The case for massively modular models of mind -- The architecture of animal minds -- Modules of the human mind -- Modularity and flexibility : the first steps -- Creative cognition in a modular mind -- The cognitive basis of science -- Distinctively human practical reason.

Do we have introspective access to our own thoughts? Peter Carruthers challenges the consensus that we do: he argues that access to our own thoughts is always interpretive, grounded in perceptual awareness and sensory imagery. He proposes a bold new theory of self-knowledge, with radical implications for understanding of consciousness and agency.

In ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’, Giubilini and Minerva argue that infanticide should be permitted for the same reasons as abortion. In particular, they argue that infanticide should be permitted even for reasons that do not primarily serve the interests (or would-be best interests) of the newborn. They claim that abortion is permissible for reasons that do not primarily serve the interests (or would-be interests) of the fetus because fetuses lack a right to life. They argue that newborns (...) also lack a right to life, and they conclude that therefore, the same reasons that justify abortion can justify infanticide. This conclusion does not follow. The lack of a right to life is not decisive. Furthermore, the justificatory power of a given reason is a function of moral context. Generalisations about reasons across dissimilar moral contexts are invalid. However, a similar conclusion does follow—that fetus-killing and newborn-killing are morally identical in identical moral contexts—but this conclusion is trivial, since fetuses and newborns are never in identical moral contexts. (shrink)

In the Politics of Black Joy, Lindsey Stewart develops Hurston's contributions to political theory and philosophy of race by introducing the politics of joy as a refusal of neoabolitionism, a political tradition that reduces southern Black life to tragedy or social death.

The sense of embodiment is vital for self recognition. An examination of anosognosia for hemiplegia—the inability to recognise that one is paralysed down one side of one’s body—suggests the existence of ‘online’ and ‘offline’ representations of the body. Online representations of the body are representations of the body as it is currently, are newly constructed moment by moment and are directly “plugged into” current perception of the body. In contrast, offline representations of the body are representations of what the body (...) is usually like, are relatively stable and are constructed from online representations. This distinction is supported by an analysis of phantom limb—the feeling that an amputated limb is still present—phenomena. Initially it seems that the sense of embodiment may arise from either of these types of representation; however, an integrated representation of the body seems to be required. It is suggested information from vision and emotions is involved in generating these representations. A lack of access to online representations of the body does not necessarily lead to a loss in the sense of embodiment. An integrated offline representation of the body could account for the sense of embodiment and perform the functions attributed to this sense. (shrink)

We present Birch and colleagues with a dilemma. On one interpretation, they aim to chart the distribution of a sort of minimal perceptual awareness across the animal kingdom, where that awareness can be fully characterized in third-person psychological terms. On this interpretation, the project is worthy but dull, since it doesn’t touch the question that has excited most people: whether other animals are phenomenally conscious. On an alternative interpretation, in contrast, they hope to resolve this latter question, arguing that phenomenal (...) consciousness is extremely widespread. But if this is their intention, then their argument begs the question. (shrink)

This paper shows that even if the mental states of non-human animals lack phenomenological properties, as some accounts of mental-state consciousness imply, this need not prevent those states from being appropriate objects of sympathy and moral concern. The paper argues that the most basic form of mental (as opposed to biological) harm lies in the existence of thwarted agency, or thwarted desire, rather than in anything phenomenological.

Tyler Burge claims in a recent high-profile publication that none of the existing evidence for mental-state attribution by children prior to the age of four or five really supports such a conclusion; and he makes this claim, not just for beliefs, but for mental states of all sorts. In its place, he offers an explanatory framework according to which infants and young children attribute mere information-registering states and teleologically-characterized motivational states, which are said to lack the defining properties of the (...) mental. I argue that Burge’s claims are poorly motivated and irrelevant to the goals of developmental psychology. (shrink)

This paper exposes the relation between the different mathematical orientations, on the one hand, and the modes of documentary film on the other. When we take, with Badiou, mathematics as ontology, and mathematical orientations as orientations to Being, we find in the structural similarity of mathematics and documentary an equivalence: between modes of documentaryand mathematical-ontological decisions, regarding the inscription of 'what is'. From here we move to consider Badiou's notion of 'in-appearing' through a reading of Alain Resnais' documentary Night and (...) Fog. (shrink)

Audio features such as inharmonicity, noisiness, and spectral roll-off have been identified as correlates of “noisy” sounds. However, such features are likely involved in the experience of multiple semantic timbre categories of varied meaning and valence. This paper examines the relationships of stimulus properties and audio features with the semantic timbre categories raspy/grainy/rough, harsh/noisy, and airy/breathy. Participants rated a random subset of 52 stimuli from a set of 156 approximately 2-s orchestral instrument sounds representing varied instrument families, registers, and both (...) traditional and extended playing techniques. Stimuli were rated on the three semantic categories of interest, as well as on perceived playing exertion and emotional valence. Correlational analyses demonstrated a strong negative relationship between positive valence and perceived physical exertion. Exploratory linear mixed models revealed significant effects of extended technique and pitch register on valence, the perception of physical exertion, raspy/grainy/rough, and harsh/noisy. Instrument family was significantly related to ratings of airy/breathy. With an updated version of the Timbre Toolbox, we used 44 summary audio features, extracted from the stimuli using spectral and harmonic representations, as input for various models built to predict mean semantic ratings for each sound on the three semantic categories, on perceived exertion, and on valence. Random Forest models predicting semantic ratings from audio features outperformed Partial Least-Squares Regression models, consistent with previous results suggesting that non-linear methods are advantageous in timbre semantic predictions using audio features. Relative Variable Importance measures from the models among the three semantic categories demonstrate that although these related semantic categories are associated in part with overlapping features, they can be differentiated through individual patterns of audio feature relationships. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Christology and EthicsLindsey EsbensenChristology and Ethics Edited by F. Leron Shults and Brent Waters Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2010. 231 pp. $28.00.This collection of essays is a welcome venture into the often-neglected relationship between Christology and ethics. The book stresses that the reciprocal relationship between Christology and Christian moral discernment needs greater attention as well as creative reformulation. The essays produce a variety of models of how other (...) disciplines provide the critical and constructive developments that can strengthen the bond between Christology and the Christian moral life. Rather than a definitive resolution to the “problem” of these Christian disciplines, the book is an invitation to further inquiry, an offer to join the conversation.Although the contributors to this anthology present disparate analyses, they share the goal of integrating interdisciplinary developments in the engagement of Christology and ethics. While each author shares similar departure points for these essays, the conclusions are vastly diverse for each contributor. This is in part because the essays draw from a broad range of sources, from the theological to the scientific. One chapter incorporates developments in the field of psychoanalysis in a discussion of the Christian emphasis on participation in the “new creation” through Jesus Christ, who is akin to the psychoanalytic “third” (121). Another chapter applies evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary ethics to a discussion of the ongoing social mediation and cultural reinterpretation of what it means to “do as Jesus did” (178). Underlying all the expositions is an affirmation that ethics and Christology mutually instruct and challenge each other (98). [End Page 211]Despite the integral connection among the essays, some underlying tensions remain. For instance, Brent Waters’s “The Incarnation and the Moral Life” strongly emphasizes the distinction between the civil community and the church, between the City of Man and the City of God (30). The church is the body of Christ that ministers to the world; therefore, “the singular ministry of the baptized engages, evangelizes, and orders the world in the name and under the authority of Jesus Christ” (21). All moral discernment outside of that with Christological foundations falls short of its goal. Conversely, Jan-Olav Henriksen’s “The Surprise of Judgment and Justice” suggests a much more inclusive view of non-Christian (and non-Christological) contributions to ethics in his interpretation of Matthew 25. Using the imago Dei as the springboard for his analysis, the world is envisioned as God’s gift, and the other (the neighbor) is the imago Dei who calls for recognition. Henriksen contends, “Because Christ is the true image of God, all of humanity is related to him, and is in some sense represented in him.... Christ is the face of every other human—as the one who calls us to mercy, compassion, and love” (142). Christian moral action, then, “is not only determined by you, it is determined by them and their calling of you” (141). In this sense, then, the church does not minister to the world, but the world ministers to the church in helping her to recognize the world as God’s gift and to see the image of God in the neighbor.While the emphases of the various proposals in this collection of essays may produce tensions, the strain is actually a positive contribution to the overall project. The anthology seeks to examine the most significant issues in the relationship between Christology and ethics without necessarily providing a conclusive resolution to how these disciplines mutually inform and reinforce each other. This collection of essays begins a conversation and invites further investigation of the various lines of inquiry.As with any anthology, each essay will have a greater or lesser appeal to the reader according to his interests. Nonetheless, this collection of essays is a unique contribution to systematic and moral theology, and it is an indispensable anthology for those pursuing Christology or ethics for their future endeavors. [End Page 212]Lindsey EsbensenUniversity of Notre DameCopyright © 2012 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

This article explores three ways in which a cognitively entrenched mindreading (or 'theory of mind') system may bias our thinking as cognitive scientists. One issues in a form of tacit dualism, impacting scientific debates about phenomenal consciousness. Another leads us to think that our own minds are easier to know than they really are, influencing debates about self-knowledge, and about mindreading itself. And the third results in a bias in favour of empiricist over nativist accounts of cognitive development. The discussion (...) throughout is tentative and speculative, and can be regarded as an appeal for caution, as well as a call for further research. (shrink)

A number of two-systems accounts have been proposed to explain the apparent discrepancy between infants’ early success in nonverbal mindreading tasks, on the one hand, and the failures of children younger than four to pass verbally-mediated false-belief tasks, on the other. Many of these accounts have not been empirically fruitful. This paper focuses, in contrast, on the two-systems proposal put forward by Ian Apperly and colleagues. This has issued in a number of new findings. The present paper shows that the (...) theoretical arguments offered in support of Apperly’s account are nevertheless unconvincing, and that the data can be explained in other terms. A better view is that there is just a single mindreading system that exists throughout, but which undergoes gradual conceptual enrichment through infancy and childhood. This system can be used in ways that do, or do not, draw on executive resources and/or working memory. (shrink)

This study examines the cross‐cultural generality of Hering's (1878/1964) color‐opponent theory of color appearance. English‐speaking and Somali‐speaking observers performed variants of two paradigms classically used to study color‐opponency. First, both groups identified similar red, green, blue, and yellow unique hues. Second, 25 English‐speaking and 34 Somali‐speaking observers decomposed the colors present in 135 Munsell color samples into their component Hering elemental sensations—red,green,blue, yellow, white, and black—or else responded “no term.” Both groups responded no term for many samples, notably purples. Somali (...) terms for yellow were often used to name colors all around the color circle, including colors that are bluish according to Hering's theory. Four Somali Grue speakers named both green and blue elicitation samples by their term for green. However, that term did not name the union of all samples called blue or green by English speakers. A similar pattern was found among three Somali Achromatic speakers, who called the blue elicitation sample black or white. Thus, color decomposition by these Somali‐speaking observers suggests a lexically influenced re‐dimensionalization of color appearance space, rather than a simple reduction of the one proposed by Hering. Even some Somali Green‐Blue speakers, whose data were otherwise similar to English, showed similar trends in yellow and blue usage. World Color Survey data mirror these results. These within‐ and cross‐cultural violations of Hering's theory do not challenge the long‐standing view that universal sensory processes mediate color appearance. However, they do demonstrate an important contribution of language in the human understanding of color. (shrink)

This book is the second of a three-volume set on the subject of innateness. The book is highly interdisciplinary, and addresses such question as: to what extent are mature cognitive capacities a reflection of particular cultures and to what extent are they a product of innate elements? How do innate elements interact with culture to achieve mature cognitive capacities? How do minds generate and shape cultures? How are cultures processed by minds?Concerned with the fundamental architecture of the mind, this text (...) addresses questions about the existence & extent of human innate abilities, how these inate abilities affect the development of the mature mind, & which of them is shared with other species. (shrink)

Four different accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of them endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. Section 1 of this target article introduces the four accounts. Section 2 develops the “mindreading is prior” model in more detail, showing how it predicts introspection for perceptual and quasi-perceptual (e.g., imagistic) mental (...) events while claiming that metacognitive access to our own attitudes always results from swift unconscious self-interpretation. This section also considers the model's relationship to the expression of attitudes in speech. Section 3 argues that the commonsense belief in the existence of introspection should be given no weight. Section 4 argues briefly that data from childhood development are of no help in resolving this debate. Section 5 considers the evolutionary claims to which the different accounts are committed, and argues that the three introspective views make predictions that are not borne out by the data. Section 6 examines the extensive evidence that people often confabulate when self-attributing attitudes. Section 7 considers “two systems” accounts of human thinking and reasoning, arguing that although there are introspectableeventswithin System 2, there are no introspectableattitudes. Section 8 examines alleged evidence of “unsymbolized thinking”. Section 9 considers the claim that schizophrenia exhibits a dissociation between mindreading and metacognition. Finally, section 10 evaluates the claim that autism presents a dissociation in the opposite direction, of metacognition without mindreading. (shrink)

Berent (this issue) critiques one of the three main proposals put forward by Carruthers (this issue), who suggests that cognitive scientists are biased against innateness-claims by the tacit assumptions of the mentalizing faculty. Berent proposes, instead, that the bias results from dissonance produced by a conflict between our innate dualism and our innate essentialism. The present response raises a number of difficulties for her argument.

As someone diagnosed with severe chronic mental illness early in my adolescence, I have spent over half of my life feeling out of step with the rest of the world due to hospitalizations, treatment programs, and the disruptions caused by anxiety, anorexia, depression, and obsessive–compulsive disorder. The effect of my mental health conditions compounded by these treatment environments means I often feel that I experience time passing differently, which results in sensations of removal and isolation from those around me. The (...) global shutdown caused by the COVID-19 pandemic seemed a way for normative bodies to experience the passing of time the way I always have. In this paper, I extend Dr. Sara Wasson’s analysis of the ways in which chronic pain resists narrative coherence to my own temporal experience of chronic mental illness, specifically my embodied experience of the pandemic. I use that embodied experience as a case study for examining how the reciprocal nature of time and narrativity, as outlined by Dr. Paul Ricoeur, can create isolation for those struggling with their temporality due to chronic mental illness. To acknowledge and grapple with the ramifications of discursive and material privilege involved in such situations, I include an analysis of Robert Desjarlais’s 1994 article “Struggling Along: The Possibilities for Experience among the Homeless Mentally Ill,” in which he investigates a similar phenomenon of being outside of structured sequential narrative time in the residents of a Boston shelter for the mentally ill. (shrink)

One recently popular way to characterise strong emergence is to say that emergent entities possess novel causal powers. However, there is little agreement concerning the nature of powers. One controversy involves whether powers are single- or multi-track; that is, whether each power has only one manifestation type, or whether a single power can be directed towards a number of distinct manifestations. Another concerns how powers operate: whether a lone power manifests when triggered by the presence of a suitable stimulus, or (...) whether powers operate mutually such that several powers must ‘work together’ to bring about a particular manifestation. This paper examines how these distinctions—which can be cross-combined to frame four distinct accounts of the nature of powers—bear on the debate between emergentists and reductionists. (shrink)

In “Post-Liberation Feminism,” Ladelle McWhorter raises the question of what practices will be helpful to further feminist goals if we are no longer in a state of domination, but are still oppressed. McWhorter finds resources in Michel Foucault's concept of “practices of freedom” to begin to answer this question. I build upon McWhorter's insight while recalling Angela Davis's Blues Legacies and Black Feminism: namely, that sexual love, as conceived in hoodoo and the blues, became a terrain upon which newly emancipated (...) blacks worked out what their newfound freedom meant. In this essay, I consider what practices of freedom would look like within a life-giving nexus of hoodoo, blues, and sexual love. Not only does the image of the hoodoo woman, prevalent within the blues, emerge through an interaction of race, class, region, gender, sexuality, and spiritualty, but analyzing sexual love within this hoodoo–blues coupling will help us track how sexual love was transformed into a practice of freedom. I will argue that sexual love within this hoodoo–blues coupling reveals an important dimension of emancipatory work that both defies categorization as resistance and is crucial to the development of capacities for resistance. (shrink)

The Declaration of Helsinki and the Council of the International Organization of Medical Sciences provide guidance on standards of care and prevention in clinical trials. In the current and increasingly challenging research environment, the ethical status of a trial design depends not only on protection of participants, but also on social value, feasibility, and scientific validity. Using the example of a study assessing efficacy of a vaccine to prevent human papilloma virus in HIV-1 infected adolescent girls in low resource countries (...) without access to the vaccine, we compare several trial designs which rank lower on some criteria and higher on others, giving rise to difficult trade-offs. This case demonstrates the need for developing more nuanced guidance documents to help researchers balance these often conflicting criteria. (shrink)

Do we think in natural language? Or is language only for communication? Much recent work in philosophy and cognitive science assumes the latter. In contrast, Peter Carruthers argues that much of human conscious thinking is conducted in the medium of natural language sentences. However, this does not commit him to any sort of Whorfian linguistic relativism, and the view is developed within a framework that is broadly nativist and modularist. His study will be essential reading for all those interested (...) in the nature and significance of natural language, whether they come from philosophy, psychology or linguistics. (shrink)

As a result of globalization, the number of people living outside of their countries of origin is on the rise. Among them are children of primary and secondary school age of varying socio-economic backgrounds. This article addresses the education-related challenges that children in such circumstances face. I first identify two principles – an educational adequacy principle and a presumption of responsibility on the part of a host country for meeting children’s educationalneeds – which are widely employed to guide national policy (...) decisions on educational content and the distribution of educational resources. I then discuss a number of problems that students living abroad face which, I argue, policies devised on the basis of these principles either systematically overlook or, in some cases, exacerbate. Finally, I offer two alternative principles – a cosmopolitan revision of the first and a replacement for the second with a focus on collective responsibility – designed to promote education policies better suited to a globalized world which might help to alleviate the barriers to success commonly encountered by children learning abroad. (shrink)