Introducing formal causation / Ludger Jansen and Petter Sandstad -- Form, intention, information : from scholastic logic to artificial intelligence / Gyula Klima -- Formal causation : accidental and substantial / David S. Oderberg -- A non-hylomorphic account of formal causation / Petter Sandstad and Ludger Jansen -- Formal causes for powers theorists / Giacomo Giannini and Stephen Mumford -- Away with dispositional essences in trope theory / Jani Hakkarainen and Markku Keinänen -- Functional powers / Michele Paolini (...) Paoletti -- An Aristotelian approach to existential dependence / Benjamin Schnieder and Jonas Werner -- Finean feature dependence and the Aristotelian alternative / Wolfgang Sattler -- A problem for natural-kind essentialism and formal causes / José Tomás Alvarado and Matthew Tugby -- Form as cause and the formal cause : Aristotle's answer / James G. Lennox -- Form, cause, and explanation in biology : a neo-Aristotelian perspective / Christopher J. Austin -- Formal explanation and mechanisms of conceptual representation / Sandeep Prasada. (shrink)

_Religion, War and the Crisis of Modernity: A Special Issue Dedicated to the Philosophy of Jan Patočka_ _The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy_ provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer. Contributors: Ivan Chvatík, Nicolas de Warren, James Dodd, Eddo Evink, Ludger Hagedorn, Jean-Luc Marion, Claire Perryman-Holt, Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback, Michael Staudigl, Christian (...) Sternad, and Ľubica Učník. (shrink)

Being an "untimely review", this paper reviews Aristotle's 'Categories' as if they were published today, in the era of computerised information, where categorisation becomes more and more essential for information retrieval. I suggest a systematic ordering of Aristotle's list of categories and argue that Aristotle's discussion of ontological dependency and his focus on concrete entities are still a source of new insight and can indeed be read as a contribution to the emerging field of applied ontology and ontological engineering.

Die Rede von Kollektiven, in der politischen Theorie, aber auch in Theorien kollektiven Handelns, unterstellt bereits den Status des Kollektivs. Das Volk der Gesetzgebung wird in seiner Existenz und Identität vorausgesetzt. Der Akt der Konstitution unterstellt ebenso ein bereits konstituiertes Volk wie auch die Regeln, nach denen sich dieses Volk eine Verfassung gibt. Was sind Vorformen des Kollektivs, was leitet die Formierung an? Mein Beitrag untersucht die ästhetischen Grundlagen der Formierung von Kollektiven und die Aspekte, die die Effektivität von Partizipationsformaten (...) betreffen. (shrink)

The backdrop for this thesis is provided by Troeltsch's far more detailed and extensive studies of the social doctrines of various Christian churches and groups. According to Troeltsch's interpretation, the reception of the Stoic concept of natural law is as crucial to Christian ethics as the reception of the concept of logos is to Christian dogmatics. Just as the concept of logos mediates between the truth of revelation and the truth of reason, so the concept of natural law mediates between (...) the moral demands of the gospel and the principles of a worldly ethos. Since there is a distinction between an absolute natural law, which is identical with the radical ideal of the Sermon on the Mount, and a relative natural law, substantially corresponding to the Ten Commandments and to political and social reality, such a mediation--which must be oriented on the relative natural law--must qualify the original radical Christian claim. Whereas the old church allowed both forms of the natural law to stand alongside each other without mediation and was therefore unable to overcome their estrangement within the surrounding social reality, the Christian Middle Ages succeeded in uniting both forms by replacing the distinction between the gospel and the world with a distinction between the natural and the supernatural, interpreting each as a level of a metaphysical whole. When this idea of a metaphysical hierarchy of reality, attached to the concept of natural law, became linked to the notion of society as a structured organism, as taught by Aristotle and Paul, the concept of natural law assumed a virtually fundamental status: it grounded both moral and social philosophy and enabled the rise of the "unified culture" characteristic of the Christian Middle Ages, from which the Reformation later departed in order to regain the radicalism of the gospel. By linking the concept of natural law to the organic interpretation of-the social, the Christian Middle Ages could also assign a central role to the church: just as the divine law is the bracket that binds together the levels of moral laws, so the church is the bracket that holds together the members of the social organism. Its interpretation as the "boundless, comprehensive, and guiding institution of salvation," together with the strong attachment of natural law to eternal and immutable principles, must, in the last consequence, lead to a "conservative, organically patriarchal natural law." Consequently, those elements that were already contained in the medieval form of the natural law but not in the Platonic interpretation of the social order, and which in its later secular form gave it its progressive, even revolutionary, power, remain repressed: the idea of the dignity of the person, the associated freedom and autonomy of individual reason, the-resulting responsibility of personal conscience, and the significance of one's vocation, which stems from the place of the individual within the whole. (shrink)

Max Weber· e Troeltsch perceberam a importância que o conceito de direito natural, tal como o entenderam os medievais, teve para a formação e desenvolvimento da civilização Ocidental. Não se pode negar esta importância, mas os estudos posteriores mostram claramente que a leitura feita por aqueles dois cientistas necessita de diversas correções, principalmente quando se toma como para digmática a obra de Tomás de Aquino.

In what follows, I argue that the thinkers of the twelfth to thirteenth century rediscovered and passed on the questions of metaphysics; in what I call the second beginning of metaphysics they also developed those questions in such a way that they could be received into the thinking of the modern era in the first place. It was precisely the theological context which forced this development and lead the theologians of the Latin West, inspired by their Arabic predecessors, to redesign (...) metaphysics according to the rules of Aristotle’s logic and philosophy of science. Put differently, through the challenge of theology medieval metaphysics was forced to become what it had claimed to be from the onset: first philosophy. (shrink)

BACKGROUND -/- Understanding, modelling and influencing the transition between different states of cells, be it reprogramming of somatic cells to pluripotency or trans-differentiation between cells, is a hot topic in current biomedical and cell-biological research. Nevertheless, the large body of published knowledge in this area is underused, as most results are only represented in natural language, impeding their finding, comparison, aggregation, and usage. Scientific understanding of the complex molecular mechanisms underlying cell transitions could be improved by making essential pieces of (...) knowledge available in a formal (and thus computable) manner. -/- RESULTS -/- We describe the outline of two ontologies for cell phenotypes and for cellular mechanisms which together enable the representation of data curated from the literature or obtained by bioinformatics analyses and thus for building a knowledge base on mechanisms involved in cellular reprogramming. In particular, we discuss how comprehensive ontologies of cell phenotypes and of changes in mechanisms can be designed using the entity-quality (EQ) model. -/- CONCLUSIONS -/- We show that the principles for building cellular ontologies published in this work allow deeper insights into the relations between the continuants (cell phenotypes) and the occurrents (cell mechanism changes) involved in cellular reprogramming, although implementation remains for future work. Further, our design principles lead to ontologies that allow the meaningful application of similarity searches in the spaces of cell phenotypes and of mechanisms, and, especially, of changes of mechanisms during cellular transitions. (shrink)

Ludger Schwarte (Münster, 1965) es profesor de filosofía en la Kunstakademie de Düsseldorf. Es ampliamente considerado como uno de los representantes más importantes de la filosofía de la arquitectura, una disciplina que ha venido desarrollándose rápidamente en las últimas dos décadas y cuya actualidad es cada vez mayor. En su monumental libro Philosophie der Architektur (2009), desarrolla una filosofía política ―y no meramente estética o simbólica― de la arquitectura. Su original planteamiento consiste en entender la arquitectura, en primer lugar, (...) como construcción de posibilidades, esto es, en su capacidad de instaurar, definir o movilizar los fundamentos del «mundo de la vida» vigente en cada caso a través de la producción de espacios, registros temporales y medios de interacción que determinan nuestra experiencia. En este sentido, para Schwarte la filosofía de la arquitectura tiene una importancia fundamental en la medida en que ayuda a rastrear la génesis de una especie de «sentido fundamental» que constituye la raíz común de las formas de vida y de los órdenes lingüísticos. El presente artículo, la primera traducción del autor alemán al español, ofrece una síntesis de su proyecto de una filosofía de la arquitectura. (shrink)

Se olharmos para Alberto Magno apartir de nossa época, provavelmente não perce-beremos sua importância como filósofo, poismuito do que ele realizou pode parecer comoalgo natural, que sempre foi assim. Entretanto,seus textos sobre a teologia como ciência, sobrea separação entre filosofia e teologia e sobre aética como ciência prática, por exemplo, sobrevi-vem até hoje.

My contribution begins with the observation that aesthetics has been conceived since Baumgarten on the basis of experimental procedures. Rather than, in the veine of Fechner’s works, taking the experimental methods of the natural sciences as a measure for the »science of sensual knowledge and representation« (Baumgarten) or for the working on the limits of sense, I try to analyze more attentively the genuine forms of aesthetical experimentation. With Adorno, one can differentiate between three historical phases of aesthetic experimentation. Lyotard (...) claims that philosophy today should become experimental, following an experimentalization in the arts. But how could aesthetic experiments prepare the grounds for artistic developments? (shrink)

Mein Beitrag geht von der Beobachtung aus, dass in deliberativen und in partizipativen Demokratietheorien das Moment kollektiver Entscheidung kaum analysiert wurde, obschon es zu den wesentlichen Kennzeichen politischer Freiheit zählt. Nicht nur die Entscheidungsregeln, sondern grundsätzlicher noch die Arrangements, die festlegen, wer teilzunehmen qualifiziert ist, was zur Sprache kommen kann und wie interagiert wird, gilt es neu zu entwerfen, wenn politische Freiheit, mit Adorno, vom Impuls der Befreiung her begriffen werden soll.

Die Tradition der Metaphysik, auf die sich die Neuzeit bezieht verdankt ihre Physiognomie den systematischen Ansätzen, die den nach Aristoteles „zweiten“ Anfang der Metaphysik im 13. Jhd. Bestimmen. Der Zusammenhang, der die mittelalterliche Metaphysik mit der neuzeitlichen Metaphysik und Metaphysikkritik verbindet, ist jedoch immer noch zu wenig erforscht. Die vorliegende Untersuchung greift den einflußreichsten der mittelalterlichen Ansätze, den des Johannes Duns Scotus, auf und verfolgt seine Rezeption und Transformation über Francisco Suárez und Christian Wolff zu Immanuel Kant und Charles Sanders (...) Peirce. Nach Duns Scotus ist Metaphysik als Wissenschaft vom Seienden als Seienden nur dann möglich, wenn man sie nicht als Wissenschaft vom ersten ausgezeichneten Seienden, sondern als Wissenschaft vom ersterkannten Begriff des Seienden versteht. Da dieser Begriff nur im Rückgang auf die Voraussetzungen unserer kategorialen Prädikate erfaßt und nur im Durchgang durch seine modalen Bestimmungen entfaltet werden kann, faßt Scotus Metaphysik strikt als „Transzendentalwissenschaft“ (scientia transcendens) und ordnet ihr als Inhalt die formalmodale Bestimmung und Explikation der „ratio entis“ zu. Die Erkenntnis des unendlichen Seienden ist Teil dieser Explikation und nur als solche möglich. Die neuzeitliche Gestalt der Metaphysik, die sich auf der bisher meist herangezogenen Folie der Metaphysik des Thomas von Aquin als Traditionsbruch darstellt, erweist sich im Blick auf das Konzept des Scotus als Resultat einer kritischen Transformation. (shrink)

Die Vertreibung jüdischer Psychoanalytiker aus NS-Deutschland ging damit einher, dass sie von ihren eigenen Kollegen aus der DPG gedrängt wurden. Dieser Bruch hat die Wiederanknüpfung echter Beziehungen zwischen beiden Gruppen nach dem Zusammenbruch des NS-Regimes und der deutschen Niederlage im Zweiten Weltkrieg erheblich belastet. Anhand erhaltener Korrespondenzen wird diese gestörte Nachkriegskommunikation rekonstruiert und auf ihre Langzeitfolgen geprüft.

In order to develop the ontology of tendencies for use in the representation of medical knowledge, tendencies are compared with other kinds of entities possessing the realizable-realization structure, specifically: dispositions, propensities, abilities and virtues. The peculiarities of tendencies are discussed and a standard schema of tendency ascription is developed in order to represent the relations between the ascriptions of tendency tokens to particulars and the ascriptions of tendency types to universals. Two nonstandard cases and their epistemic variants are discussed.

It has long been a standard practice for the natural sciences to classify things. Thus, it is no wonder that, for two and a half millennia, philosophers have been reflecting on classifications, from Plato and Aristotle to contemporary philosophy of science. Some of the results of these reflections will be presented in this chapter. I will start by discussing a parody of a classification, namely: the purportedly ancient Chinese classification of animals described by Jorge Luis Borges. I will show that (...) many of the mistakes that account for the comic features of this parody appear in real-life scientific databases as well. As examples of the latter, I will discuss the terminology database of the National Cancer Institute (NCI) of the United States, the NCI Thesaurus. (shrink)

After a short sketch of Lowe’s account of his four basic categories, I discuss his theory of formal ontological relations and how Lowe wants to account for dispositional predications. I argue that on the ontic level Lowe is a pan-categoricalist, while he is a language dualist and an exemplification dualist with regard to the dispositional/categorical distinction. I argue that Lowe does not present an adequate account of disposition. From an Aristotelian point of view, Lowe conflates dispositional predication with hôs epi (...) to poly statements about what is normally or mostly the case. (shrink)

Functional explanations apply not only in cases of normal functioning, but also in the case of malfunctioning. According to a straightforward analysis, a bearer of the function to F is malfunctioning if and only if it does not F although it should do so. This makes malfunctions and malfunctionings analogous to negative causation and thus peculiarly problematic, because they seem to involve absent dispositions and absent processes. This analysis seems also to require that the function to F cannot be identical (...) with the disposition to F. Then we seem to be trapped in a dilemma: Either the realm of functions is separated from the realm of dispositions; then it seems that functions cannot be causally efficacious. Alternatively, functions are considered to be identical with dispositions; but then malfunctioning seems to be conceptually impossible. The paper defends and further develops the thesis of Röhl and Jansen that functions are not a special type of dispositions. For this purpose, it first reviews different varieties of malfunction and malfunctioning and suggests definitions of both malfunction and malfunctioning. It reviews how causal, etiological and intentional theories of functions can deal with these problems. In particular, the paper discusses the special-disposition account of the Basic Formal Ontology. Spear, Ceusters and Smith :103--128, 2016) have defended the special-disposition account of the Basic Formal Ontology by suggesting various strategies how a special-disposition account can deal with malfunctions. On the one side, the paper evaluates these strategies and indicates several problems arising from them. On the other hand, it describes how to account for the non-optionality and the causal efficacy of functions, if functions are not dispositions. While function types are not identical to disposition types, there are important interrelations between functions and dispositions, namely heuristically, from a design perspective for artefact functions, and from an evolutionary perspective for types of biological functions. (shrink)

Dieses Buch betritt Neuland. Es ist eine Einführung in das neue Gebiet der angewandten Ontologie, jenem multidisziplinären Arbeitsgebiet, in dem Philosophen gemeinsam mit Informatikern und Vertretern der jeweils thematischen Wissenschaftsbereiche, in unserem Fall mit Biologen und Medizinern, daran arbeiten, wissenschaftliches Wissen informationstechnisch zu repräsentieren. Es zeigt, wie Philosophie eine praktische Anwendung findet, die von zunehmender Wichtigkeit nicht nur in den heutigen Lebenswissenschaften ist. Und so richtet sich dieses Buch an Philosophen, aber auch an interessierte Biologen, Mediziner und Informatiker.

In "On Social Facts" (1989) and subsequent works, Margaret Gilbert has suggested a plural subject account of the semantics of ‘we’ that claims that a central or standard use of ‘we’ is to refer to an existing or anticipated plural subject. This contrasts with the more general approach to treat plural pronouns as expressions referring to certain pluralities. I argue that (i) the plural subject approach cannot account for certain syntactic phenomena and that (ii) the sense of intimacy, which Gilbert (...) cites as evidence for her plural subject account, has a different source than the existence of joint commitments constituting a respective plural subject. Moreover, (iii) there is a wide varie-ty of phenomena in the linguistic record, which, while not constituting conclusive evidence against the plural subject account, nevertheless, are dealt with better by the plurality account. ‘We’ thus refers to pluralities, which may or may not be plural subjects. The precise analysis of ‘we’ thus reveals a multi-layered ontology of groups. (shrink)