Resumen: Vivimos tiempos en los que se ha pasado de concebir un acto de educar que proponía una relación medial a un acto de educar inscrito en una globalización que dicta la disolución del sujeto en una esfera vasta e impersonal. Esto nos ha portado a analizar el yo del alumnado que hoy acude a las aulas. A partir de una revisión teórica basada en el análisis hermenéutico de contenido y confrontación con la literatura sobre el tema, los resultados principales (...) se centran en una reformulación del yo que pasa por la revalorización de la complementariedad latente entre la subjetividad heredada y la subjetividad del hiperindividualismo. A pesar de encontrarnos en la era de la globalización, el artículo explicita que la educación no dispondría de muchas ejecuciones prácticas si en ella no se desarrollara un cierto grado de tropismo hacia la individualidad. En consecuencia, el yo, a pesar de ser habitante de colectividades atomizadas, concluimos que debe consolidarse como un antídoto, adaptado a la segmentación de las formas de vida de cada contexto, aunque este se encuentre condicionado por el consumismo y por las necesidades que dicta la civilización tecnológica.: We live in times when we have passed from conceiving an act of educating that proposed a medial relationship to an act of globalized education that dictates the dissolution of the subject in a vast and impersonal sphere. This has led us to analyse the self of the students who attend the classrooms today. Theoretical revision based on the hermeneutic analysis of content and confrontation with literature on the topic, the main results focus on a reformulation of the self that goes through the revaluation of the latent complementarity between the inherited subjectivity and the subjectivity of hyper-individualism. Despite being in the era of globalization, the article explicates that education would not have many practical executions if it did not develop a certain degree of tropism towards individuality. Consequently, the self, despite being an inhabitant of atomized collectivities, must be consolidated as an antidote, adapted to the segmentation of the ways of life of each context, although this is conditioned by consumerism and by the needs dictated by the technological civilization. (shrink)

La globalización y la era digital plantean un giro que trasciende a las realidades económica, científica, filosófica y educativa, llegando a afectar a la totalidad de la vida cotidiana. Este artículo examina en qué medida los factores históricos, culturales y sociales configuran al individuo de esta nueva era. En él se delibera sobre los condicionantes que permiten adscribirse a una era, así como aquellas circunstancias que determinan y justifican el paso de una era a la siguiente. Finalmente puede decirse que, (...) aunque con prudencia, porque es el tiempo quien debe darnos la razón, empezamos a vivir en la post-postmodernidad. (shrink)

This paper presents philosophical perspectives related to the concept of boredom from the point of view of its forms and structural modes as developed by Martin Heidegger in his lectures at the University of Freiburg during the winter semesters of 1929 and 1930. We highlight a philosophical stance often overlooked in comparison to more traditional positions in Western philosophical thought—through the proposed hermeneutic-phenomenological processes, this will allow us to interweave their philosophical images with cinematographic narratives that enrich the factual understanding (...) of modernity. For this reason, we assume boredom and its essence, “tediousness”, as the fundamental mood of our era, thus permitting other mobilities of thought that warrant a study of phenomena relating to cultural entertainment as a symptom of the modern disease that distances Dasein from meeting, questioning, and self-care. (shrink)

Unlike explanation in science, explanation in mathematics has received relatively scant attention from philosophers. Whereas there are canonical examples of scientific explanations, there are few examples that have become widely accepted as exhibiting the distinction between mathematical proofs that explain why some mathematical theorem holds and proofs that merely prove that the theorem holds without revealing the reason why it holds. This essay offers some examples of proofs that mathematicians have considered explanatory, and it argues that these examples suggest a (...) particular account of explanation in mathematics. The essay compares its account to Steiner's and Kitcher's. Among the topics that arise are proofs that exploit symmetries, mathematical coincidences, brute-force proofs, simplicity in mathematics, merely clever proofs, and proofs that unify what other proofs treat as separate cases. (shrink)

Standardly, epistemic peers regarding a given matter are said to be people of equal competence who share all relevant evidence. Alternatively, one can define epistemic peers regarding a given matter as people who are equally likely to be right about that matter. I argue that a definition in terms of likelihood captures the essence of epistemic peerhood better than the standard definition or any variant of it. What is more, a likelihood definition implies the truth of the central thesis in (...) the debate on peer disagreement, the so-called Equal Weight View, according to which we should give the opinions of our peers the same weight we give our own. Adopting a likelihood definition, however, does not end the debate on peer disagreement, because the alleged theoretical alternatives to the Equal Weight View, reinterpreted in the light of a likelihood definition, can in fact be shown to be compatible with this view—though the reinterpreted versions may appear less plausible than the original ones. (shrink)

This paper explores whether there is any relation between mathematical proofs that specify the grounds of the theorem being proved and mathematical proofs that explain why the theorem obtains. The paper argues that a mathematical fact’s grounds do not, simply by virtue of grounding it, thereby explain why that fact obtains. It argues that oftentimes, a proof specifying a mathematical fact’s grounds fails to explain why that fact obtains whereas any explanation of the fact does not specify its ground. The (...) paper offers several examples from mathematical practice to illustrate these points. These examples suggest several reasons why explaining and grounding tend to come apart, including that explanatory proofs need not exhibit purity, tend not to be brute force, and often unify separate cases by identifying common reasons behind them even when those cases have distinct grounds. The paper sketches an account of what makes a proof explanatory and uses that account to defend the morals drawn from the examples already given. (shrink)

Philosophers who regard some mathematical proofs as explaining why theorems hold, and others as merely proving that they do hold, disagree sharply about the explanatory value of proofs by mathematical induction. I offer an argument that aims to resolve this conflict of intuitions without making any controversial presuppositions about what mathematical explanations would be.

The evidence that we get from peer disagreement is especially problematic from a Bayesian point of view since the belief revision caused by a piece of such evidence cannot be modelled along the lines of Bayesian conditionalisation. This paper explains how exactly this problem arises, what features of peer disagreements are responsible for it, and what lessons should be drawn for both the analysis of peer disagreements and Bayesian conditionalisation as a model of evidence acquisition. In particular, it is pointed (...) out that the same characteristic of evidence from disagreement that explains the problems with Bayesian conditionalisation also suggests an interpretation of suspension of belief in terms of imprecise probabilities. (shrink)

Biologists and philosophers that debate the existence of the species category fall into two camps. Some believe that the species category does not exist and the term 'species' should be eliminated from biology. Others believe that with new biological insights or the application of philosophical ideas, we can be confident that the species category exists. This paper offers a different approach to the species problem. We should be skeptical of the species category, but not skeptical of the existence of those (...) taxa biologists call 'species.' And despite skepticism over the species category, there are pragmatic reasons for keeping the word 'species.' This approach to the species problem is not new. Darwin employed a similar strategy to the species problem 150 years ago. (shrink)

Humean accounts of natural law have long been charged with being unable to account for the laws’ explanatory power in science. One form of this objection is to charge Humean accounts with explanatory circularity: a fact in the Humean mosaic helps to explain why some regularity is a law (first premise), but that law, in turn, helps to explain why that mosaic fact holds (second premise). To this objection, Humeans have replied that the explanation in the first premise is metaphysical (...) whereas the explanation in the second premise is scientific, so (since these two varieties of explanation operate very differently) the two explanations cannot be chained together to yield explanatory circularity. This paper presents a new circularity argument that avoids this objection because both explanations in the premises are metaphysical. The new circularity argument also avoids the objection that the contrasts at the point where the two explanations are chained together fail to line up properly. The upshot is to leave the Humean account of law with two unattractive options: to regard scientific explanation under natural law as not constituting genuine explanation at all or to regard the Humean account as involving a vicious explanatory circularity. (shrink)

Metaphysics is, as Adorno once notes, the nuisance of philosophy. On the one hand, metaphysics is the reasons of philosophy's existence; on the other hand, it is nearly impossible to characterise metaphysics precisely. This tension is reflected with reference to the contemporary political and cultural situation in Adorno's "Meditations on Metaphysics", the last part of his opus magnum *Negative Dialectics*. The essays in this volume are devoted to different facets of Adorno's examination of metaphysics. They do, however, not only concern (...) themselves with Adorno's metaphysical reflections in a narrow sense, but also extend to other themes Adorno relates to metaphysics: critique of concepts, history, truth, and materialism. Thereby, they render a hardly investigated topic of the *Negative Dialectics* accessible. -/- Contributors: Emil Angehrn, Dirk Braunstein, Peggy H. Breitenstein, Gunnar Hindrichs, Axel Hutter, Philip Hogh, Christian Iber, Julia Jopp, Guido Kreis, Ansgar Martins, Brian O'Connor, Mario Schärli, Marc Nicolas Sommer, Tilo Wesche. (shrink)

Why do forces compose according to the parallelogram of forces? This question has been controversial; it is one episode in a longstanding, fundamental dispute regarding which facts are not to be explained dynamically. If the parallelogram law is explained statically, then the laws of statics are separate from and “transcend” the laws of dynamics. Alternatively, if the parallelogram law is explained dynamically, then statical laws become mere corollaries to the dynamical laws. I shall attempt to trace the history of this (...) controversy in order to identify what it would be for one or the other of these rival views to be correct. I shall argue that various familiar accounts of natural law not only make it difficult to see what the point of this dispute could have been, but also improperly foreclose some serious scientific options. I will sketch an alternative account of laws that helps us to understand what this dispute was all about. (shrink)

That's Brandenberg Concerto #3,” the Latino teenager informed me as I entered the exam room. I have a habit of whistling around the hospital. A little Bach. A little Gershwin. Disney. The Beatles. Italian folk songs. Christmas carols in December. I mix it up. As whistlers go, I'm pretty good—maybe a seven out of ten, all around—but I'm no virtuoso. In my work as a family physician, my repertoire is also quite broad, but not endlessly deep.My Latino teenager ostensibly came (...) in for evaluation of a “lump” that turned out to be a small lymph node. The real reason for his visit, however, was to discuss symptoms of depression and anxiety, a self‐described sense of “disassociation,” and his severely alcoholic father. “Tell the doctor why you are really here,” his mother told us both in Spanish as she exited the room. And I had fifteen minutes. With patients waiting. (shrink)

Paul Thompson, John Beatty, and Elisabeth Lloyd argue that attempts to resolve certain conceptual issues within evolutionary biology have failed because of a general adherence to the received view of scientific theories. They maintain that such issues can be clarified and resolved when one adopts a semantic approach to theories. In this paper, I argue that such conceptual issues are just as problematic on a semantic approach. Such issues arise from the complexity involved in providing formal accounts of theoretical laws (...) and scientific explanations. That complexity is due to empirical and pragmatic considerations, not one's adherence to a particular formal approach to theories. This analysis raises a broader question. How can any formal account properly represent the complex nature of empirical phenomena? (shrink)

Who hasn't wondered what it's like to be a dog or bird? Such questions seem unanswerable because we have no way of getting into an animal's mind. Marc Bekoff's work on animal behavior and mind draws world-wide attention for its originality and its probing into what animals might know as well as what skills are needed to live life successfully as a member of a particular species. Convinced that individuals of every species have some level of self-awareness, Bekoff embarks (...) on fascinating observations of animals playing, leaving and detecting scent-marks, solving problems, and behaving fairly toward each other.Animal Passions and Beastly Virtuesbrings together some of his path-breaking research papers, essays on science and ethics, and popular articles in order to reveal a remarkable range of animal behaviors but also to argue that the ethical treatment of animals is an especially significant issue now. (shrink)

La critique littéraire est-elle vouée par nature et fonction à rester un « discours second » entièrement subordonné à un texte premier qui peut seul prétendre à la dignité d’un discours créateur? L’interprète peut-il se départir de toute déférence à l’égard des décisions de l’auteur pour les regarder comme des choix parmi d’autres, de fragiles options ou des arrêts toujours révisables? Peut-on concevoir une forme de critique authentiquement créatrice qui s’émanciperait du respect attaché à la lettre du texte pour entrer (...) dans l’élan dont l’œuvre est le produit, en tentant par exemple de lui offrir quelque supplément, voire en l’imaginant tout à fait autrement? Les auteurs critiques ici réunis s’accordent à donner priorité au possible sur le réel, en traquant dans les œuvres déjà faites la trace de scénarios abandonnés ou de livres qui restent à écrire. Renouant parfois avec des convictions très anciennes – celles de la tradition rhétorique ou de la philologie – ils jettent les bases d’une théorie des textes possibles qui invite à aimer dans les grands textes littéraires non seulement le passé dont ils viennent mais aussi le futur qu’ils recèlent en puissance. (shrink)

Myrvold (2003) has proposed an attractive Bayesian account of why theories that unify phenomena tend to derive greater epistemic support from those phenomena than do theories that fail to unify them. It is argued, however, that "unification" in Myrvold's sense is both too easy and too difficult for theories to achieve. Myrvold's account fails to capture what it is that makes unification sometimes count in a theory's favor.

People who, by intention or negligence, deceive themselves put other people at risk of being misinformed. The paper argues that this kind of misinforming other people is to be avoided for largely the same reasons for which lying is to be avoided – regardless of what exactly these reasons are. This makes the ethical evaluation of self-deception in part dependent on the ethical evaluation of lying. In order to bring out this result as clearly as possible, detailed characterisations of the (...) concepts of attempted deception, lying, and self-deception are given. (shrink)

Contents Acknowledgements iii I. Royce and the Interpretation of His Contemporaries Introduction 1 1. Royce and Lotze 25 Introduction to Lotze. Lotze's ontology. Royce's response to Lotze. Successfull metaphysics renders experience broadly consistent without denying types of human experience. Logically testing metaphysical assumptions offers a promising methodology. The individual is not immediately given but realized through a process. The individual is not immediately given but realized through a process. Conclusion. 2. Royce and James 66 The friendship of James and Royce. (...) James's position. James summarized. Royce's response. The ‘abstract’ ideal has its pragmatic aspect. Logic can supplement pragmatism. Experience itself drives the unifying efforts of speculative philosophy. A more consistent pragmatism hypothesizes broader experience and allows an active and constructive process of response to that experience. Conclusion. 3. Royce and Bradley 108 Bradley's destruction of appearances. Bradley's construction? Royce's response - non-technical. Metaphysics is interpretively applicable to special experiential problems. In active willful attention the ethical complements the theoretical, rendering the relation of finite and absolute interpretable. Royce's response - technical development. Conclusion. 4. Royce and Whitehead 163 Statement of Whitehead's three primary presuppositions. Scheme of Whitehead's philosophy: the role of extended events. The building blocks of Whitehead's metaphysics. Process as an action within and upon experience. The process of concrescence. Consciousness and propositions in Whitehead's philosophy. Royce in comparison with Whitehead. Royce's cosmology in outline. Explicit contrast and comparison of Royce's and Whitehead's philosophies. Principles suggested by the contrast of Royce and Whitehead. II. An Extension of Royce’s Philosophy of Interpretation Preamble: The Need for a Re-Envisioned Philosophy of Interpretation 212 5. The Roycean Hypothetical Method and Its Prospects 226 The interpretation of Christianity. Metaphysical foundations of community. The synthesis and promise of Royce's insights. 6. Hyperthematics 269 Working definition. Some methodological considerations. Some general considerations. Some definitions. The foundational hypertheme and the derivatives. Hyperthematic expansion. The hyperthematic structure of the game. The hyperthematic structure of narrative. The hyperthematic structure of dance. The hyperthematic structure of music. Retrospect and prospect. 7. Hyperthematics Applied: The Corporation As a Hyperthematic Structure 339 Introduction. Restatement of the hyperthemes. The problematic of the corporation. Some exemplifications of the historical development of the corporation. Consideration of several prominent views regarding the purpose of commercial corporations. Consideration of consistency of the corporation as a hyperthematic structure. Hyperthematic reconstruction of the corporation as a community of epsionomic interpretation. Bibliography 412. (shrink)

If the end of exoticism is one of the characteristics of our time, and if classical anthropology based its study of alterity on this exotic distance from the other, is anthropology still possible, and if so, to what end? The author uses these questions as a point of departure for a probing interrogation of ethnological practice, starting with Le;vi-Strauss. The author advocates an anthropology of 'proximity' in place of the usual anthropology of distance. He has studied such emblematic places of (...) Western modernity as the Parisian Metro, or such emblematic 'non-places' as airports, treating as valid anthropological objects phenomena that others might judge less 'pure' or 'significant' than systems of filiation or matrimonial alliance. He outlines an approach to anthropology that focuses on negotiating the social meanings we and others use in making sense of the world, and on the processes of identification that create the difference between same and other. (shrink)

Können wir als Personen irreversible Gedächtnisverluste überleben? Wie steht es mit Teletransportationen? Wie mit jahrelangem Einfrieren? Fragen wie diese sind weit davon entfernt, bloße Denksportaufgaben für Science-Fiction-Fans zu sein. Vielmehr verraten uns Antworten darauf, welche unserer Eigenschaften uns wirklich wichtig sind und was unser Wesen ausmacht. -/- Unglücklicherweise beantworten Vertreter unterschiedlicher Theorien personaler Identität diese Fragen auf völlig verschiedene Weise. Manche schöpfen die Plausibilität ihrer Positionen aus phantasievollen Gedankenexperimenten; anderen sind dieselben Gedankenexperimente für eine ernsthafte Einbeziehung in die philosophische Theoriebildung (...) schlicht zu wirklichkeitsfern. Es überrascht daher kaum, dass jene Anhänger unterschiedlicher Theorien einander oft wenig zu sagen haben. Im ersten Teil des Buches wird untersucht, unter welchen Umständen Gedankenexperimente aussagekräftige philosophische Werkzeuge sind. Auf der Basis dieser Analyse werden die diversen zeitgenössischen Theorien personaler Identität dann im zweiten Teil einer Neubewertung unterzogen – nicht ohne dass dabei mit vielen selbstverständlich erscheinenden Überzeugungen aufgeräumt wird. (shrink)

Many writers claim that human kinds are significantly different from biological and natural kinds. Some suggest that humans kinds are unique because social structures are essential for the etiology of human kinds. Others argue that human cultural evolution is decidedly different from other forms of evolution. In this paper I suggest that the gulf between humans and our biological relatives is not as wide as some argue. There is a taxonomic difference between human and nonhuman organisms, but such factors as (...) social structure and cultural evolution do not distinguish us from many other organisms. (shrink)

What is the purpose of political theoretical endeavour and what methods should the early 21st-century political theorist employ? These questions – which touch on issues which go to the very heart of the vocation of political theory – have become increasingly contentious in recent years. The period since the late 1980s has been one in which theorists have increasingly disagreed not only about conventional matters of normative contention but also about the means by which to seek to resolve them. This (...) article examines a central tension that has characterized that general methodological disagreement, namely the place of empirical inquiry within the repertoire of the professional political theorist. Having carefully examined the contentions of an eclectic range of contributors to the debate, including G.A. Cohen, Alasdair MacIntyre and David Miller, this article argues that efforts either wholly to separate empirical investigation from normative enquiry or to bind the two ever-closer together are fraught with difficulties. It concludes by contending that political theorists ought to take aspects of the empirical political and social sciences extremely seriously while avoiding the temptation to have their normative agenda dictated to them by the contingent pressures of the here and now. (shrink)

Marc Jeannerod is director of the Institut des Sciences Cognitives in Lyon. His work in neuropsychology focuses on motor action. The idea that there is an essential relationship between bodily movement, consciousness, and cognition is not a new one, but recent advances in the technologies of brain imaging have provided new and detailed support for understanding this relationship. Experimental studies conducted by Jeannerod and his colleagues at Lyon have explored the details of brain activity, not only as we are (...) actively moving, but as we plan to move, as we imagine moving, and as we observe others move. His work also captures important distinctions between pathological and non-pathological experience. In The Cognitive Neuroscience of Action , Jeannerod focussed on object-oriented actions. What happens in the brain and what do we experience when we reach to grasp an object? How do we plan an action of that sort? To what extent does explicit motor imagery contribute to such action? What role does a motor representation or motor schema play in the accomplishment of action? At the very end of that book he raises questions that seem quite different. How is it possible to understand the intentions of others? Precisely what mechanisms allow us to imitate other people's actions? In more recent years much of Jeannerod's work has been in pursuit of these questions about interaction with others, and he has helped to show that there are intimate connections between moving ourselves and understanding others. Jeannerod's work does not lack important implications for a philosophical understanding of human activity. Although in contemporary philosophical debates on consciousness one can still find arguments that simply ignore bodily movement as an important factor in cognition, several recent works have returned to serious consideration of movement and action . In the following interview Jeannerod discusses many issues relevant to the philosophy of mind and action, including concepts of intentionality, movement and consciousness of movement, the role of simulation in understanding others, and the best way to conceptualize brain processes in all of these regards. Importantly, he makes constant reference to the empirical evidence, much of it developed in his own experimental studies. (shrink)

The model proposed by Redish et al. considers vulnerabilities within decision systems based on expectancy-value assumptions. Further understanding of processes leading to addiction can be gained by considering other inputs to decision-making, particularly affective associations with behaviors. This consideration suggests additional decision-making vulnerabilities that might explain addictive behaviors.

Darwin offered an intriguing answer to the species problem. He doubted the existence of the species category as a real category in nature, but he did not doubt the existence of those taxa called ‘‘species’’. And despite his scepticism of the species category, Darwin continued using the word ‘‘species’’. Many have said that Darwin did not understand the nature of species. Yet his answer to the species problem is both theoretically sound and practical. On the theoretical side, DarwinÕs answer is (...) confirmed by contemporary biology, and it offers a more satisfactory answer to the species problem than recent attempts to save the species category. On the practical side, DarwinÕs answer frees us from the search for the correct theoretical definition of ‘‘species’’. But at the same time it does not require that we banish the word ‘‘species’’ from biology as some recent sceptics of the species category advocate. Ó The Willi Hennig Society 2010. (shrink)

In wildlife conservation work, rewilding - to make wild once again - refers to the creation of corridors between preserved lands that allow declining populations to rebound. Marc Bekoff, one of our most engaging animal experts and activists, here applies the concept to human attitudes. He argues that unless we rewild ourselves, becoming profoundly reconnected to nature and fundamentally shifting our consciousness, our conservation efforts will have but limited impact. Bekoff shows that when we make the effort to not (...) just see, but to empathetically become "the seen," our perspective on animals and their habitats changes in profound ways. As we shift to acting from the inside out, our efforts move beyond simply reacting to current crises and become powerfully proactive. Ultimately, Rewilding Our Hearts invites readers to become re-enchanted with our world, and by dissolving false boundaries, to truly connect with both nature and ourselves. (shrink)

Engineering, as a complex and multidimensional practice of technology development, has long been a source of ethical concerns. These concerns have been approached from various perspectives. There are ongoing debates in the literature of the philosophy of engineering/technology about how to organize an optimized view of the values entailed in technology development processes. However, these debates deliver little in the way of a concrete rationale or framework that could comprehensively describe different types of engineering values and their multi-aspect interrelations in (...) real engineering practices. Approaching engineering values from a meaning-based perspective, as in this paper, can be a reliable method of tackling such a controversial problem. This paper therefore proposes that technology development be considered a systemic normative practice and attempts to provide a comprehensive view of various built-in values, their different origins and features, and a way of prioritizing them in real engineering processes. Studying two cases of the Zayandeh Rood Dam and the Abbasi Dam will lead to practical insights into how to understand norms in technology development and incorporate them into engineering practice. (shrink)

Que doit la narratologie au corpus à partir duquel elle a été constituée, les « trois volumes Pléiade » d’ À la recherche du temps perdu? Dans « Discours du récit » comme dans Nouveau Discours du récit, mais aussi dans tous les moments de la « suite bardadraque » où il est revenu sur le projet narratologique, G. Genette donne à la Recherche un statut volontairement paradoxal : celui d’une œuvre inachevée après coup. L’alternative entre achèvement et inachèvement peut-elle (...) être toutefois indifférente à une « théorie générale des structures narratives »? On se propose ici de relire toutes les déclarations relatives au statut du roman proustien pour réfléchir aux présupposés de la méthode et tenter de mettre au jour ce qui constitue peut-être l’un des postulats souterrains de la théorie du récit. (shrink)