This paper investigates the behavior of contestants in the game show “Quiz Taxi” when faced with the decision whether to bet the winnings they have acquired on a final “double or nothing” question. The decision in this natural experiment is made by groups of two or three persons. This setup enables the decision-making process to be studied with regard to group and communication characteristics. The contestants show fairly risk averse behavior. There is also a significant heterogeneity in attitude to risk. (...) In particular, all-female groups are much less likely to go for the risky option. Furthermore, decision-making behavior appears to vary across differently composed groups and prior performance. The study also documents the importance of discussions: The propensity to gamble increases with discussion length, and the correlation between communication content and the final choice is strong, indicating that time and subjective context are important features of decisions made under risk. (shrink)

Wenn es eine Lehre gibt, welche neben der Raum-Zeittheorie der Inauguraldissertation von 1770 für die Genese der Kritik der reinen Vernunft von zentraler Bedeutung ist, dann ist es die von Kant in den frühen Anthropologievorlesungen der siebziger Jahre vorgetragene Theorie eines spontanen, freien und selbstbewußten Ich. Aus welchen systematischen Erwägungen heraus hat er diese Ich-Theorie entwickelt? Was hat ihn dazu veranlaßt, seine Philosophie auf einem spontanen, freien und selbstbewußten Ich zu gründen, welches als eine einfache, numerisch identische, immaterielle und freie (...) Substanz verstanden wird, von der wir eine anschauende Erkenntnis im inneren Sinn haben? Aufgrund welcher konzeptionellen Änderungen wird diese Theorie gegenüber seiner Dissertation überhaupt erst ein sinnvolles Unternehmen? Es wird im Rahmen einer detaillierten Rekonstruktion der Problemlage, mit der sich Kant zwischen 1770 und 1772 konfrontiert war, gezeigt, daß er wesentliche Anregungen durch seinen früheren Schüler Marcus Herz erhalten hat, der in seiner Schrift Betrachtungen aus der spekulativen Weltweisheit einige grundlegende Lehrstücke der Dissertation kritisiert und mit Moses Mendelssohn für die Notwendigkeit eines „ersten Subjekts" plädiert. Nicht Rousseau, sondern Herz und Mendelssohn haben also in ihrer direkt auf die Dissertation bezogenen Kritik Kant davon überzeugt, daß das epistemisch aufgewertete Ich als Grund einer neuen Theorie des Verhältnisses von Denken und Gedachtem fungieren muß, um die Einheit unserer Erfahrung erklären zu können. (shrink)

Many of Margaret Cavendish’s criticisms of Thomas Hobbes in the Philosophical Letters (1664) relate to the disorder and damage that she holds would result if Hobbesian pressure were the cause of visual perception. In this paper, I argue that her “two men” thought experiment in Letter IV is aimed at a different goal: to show the explanatory potency of her account. First, I connect Cavendish’s view of visual perception as “patterning” to the “two men” thought experiment in Letter IV. Second, (...) I provide a potential reply on Hobbes’s behalf that appeals to physiological differences between perceivers’ sense organs, drawing upon Hobbes’s optics in De homine. Third, I argue that such a reply would misunderstand Cavendish’s objective of showing the limited explanatory resources available in understanding visual perception as pressing when compared to her view of visual perception as patterning. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously criticizes traditional metaphysics and its proofs of immortality, free will and God's existence. What is often overlooked is that Kant also explains why rational beings must ask metaphysical questions about 'unconditioned' objects such as souls, uncaused causes or God, and why answers to these questions will appear rationally compelling to them. In this book, Marcus Willaschek reconstructs and defends Kant's account of the rational sources of metaphysics. After carefully explaining Kant's conceptions (...) of reason and metaphysics, he offers detailed interpretations of the relevant passages from the Critique of Pure Reason in which Kant explains why reason seeks 'the unconditioned'. Willaschek offers a novel interpretation of the Transcendental Dialectic, pointing up its 'positive' side, while at the same time it uncovers a highly original account of metaphysical thinking that will be relevant to contemporary philosophical debates. (shrink)

It has been suggested that a substitutional semantics for quantification theory lends itself to nominalistic aims. I should like in this paper to explore that claim.

Abstract The current accountability system for private military and security contractors (PMSCs) is woefully inadequate, and mere enhancements in oversight cannot hope to remedy that failing. I contend that once we recognize the kind of accountability required of PMSCs, we will realize that radical changes in the foundational relationship between PMSCs and the state are required. More specifically, in order to be appropriately accountable, members of PMSCs must become a part of or, at the very least, directly responsible to the (...) legitimate authoritative military or police structures, and there must be a clear and precise delineation of responsibility among public officials for holding individual members of PMSCs criminally liable. (shrink)

Introduction -- Creative experience as the birthplace of the transcendent -- On refinding God during chemotherapy -- Reflections on moments of grace -- On the quiet virtue of humility -- Summoned to courage -- Maintaining personal dignity in the face of the mass society -- On fidelity and betrayal in love relationships -- The kiss.

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Alternative readings of quantification are considered. The absence of an unequivocal translation into ordinary speech is noted. Some examples are cited which, in the opinion of the author, are a result of equivocal readings of quantification, or unnecessarily restrictive readings which obscure its primary function.

Anthropology as Counter-Science. A Merleau-Pontyan approachThe author tries to show that the conception of the anthropology as counter-science, presented by Foucault (inspired by Lévi-Strauss), is limited to dissolve some naïve representations of subjectivity, and that the critical potential of this notion could be extended to the current theoretical conceptions (section 1). The author holds that the limited notion of contra-science can be found in the very Lévi-Strauss’ works, and this is made clear by comparison with Edmund Husserl’s works (sections 2-3). (...) After that, the author tries to develop a larger notion of counter-science, based on Merleau-Ponty’s criticisms to Lévi-Strauss (section 4). The author uses the subject of acupuncture’s efficacy as an example of this larger notion of counter-science.L’antropologia come contro-scienza. Un approccio merleau-pontyanoIntendiamo mostrare come la concezione dell’antropologia in quanto contro-scienza presentata da Foucault (ispirata dalle opere di Lévi-Strauss) si limiti a smontare alcune rappresentazioni ingenue della soggettività, e che il potenziale critico di questa nozione potrebbe invece essere esteso alle concezioni teoriche in vigore (sezione 1). Sosteniamo che questa nozione limitata di contro-scienza può essere trovata nell’opera di Lévi-Strauss stesso, cosa che emerge con chiarezza nel confronto con alcuni testi di Edmund Husserl (sezioni 2-3). Cerchiamo quindi di sviluppare una più ampia nozione di controscienza antropologica, che si basa sulle posizioni critiche di Merleau-Ponty riguardo a Lévi-Strauss (sezione 4). Il tema dell’efficacitá dell’agopuntura è utilizato come esempio di questa nozione ampliata di contro-scienza. (shrink)

This book challenges the conventional wisdom that improving democratic politics requires keeping emotion out of it. Marcus advances the provocative claim that the tradition in democratic theory of treating emotion and reason as hostile opposites is misguided and leads contemporary theorists to misdiagnose the current state of American democracy. Instead of viewing the presence of emotion in politics as a failure of rationality and therefore as a failure of citizenship, Marcus argues, democratic theorists need to understand that emotions (...) are in fact a prerequisite for the exercise of reason and thus essential for rational democratic deliberation and political judgment. Attempts to purge emotion from public life not only are destined to fail, but ultimately would rob democracies of a key source of revitalization and change. Drawing on recent research in neuroscience, Marcus shows how emotion functions generally and what role it plays in politics. In contrast to the traditional view of emotion as a form of agitation associated with belief, neuroscience reveals it to be generated by brain systems that operate largely outside of awareness. Two of these systems, "disposition" and "surveillance," are especially important in enabling emotions to produce habits, which often serve a positive function in democratic societies. But anxiety, also a preconscious emotion, is crucial to democratic politics as well because it can inhibit or disable habits and thus clear a space for the conscious use of reason and deliberation. If we acknowledge how emotion facilitates reason and is "cooperatively entangled" with it, Marcus concludes, then we should recognize sentimental citizens as the only citizens really capable of exercising political judgment and of putting their decisions into action. (shrink)

Understanding and measuring levels of academic integrity within higher education institutions across the world is an important area of study in the era of educational internationalization. Developing a cross-cultural measure will undoubtedly assist in creating standardization processes and add to the discourse on cross-cultural understanding on what constitutes honest and dishonest action in the higher education context. This study has used a combination of exploratory and confirmatory factor analytical procedures to validate a previously published questionnaire, namely the cross-cultural academic integrity (...) questionnaire. Inspection of response distributions was also undertaken. Primary participants in this study were from Iran, and secondary reference participants were from New Zealand and Nigeria. The findings indicate that a revised questionnaire better represents the data obtained from all three regions. Three CCAIQ-2 domains are proposed: cheating, collusion and complying. However, the response distributions indicated differences among the three groups, further suggesting that the theoretical constructs developed through factors analysis may not represent equivalence in terms of cross-cultural understanding. This research will inevitably create international debate on the measurement of integrity and how this measurement process can be used to establish internationally recognized and accountable educational regulations. (shrink)

v. 1. Academicarum quæstionum editionis primæ liber secondus. Editionis secundæ liber primus. De finibus bonorum & malorum libri v. Tusculanarum quæstionum libri v. -v. 2. M. T. C. De natura deorum libri III. De diuinatione libri II. De fato liber I. Scipionis somnium, quod e sex. De rep. libris superest. De legibus libri III. De Vniuersitate liber I. Q. Ciceronis de petitione consulatus ad Marcum fratrem liber I.0.

Nesse artigo analisamos alguns aspectos do Programa Um Computador por Aluno (UCA), recentemente implantado na rede municipal de ensino de Erechim (RS), buscando apresentar reflexões sobre as possibilidades desse Programa à formação docente e lançando luzes para as implicações dessa formação nos processos de ensino e aprendizagem e na promoção da inclusão digital na escola pública. Nosso estudo sinaliza que a inclusão digital tornou-se desafio e compromisso no referido município, ao tempo que a formação tecnológica de professores é entendida como (...) prioridade para que essa inclusão se concretize. O estudo mostra que mudanças estruturais e pedagógicas são vislumbradas pelos professores, os quais sugerem a necessidade de formação tecnológica contínua para que possam mudar suas práticas, e, ainda, que a inclusão digital é entendida pelos gestores e docentes como via para a qualificação dos processos de ensino e aprendizagem. Para tanto, entendemos que o processo de inclusão digital precisa fomentar novas formas de conhecimento e participação social para professores e estudantes. (shrink)

Though ‘evil’ is often used loosely as merely the generic opposite of ‘morally good’, used precisely it is the worst possible term of opprobrium available. In this essay it is taken as applying primarily to persons, secondarily to conduct; evil deeds must flow from the volition to do something evil. An evil action is one so horrendously bad that no ordinary decent human being can conceive of doing it, and an evil person is one who knowingly wills or orders such (...) actions. Malignant evil—doing evil because it is evil—is not just possible but real, and is one of several kinds of evil delineated. There are incidental discussions of cruelty, Rosenbaum on Explaining Hitler, Baumeister on Evil, and Benn on wickedness. Footnotes1 Dedicated to Alan Gewirth, in honour of his 90th birthday, and in appreciation of his superb, illuminating, and ground-breaking philosophical work over many years. (shrink)

Understanding inductive reasoning is a problem that has engaged mankind for thousands of years. This problem is relevant to a wide range of fields and is integral to the philosophy of science. It has been tackled by many great minds ranging from philosophers to scientists to mathematicians, and more recently computer scientists. In this article we argue the case for Solomonoff Induction, a formal inductive framework which combines algorithmic information theory with the Bayesian framework. Although it achieves excellent theoretical results (...) and is based on solid philosophical foundations, the requisite technical knowledge necessary for understanding this framework has caused it to remain largely unknown and unappreciated in the wider scientific community. The main contribution of this article is to convey Solomonoff induction and its related concepts in a generally accessible form with the aim of bridging this current technical gap. In the process we examine the major historical contributions that have led to the formulation of Solomonoff Induction as well as criticisms of Solomonoff and induction in general. In particular we examine how Solomonoff induction addresses many issues that have plagued other inductive systems, such as the black ravens paradox and the confirmation problem, and compare this approach with other recent approaches. (shrink)

Anscombe famously argues that to act intentionally is to act under a description, and that “it is the agent's knowledge of what he is doing that gives the descriptions under which what is going on is the execution of an intention.” Further, she takes ‘knows’ to mean that the agent can give these descriptions herself. It would seem to follow that animals cannot act intentionally. However, she denies this, insisting that although animals cannot express intentions, they can have them. But (...) how can we speak without equivocation of humans and animals acting intentionally while maintaining that linguistic expressibility is an essential characteristic of only human action? The human capacity for articulation, I argue, transforms animal intention in the following way: Whereas animal intentions are immanent in their behavior, human action is an actualization of the power to make judgments about what is to-be-done; this confers on human intentions a distinctive sort of independence from behavior. (shrink)

Given a normal (multi-)modal logic a characterization is given of the finitely presentable algebras A whose logics L A split the lattice of normal extensions of . This is a substantial generalization of Rautenberg [10] and [11] in which is assumed to be weakly transitive and A to be finite. We also obtain as a direct consequence a result by Blok [2] that for all cycle-free and finite A L A splits the lattice of normal extensions of K. Although we (...) firmly believe it to be true, we have not been able to prove that if a logic splits the lattice of extensions of then is the logic of an algebra finitely presentable over ; in this respect our result remains partial. (shrink)

In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about object-identity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token identical (...) to physical events: A particular mental event m is identical with a particular physical event p only if there is a sortal S such that m and p are both Ss. If there is no such sortal, the doctrine of token-identity is not true. I argue here that we have no good reason for thinking that there is any such sortal. (shrink)