Cursed Are You! The Phenomenology of Cursing in Cuneiform and Hebrew Texts. By Anne Marie Kitz. Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2014. Pp. xiii + 528. $59.50.

In this exposition of Boehme's key conceptions, the author tries to show that the seventeenth-century Silesian mystic's work can and should be viewed as an original, coherent philosophic system. Includes detailed biographical sketch, bibliography, indexes, illustrations and diagrams.--C. M.

In his preface, Hunter explains that this volume is intended to provide for non-mathematicians an introduction to the most important results of modern mathematical logic. The reader will find here the work of Post, Skolem, Gödel, Church, Henkin, and others, presented in a terse and closely-knit style. Though acknowledging the trend toward natural deduction systems, Hunter sticks to more classical axiomatic systems on the grounds that the proofs of metatheorems are simplified by that choice. He begins with a formal system (...) of propositional logic, for which he develops proofs of completeness, consistency, and decidability. Systems of first order predicate logic are then dealt with, and Church's and Gödel's results on undecidability and incompleteness are presented. There is a brief, useful discussion indicating what parts of first order predicate logic are decidable. It is assumed that the reader has some familiarity with elementary formal logic: Hunter develops the set-theoretical results he requires. The compactness of the presentation is facilitated by the use of earlier results for propositional logic to obtain certain results for predicate logic. Especially helpful is Hunter's technique of prefacing each of the longer and more difficult proofs with a section explaining the key ideas and the general method of proof; summaries are also often provided in conclusion. Because of the orientation of the book, a more extensive discussion of the significance of the results obtained and the philosophical issues which have been raised concerning some of them, would have been welcome. Nonetheless, this is a good, concise introduction for those who are not yet prepared to tackle the more technical literature. A bibliography is provided for those interested in pursuing the subject in greater detail.--E. M. F. (shrink)

The author, a physicist as well as a philosopher, uses the thought of Werner Heisenberg as a focus for examining the epistemological foundations of quantum theory. Though Heisenberg's earliest original insights were stimulated by Plato's Timaeus he soon swung over to Bohr's empiricism in developing and supporting the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. His later philosophical reflections are markedly Kantian with irreducible physical invariants playing the role of Kant's necessary and universal laws. As Heelan sees it, an examination of the (...) intentionality-structure of the scientist supplies the critical basis for judging the reality of the objects known through science. Though Heisenberg rejected the naive "empirical objectivity" of pre-quantum interpretations of science, his reflective evaluation of his own achievements is inadequate in explaining the formal objectivity of the objects known. By distinguishing the criterion of reality, rational affirmation, from the meaning of "reality," whatever is defined by the object in its formal sense, Heelan is able to develop a critical realism that assigns an ontological status to fundamental particles. "Main-line" philosophers of science may feel ill at ease with Heelan's phenomenological terminology of "intentionality-structure," "noema," and "horizon" and may object to his treatment of "meaning" and "language." But if they "bracket" these reservations they will find this book an unusually well-informed and penetrating study of the philosophical implications of modern physics.—E. M. M. (shrink)

A report on the teacher education programs supported by the Fund for the Advancement of Education which calls for a broad liberal education for all teachers and greater attention to the philosophy of education.--F. M. S.

Dicke discusses the metamorphosis of Hegelianism in Feuerbach and Marx through an examination of the concept of identity in the three philosophers. He demonstrates the persistence of this concept as a decisive theme in both Feuerbach and Marx, and shows how Hegel's doctrine of identity is transformed and adulterated in the process of adaptation. A primary consequence of Marx's modification of this doctrine is the philosophical sacrifice of the individual to the collective, which has its practical consequences in contemporary communist (...) states.--J. M. W. (shrink)

This book attempts to prepare the non-philosopher for the study of contemporary philosophical works. After a discussion of the course of science after Copernicus, Mr. Prosch turns to an exposition of, first, the metaphysical and epistemological positions of the British empiricists and Kant and, second, the ethical and political positions of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, Kant, Rousseau, and Hegel. His discussion of Marxism, pragmatism, analytical philosophy and existentialism is written from a neutral position. The book may be too technical (...) to serve its purpose, but it is a well-organized and clear attempt.—J. M. B. (shrink)

This book's purpose is the exposition of the inability of natural science to disprove the existence of God. Clark argues that the acceptance of a mechanistic world view based on Newtonian science makes, unjustifiably, a philosophy of science in which science forgets the many idealizations built into its laws' mathematical formulations. The philosophy of science Mr. Clark espouses is Percy Bridgman's operationalism, i.e., the reduction of the meaning of a concept to the operations used to measure it. The separation of (...) the physical world from what the scientist says about it leads Clark to deny that science is cognitive. It is, rather, a way of increasing nature's utility. As such, it may not be used to support any ethical position whatever.—J. M. B. (shrink)

In a series of essays, Miss Rand expounds her "Objectivist Ethics." Man will discover, if he is sufficiently rational, those goals and values which are peculiar to him alone, i.e., those which will enable him to survive, and which require complex thought processes. The result of this search is that the moral man is he who achieves his maximum happiness; relationships, whether economic or emotional, are to be based on trade, and no interests conflict if they are viewed in a (...) properly wide context. The essays are quite readable, although not so arresting as Miss Rand's novels; however, the ethics collapses when it is applied to a populous society whose environment is either agriculturally poor or highly mechanized. Given these conditions, if a man views his interest from the limited standpoint of Objectivism, there is a necessary conflict of interests.—J. M. B. (shrink)

One hundred years separates the birth of T. Campanella from that of G. B. Vico. This collection of essays, published in 1969 by the Archives of Philosophy, is the end result of a congress held in Rome commemorating the birth of both philosophers. Campanella and Vico are celebrated in the same volume on the assumption of ideal affinities besides the accidental circumstances of having been born a century apart. Unfortunately, only one essay is expressly devoted to the analysis of Campanella's (...) and Vico's metaphysics. While the first two papers consider Campanella's medical biography and his epistemology, the last four are dedicated solely to various aspects of Vico's thought. On Iacobelli Isoldi falls the responsibility of justifying the title of the volume. But her attempt to demonstrate a family resemblance between Vico's and Campanella's metaphysics remains farfetched. For Campanella's way of solving the theoretical problem arising from Descartes' dualism issues in inevitable skepticism. Campanella never abandoned the position that the cogito is a vehicle of certainty, but not a criterion of truth. Vico on the other hand, overcomes his initial skepticism by transforming the criterion of truth into a criterion of certainty. In the New Science he demonstrates how man can possess true knowledge of the social and historical sciences. To demonstrate that this symposium had been assembled for reasons other than physical convenience, more papers on possible relations between the Dominican friar of Cosenza and the professor of eloquence of Naples would have been a desideratum.--L. M. P. (shrink)

Karl Barth's younger brother died shortly before the publication of this monumental work, the crowning piece of his long philosophical career. Since Sein und Zeit and L'Etre et le Néant the present book has been the first real "treatise" in what now we might call "the existentialistic tradition." Such a short notice cannot even hope to enumerate the major themes of this huge volume. This is a truly significant work covering most of the themes that attract a passionate concern for (...) the history of Western philosophizing. The continuity with this history is preserved through the determination of existence as knowledge. The question and the quest about appearance is conducted in such a way that neither the existentialist nor the transcendental elements are neglected. Throughout the entire book it is argued that appearance and existence are positively grounded in transcendence.—M. J. V. (shrink)

One of the most important and most interesting questions of the history of Christian thought is that of the influence of Platonism on Patristic and Scholastic speculation. Today, perhaps more than ever before, this question of the influence of Plato--and that of his later, more faithful disciples, the Neo-Platonists--presents itself as a fascinating issue. Ivánka is a historian, and the shorter essays and studies of a thirty-year research career are here recast and integrated into a unified book, focussing on some (...) major figures and problems of Christian Platonism. After a lengthy and highly interesting general reflection on Platonism and its historical fortunes, we have chapters on Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, and Augustine, representing the culmination of Platonism in the Greek East and the Latin West respectively. The second part of the book is devoted to speculative mystical theology: Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus Confessor, the pre-Thomistic West, and at the end a fascinating chapter on the Platonic core of the spiritual doctrine of the late Byzantine centuries.--M. J. V. (shrink)

After the post-war insistence on Schelling's middle philosophy, his late speculation is becoming again the focus of Schelling-studies--but now from a genuinely transcendental viewpoint. The origin of this shift in perspective can be traced back to W. Schulz's celebrated work on Schelling's late philosophy as the culmination of German idealism. The present study unmistakably displays the mark of Schulz's influence. Its thesis is that the early and late philosophies, are similar in that both have a double structure. In Schelling's Early (...) philosophy because the ego must represent itself at a certain stage of its development as matter, transcendental philosophy necessarily refers to the philosophy of nature. In his Late philosophy because finite knowledge has as its principle absolute freedom which manifests itself in history, negative philosophy necessarily refers to positive philosophy. Philosophy of nature and positive philosophy are privileged realms for the thinker to show the active presence of experience in reflection, i.e. to insist on the role of facticity in reason's self-founding and self-mediating enterprise. All this is presented in a clear, correct and competent way; however the style and expression are too abstract, and the reader is left with a feeling of narrow precision.--M. J. V. (shrink)

This book by an economist might seem to claim the attention of philosophers, as its chapters include "The subject and methods of inquiry," and "The problem of induction"; important topics in the philosophy of science. In fact, it is a superficial and pretentious essay on science as a social system. Few facts are offered. The generalizations distort. Probably due to the imprecision of their statement, the premisses often contradict one another. A disproportionate percentage of the book's length consists of various (...) forms of the first person pronoun. The chapter on induction, which Mr. Tullock calls a digression, characterizes induction, also called Hume's problem, twice; once in terms of the popular misconception, as a process of going from the particular to the general, second, as the process whereby "a pattern of the whole problem appears in the mind and is then tested by working out.... The patterns must be directly perceived by the mind, since no 'intellectual' explanation is available." The author seems unaware that Hume's problem, and the justification of induction, are never mentioned.—M. B. M. (shrink)

Salutary reading for all philosophers, and not only for inductive logicians, philosophers of science and law, this important book presents an elaborate theory of inductive reasoning whose substantive features are as strikingly original as the approach is rare. First, the theory is based on concrete, real, actual, and significant instances of inductive reasoning, e.g., Karl von Frisch’s work on bees; that is, though its aim is genuinely theoretical in the sense that it engages in the proper amounts of idealization, abstraction, (...) systematization, precision, and rigor, it never loses sight of the fact that "theories in the philosophy of science, like theories in science itself, have to face up to the challenge of appropriately accredited experience within their appointed domains". Second, a central subject matter being analyzed is legal reasoning, that is, the types of proofs and arguments used by juries, judges, and lawyers in the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, where criminal charges have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and civil cases have to be argued on the balance of probability. Thus, in effect, Cohen’s synthesis of juridical and of scientific reasoning is an admirable example of the bridging of two "cultures." Third, and most importantly, the concept of "inductive probability," in terms of which Cohen makes sense out of his subject matter, is incommensurable with that of "mathematical probability," namely the classical calculus of chance according to which probability is measurable, additive, transitive, and obeys a multiplicational principle for conjunction and a complementational one for negation. This is not to say that "inductive probability" is a hazy, mysterious, or unstructured concept, and Cohen goes to great lengths to show that it is ordinal, modal, and formally analyzable; what it does mean is that essential types of reasoning in science and in law involve probable inferences whose probabilities are nonquantitative. Hence, though Cohen does not stress the qualitative nature of inductive probability, his book will be welcome by those who conceive of philosophy as scientia qualitatum. Specific conclusions reached by Cohen are that, in general, probability may be conceived as degree of provability, that differences in proof-rules generate different special cases of probability, that inductive probability may be viewed as the special case where the proof-rules are incomplete, that inductive probability is to inductive support as deducibility is to logical truth, and that some recent epistemological scepticism may be refuted by Cohen’s inductive logic. Finally, he sees himself in the British inductivist tradition, interpreting his predecessors as groping toward a logic of inductive support and probability rather than a methodology of discovery: from Bacon he develops the notion of eliminative induction but rejects that of induction by enumeration; Mill’s canons are analyzed as special cases of Cohen’s own "method of relevant variables," except for the method of residues, which is rejected as invalid ; he takes his critique of mathematical probability as a vindication of Hume’s thesis that "probability or reasoning from conjecture may be divided into two kinds, viz., that which is founded on chance and that which arises from causes" ; Whewell’s consilience of induction is justified ; and from Keynes, he develops the notion of the "weight" of evidence but rejects his mathematicist approach.—M. A. F. (shrink)

Histories of philosophy generally jump from Kant directly to Fichte without mentioning Salomon Maimon; yet even Fichte wrote about his "unbounded admiration" toward the Jewish thinker. The present volume is a most welcome reprint of Maimon's principal work, out of print for over a century and a half, in which he tries to refute the very idea of a Ding-an-sich. It can be claimed that this same enterprise had been carried out more spectacularly and with greater originality and depth by (...) Fichte; but it remains Maimon's great merit to have exorcised the spectre of the noumena operating from within the very framework of the Critique.—M. J. V. (shrink)

This seems destined, quite naturally and justly, to become a standard group of selections. Included are Chappell's meaty Introduction, My Own Life, Of the Standard of Taste, the Dialogues, and large portions of the Treatise and the two Inquiry's. Where Chappell feels that the Treatise and especially the first Inquiry overlap, he favors the passages from the Treatise. Among the notable exclusions from the latter are most of the discussion of space and time and the better part of Book II, (...) Part II. What is probably most controversial and unfortunate is the editor's omission of all but three sections in "Of Justice and Injustice".--W. L. M. (shrink)

The author sees his work as uniting the philosophy of mind and computer research. Each of these fields can benefit the other, philosophy of mind providing conceptual analyses and computers providing models for understanding human mental processes. A case in point providing the focus of this book is the problem of the mechanical simulation of the human ability to recognize handwritten script. Present difficulties in designing machines that can read human script point to a conceptual muddle in which classification and (...) recognition are confused. The author untangles the confusion by ordinary language analysis and then speculates as to how a more successful machine for recognizing the letters of human script might be designed. The language analysis is somewhat tedious, but the speculations about perceptual acts and mechanical letter recognition are intriguing.—P. M. (shrink)

The first volume of a yearbook to be published regularly by the Center of Humanistic Studies at the University of Nuevo Leon in Mexico. Devoted primarily to the publication of articles by members of the Center, the contents are arranged under five headings: Philosophy, Literature, History, Social Sciences, and Editorial Matter.--S. M. W.

An essay in normative jurisprudence where the author is concerned with delineating and evaluating legal decision procedures. The appeal to precedent and equity are critically examined and found to be deficient. Wasserstrom proposes as an improvement a two-level decision procedure, which is like precedent in appealing to a rule of law as a necessary condition for deciding a case, and like equity "in that considerations of justice are directly relevant to the justification of any decision." He frankly admits that this (...) decision procedure is an improvement at the "price of becoming imprecise at certain crucial points." The discussion is informed throughout with an appreciation of both legal and philosophical treatments of the issues.--S. M. W. (shrink)

Listening to someone from some distance in a crowded room you may experience the following phenomenon: when looking at them speak, you may both hear and see where the source of the sounds is; but when your eyes are turned elsewhere, you may no longer be able to detect exactly where the voice must be coming from. With your eyes again fixed on the speaker, and the movement of her lips a clear sense of the source of the sound will (...) return. This ‘ventriloquist’ effect reflects the ways in which visual cognition can dominate auditory perception. And this phenomenological observation is one what you can verify or disconfirm in your own case just by the slightest reflection on what it is like for you to listen to someone with or without visual contact with them. (shrink)

This volume offers the first-ever complete English translation of Leibniz’s Dissertatio De Arte Combinatoria together with a critical edition of the original Latin text on fa...

Our research is based on a rather large "library" of various works by M. Drahomanov, which contains his views on religion. Among them: Paradise and Progress, From the History of Relations Between Church and State in Western Europe, Faith and Public Affairs, Fight for Spiritual Power and Freedom of Conscience in the 16th - 17th Centuries,, "Church and State in the Roman Empire", "The Status and Tasks of the Science of Ancient History," "Evangelical Faith in Old England," "Populism and Popular (...) Progress in Austrian Rus, Austrian-Russian Remembrance," "Pious The Legend of the Bulgarians "," The Issues of Religious Freedom in Russia, "" On the Brotherhood of the Baptist or the Baptist in Ukraine, "" The Foreword, " Shevchenko, Ukrainianophiles and Socialism "," Wonderful thoughts about the Ukrainian national affair "," Zazdri gods "," Slavic variants of one Gospel legend "," Resurrection of Christ ", etc. (shrink)