In his reflections on the spatiotemporal structuring of the life-world, Schütz distinguishes between two forms of intersubjectivity among contemporaries. Firstly, he points at actors sharing both space and time and experiencing a direct, immediate face-to-face communication; secondly, he indicates the intersubjectivity of indirect communication, lacking any commonalities of space and time, such as the correspondence by letter. Apart from the strict exchange of thoughts, the alternating writing gives one the chance to relate to the interpretive patterns and relevancies of the (...) correspondent and thereby to understand more clearly the intellectual position of the proponent. Reflecting on the specificity of the situation, Schütz claims: “The written communication forced upon us by the geographical distance between us should at least have the benefit of encouraging us to put our thoughts, as best we can, into a clear and orderly form” (p. 49). The correspondence between Alfred Schütz and Eri. (shrink)

Ve svém přístupu k intersubjektivitě Schütz odhlíží od radikálně filozofické analýzy toho, jak je druhý (alter ego) konstituován v mém vědomí. Namísto toho bere existenci druhých a jejich subjektivit za zaručenou a zkoumá intersubjektivní vztahy rozumění a jednání mezi jedinci. Přiblížení fenomenologické teorie žitého světa k sociologii Schützovi umožňuje studovat sociální interakci a řád. Článek věnuje pozornost Schützově pohledu na subjektivitu, smysl a struktury relevance. Rozlišuje mezi spoluprožívanou a typizovanou intersubjektivitou, přičemž typizovaná je prezentována jako originální příspěvek k interpretativní sociologii. (...) Díky analýze intersubjektivity Schütz překračuje pozici (metodického) individualismu, která je mu někdy připisována. (shrink)

The article honors aspects of George Psathas’ life achievement. In particular, it describes his commitment to “Human Studies” and places his social phenomenological research work in dialogue with Alfred Schütz and Harold Garfinkel.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGRudolf Otto hat sich – was weithin unbekannt geblieben ist – mehrfach mit »Darwinismus« auseinandergesetzt. Er sah in ihm eine Gefahr für Geist und Frömmigkeit, lehnte ihn aber keineswegs in Bausch und Bogen ab. Er hielt ihn für begrenzt und wenig plausibel; ihm gegenüber sei auf der Eigenständigkeit des Geistigen zu bestehen. Otto wendet sich gegen Naturalismus und Supranaturalismus. Der Religion gehe es um »Teleologie«; ohne »Teleologie« hänge die Deszendenztheorie sozusagen in der Luft. Er wirbt für eine Doppelperspektive, ohne zu (...) berücksichtigen, dass Teleologie als solche kein theologisches Argument sein kann. Angesichts der heute verschärften Fragestellung eines »neuronalen Darwinismus« muss die Verhältnisbestimmung zur Religion innerhalb des Evolutionsdenkens gesucht werden: Religion als Schutz der biologischen und kulturellen Evolution vor sich selbst.SUMMARYAlthough it has generally gone unremarked, Rudolf Otto several times took up the discussion about “Darwinism”. He saw in it a danger for spiritual life and piety while at the same time he by no means rejected it altogether. Regarding it as plausible to a certain, limited extent, he considered it necessary at the same time to insist on the autonomy of the spiritual. Otto takes a position against naturalism and supernaturalism. In religion, he argues, it is a question of “teleology”, and without teleology the theory of descent hangs, so to speak, in the air. He calls for a double perspective, while overlooking that teleology as such cannot be a theological argument. In view of today's increasingly sharply focused “neuronal Darwinism” we need to seek to position religion within evolutionary thought: i.e. religion as the protection of biological and cultural evolution from itself. (shrink)

Mit der Vielzahl von Daten aus genetischen Untersuchungsverfahren wächst das Problem von „Zufallsbefunden“, d. h. von zufällig erhobenen Nebenbefunden, die mit der ursprünglichen Fragestellung nicht in Verbindung stehen und dennoch eine Bedeutung für Gesundheit und Reproduktionsverhalten der untersuchten Person selbst oder ihrer Anverwandten haben. In Ermangelung nationaler oder internationaler Richtlinien greifen die Autoren die aktuelle Diskussion um den Umgang mit genetischen Zufallsbefunden in Behandlungs- und Forschungskontext auf. Dabei nehmen sie auf die für Deutschland relevanten rechtlichen und ethischen Rahmenbedingungen Bezug. Nach (...) Gendiagnostikgesetz (GenDG) muss in Deutschland im Rahmen eines Behandlungsvertrages auf die Möglichkeit von Zufallsbefunden hingewiesen werden. Es ist Bestandteil der Aufklärung und Einwilligung, inwieweit Zufallsbefunde mitgeteilt werden, wobei das Recht auf Nichtwissen und der Schutz nicht-einwilligungsfähiger Personen berücksichtigt werden müssen. Im Forschungskontext greift das GenDG nicht, aber auch hier sollte über mögliche Zufallsbefunde aufgeklärt werden, wenngleich eine Rückmeldung nicht zwingend, aber bei Befunden mit hohem klinischen Nutzen ethisch geboten sein kann. Folgende Aspekte sind im Umgang mit Zufallsbefunden zu berücksichtigen: 1) Art und Umfang der Aufklärung und Einwilligung bei einer unüberschaubaren Zahl von möglichen Befunden. 2) Einordnung der klinischen Bedeutung einer genetischen Veränderung im Sinne von gesichertem, wahrscheinlichem, möglichem oder fraglichem/unbekanntem klinischen Nutzen. 3) Prozessierung des Informationsrückflusses für Gegenwart und Zukunft. 4) Ressourcenplanung im Hinblick auf die klinische Validierung, die Erläuterung von Befunden und den Transfer in die klinische Praxis. Im Umgang mit genetischen Zufallsbefunden besteht erheblicher empirisch-ethischer Forschungs- und politischer Regelungsbedarf. Zeitgleich ist es unabdingbar, die Wahrnehmung und das Verständnis der untersuchten Personen sowie die Grundhaltung gegenüber Zufallsbefunden im Rahmen von Studien zu beleuchten und entsprechende Bildungs- und Kommunikationswerkzeuge zu entwickeln. (shrink)

Alfred Schutz in his phenomenological studies on the social world, has systematically analyzed the nature of social relationships between individuals, and has arrived at an originating point involving intersubjectivity. This point is described by what he calls the Pure We-relationship. Comparison of Schutz's analysis of the Pure We relationship with Buber's description of his personal experience of intersubjectivity, i.e., the l-Thou relationship, reveals a remarkable convergence. For instance, fundamental to both Schutz and Buber are the notions that intersubjectivity is tied (...) to the lived presence of the self with the other (i.e., sharing of time in the stream of duration), and that the 'content' of this 'experience' is related to the being of the other. These interesting features in the works of Schutz and Buber are described by showing the similarity between the Pure We and I-Thou relationships. (shrink)

This volume also includes a collection of essays entitled _The Educational Fron­tier, _Dewey’s articles on logic, the out­lawry of war, and philosophy for the _En­cyclopedia of the Social Sciences, _and his reviews of Alfred North Whitehead’s _Adventures of Ideas, _Martin Schutze’s _Academic Illusions in the Field of Let­ters and the Arts, _and Rexford G. Tugwell’s _Industrial Discipline and the Governmental Arts._.

Om Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Arnold Gehlen, Helmuth Plessner, Ernst Bloch, Theodor W. Adorno, Alexander Mitscherlich, Karl Löwith, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Hannah Arendt, Wolfgang Abendroth, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, Gershom Scholem, Hans Georg Gadamer, Alfred Schütz, Max Horkheimer og Leo Löwenthal.

I am trying...to go back through all those places where I was exiled-enclosed so he could constitute his there. To read his text to try to take back from it what he took from me irrecoverably...I am trying to re-discover the possibility of a relation to air. Don’t I need one, well before starting to speak?

Questions concerning the proof-theoretic strength of classical versus nonclassical theories of truth have received some attention recently. A particularly convenient case study concerns classical and nonclassical axiomatizations of fixed-point semantics. It is known that nonclassical axiomatizations in four- or three-valued logics are substantially weaker than their classical counterparts. In this paper we consider the addition of a suitable conditional to First-Degree Entailment—a logic recently studied by Hannes Leitgeb under the label HYPE. We show in particular that, by formulating the theory (...) PKF over HYPE, one obtains a theory that is sound with respect to fixed-point models, while being proof-theoretically on a par with its classical counterpart KF. Moreover, we establish that also its schematic extension—in the sense of Feferman—is as strong as the schematic extension of KF, thus matching the strength of predicative analysis. (shrink)

In Groenendijk & Stokhof [1989] a system of dynamic predicate logic (DPL) was developed, as a compositional alternative for classical discourse representation theory (DRT ). DPL shares with DRT the restriction of being a first-order system. In the present paper, we are mainly concerned with overcoming this limitation. We shall define a dynamic semantics for a typed language with λ-abstraction which is compatible with the semantics DPL specifies for the language of first-order predicate logic. We shall propose to use this (...) new logical system as the semantic component of a Montague-style grammar (referred to as dynamic Montague grammar, DMG), which will enable us to extend the compositionality of DPL to the subsentential level. Furthermore, we shall extend this analysis also in this sense that we shall add new, dynamic interpretations for logical constants which in DPL were treated in a static fashion. This will substantially increase the descriptive coverage of DMG. (shrink)

Classical phenomenology -- The transcendental tradition -- The logical investigations of the I -- From the I to the ego -- The grammar of the transcendental ego -- Strawson on the primacy of personhood -- Wittgenstein on the lure of words -- The grammar of the transcendental ego -- Zahavi on transcendental subjectivity as intersubjectivity -- Contemporary arguments for the transcendental ego : Marbach, Soffer -- Schutz, Theunissen on social phenomenology -- Husserl's later thought -- The multidiscipline of dialogical phenomenology (...) -- Sociolinguistics -- Personal pronouns : reconsidering the traditional view -- Egocentrism and polycentrism -- Person deixis and polycentrism -- Anscombe -- Wittgenstein -- Personal pronouns : reconsidering the traditional view -- I and we : a relational community -- Benveniste and I : you connectedness -- Objectification in the third person -- Castaneda's phenomeno-logic of the I -- Developmental perspectives -- Piaget's legacy -- Recent research on the sociality of children -- Proto-conversations in infancy -- The dialogic model of Jaffe and Feldstein -- From proto-conversation to conversation -- Perspectives from blindness and autism -- Polycentrism and personal pronoun acquisition: loveland and others -- An egocentric model of personal pronoun acquisition : Charney and others -- Philosophical implications and directions for future research -- Philosophy of dialogue -- Rosenstock-Huessy's grammatical method of social research -- Rosenzweig's speech-thinking -- Buber's I and you -- The primordial duality in Buber, Humboldt, Plato -- Buber and his critics -- Rosenstock-Huessy -- Levinas -- Dialogical phenomenology -- The dialogic dimension of meaning and experience -- The practice of phenomenology -- Implications for politics and feminism. (shrink)

We do lots of things together in a shared manner. From the phenomenological point of view, does joint or shared agency need a conscious sense of shared agency? Yet there are many processes where we seem to just go along with the group without conscious intent. Building on the classic phenomenological accounts of Edmund Husserl, Alfred Schutz, Martin Heidegger (and the synthetic account of Berger & Luckmann), I want to emphasize the thick horizon of the life-world as a fundamental (...) condition for intentional shared agency. Joint agency has divergent forms with their own peculiar intentionality, attentivity, anticipations and expectations, and embeddedness in a pre-predicative tacit knowledge in the overall live-world. Phenomenology recognizes that even ego-centered activities that appear to be fully ‘agential’ can be carried out in an anonymous un-owned manner, in the manner which Heidegger calls ‘das Man’, or ‘the one’. This suggests that tacit belonging to the collective ‘we’ undergirds individual agency. Husserl, Heidegger, and Schutz all have accounts of this ‘anonymous’, pre-predicative kind of group participation. Phenomenology has rich accounts of anonymous, voluntary, shared, social participation that demand a new concept of agency, one neglected in the current literature in philosophy of action. (shrink)

A century ago, John Dewey remarked that when home changes radically, school must change as well. With home, family, and gender roles dramatically altered in recent years, we are faced with a difficult problem: in the lives of more and more American children, no one is home. The Schoolhome proposes a solution. Drawing selectively from reform movements of the past and relating them to the unique needs of today's parents and children, Jane Martin presents a philosophy of education that (...) is responsive to America's changed and changing realities. As more and more parents enter the workforce, the historic role of the domestic sphere in the education and development of children is drastically reduced. Consequently, Martin advocates removing the barriers between the school and the home--making school a metaphorical "home," a safe and nuturant environment that provides children with the experience of affection and connection otherwise missing or inconsistent in their lives. In this proposition, the traditional schoolhouse where children are drilled in the three Rs is transformed into a "schoolhome" where learning is animated by an ethic of social awareness. At a time when many school reformers are calling for a return to basics and lobbying for skills education and quick-fix initiatives, Martin urges us to reconsider the distinctive legacies of Dewey and Montessori and to conceive of a school that integrates the values of the home with those of social responsibility. With cultural diversity and gender equality among its explicit goals, the schoolhome expands upon Dewey's edict to educate the "whole child," seeking instead to educate all children in the culture's whole heritage. Martin eloquently challenges reformers to reclaim the founding fathers' vision of the nation as a domestic realm, and to imagine a learning environment whose curriculum and classroom practice reflect not merely an economic but a moral investment in the future of our children. More than a summons to action, this remarkable book is a call to rethink the assumptions we bring to the educational enterprise, and so, to act wisely. (shrink)

This volume is chiefly composed of revised versions of essays presented and discussed at the research symposium of the same title held in Delray Beach, Florida, on May 7-9, 1993. The symposium was conducted under the sponsorship of the William F. Dietrich Eminent Scholar Chair in Philosophy at Florida Atlantic University and the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc. Several essays have been added, including the Husserl ineditum and its translation. The intention of the project was to attract even (...) wider appreciation for this posthumous work by Husserl, especially since it has now been first translated into English by Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz. In manuscript form, the Ideas II was known to Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty before Sein und Zeit and Phenomenologie de la perception, as well to Edith Stein and Ludwig Landgrebe, of course, who worked on it as Husserl' s assistants. It was published in 1952 as Volume IV of the Husserliana series, and critical studies of that volume were written by Paul Ricoeur and Alfred Schutz. Now that there is an English translation, it is increasingly being taught in the United States along with the Ideas I. (shrink)

Say that two goals are normatively coincident just in case one cannot aim for one goal without automatically aiming for the other. While knowledge and justification are distinct epistemic goals, with distinct achievement conditions, this paper begins from the suggestion that they are nevertheless normatively coincident—aiming for knowledge and aiming for justification are one and the same activity. A number of surprising consequences follow from this—both specific consequences about how we can ascribe knowledge and justification in lottery cases and more (...) general consequences about the nature of justification and the relationship between justification and evidential probability. Many of these consequences turn out to be at variance with conventional, prevailing views. (shrink)

In ‘The normative role of knowledge’ (2012), Declan Smithies defends a ‘JK-rule’ for belief: One has justification to believe that P iff one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know that P. Similar claims have been defended by others (Huemer, 2007, Reynolds, forthcoming). In this paper, I shall argue that the JK-rule is false. The standard and familiar way of arguing against putative rules for belief or assertion is, of course, to describe putative counterexamples. My (...) argument, though, won’t be like this – indeed I doubt that there are any intuitively compelling counterexamples to the JK-rule. Nevertheless, the claim that there are counterexamples to the JK-rule can, I think, be given something approaching a formal proof. My primary aim here is to sketch this proof. I will briefly consider some broader implications for how we ought to think about the epistemic standards governing belief and assertion. (shrink)

The “ontological turn” is a recent movement within cultural anthropology. Its proponents want to move beyond a representationalist framework, where cultures are treated as systems of belief (concepts, etc.) that provide different perspectives on a single world. Authors who write in this vein move from talk of many cultures to many “worlds,” thus appearing to affirm a form of relativism. We argue that, unlike earlier forms of relativism, the ontological turn in anthropology is not only immune to the arguments of (...) Donald Davidson’s “The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” but it affirms and develops the antirepresentationalist position of Davidson’s subsequent essays. (shrink)

We argue that some algorithms are value-laden, and that two or more persons who accept different value-judgments may have a rational reason to design such algorithms differently. We exemplify our claim by discussing a set of algorithms used in medical image analysis: In these algorithms it is often necessary to set certain thresholds for whether e.g. a cell should count as diseased or not, and the chosen threshold will partly depend on the software designer’s preference between avoiding false positives and (...) false negatives. This preference ultimately depends on a number of value-judgments. In the last section of the paper we discuss some general principles for dealing with ethical issues in algorithm-design. (shrink)

ISBN-13: 978-0-8229-4317-4 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-8229-4317-4 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Science — Philosophy. 2. Science — Social aspects. 3. Values. 4. Science and civilization. I. Carrier, Martin. II. Howard, Don, professor. III. Kourany ...

Scientific discoveries are often to some degree influenced by luck. Whether luck’s influence is at odds with common-sense intuitions about responsibility, is the central concern of the philosophical debate about moral luck. Do scientists acknowledge that luck plays a role in their work and – if so – do they consider it morally problematic? The present article discusses the results of four focus groups with scientists, who were asked about their views on luck in their fields and its moral implications. (...) The participants underscored circumstantial luck as a key dimension of luck in science. Nevertheless, most participants insisted that there are ways of executing ‘control’ in science: They believe that virtues and skills can increase one’s chances for success. The cultivation of these skills and virtues was considered a reasonable ground for pride. Prizes and rewards were rarely tied to personal desert, but instead to their societal function. (shrink)

What is happiness? How is it related to morality and virtue? Does living with illusion promote or diminish happiness? Is it better to pursue happiness with a partner than alone? Philosopher Mike W. Martin addresses these and other questions as he connects the meaning of happiness with the philosophical notion of "the good life." Defining happiness as loving one's life and valuing it in ways manifested by ample enjoyment and a deep sense of meaning, Martin explores the ways (...) in which happiness interacts with all other dimensions of good lives--in particular with moral decency and goodness, authenticity, mental health, self-fulfillment, and meaningfulness. He interweaves a variety of examples from memoirs, novels, and films along the way, connecting his discussion of the philosophical issues to related topics that interest all of us: virtue, love, philanthropy, suffering, simplicity, balancing work and leisure, and much more. Drawing on wide-ranging and robust evidence, Martin also makes the case that we need a "politics of happiness" whereby government would apply the results of recent "happiness studies" in psychology to public policy. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to clarify the relation between genealogy and history and to suggest a methodological reading of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals. I try to determine genealogy's specific range of objects, specific mode of explication, and specific textual form. Genealogies in general can be thought of as drastic narratives of the emergence and transformations of forms of subjectivity related to power, told with the intention to induce doubt and self-reflection in exactly those readers whose (collective) history is (...) narrated. The main interest in understanding the concept of genealogy and revisiting Nietzsche's introduction of it into philosophy lies in understanding how a certain way of writing and a certain textual practice function that successfully call into question current judgments, institutions and practices. Nietzsche's example, I argue, can provide a paradigm for a critical practice that accounts for historical processes of subject formation in terms of power and turns them against given forms of subjectivity. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that (at least many) philosophical thought experiments are unreliable. But I argue that this notion of unreliability has to be understood relative to the goal of thought experiments as knowledge producing. And relative to that goal many thought experiments in science are just as unreliable. But in fact thought experiments in science play a varied role and I will suggest that knowledge production is a goal only under quite limited circumstances. I defend the view that (...) these circumstances can (sometimes) arise in philosophy as well. (shrink)

This is the best collection of essays on Rorty’s philosophy that has been published in the last decade. It will be of great interest not only to Rorty specialists but to anyone concerned with the difficulties contemporary analytic philosophy faces in its search for a viable self-understanding. The contributors are Barry Allen, Akeel Bilgrami, Jacques Bouveresse, Robert Brandom, James Conant, Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennett, Jürgen Habermas, John McDowell, Hilary Putnam, Bjørn Ramberg, and Michael Williams. Rorty himself has also written an (...) essay, plus individual and fairly extensive replies to each of his critics. (shrink)

The study of engineering ethics tends to emphasize professional codes of ethics and, to lesser degrees, business ethics and technology studies. These are all important vantage points, but they neglect personal moral commitments, as well as personal aesthetic, religious, and other values that are not mandatory for all members of engineering. This paper illustrates how personal moral commitments motivate, guide, and give meaning to the work of engineers, contributing to both self-fulfillment and public goods. It also explores some general frameworks (...) for thinking about these commitments and calls for further exploration of them. (shrink)

Boarding school is a major educational option for many students (e.g., students living in remote areas, or whose parents are working interstate or overseas, etc.). This study explored the motivation, engagement, and achievement of boarding and day students who are educated in the same classrooms and receive the same syllabus and instruction from the same teachers (thus a powerful research design to enable unique comparisons). Among 2,803 students (boardingn= 481; dayn= 2,322) from 6 Australian high schools and controlling for background (...) attributes and personality, we found predominant parity between boarding and day students in their motivation, engagement, and achievement. We also found that classroom-average motivation, engagement, and achievement was not significantly affected by the number of boarders (relative to day students) in the classroom. In addition, the effects of boarding were generally not moderated by students’ background or personality attributes. We conclude that boarders have academic opportunities and outcomes that are comparable to their day student counterparts. Implications for students, teachers, and parents are discussed. (shrink)