In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren damit den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction A Brief History of Developmental Explanations of Phenotypic Evolution Research Questions of Evo‐Devo Unifying Themes of the Conceptual Basis of Evo‐Devo Conclusion: A Mechanistic Theory of Evo‐Devo Challenges the Modern Synthesis Postscript: Counterpoint References.

The biological sciences have become increasingly reliant on so-called ‘model organisms’. I argue that in this domain, the concept of a descriptive model is essential for understanding scientific practice. Using a case study, I show how such a model was formulated in a preexplanatory context for subsequent use as a prototype from which explanations ultimately may be generated both within the immediate domain of the original model and in additional, related domains. To develop this concept of a descriptive model, I (...) focus on use of the nematode worm Caenorhabditis elegans and the wiring diagrams that were developed as models of its neural structure. In addition, implications of the concept of a descriptive model, particularly its relevance for the data-phenomena distinction as well as its relation to long-standing debates on realism, are briefly examined. (shrink)

Here we argue that the concept of strategies, as it was introduced into biology by John Maynard Smith, is a prime illustration of the four dimensions of theoretical biology in the post-genomic era. These four dimensions are: data analysis and management, mathematical and computational model building and simulation, concept formation and analysis, and theory integration. We argue that all four dimensions of theoretical biology are crucial to future interactions between theoretical and empirical biologists as well as with philosophers of biology.

Caenorhabditis elegans is a tiny worm that has become the focus of a large number of worldwide research projects examining its genetics, development, neuroscience, and behavior. Recently several groups of investigators have begun to tie together the behavior of the organism and the underlying genes, neural circuits, and molecular processes implemented in those circuits. Behavior is quintessentially organismal—it is the organism as a whole that moves and mates—but the explanations are devised at the molecular and neurocircuit levels, and tested in (...) populations using protocols that span many levels of aggregation. Following a brief review of the main relevant features of C. elegans, I describe some of these circuits, and then discuss two contrasting approaches in behavioral genetics and neural network analysis of the worm. Finally, I outline the rudiments of a “field and focus” explanation model using the two contrasting approaches. (shrink)

Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Freie Universitèat Berlin.

Phänomenologie und sprachanalytische Philosophie, die erstere mit den Namen Husserl und Heidegger verbunden, die letztere mit Wittgenstein, waren die beiden dominierenden philosophischen Strömungen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Phänomenologie und Sprachanalyse ergibt sich auf dem Hintergrund ihrer gemeinsamen Problembestände, vornehmlich in der Philosophie des Geistes, der Philosophie der Wahrnehmung und der Bedeutungstheorie. Konvergenzen sind erst im letzten Drittel des Jahrhunderts sichtbar geworden, wobei die Rezeption phänomenologischen Gedankenguts durch analytische Philosophen (Chisholm, Searle, Føllesdal, Danto, Evans, Tugendhat) intensiver war als die (...) in umgekehrter Richtung. Die Konvergenzen betreffen die neuen Theorien der Intentionalität, die Renaissance des Themas „Bewusstsein” und die Debatte um die Qualia. Der Band versammelt zwölf Beiträge einschlägig ausgewiesener Philosophen aus Deutschland, Schweden, Norwegen, der Schweiz und den USA. (shrink)

Inductive probabilistic reasoning is understood as the application of inference patterns that use statistical background information to assign (subjective) probabilities to single events. The simplest such inference pattern is direct inference: from “70% of As are Bs” and “a is an A” infer that a is a B with probability 0.7. Direct inference is generalized by Jeffrey’s rule and the principle of cross-entropy minimization. To adequately formalize inductive probabilistic reasoning is an interesting topic for artificial intelligence, as an autonomous system (...) acting in a complex environment may have to base its actions on a probabilistic model of its environment, and the probabilities needed to form this model can often be obtained by combining statistical background information with particular observations made, i.e., by inductive probabilistic reasoning. In this paper a formal framework for inductive probabilistic reasoning is developed: syntactically it consists of an extension of the language of first-order predicate logic that allows to express statements about both statistical and subjective probabilities. Semantics for this representation language are developed that give rise to two distinct entailment relations: a relation ⊨ that models strict, probabilistically valid, inferences, and a relation that models inductive probabilistic inferences. The inductive entailment relation is obtained by implementing cross-entropy minimization in a preferred model semantics. A main objective of our approach is to ensure that for both entailment relations complete proof systems exist. This is achieved by allowing probability distributions in our semantic models that use non-standard probability values. A number of results are presented that show that in several important aspects the resulting logic behaves just like a logic based on real-valued probabilities alone. (shrink)

Whoever wants to understand the successions of the history of philosophy, will not, as Droysen mocked, only follow in «eunuch-like neutrality». He/she will want to enter into a philosophising relationship to these successions. Now, philosophy is essentially arguing. And arguments have a formal and a material aspect. The logical validity in the truth-value preserving transition from premises to conclusions , is different from the reasons for our conviction of this truth itself . For the second validity claim we are differently (...) accountable than we are when proving the formal consistency of our belief connections. We must justify the assumption for which we argue on its own, independently of whether it stands in analytically correct relations to others of its own kind, or whichever conclusions we wish to draw from it. Only the latter, the second, aspect makes philosophy an untargetted endeavour, a dispute between materially competing intuitions. We argue, yes we quarrel with philosophical theses. It would be naive to believe we could ever be so certain of a position as if it were beyond reasonable doubt. «Whether or not it would be nice to knock disagreeing philosophers down by sheer force of argument, it cannot be done. Philosophical theories are never refuted conclusively. […] The theory survives its refutation – at a price» . The question hence is: what price are we prepared to pay for convictions with which we sympathise? In this consideration I am primarily advised by Stephen Toulmin, but also raise critical questions regarding Habermas’s consensualist reception of Toulmin’s indeterminate argumentation theory. (shrink)

It will be recalled that Mr. Mattick stated that Marxism does not derive its social theory from physical theory, and that any attempt to do so is an aberration from marxism. It is maintained that Marx is not a determinist or indeterminist in the ususal sense of these terms. Furthermore, it was argued that ideologies are no longer decisive weapons and that Marxists put little trust in the dialectical course of history.

Die Studie versucht, das Politische als ein zwischenmenschliches Urteilshandeln zu erklären. Der Urteilstypus, der dem zugrundeliegen muß, wird systematisch ausgewiesen und - neben den Leuten selbst - der Philosophie, Politischen Theorie, Rechtswissenschaft und auch Theologie vorgelegt.Anlaß und Stoff für die Beweisführung bildet die Berliner Diskussion über die Möglichkeiten menschlicher Rationalität um J. G. Fichte und seine vielfältigen Kritiker, darunter Carl Schmitt. Durch die Art, wie der untersuchte Urteilstypus aus sich heraus Einheit und Kraft gewinnt und so kommunikativ zu wirken vermag, (...) ergibt sich ein neues Bild von Demokratie-Theorie: Das Politische ist wesentlich unvertretbar; die Urteilenden selber sinnen einander Einsatz an und rufen sich zur Entscheidung auf. So wird man Bürger.Im Sinn einer solchen nicht von bloß privaten Interessen bestimmten Gemeinschaftlichkeit wurde Fichte insbesondere in China aufgenommen, als es sich in Begegnung mit Berliner Philosophie zu erneuern begann. Das vorliegende Buch erinnert auch an dieses Stück gemeinsamer Zukunft. (shrink)