1. Bd. Die Kategorie des Seinszusammenhanges und die Einheit des Seins.

The first part of this article questions the authenticity of one of the most quoted and allegedly reliable sources in the Burckhardt-Nietzsche debate. After having pointed out who was interested in manipulating this source and why, it will go back to the original issue of Burckhardt’s “silence.” This time, though, the question is going to be tackled from a different angle: not what Burckhardt thought about Nietzsche; rather, what did Nietzsche think about Burckhardt’s silence. The claims I will raise in (...) this respect are two: 1) Nietzsche is the first interpreter of Burckhardt’s silence; 2) Burckhardt’s silence, far from being a mere private issue, became an elaborate theme of Nietzsche’s mature philosophy. (shrink)

This work focuses on the issue of an ethical right to life. Its aim is to formulate a persuasive answer the question: What attribute can endow an entity with an ethical right to not have its existence terminated? The issue of an ethical right to life is heavily politicized and divisive in Western societies. The reflections and analyses offered in An Ethical Right to Life contribute a much-needed clarification to the on-going discussion.

Bd. 1. Gesamtansatz, Grundlinien : Leben, Dasein und Reflexion ; Psychoanalyse und Sublimation ; Lebensgeschichte und Identität -- Bd. 2. Das sinnkonstitutive Subjekt : Kunst ; Religion ; Philosophie.

Co jest większe, bycie czy nic? Anzelm dowodzi istnienia Boga przy pomocy nihil. Bóg jako to, od czego nic większego nie może zostać pomyślane przez skończony umysł. Właściwe dla Anzelma logiczne – i być może mistyczne – użycie słowa „nic” domaga się porównania z negatywną ontologią Heideggera i jej recepcją w ramach tzw. Szkoły z Kioto założonej przez Nishidę. Czyż jednak pustka buddyzmu zen nie odsyła nas do – niewypowiedzianej – boskiej obecności?

Was the philosophy of Early German Romanticism, as we understand it today, nothing but a milder variety of Early German Idealism? Not at all! One has only to note the radical differences between the two. Friedrich von Hardenberg and Friedrich Schlegel, the two most significant thinkers of the Early Romantic movement, decisively broke with what Reinhold’s critical disciples had called a “philosophy from the highest principle [Grundsatzphilosophie].” Instead of adopting Reinhold’s and Fichte’s idea of subjectivity as the principle of a (...) deductively unfolding system of knowledge, they replaced it with the idea of “philosophy as an unending longing for the Infinite.” Who only aspires to the Absolute cannot pretend to “possess” or capture it in an absolute knowledge as Fichte and Hegel did, but Schelling did not. Underlying Hegel’s and Fichte’s denial that the Absolute transcends knowability is the temptation to make existence itself dependent upon the grasp of thoughts or concepts, a temptation firmly rejected by the Early Romantics. This is why Early Romanticism should not be considered as a species of one or the other kind of Idealism, as most German and American researchers would like it to be. (shrink)

to appear in Lisa Matthewson (ed.), Cross-linguistic perspectives on the semantics of quantification, Elsevier.