Open peer commentary on the article “Making Sense and Meaning: On the Role of Communication and Culture in the Reproduction of Social Systems” by Raivo Palmaru. Upshot • I argue that if we decide to use the term “culture,” we need to be explicit about the problems we hope to solve in doing so. I suggest that Luhmann might have had a good reason to be hesitant to utilize the term.

Çin, son dönemlerde Körfez Bölgesine yönelik izlediği aktif politika, Çin Devlet Başkanı Xi Jipping’in (Şi Cinping), 7-9 Aralık 2022 tarihinde Körfez’e gerçekleştirdiği kapsamlı ziyaretle birlikte daha fazla dinamizm kazanmıştır. Bu ziyareti takiben yapılan analizler Çin’in, Körfez açılımını ABD’nin bölgesel hegemonyasını zayıflatmaya yönelik bir girişim olarak değerlendirmektedirler. Aynı ziyaret sırasında Pekin ve Riyad yönetimleri arasında imzalanan kapsamlı anlaşmalar ise ABD’nin Körfezdeki uzun erimli güvenlik partneri Suudi Arabistan’a ilişkin “eksen kayması” tartışmalarını başlattı. Bu çalışma güncelliğini koruyan iki tartışmanın kapsamlı bir muhakemesini yapmayı (...) hedeflemektedir. Bu amaçla uluslararası ilişkiler disiplinin son dönem fenomen teorisi olan hiyerarşinin ilgili argümanları kullanılmaktadır. Bu teorik çerçeveden hareketle, çalışmada ilk olarak Çin’in Körfez siyasetini şekillendiren stratejilerin fiyat arttırma (oubidding) ve negatif dengeleme (negative balancing) olduğu ve bu stratejilerin Körfez Bölgesi ülkeleri açısından yeni imkânlar yarattığı tespitinde bulunulmaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra Suudi Arabistan’ın, Çin ile gelişen ikili ilişkilerini hâlihazırda ABD ile sürdürmekte olduğu ilişkisine bir alternatif olarak görmediği, aksine Çin’in bahsi geçen stratejilerinden maksimum kazanım elde ederek otonomisini arttırmaya çalıştığı ayrıca belirtiliyor. (shrink)

Originally published in 1939, this volume contains the text of an inaugural lecture delivered by M. M. Postan on his accession to the Professorship of Economic History at the University of Cambridge. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in economic history or the history of the study of humanities.

McNeilly presents an interesting if not altogether convincing analysis of Hobbes' Leviathan. He argues in introductory chapters that the different accounts of human nature given in The Elements of Law, De Corpore, and Leviathan reveal a development parallel to the development in the Hobbesian notion of science. More particularly, he claims that the theory of science presented in Leviathan is a conventionalist one, taking mathematics as its model. This is in contrast to the self-evidence theory of mathematics and the hypothetico-deductive (...) theory of physics found in De Corpore and it is like the conventionalism of Elements. Using the conventionalist model, Hobbes presents in Leviathan, a science of man which is a formal system of moral and political propositions definitionally true and not "purporting to state truths about human nature." The system of propositions remains true whatever the actual nature of human motivation. Applying his thesis to the various parts of the Leviathan, McNeilly finds Hobbes presenting there a generalized theory of the passions from which the egoism of the earlier works cannot be logically deduced, but is merely a "cautious empirical generalization added to the latter," and not necessary to it. He then shows that notions like power, glory, and felicity of the ethics, and the state of nature, natural law, and obligation of the politics, are reformulated in Leviathan as strictly formal concepts and are logically deduced from the theory of the passions. Material concepts, such as self-preservation, are seen to be expressions of Hobbes' private views and not essential to the system. McNeilly's analyses are lucid and perceptive throughout with the exception of his discussion of the nature of science. Here he imposes upon the writings of Hobbes the contemporary meanings and distinctions instead of working within the tradition of the seventeenth century where the distinctions have not yet been made. A good short English bibliography on Hobbes is appended.--M. M. H. (shrink)

A massive series of meticulous clarifications and arguments is marshalled to attempt to refute, first, the doctrine that all relations are "internal", next, the claims that coherence is the sole criterion of the nature of truth, and finally, the theory of degrees of truth and falsity. The author's great familiarity with the literature of the coherence theorists proves almost a drawback: he prefers to cite texts extensively, but must then acknowledge important differences among them. There is little in the way (...) of a constructive alternative theory of truth, but the criticism is formidable.--W. L. M. (shrink)

The thesis of this work may be summarized in the words of its author: "... the Social Sciences, which heretofore have wavered between literature and an impossible positivism after the fashion of the Natural Sciences, could establish their own scientific statute if, aided by special techniques, they began discovering their hypotheses and interpreting their observations in the light of the partial overlapping of objective man and subjective man within the idea of Universal Man possessed by all". Parain makes use of (...) the Cartesian idea of the Universal Man in her efforts to provide a solid foundation for the Human Sciences. In her dissatisfaction with procedures basing the human facts solely on scientific method, she frankly demands a framework that is truly ontological. She is confronted here with the same difficulties experienced by all those trying to define as facts our knowledge of self and our knowledge of other minds. Her solution, as in the above quote, constitutes a compromise between subjectivity and objectivity, between the lived and the reflective, between a postulated universal and an interpretative schema. The author is quite conscious of the special difficulty presented by passions and ideological biases in the definition of human facts. Here her attitude is resignation with the inevitable: an empirical observer will never quite do as a transcendental observer. In spite of this the author maintains and illustrates that we know a great deal more about man than we might suspect.—A. M. (shrink)

The ontological argument continues to draw the attention of philosophers of different persuasions. This is one of the latest works on the subject. In it the Anselmian proof as developed in the Proslogion is submitted to careful analysis and placed in relation to Anselm’s approach to God in the Monologion. Thus the title of the book seems to be justified, inasmuch as it is Anselm’s notion of God that is investigated from a rational viewpoint rather than the ontological argument alone. (...) Vuillemin divides his work into four parts, which are followed by a conclusion and seven appendices. In the first two parts he contends that the ontological argument as stated in the Proslogion is a rational proof based on rational data, even though faith may support those data, and that the proof therefore involves an illegitimate transition from the concept of God in our mind to his actual existence, a criticism that the author shares with Kant. The third and fourth parts of the book are Vuillemin’s personal contribution to the understanding of the argument and purport to show the epistemological and mathematical antinomies that result from the "negative" concept of a being than which nothing greater can be thought which is at the basis of the Anselmian proof. It is the author’s contention that reason can prove both the impossibility of conceiving the being in question and the inability of the human mind to argue to the existence of a transcendent being from concepts derived by abstraction from the beings of our experience. Thus Vuillemin would rule out not only the so-called argument a priori of the Proslogion but also the arguments a posteriori presented in the Monologion. To understand Anselm’s ontological argument correctly, it is necessary to view it in the light of Anselm’s belief and in the context of the ideological realism which he shared with the entire Augustinian school. By neglecting such considerations, Vuillemin, like many other interpreters before him, does not seem to have done justice to what has been called "one of the boldest creations of man’s reason and a credit not only to his inventor, but to human reason itself.".—B. M. B. (shrink)

Consists largely of fragments from the works of poets, prophets, and philosophers, particularly the author's teacher, Charles E. Garman, all expressive of a kind of anti-dogmatic theism.--C. M.

In this revised and expanded edition of his well-known study of Denis Diderot's life and works, Crocker combines solid scholarship with a vivid portrayal of his subjects. Leaving firm ground only occasionally, Crocker masterfully reconstructs Diderot's life by weaving into his narrative the testimony of Diderot's contemporaries and the philosopher's own anecdotes of the more picturesque episodes of his life. The author never departs from firm ground, however, in his presentation of Diderot's works. With a rare blend of erudition and (...) a lively critical sense, he sets them forth in the light of eighteenth-century currents of thought, highlighting Diderot's most significant contributions to materialism, sensualism, and experimentalism, while at the same time preserving, in quite readable summaries, the integrity of individual writings. His extensive consideration of the twenty years Diderot devoted to the Encyclopedia is particularly stimulating. By contrast, his summary presentation of Diderot's novels is somewhat disappointing, especially since he gives all too brief mention to Diderot's innovations in that genre. A needed index is lacking, but in spite of this and other minor shortcomings, Crocker's efforts have resulted in what is clearly the best complete English biography of one of the eighteenth century's most colorful geniuses.—C. M. M. (shrink)

The title refers to Anselm's insight into the modal uniqueness of the divine existence and the proof based upon it in Proslogium III. Hartshorne continues his vigorous defense of "the Proof," his polemic against its critics, most of whom confuse it with the weaker one in Proslogium II, and his attempt to show that Anselm's discovery is ultimately viable only in the context of neo-classical theism. In the second half of the book a variety of responses to the proof, from (...) Gaunilo to several contemporaries, are examined and criticized. While this does not add substantially to the presentation and defense of the argument given in the first half, it does provide ample evidence of the way in which a host of philosophical questions are brought into sharp focus by reflecting on Anselm. Some of these, e.g., the theory of modalities, receive important attention which was lacking in The Logic of Perfection. The author's own position has not changed, though he now seems more impressed than previously by Barth's treatment of Anselm.—M. W. (shrink)

A collection of 24 out of the 35 papers presented at the Fourth Scandinavian Logic Symposium and First Soviet-Finnish Logic Conference, which took place simultaneously in Finland in 1976. Topics covered are proof theory, set theory, model theory, recursion theory, infinitary languages, generalized quantifiers, truthlikeness, natural language, and "philosophical logic." There is a paper by George Kreisel which discusses an intriguing distinction between the theory of proofs and general proof theory, the latter being the study of the allegedly definitional or (...) essential property of proofs, the former being the study of structural features such as length of proofs and of relations between proofs and other things. There is a paper by Hintikka in which he applies his "game-theoretical semantics" developed elsewhere to quantifiers in natural languages, e.g., the analysis of sentences like "some novel by every novelist is mentioned by every critic". I found the most interesting paper to be the one by Bengt Hansson, which studies the nature of paradoxes by articulating an analogy with mathematical equations, the crucial property about the latter being that they do not always have solutions. Almost all papers are highly technical and thus aimed at experts of the specialties mentioned in the book’s title.—M.A.F. (shrink)

As the crime rate rises and attempts to rehabilitate criminals prove unsuccessful, attacks upon recent reforms in our handling of crime increase. In this book van den Haag offers both a theory of punishment which supports traditional penal policies and factual data which show the failure of recent reforms. van den Haag claims that the main purpose of a legal system is to preserve order but that not every system that does this is acceptable. Along with preserving order, a legal (...) system should also be retributively just, i.e., punish those and only those who deserve it, because only such a system will gain public support. Although van den Haag does not present an original thesis on the moral justification of punishment, he covers many important issues in a lucid fashion, argues forcefully for his views, and presents some new arguments. In his discussion of our legal system’s exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, he argues that such evidence should be admissible in court since the misconduct of the police is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the police obtain evidence illegally, then they should be punished rather than society harmed by allowing the guilty to go free. In defending the death penalty, van den Haag contends that it is the opponents of the penalty’s effectiveness as a deterrent who have the burden of proof. Since, other things being equal, increasing the severity of the penalty decreases the incidence of various crimes, it must be assumed that the incidence of any crime can be decreased by increasing the severity of the punishment. Thus, without clear evidence to the contrary, the death penalty would have to be deemed likely to have a deterrent effect. The factual data presented by van den Haag is interesting and one recent experiment he discusses has produced particularly surprising results. This experiment on student cheating showed that the threat of punishment was effective in producing the desired behavior, but that exhortations to be honest were counterproductive.—M.G. (shrink)

Readable, knowledgeable, and above all, eminently timely, this book is intended for the general public. It is written by a college professor and chaplain whose substantial background in the philosophical and theological bases of ethics enables him to show that the pervasive problem underlying the causes, symptoms, and effects of today's unease is essentially moral. Conover deals with the coequal focal points of moral man and moral society. He has chapters on the self, interpersonal relations, and the meaning of the (...) moral in impersonal relations. His definition of morality is a naturalistic one; its purpose is to regulate personal and group relations with other persons and groups. He finds our greatest obstacle to be the exclusive or "closed" nature of the moral community, which frustrates the accomplishment of moral purposes just at the points at which our conflicts are most difficult to resolve. He is able to place current issues of race, student disaffection, personal alienation, international conflict, and changing sexual standards in the unifying context of our need to protect both the personal and the corporate life of mankind. Therefore, the book stands a good chance of helping those interested in closing the generation, or other gaps. It is recommended for study and discussion groups of adults, college students, and perhaps advanced secondary school students. Helpful to educators and educational for parents, the book has particular merit for students because it avoids oversimplification.--M. B. M. (shrink)

A collection of articles centering around the analysis of the category of possibility. Most have been previously published; an English translation of one, "Scienza e Liberta," appeared in this Review V, p. 361. The treatment is in the contemporary existentialist manner, freedom being presented as based upon possibility, as existentially relevant, as finite and conditioned, yet effective in human affairs. Possibility and freedom, and their interrelation, are discussed from the point of view of their function and value within the philosophical, (...) scientific, artistic, historical and linguistic disciplines. The last three articles deal with the problem in relation to Dewey, Wittgenstein and Croce respectively. --M. B. (shrink)

A concise, popular introduction to Buddhism, this book presents Buddha's teaching: avoid "desiring too much and avoid desiring too much stopping of such desiring." After a preliminary exposition, the author proceeds to examine the causes for various misinterpretations of Buddha's teaching and concludes with his own criticisms. Bahm's lack of sympathy, however, prevented him from seeing the relevance of Buddha's teaching to the problems confronting Western civilization. And in desiring too much to argue and to document, he interferes with the (...) natural persuasiveness of Buddhism. Nevertheless, the book is to be recommended as a useful introductory work on Buddhism.--T. L. M. (shrink)

A versatile text for graduate or undergraduate courses following a "problem" format, this is a technical manual, which if mastered would impart one of the indispensable skills of philosophers to its students. The responsibility for three of the six chapters lies with each author. Lehrer leads off with "The Contents and Methods of Philosophy," in which he presents the logical and semantic skills which are prerequisite to the following chapters. He considers valid argument forms, the method of counter-example, definition, induction, (...) and so on, with exercises given for each topic. The chapters "Knowledge and Skepticism" and "Freedom and Determinism" are also his. Cornman contributes chapters on the "Mind-Body Problem," "Justifying the Belief in God," and "Justifying an Ethical Standard." Each chapter has an exhaustive bibliography running several pages, giving classical sources, anthologies, textbooks, recent books, other bibliographies where available, and paying special attention to contemporary articles of both immediate and related pertinence. Each chapter, after the first, begins with a statement of the topic in straightforward terms. The alternative positions on the issue are enumerated; each is given a clear elaboration, and the problems faced by each are brought out for consideration. There is considerable dialectical play between positions, as one arises in response to problems unsolvable by another. Each chapter ends by showing which of the alternatives seems most reasonable, and providing exercises for the student.--M. B. M. (shrink)

This anthology is intended primarily to provide students of theology with some of the basic writings of the major thinkers who have contributed to the development of the movement known as "process theology." Because of the content students of philosophy will likewise find it useful. The editor begins the work with an introduction in which he ably traces in broad perspective the various ways in which a mental attitude stressing process is reflected in contemporary culture, philosophy, and theology. The first (...) part of the volume then provides essays that center on process thought as this has emerged from the writings of Alfred North Whitehead and his American disciples. Two essays in this part are concerned with tracing the development of process thought, the one by Norman Pittenger centering on its historical evolution from Whitehead through Hartshorne and others into a distinct theological movement, whereas the one by Charles Hartshorne is concerned with the inner development of process thought as a noetic capable of dealing with relational reality. In other essays in this part Bernard Meland comments on the value of process thought in providing an imagery and concepts congenial to contemporary man in his struggle to understand his experience, and Bernard M. Loomer examines in detail the empirical basis and methodology central to Whitehead’s philosophy. The essays in the second part focus on the relationship between God and the world as this relationship is interpreted by process thinkers. Here selections include the final chapter of Whitehead’s Process and Reality, Hartshorne’s suggestive account of the philosophical and religious uses of the term "God," Schubert Ogden’s attempt to defend a concept of God modeled on process thought as more conformable to biblical testimony than the concept of God classical in Christian thought, Walter Stoke’s endeavor to integrate features of process thought within a more Thomistic framework relative to the being of God, and two essays by Daniel Day Williams and John B. Cobb, Jr. on the relationship between God and world and God and man. Essays in the third part, called "Christ and Redemption," reflect the efforts of three Whiteheadian-inspired theologians, Meland, Pittenger, and Henry Nelson Wieman, to rethink the Christian doctrine of the incarnation within the framework provided by process thought. In the fourth part of the work attention is directed from Whitehead to another major source of contemporary process theology, Teilhard de Chardin. The essays include Theodosius Dobzhansky’s lengthy critical appreciation of the major directions in Teilhard’s vision of the universe, Teilhard’s own views on a cosmic Christology, a development of his views on this topic by Henri de Lubac, and other studies of aspects of Teilhard’s thought by N. M. Wildiers, George Crespy, and Christopher F. Mooney. An appendix includes a comparative study of the metaphysics of Teilhard and Whitehead by Ian G. Barbour. A useful bibliography completes the anthology.—W. E. M. (shrink)

Selections from five books written since 1937 are combined with one journal article to form a debate. But, as the editor points out in his perceptive introduction, Plato has become more or less an occasion for discussing another issue--the theoretical foundations of democracy. Interestingly, the three against Plato are British--Crossman, Popper and Russell; the three for him are American--Wild, Hallowell and Strauss. The selections are non-technical, and together constitute a good introduction to an important aspect of political philosophy.--M. W.

With the addition of the words "Anglo-American" after "Contemporary," the title of this book could serve as its review. The emphasis of the collection is on analytic British and American ethical theory since 1950, although the editors do dip back into 1903 for G. E. Moore. There are five sections: Moral Reasoning and the Is-Ought Controversy; Rules, Principles, and Utilitarianism; Concepts of Morality; Why be Moral?; and Normative, Religious, and Metaethics. The editors have kept their explanatory material to a minimum, (...) three pages serving to introduce most sections. The eleven pages of bibliography list selections of the same genre, mainly from the 1950's and 60's. Comparing this book with Philipa [[sic]] Foot's 1967 Theories of Ethics, which has the same emphasis, almost the same contributors, and several of the same articles, Pahel and Schiller give us a longer, more substantial, hard-cover book, and in this larger compass are able to provide more examples of dialogue between authors, critics, and replies.--M. B. M. (shrink)

After the post-war insistence on Schelling's middle philosophy, his late speculation is becoming again the focus of Schelling-studies--but now from a genuinely transcendental viewpoint. The origin of this shift in perspective can be traced back to W. Schulz's celebrated work on Schelling's late philosophy as the culmination of German idealism. The present study unmistakably displays the mark of Schulz's influence. Its thesis is that the early and late philosophies, are similar in that both have a double structure. In Schelling's Early (...) philosophy because the ego must represent itself at a certain stage of its development as matter, transcendental philosophy necessarily refers to the philosophy of nature. In his Late philosophy because finite knowledge has as its principle absolute freedom which manifests itself in history, negative philosophy necessarily refers to positive philosophy. Philosophy of nature and positive philosophy are privileged realms for the thinker to show the active presence of experience in reflection, i.e. to insist on the role of facticity in reason's self-founding and self-mediating enterprise. All this is presented in a clear, correct and competent way; however the style and expression are too abstract, and the reader is left with a feeling of narrow precision.--M. J. V. (shrink)

This is the first good book on the early Schelling since Metzger's study in 1911. What is more, it is an entirely novel interpretation of this first and most productive decade of Schelling's philosophizing. The central thesis is that Schelling's fundamental intuition had always been that of the concrete and particular character of all reality. Reality is a whole and everything real is a whole: an actual closed totality. Even in this most Fichtean period, Schelling did not really accept the (...) transcendental position, and the philosophy of nature allowed him to expand his vision of the concrete into rich and complex constructions. This is a view which one occasionally encounters in other critical writings on Schelling, but it is usually overpowered by the accumulated Hegelian prejudice concerning Schelling's "dogmatism" and "abstract formalism." It is therefore heartening to see the author, without any polemics, challenging the Hegelians on their own favorite hunting-ground: the arid pastures of the philosophy of identity. Although the author does not fully document her findings, and although the System of Transcendental Idealism is almost totally neglected, the book is undoubtedly an important event. It may even signal the opening of new research into the early Schelling. It is immensely useful--and encouraging--for a number of scholars working on the Ages of the World and on the positive philosophy: it helps them to see the continuity in the six decades of Schelling's philosophizing.--M. J. V. (shrink)

Once more these annals offer the reader a substantial collection of varied articles and studies, mostly pertaining to issues of medieval philosophy and metaphysics. The contributors are from Austria, West Germany, and South Korea. Especially interesting are: the study on Kant's early writing, "The Only Possible Proof of God," by J. Bauer; a very strict analysis of the thirteenth chapter of Cusanus' book, De Visione Dei, by the Proclus specialist W. Beierwaltes; and an attempt at the "reconciliation" of metaphysics and (...) positivism by R. Wohlgenannt. There are a number of shorter book reviews and a lengthy instructive review article on R. Berlinger's recent book on Augustine's dialectical metaphysics. This review article is at least as interesting and inspiring as the major articles making up the bulk of the book.--M. J. V. (shrink)

The author traces the motley and fascinating history of two shapes of philosophical history, the cyclical and progressive. In the first five chapters his interpretations are sensitive, the language vigorous, elegant, and learned. His accounts of Augustine and Joachim, the Renaissance and early Kant are particularly good. Unfortunately, in his treatment of German philosophical history his scholarship breaks down. He claims, for example, that Hegel's encounter with French history aroused only hostility and rejection, when in fact Hegel regarded the French (...) as "on a higher level of universal and national culture" than the Germans in understanding history. Chapter 6 sees Hegel a proponent of the vita contemplativa; certainly his greatness lay in altering the very conception of "life" and contributing the decisive influence on the most activist philosophy of all time. Manuel falsely links Hegel's idea of the Germanic world with race theory, and presses to a crooked conclusion: the Germans looked on everything foreign as inimical. Hegel's unexampled ideal was a knowledge of all cultures and universal freedom.—M. M. (shrink)

This is a monumental work. The author's aim is to follow the destiny of the self-explicitation [[sic]] of western thought from the concept of substance to that of structure. Authentic philosophical thinking has always been ontological, and structure, no less than substance is a form or species of being. System too is a species of being which leads from substance to structure. Structure is only an articulation and intensification of substance. The concept of structure is the central notion of contemporary (...) thought; it is at the focus of the natural as well as of the social sciences and it alone can bridge the gap between the "two cultures." It alone can pave the way for a new philosophical humanism which, without abandoning the claim to universality and "objectivity," retains the thinking man as its focus. The author's contention is that the concept of structure is far from being a newcomer on the scene but it has been rather ripening slowly throughout the great systems of the last six centuries. Without being in any way a treatise on the history of philosophy and on the history of science, the present book describes with great competence and persuasiveness the evolution of "structure" from Nicholas of Autrecourt via Cusanus and early modern science to Descartes. Next comes an extraordinarily rich and insightful analysis of the world of Pascal. Finally the conclusion is reached through a discussion of Leibniz and Kant. This is a difficult book, a long and complex one. It might well belong to those writings which reshape our understanding of the past, and through it, contribute to our expectations of the future.--M. J. V. (shrink)

Wölfel's study is a very technical enterprise, profusely endowed with footnotes and making little attempt if any at reaching the nonspecialist. Yet the subject matter of the work must be of concern to anyone interested in philosophical theology and the history of Christian speculation. Two seemingly very distant topics, those of the Trinity and of natural theology are brought together by the author and the point of departure for this rapprochement is the univocal concept of being, one cornerstone of Scotism. (...) This is why a book almost entirely devoted to an investigation dwelling on the inner structure of the being of God can have relevance to general ontology.--M. J. V. (shrink)

An attempt to argue apodictically for the existence of a provident Creator in the spirit, but not the letter of Aquinas. Attempted proofs which depend on Platonic ontology, including Thomas' Fourth Way, are rejected outright, along with other considerations which are considered to have psychological, but not logical force, such as the widespread belief in God. Thomas' other four proofs, described as of the cosmological type, in distinction from the author's metaphysical proof, are criticized, not for being fallacious inferences, but (...) for being incomplete, that is, for proving the existence of something less than a provident Creator. The metaphysical proof which is offered seeks to overcome this defect by taking as its starting point, not the material world, but finite existence as such, and developing the antithesis between finite and absolute being. Two special features of the book are its extensive argument for the independence of metaphysics from all physical science, and its discussion of the problem of evil, which ultimately appeals beyond philosophical arguments to theological considerations.—M. W. (shrink)

This book is primarily a survey of commonly accepted theories of memory. In the course of the book Locke attempts to show that the traditional theories of memory, that is the Representative and the Realist theories are inadequate because of certain mistaken assumptions adopted by the advocates of these views. For example, both of these theories’ proponents mistakenly assume that remembering is an occurrence, that this occurrence consists in a mental experience in the form of having mental images, and that (...) memory-knowledge is knowledge based on or derived from the memory-experience or the memory-image. These notions are mistaken, Locke claims, because memory consists in immediate knowledge of the past, not in the immediate experience of the past; and memory is a form of knowledge, not a form of quasi-perceptual awareness. The notion that memory is a form of knowledge is considered by Locke to be the standard contemporary account of the nature of memory. It is in these terms that he analyzes the different forms of memory: factual memory, which is defined as retained factual knowledge or knowledge we have possessed before and still possess; practical memory, which is defined as retained practical knowledge or knowledge that consists in possessing certain acquired abilities and skills; and personal memory, which is defined as memory of items that one has experienced for himself. The true test of the contemporary account, as Locke sees it, is whether it allows one to answer affirmatively the question "Is memory reliable?". In the final analysis, however, this seems to be impossible. Generally speaking, one believes that he is entitled to rely on something insofar as it can be established that what is relied upon is normally an accurate guide to the facts of the matter. Nevertheless, if one can never tell when memory is correct, it cannot be established that memory is a reliable guide to anything; thus, one can never be entitled to rely on memories. One solution to this dilemma seems to lie in the suggestion that even if one cannot demonstrate that memory is reliable, this is the simplest and possibly the only plausible assumption to make to explain the plain facts of the human situation. Moreover, one who rejects this pragmatic use of the reliability of memory is committed to saying that knowledge is impossible in any case. If there is no avenue to the past, then there is no assurance that anyone or anything has a past history at all. Without a past history, one has never acquired any information nor any reason for knowing anything, not even about the present. Memory-knowledge, then, is not a matter of simple utility, rather it is a matter of what presuppositions or assumptions have to be made if knowledge is to be possible at all. In effect, Locke sees this as simply a "transcendental argument" for the reliability of memory; that is, an argument that shows that a certain principle has to be accepted as true if a certain form of inquiry is to be possible.—T. L. M. (shrink)

An examination of the various manifestations of love, in the form of a conversation between a psychiatrist and two young interlocutors. Each type of love--adoring, benevolent and erotic--follows its own laws and is subject to its own special obstacles. The emotional and sexual life of man is described in general terms as that of a being who is "not only biological but also metaphysical" in nature. The author's many insights into human emotional processes are complemented by counsels for avoiding and (...) overcoming anxieties connected with love.--M. F. (shrink)

This is a translation of another volume of the monumental history of philosophy published in the 1930s by Bréhier. The bibliography is brought up to date by the translator with help from Wesley Piersol. Bréhier writes history of philosophy in the broad sense, showing the social, literary, and political forms taken by philosophical trends of the period. Many of the writings treated in this volume will be unknown to students trained in the Anglo-American tradition. There are only fifteen pages on (...) Scottish realism and British utilitarianism, and a page or so each on Kierkegaard and Emerson. In the substantial chapters on Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and the trends in German thought following Hegel, one can find summaries of the positions of such philosophers as von Humboldt, Schleiermacher, Herbart, Feuerbach, Stirner, and others. There is a rich section of over a hundred pages on French social philosophy: Fourier, Saint-Simon, Comte, and Proudhon. Early work of Engels and Marx is mentioned, but fuller treatment belongs to the next volume. A chapter on Italian idealism is also included. This period saw the flowering of vast constructive systems. A sense of history and development transformed philosophical problems, and faith in the rational, reflective initiative of human wills was replaced by faith in a mysterious historical force, an immanent law which makes sport of efforts to resist it. The difference in substance is reflected in differences of style. The clarity and naturalness with which eighteenth-century men of action wrote for a general educated public was replaced by constraint, effort, conventionality, and above all, a prophetic and apocalyptic tone in the works of this time.--M. B. M. (shrink)

This posthumous and unfinished book by the author of The Revolt of the Masses is in the continental tradition of philosophy as literature. The theme of this historical and etymological essay is the justification of that tradition. Ortega's writing is graceful, and includes aphorisms intended to evoke in the reader the philosophical frame of mind, and a sense of wonder. He finds that philosophy so far has provided no system which is adequately true for us; it is dialectical, revealing the (...) past as a defunct world of errors, which are at the same time involuntary instruments of future truth.. In ancient Greece man first felt an excess of possibilities over needs, both in economics and in explanation. The consequent necessity to choose brought about the phenomenon of rationalism. The means of choosing constitutes method. Science and theology thus emerge in Greece as secondary speculations on primary poetic-mythological explanations. In chapters on Parmenides and Heraclitus, Ortega analyzes the style of each, and illustrates his views on the relation between style and the growth of philosophy. His tool here he calls "etymology," although to those trained in the Anglo-American tradition, his word-analysis is more lyrical than analytic. He concludes that Heraclitus used the oracular or sibylline formula for expressing universal wisdom, and that this in fact is philosophy's most suitable vehicle of expression.—M. B. M. (shrink)

Salutary reading for all philosophers, and not only for inductive logicians, philosophers of science and law, this important book presents an elaborate theory of inductive reasoning whose substantive features are as strikingly original as the approach is rare. First, the theory is based on concrete, real, actual, and significant instances of inductive reasoning, e.g., Karl von Frisch’s work on bees; that is, though its aim is genuinely theoretical in the sense that it engages in the proper amounts of idealization, abstraction, (...) systematization, precision, and rigor, it never loses sight of the fact that "theories in the philosophy of science, like theories in science itself, have to face up to the challenge of appropriately accredited experience within their appointed domains". Second, a central subject matter being analyzed is legal reasoning, that is, the types of proofs and arguments used by juries, judges, and lawyers in the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, where criminal charges have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and civil cases have to be argued on the balance of probability. Thus, in effect, Cohen’s synthesis of juridical and of scientific reasoning is an admirable example of the bridging of two "cultures." Third, and most importantly, the concept of "inductive probability," in terms of which Cohen makes sense out of his subject matter, is incommensurable with that of "mathematical probability," namely the classical calculus of chance according to which probability is measurable, additive, transitive, and obeys a multiplicational principle for conjunction and a complementational one for negation. This is not to say that "inductive probability" is a hazy, mysterious, or unstructured concept, and Cohen goes to great lengths to show that it is ordinal, modal, and formally analyzable; what it does mean is that essential types of reasoning in science and in law involve probable inferences whose probabilities are nonquantitative. Hence, though Cohen does not stress the qualitative nature of inductive probability, his book will be welcome by those who conceive of philosophy as scientia qualitatum. Specific conclusions reached by Cohen are that, in general, probability may be conceived as degree of provability, that differences in proof-rules generate different special cases of probability, that inductive probability may be viewed as the special case where the proof-rules are incomplete, that inductive probability is to inductive support as deducibility is to logical truth, and that some recent epistemological scepticism may be refuted by Cohen’s inductive logic. Finally, he sees himself in the British inductivist tradition, interpreting his predecessors as groping toward a logic of inductive support and probability rather than a methodology of discovery: from Bacon he develops the notion of eliminative induction but rejects that of induction by enumeration; Mill’s canons are analyzed as special cases of Cohen’s own "method of relevant variables," except for the method of residues, which is rejected as invalid ; he takes his critique of mathematical probability as a vindication of Hume’s thesis that "probability or reasoning from conjecture may be divided into two kinds, viz., that which is founded on chance and that which arises from causes" ; Whewell’s consilience of induction is justified ; and from Keynes, he develops the notion of the "weight" of evidence but rejects his mathematicist approach.—M. A. F. (shrink)

Throughout his work, from the logic which first brought him to prominence, through Our Social Inheritance, to the last book he lived to see through the press, Lewis was concerned with what he calls "the whole question of validity at large... the relation between valid knowing and justified self-direction of our activities." Lange, who was Lewis' student, has selected several lectures and papers from the last years of Lewis' life. Because Lewis had been working toward a major statement on ethics, (...) these ten late essays are all on ethical themes. Because Lewis was a constructive, systematic philosopher, his ethical position is grounded in his logic, metaphysics, and epistemology. For example, Lewis characterizes 'truth' as a semantic word designating a relation between the conception in question and existant actuality, NOT a relation between the conception and the evidence. Only two of these papers have already appeared in print; the rest were delivered as public lectures. Some were deliberately not published while he still hoped to improve on them. Acknowledging this is probably only fair to Lewis, but it is not the whole story. Over the years, Lewis has delineated the spheres of the valid, the right, the good, and the imperative, and has worked on capturing the relations between the right and the good, the valid and the imperative, the rational, the consistent and the normative. These papers contain new insights as well as older insights elegantly polished.--M. B. M. (shrink)

This volume brings together eight essays on the morality of warfare that originally appeared in Philosophy and Public Affairs. The essays comprising Part I are primarily concerned with the kinds of restrictions on military action that are morally required. As a means of avoiding the unacceptable acts that he believes utilitarianism justifies, Thomas Nagel argues that various moral intuitions should be considered sacrosanct. Richard Brandt criticizes Nagel for defending on intuitive grounds views that do not at all appear self-evident and (...) for failing to explain the crucial distinction between what one does to people and what happens to people as a result of what one does. Brandt contends that although rule-utilitarianism, the position he defends, cannot eliminate the possibility of justifying such generally condemned acts as obliteration bombing, the theory would provide significant and proper restrictions on the actions of belligerents. R. M. Hare argues that the only way to salvage anything of Nagel’s absolutist position is to consider his intuitive principles as practical guides to action but not as principles which can never be overridden by other moral concerns. (shrink)

A translation into French of a work originally published in Germany in 1931. The unity of Kant's thought is highlighted through an examination of the relation of the moral philosophy to Kant's general critical program. Krüger acknowledges a debt to Heidegger, while differing from the latter in his interpretation of Kant.--S. M. W.

Listening to someone from some distance in a crowded room you may experience the following phenomenon: when looking at them speak, you may both hear and see where the source of the sounds is; but when your eyes are turned elsewhere, you may no longer be able to detect exactly where the voice must be coming from. With your eyes again fixed on the speaker, and the movement of her lips a clear sense of the source of the sound will (...) return. This ‘ventriloquist’ effect reflects the ways in which visual cognition can dominate auditory perception. And this phenomenological observation is one what you can verify or disconfirm in your own case just by the slightest reflection on what it is like for you to listen to someone with or without visual contact with them. (shrink)

This volume offers the first-ever complete English translation of Leibniz’s Dissertatio De Arte Combinatoria together with a critical edition of the original Latin text on fa...

Our research is based on a rather large "library" of various works by M. Drahomanov, which contains his views on religion. Among them: Paradise and Progress, From the History of Relations Between Church and State in Western Europe, Faith and Public Affairs, Fight for Spiritual Power and Freedom of Conscience in the 16th - 17th Centuries,, "Church and State in the Roman Empire", "The Status and Tasks of the Science of Ancient History," "Evangelical Faith in Old England," "Populism and Popular (...) Progress in Austrian Rus, Austrian-Russian Remembrance," "Pious The Legend of the Bulgarians "," The Issues of Religious Freedom in Russia, "" On the Brotherhood of the Baptist or the Baptist in Ukraine, "" The Foreword, " Shevchenko, Ukrainianophiles and Socialism "," Wonderful thoughts about the Ukrainian national affair "," Zazdri gods "," Slavic variants of one Gospel legend "," Resurrection of Christ ", etc. (shrink)

Dünyada müxtəlif dillər mövcuddur. Hal-hazırda əlavə xarici dil öyrənməyə maraq artmaqdadır. Təbii ki bu hər bir şəxsin öz istəyinə və seçiminə bağlıdır. Yəni hər kəs, hər hansı bir dili öyrəndiyi zaman, qarşısında iki məqsəd dayanır; ya o dili sevir, ya da o dili öyrənmək onun üçün lazımdır. Hər bir vətəndaşın borcudur ki, əvvəlcə öz ana dilini mükəmməl şəkildə öyrənsin. Lakin elm və texnologiyanın yüksək inkişaf etdiyi bir zamanda yalnız ana dilini bilmək kifayət etmir. İnsanın hər bir sahədə inkişafı üçün bacardığı (...) qədər başqa dillərə də yiyələnməsi artıq zəruridir. Yeni dil öyrənmənin faydaları çoxdur, yaddaşın güclənməsinə, söz ehtiyatının artmasına, nitqin gözəlləşməsinə səbəb olur. Həmçinin yeni dil öyrənməklə, insanın özünə güvəni artır, ünsiyyət dairəsi genişlənir. Bununla insan yalnız yeni sözlər deyil, yeni mədəniyyətlərlə də tanış olur və nəticədə dünyagörüşü artır. (shrink)