, and further, individual pieces of evidence can have complex interactions with one (...) another. Because of this, I argue that justified epistemic paternalism requires the would-be paternalist to be in an unusually strong epistemic position, one that most would-be paternalists are unlikely to meet. (shrink)

Toleration is one of the fundamental principles that inform the design of a democratic and liberal society. Unfortunately, its adoption seems inconsistent with the adoption of paternalistically benevolent policies, which represent a valuable mechanism to improve individuals’ well-being. In this paper, I refer to this tension as the dilemma of toleration. The dilemma is not new. It arises when an agent A would like to be tolerant and respectful towards another agent B’s choices but, at the same time, A is (...) altruistically concerned that a particular course of action would harm, or at least not improve, B’s well-being, so A would also like to be helpful and seeks to ensure that B does not pursue such course of action, for B’s sake and even against B’s consent. In the article, I clarify the specific nature of the dilemma and show that several forms of paternalism, including those based on ethics by design and structural nudging, may not be suitable to resolve it. I then argue that one form of paternalism, based on pro-ethical design, can be compatible with toleration and hence with the respect for B’s choices, by operating only at the informational and not at the structural level of a choice architecture. This provides a successful resolution of the dilemma, showing that tolerant paternalism is not an oxymoron but a viable approach to the design of a democratic and liberal society. (shrink)

In patient centred care, shared decision making is a central feature and widely referred to as a norm for patient centred medical consultation. However, it is far from clear how to distinguish SDM from standard models and ideals for medical decision making, such as paternalism and patient choice, and e.g., whether paternalism and patient choice can involve a greater degree of the sort of sharing involved in SDM and still retain their essential features. In the article, different versions of SDM (...) are explored, versions compatible with paternalism and patient choice as well as versions that go beyond these traditional decision making models. Whenever SDM is discussed or introduced it is of importance to be clear over which of these different versions are being pursued, since they connect to basic values and ideals of health care in different ways. It is further argued that we have reason to pursue versions of SDM involving, what is called, a high level dynamics in medical decision-making. This leaves four alternative models to choose between depending on how we balance between the values of patient best interest, patient autonomy, and an effective decision in terms of patient compliance or adherence: Shared Rational Deliberative Patient Choice, Shared Rational Deliberative Paternalism, Shared Rational Deliberative Joint Decision, and Professionally Driven Best Interest Compromise. In relation to these models it is argued that we ideally should use the Shared Rational Deliberative Joint Decision model. However, when the patient and professional fail to reach consensus we will have reason to pursue the Professionally Driven Best Interest Compromise model since this will best harmonise between the different values at stake: patient best interest, patient autonomy, patient adherence and a continued care relationship. (shrink)

Any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways faces a problem: While we acknowledge that others stand to benefit from intellectual advice, each and every one of us tends to consider ourselves an exception, on account of overconfidence. The solution? Accept a form of epistemic paternalism.

This paper addresses the issue of paternalism in child-rearing. Since the parent–child relationship seems to be the linguistic source of the concept, one may be tempted to assume that raising a child represents a particularly appropriate sphere for paternalism. The parent–child relationship is generally understood as a relationship that is supposed to promote the development and autonomy-formation of the child, so that the apparent source of the concept is a form of autonomy-oriented paternalism. Far from taking paternalism to be overtly (...) unproblematic in such paradigmatic, pedagogical settings, this article analyzes how an effort should be made to understand a child’s capacities and which standards parents should be held to when deciding whether interference truly serves the child’s interests. (shrink)

A common objection to paternalism concerns its expressive content. Many reject paternalistic policies and actions on the ground that they arguably involve insulting expressions of disrespect toward those subjected to them. The paper challenges this view. It argues that refraining from acting paternalistically can be disrespectful. Specifically, the paper argues that there is a relevant way in which A disregards the moral worth of B if A stands idly by when B is about to act very imprudently. If true, treating (...) others with equal respect and concern, as relational egalitarians and others rightly ask us to do, will somewhat surprisingly sometimes involve treating them paternalistically. (shrink)

This paper argues that participation in an intimate relationship can generate additional or stronger reasons for one to act paternalistically toward the intimate. Moreover, participation in such a relationship can also weaken or cancel some of the presumptive reasons of respect one would otherwise have not to interfere. The paper also reflects, more generally, on the nature of intimate relationships, the normative significance of paternalism, and the normative differences between paternalism in larger-scale institutional contexts and paternalism in closer, interpersonal ones. (...) -/- . (shrink)

Defends Kantian paternalism: Interference with an individual’s liberty for her own sake is justified absent her actual consent only to the extent that such interference stands a reasonable chance of preventing her from exercising her liberty irrationally in light of the rationally chosen ends that constitute her conception of the good. More specifically, interference with an individual’s liberty is permissible only if, by interfering, we stand a reasonable chance of preventing that agent from performing actions she chose due to distorted (...) reasoning and which would result in that agent’s rationally chosen ends not being as fully realized as they would have been had she so acted. -/- Applied to suicide intervention Kantian paternalism implies that such intervention is justified to the extent that it prevents a person from ending her life when, due to distorted reasoning, she engages in suicidal behavior that is at odds with her rationally chosen ends. (shrink)

Seat belt mandates seem like a paradigmatic case of justified paternalism. Even those who generally object to paternalism often concede that seat belt laws are justified. Against this near-consensus in favor of mandates, I argue that seat belt laws are unjust and public officials should not enforce them. The most plausible exceptions to a principle of anti-paternalism do not justify seat belt mandates. Some argue that seat belt mandates are not paternalistic because unbelted riders are not fully autonomous. Others claim (...) that the decision to ride unbelted harms other people. Yet these attempts to defend seat belt mandates on non-paternalistic grounds cannot overcome the case against seat belt mandates. I therefore conclude that even seat belt mandates are unjust. With this comprehensive case against seat belt mandates, I demonstrate the more general difficulties in justifying any form of coercive paternalism. (shrink)

I argue that it can be morally permissible to coerce people into doing what is good for their own health. I discuss recent initiatives in New York City that are designed to take away certain unhealthy options from local citizens, and argue that this does not impose on them in unjustifiable ways. Good paternalistic measures are designed to promote people's long-term goals, and to prevent them from making short-term decisions that interfere with reaching those, and New York's attempts to ban (...) the sale of sugary drinks larger than 16 ounces and the use of trans fats fall within those parameters. Given our tendency to cognitive bias, we need help in making choices that truly instantiate our values. (shrink)

The philosophical debate on paternalism is conducted as if the property of being paternalistic should be attributed to actions. Actions are typically deemed to be paternalistic if they amount to some kind of interference with a person and if the rationale for the action is the good of the person interfered with. This focus on actions obscures the normative issues involved. In particular, it makes it hard to provide an analysis of the traditional liberal resistance to paternalism. Given the fact (...) that actions most often have mixed rationales, it is not clear how we should categorize and evaluate interfering actions for which only part of the rationale is the good of the person. The preferable solution is to attribute the property of being paternalistic not to actions, but to compounds of reasons and actions. The framework of action–reasons provides the tools for distinguishing where exactly paternalism lies in the complex web of reasons and actions. (shrink)

Debates on the nature and justifiability of paternalism typically focus only on adults, sometimes presuming without argument that paternalism towards children is a non-issue or obviously justified. Debates on the moral and political status of children, in turn, rarely connect with the rich literature on paternalism. This chapter attempts to bridge this gap by exploring how issues that arise in the general debate on paternalism are relevant also for the benevolent interference with children. I survey and discuss various views and (...) argue for my own: that paternalism towards children is in most respects like paternalism towards adults and stands in the same need of justification, though such justification is more often forthcoming both because children are typically less prudent than adults and so benefit more from interference, and because, in some respects, interference is less harmful to them. (shrink)

Many believe that paternalism is less wrong in intimate relationships. In this paper, we argue that this view cannot be justified by appeal to (i) beneficence, (ii) shared projects, (iii) vulnerability, (iv) epistemic access, (v) expressivism, or (vi) autonomy as nonalienation. We finally provide an error theory for why many may have believed that paternalism is less wrong in intimate relations.

A powerful critique of nudge theory and the paternalist policies of behavioral economics, and an argument for a more inclusive form of rationality.

Is it allowable for your government, or anyone else, to influence or coerce you 'for your own sake'? This is a question about paternalism, or interference with a person's liberty or autonomy with the intention of promoting their good or averting harm, which has created considerable controversy at least since John Stuart Mill's On Liberty. Mill famously decried paternalism of any kind, whether carried out by private individuals or the state. In this volume of new essays, leading moral, political and (...) legal philosophers address how to define paternalism, its justification, and the implications for public policy, professional ethics and criminal law. So-called 'libertarian' or non-coercive paternalism receives considerable attention. The discussion addresses the nature of freedom and autonomy and the relation of individuals to law, policy and the state. The volume will interest a wide range of readers in political philosophy, public policy and the philosophy of law. (shrink)

“Libertarian paternalism” aims to harness cognitive biases in order to improve prudential decision-making. Some critics have objected that libertarian paternalism is wrongly manipulative. I argue that this objection is mostly unsuccessful. First, I point out that some strategies endorsed by libertarian paternalists can help people to better appreciate reasons. Second, I develop an account of manipulation according to which an agent manipulates her target by worsening the target’s deliberative position. The means of influence defended by libertarian paternalists—for instance, the judicious (...) use of default rules—are not manipulative in this way. (shrink)

324 "we should impose a single legal restriction that would effectively eliminate boxing's main medical risk: a complete ban on blows to the head" against Mill's harm principle, is not possible to justify paternalism requires other paternalistic arguments 325 "the entire paternalism v. respect for autonomy debate as it applied to boxing is cast in nonconsequentialist terms" do we have any reason to suppose that boxers' decisions to enter the profession are lacking in autonomy? many fail the first hurdle: "having (...) adequate information" - unlikely to know the medical facts 326 liberal view would state we need better education, not paternalism stronger paternalism = "an autonomous decision must flow from the agent's own values, without undue pressure from other people or external circumstances." otherwise is coercive and precludes autonomous action "since boxers often come from severely disadvantaged backgrounds and may see boxing as their only means of escaping from dangerous, povery-stricken neighborhoods, their decision to become boxers may reflect their desperation, rather than an authentic desire that flows from their own considered values". (shrink)

A capability approach prescribes paternalist government actions to the extent that it requires the promotion of specific functionings, instead of the corresponding capabilities. Capability theorists have argued that their theories do not have much of these paternalist implications, since promoting capabilities will be the rule, promoting functionings the exception. This paper critically surveys that claim. From a close investigation of Nussbaum's statements about these exceptions, it derives a framework of five categories of functionings promotion that are more or less unavoidable (...) in a capability theory. It argues that some of these categories may have an expansionary dynamic; they may give rise to widespread functionings promotion, which would defeat the capabilitarian promise that paternalist interventions will be exceptions to the rule of a focus on capabilities. Finally, the paper discusses three further theoretical issues that will be decisive in holding this paternalist tendency in check: how high one sets threshold levels of capability protection, how lengthy one's list of basic capabilities is, and how one deals with individual responsibility for choices resulting in a loss of one's capabilities. (shrink)

"A very good book indeed: there is scarcely an issue anyone has thought to raise about the topic which Childress fails to treat with sensitivity and good judgement....Future discussions of paternalism in health care will have to come to terms with the contentions of this book, which must be reckoned the best existing treatment of its subject."--Ethics. "A clear, scholarly and balanced analysis....This is a book I can recommend to physicians, ethicists, students of both fields, and to those most affected--the (...) patients themselves."--Edmund D. Pellegrino, John Carroll Professor of Medicine and Medical Humanities, Georgetown University Medical Center. (shrink)

New media (highly interactive digital technology for creating, sharing, and consuming information) affords users a great deal of control over their informational diets. As a result, many users of new media unwittingly encapsulate themselves in epistemic bubbles (epistemic structures, such as highly personalized news feeds, that leave relevant sources of information out (Nguyen forthcoming)). Epistemically paternalistic alterations to new media technologies could be made to pop at least some epistemic bubbles. We examine one such alteration that Facebook has made in (...) an effort to fight fake news and conclude that it is morally permissible. We further argue that many epistemically paternalistic policies can (and should) be a perennial part of the internet information environment. (shrink)

Different ideas of the normative relevance of autonomy can give rise to profoundly different action-guiding principles in healthcare. If autonomy is seen as a value rather than as a right, it can be argued that patients’ decisions should sometimes be overruled in order to protect or promote their own autonomy. We refer to this as paternalism in the name of autonomy. In this paper, we discuss different elements of autonomy (decision-making capacity, efficiency, and authenticity) and arguments in favor of paternalism (...) for the sake of autonomy that have been proposed in the bioethical debate. We argue that if autonomy is valuable, then paternalism for the sake of autonomy may be justified. However, policies allowing paternalism in the name of autonomy may be self-defeating. (shrink)