The starting point of this conversation with philosopher Mathieu Triclot is the issue of the causal contribution of video game playing in school shootings. Triclot explains the limitations of current psychological approaches regarding video game violence. He further develops on the peculiar features of the video game medium and how they relate to the problem of violence. Triclot eventually shows that, although players may relate to virtual violence in very different ways, violence in video games is not merely a (...) subjective phenomenon. He highlights that some “regimes of experience,” which got stable in the video game culture, cultivate a toxic relation to violence. (shrink)

In this short paper we analyse some paradoxical aspects of France’s Foucauldian heritage: while several French scholars claim the COVID-19 pandemic is a perfect example of what Foucault called biopolitics, popular reaction instead suggests a biopolitical failure on the part of the government; One of these failures concerns the government’s inability to produce reliable biostatistical data, especially regarding health inequalities in relation to COVID-19. We interrogate whether Foucaldianism contributed, in the past as well today, towards a certain myopia in France (...) regarding biostatistics and its relation to social inequalities in health. One might ask whether this very data could provide an appropriate response to the Foucauldian question: What kind of governance of life is the pandemic revealing to us? (shrink)

Bringing Pierre Bourdieu to Science and Technology Studies Content Type Journal Article Pages 263-273 DOI 10.1007/s11024-011-9174-2 Authors Mathieu Albert, Wilson Centre and Department of Psychiatry, Faculty of Medicine, University of Toronto, 200 Elizabeth Street , Eaton-South 1-581, Toronto, ON M5G 2C4, Canada Daniel Lee Kleinman, Department of Community and Environmental Sociology, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 348 Agricultural Hall 1450 Linden Drive, Madison, WI 53706, USA Journal Minerva Online ISSN 1573-1871 Print ISSN 0026-4695 Journal Volume Volume 49 Journal Issue Volume 49, (...) Number 3. (shrink)

Since cheating is obviously wrong, arguments against it need only be mentioned in passing. But the argument of unfair advantage absurdly takes education to be essentially a race of all against all; moreover, it ignores that many cases of unfair advantages are widely accepted. On the other hand, the fact that cheating can hamper learning does not mean that punishing cheating will necessarily favour learning, so that this argument does not obviously justify sanctioning cheaters.

La philosophie de l’histoire d’Auguste Comte, méconnue aujourd’hui, mérite un nouvel examen. L’idée de progrès social qui lui sert de fil conducteur s’éclaire lorsqu’on la compare à la hiérarchie animale telle qu’elle est conçue notamment par Lamarck et Blainville. De ce point de vue, on s’aperçoit que les critiques déjà formulées par Cuvier envers une telle hiérarchie préfigurent celles qu’on peut adresser à la conception comtienne de l’histoire, qui semble postuler une corrélation trop rigide entre les différents aspects sociaux. Mais (...) ne peut-on pas alors interpréter les idées de progrès social et de hiérarchie animale comme des principes régulateurs et non des faits observables? (shrink)

In this article I criticize the non-consequentialist Weighted Lottery (WL) solution to the choice between saving a smaller or a larger group of people. WL aims to avoid what non-consequentialists see as consequentialism's unfair aggregation by giving equal consideration to each individual's claim to be rescued. In so doing, I argue, WL runs into another common objection to consequentialism: it is excessively demanding. WL links the right action with the outcome of a fairly weighted lottery, which means that an agent (...) can only act rightly if s/he has actually run the lottery. In many actual cases, this involves epistemic demands that can be almost impossible to meet. I argue that plausible moral principles cannot make such extreme epistemic demands. (shrink)

According to Clifford Geertz, the purpose of anthropology is not to explain culture but to explicate it. That should cause us to rethink our relationship with machine learning. It is, we contend, perfectly possible that machine learning algorithms, which are unable to explain, and could even be unexplainable themselves, can still be of critical use in a process of explication. Thus, we report on an experiment with anthropological AI. From a dataset of 175K Facebook comments, we trained a neural network (...) to predict the emoji reaction associated with a comment and asked a group of human players to compete against the machine. We show that a) the machine can reach the same accuracy as the players, b) it fails in roughly the same ways as the players, and c) easily predictable emoji reactions tend to reflect unambiguous situations where interpretation is easy. We therefore repurpose the failures of the neural network to point us to deeper and more ambiguous situations where interpretation is hard and explication becomes both necessary and interesting. We use this experiment as a point of departure for discussing how experiences from anthropology, and in particular the tension between formalist ethnoscience and interpretive thick description, might contribute to debates about explainable AI. (shrink)

Social transmission is at the core of cultural evolutionary theory. It occurs when a demonstrator uses mental representations to produce some public displays which in turn allow a learner to acquire similar mental representations. Although cultural evolutionists do not dispute this view of social transmission, they typically abstract away from the multistep nature of the process when they speak of cultural variants at large, thereby referring both to variation and evolutionary change in mental representations as well as in their corresponding (...) public displays. This conflation suggests that differentiating each step of the transmission process is redundant. In this paper, I examine different forms of interplay between the multistep nature of social transmission and the metric spaces used by cultural evolutionists to measure cultural variation and to model cultural change. I offer a conceptual analysis of what assumptions seem to be at work when cultural evolutionists conflate the complex causal sequence of social transmission as a single space of variation in which populations evolve. To this aim, I use the framework of variation spaces, a formal framework commonly used in evolutionary biology, and I develop two theoretical concepts, ‘technique’ and ‘technical space’, for addressing cases where the complexity of social transmission defies the handy assumption of a single variation space for cultural change. (shrink)

The use of physical models of molecular structures as research tools has been central to the development of biochemistry and molecular biology. Intriguingly, it has received little attention from scholars of science. In this paper, I argue that these physical models are not mere three-dimensional representations but that they are in fact very special research tools: they are cognitive augmentations. Despite the fact that they are external props, these models serve as cognitive tools that augment and extend the modeler’s cognitive (...) capacities and performance in molecular modeling tasks. This cognitive enhancement is obtained because of the way the modeler interacts with these models, the models’ materiality contributing to the solving of the molecule’s structure. Furthermore, I argue that these material models and their component parts were designed, built and used specifically to serve as cognitive facilitators and cognitive augmentations. (shrink)

A Polish space is not always homeomorphic to a computably presented Polish space. In this article, we examine degrees of non-computability of presenting homeomorphic copies of compact Polish spaces. We show that there exists a $\mathbf {0}'$ -computable low $_3$ compact Polish space which is not homeomorphic to a computable one, and that, for any natural number $n\geq 2$, there exists a Polish space $X_n$ such that exactly the high $_{n}$ -degrees are required to present the homeomorphism type of $X_n$. (...) Along the way we investigate the computable aspects of Čech homology groups. We also show that no compact Polish space has a least presentation with respect to Turing reducibility. (shrink)

Research has shown that context influences how sincere a smile appears to observers. That said, most studies on this topic have focused exclusively on situational cues (e.g. smiling while at a party versus smiling during a job interview) and few have examined other elements of context. One important element concerns any knowledge an observer might have about the smiler as an individual (e.g. their habitual behaviours, traits or attitudes). In this manuscript, we present three experiments that explored the influence of (...) such knowledge on ratings of smile sincerity. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants rated the sincerity of Duchenne and non-Duchenne smiles after having been exposed to cues about the smiler’s tendency to reciprocate (this person always, never or occasionally returns favours). In Experiment 3 they performed the same task but with cues about the smiler’s love of learning (this person always, never or occasionally enjoys learning new tasks). The results show that cues about the smiler’s reciprocity tendency influenced participants’ ratings of smile sincerity and did so in a stronger manner than cues about the smiler’s love of learning. Overall, these results both strengthen and broaden the literature on the role of context on judgements of smile sincerity. (shrink)

Around the beginning of the 21st century, certain mutations of capitalism and modes of neomanagement combined to replace the old "disciplinary society ", with what we can call the law and order society. Initially combining mechanisms of disciplinary power and a sophisticated biopolitics, the law and order society, has begun to adapt mechanisms of control , as well as elements of the old sovereign power and the state of permanent exception to face threats to its security. The methods of law (...) and order operate in an ambiguous manner, oscillating between protection and repression. A perfect example of this oscillation can be seen in the measures used to control migratory fluxes, notably the detention centres, which are - I will argue - to contemporary society, what the prison was to Foucault’s disciplinary society. (shrink)

La notion d’expérimentation, initialement réservée au domaine des sciences expérimentales, est employée aujourd’hui pour qualifier de multiples pratiques sociopolitiques : gouvernementales, activistes ou artistiques. Cette extension des usages du terme manifeste l’influence de l’imaginaire des pratiques de recherche expérimentale sur les conceptions contemporaines du politique. Elle accompagne des mutations du parler et de l’agir politiques qu’il importe de mieux caractériser, au confluent de la raison scientifique et technique et des transformations de l’espace public.Experimentation, which initially concerned only the experimental sciences (...) field, is a term now used to describe a great many forms of socio-political practice, for example among governments, activists or artists. This extension of the term’s usage illustrates the influence of imagination in experimental research on contemporary conceptions of politics. It is supporting changes in the patterns of political speech and action that need to be better characterised, as they are occurring at the point where scientific and technical reason meets the transformation of the public sphere. (shrink)

The ratio bias––according to which individuals prefer to bet on probabilities expressed as a ratio of large numbers to normatively equivalent or superior probabilities expressed as a ratio of small numbers––has recently gained momentum, with researchers especially in health economics emphasizing the policy importance of the phenomenon. Although the bias has been replicated several times, some doubts remain about its economic significance. Our two experiments show that the bias disappears once order effects are excluded, and once salient and dominant incentives (...) are provided. This holds true for both choice and valuation tasks. Also, adding context to the decision problem does not change this outcome. No ratio bias could be found in between-subject tests either, which leads us to the conclusion that the policy relevance of the phenomenon is doubtful at best. (shrink)

The past two decades have seen growing calls for the “tobacco endgame.” Its advocates are united by their commitment to two ideas. First, tobacco‐related harms represent a catastrophic health emergency, and second, current tobacco‐control approaches are an inadequate response to the scale of that emergency. To endgame advocates, tobacco policy should have more ambitious goals than merely “controlling” tobacco. Instead, it should aim to bring about a smoke‐free world. While a range of different policies are included under the umbrella of (...) the “tobacco endgame,” the most radical proposal is for a complete ban on tobacco. Its advocates argue that in addition to improving global public health, an effective ban on tobacco would also promote overall autonomy and would have important egalitarian benefits. This article critically examines these arguments for a tobacco ban. I argue that they rely on idealizing assumptions about the likely effects of a ban. Because an effective ban would require robust enforcement to control the illegal market in tobacco, it would be more likely to undermine autonomy and equality than it would be to promote them. By relying on idealizing assumptions and ignoring the likely consequences of a tobacco ban, advocates of a ban obscure, rather than clarify, both the policy debate and the ethical stakes. I conclude by considering the ways that idealizing assumptions should—and should not—play a role in debates about ethical issues in public policy. (shrink)

In this paper, we show that there is a distinctive mode of spatial awareness in blind individuals, which we call sense of volume, that is not to be confused with echolocation based on self-generated sounds. It is based on the analysis of variations in the ambient sound field and it provides locational information about objects in one’s surroundings. We propose that the sense of volume offers a primitive contact with the outside world. It does not give access to perceptual objects (...) as such, but it should rather be understood as a rudimentary sense of presence that expresses that there is something out there at a certain distance and in a certain direction. We conclude by highlighting its tactile quality. More specifically, we argue that the sense of volume consists in a form of tactile anticipation: when one experiences something as being out there, one tactually expects that one could come in contact with it. (shrink)

Prominent ethical and policy issues such as affirmative action and female enrollment in science and engineering revolve around the idea that diversity is good. However, a precise definition is seldom provided. I show that diversity may be construed as a factual description, a craving for symmetry, an intrinsic good, an instrumental good, a symptom, or a side effect. These acceptions differ vastly in their nature and properties. Some are deeply mistaken and some others cannot lead to concrete policies. It is (...) thus necessary to clarify what one means by ‘diversity.’ It may be a neutral description of a given state; but this is insufficient to act. The idea that there should be the same representation in a specific context as in the overall population is both puzzling and arbitrary. Diversity as intrinsic good is a mere opinion, which cannot be concretely applied; moreover, the most commonly invoked forms of diversity are not intrinsically good. On the other hand, diversity as instrumental good can be evaluated empirically and can give rise to policies, but these may be very weak. Finally, symptoms and side effects are not actually about diversity. I consider the example of female enrollment in science and engineering, interpreting the various arguments found in the literature in light of this polysemy. (shrink)

La réception de John Rawls et des théories de la justice Souvent présenté comme un des plus grands théoriciens politiques du XXe siècle, John Rawls est aujourd'hui un philosophe consacré en France, communément perçu comme le porte-parole d'un " libéralisme égalitaire ", alliant défense de la démocratie, du marché et de la justice sociale. La réception de John Rawls et des théories de la justice Souvent présenté comme un des plus grands théoriciens politiques du XXe siècle, John Rawls est aujourd'hui (...) un philosophe consacré en France, communément perçu comme le porte-parole d'un " libéralisme égalitaire ", alliant défense de la démocratie, du marché et de la justice sociale. Rien ne laissait pourtant présager l'entrée dans le canon académique et dans le débat politique d'une oeuvre longtemps ignorée des philosophes et intellectuels français. Cette consécration tardive constitue le terme d'une histoire qui court du début des années 1970 aux années 2000, durant laquelle les lectures les plus diverses de Rawls se sont affrontées. Porté par une écriture dynamique et accessible, l'ouvrage de Mathieu Hauchecorne rend compte de la réception française de ce qu'on a communément appelé les " théories de la justice ". Il retrace les circulations de Rawls mais aussi d'auteurs comme Robert Nozick, Michael Walzer ou Amartya Sen entre les Etats-Unis et la France ; entre économie, philosophie, sociologie, droit et science politique ; et entre champ intellectuel et champ politique. Une histoire inséparable de reconfigurations plus globales, comme la domination accrue de l'anglais sur les échanges intellectuels transnationaux, l'affirmation d'une gauche non-marxiste en France, et les débats relatifs aux politiques de redistribution. Une contribution majeure à une sociologie de la pensée politique contemporaine. (shrink)

Physiologists and historians are still debating what conceptually differentiates each of the three major modern theories of regulation: the constancy of the milieu inte´rieur, homeostasis and allostasis. Here I propose that these models incarnate two distinct regimes of politization of the life sciences.This perspective leads me to suggest that the historicization of physiological norms is intrinsic to the allostatic model, which thus divides it fundamentally from the two others. I analyze the allostatic model in the light of the Canguilhemian theory, (...) showing how the former contributed to the development of a critical epistemology immune to both naturalist essentialism and social constructivism. With a unique clarity in the history of physiology, allostasis gives us a model of the convergence of historical epistemology and scientific practice. As such it played a key role in codifying the epistemological basis of certain current research programs that, in the fields of social epidemiology and feminist neuroscience, promote what we name here a critical physiology. (shrink)

We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP r , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A ∧ O ∼A, O A ∧ P ∼A or even O A ∧ ∼O A. On the other hand, DP r still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP r interprets a given premise set ‘as normally (...) as possible’ with respect to SDL. Whereas some SDL-rules are verified unconditionally by DP r , others are verified conditionally. The latter are applicable unless they rely on formulas that turn out to behave inconsistently in view of the premises. This dynamic process is mirrored by the proof theory of DP r. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first-order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self-knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self-knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes (...) one's belief that p and so self-knowledge involves a constitutive relation between first- and second-order beliefs. If this is true, it is hard to see how those second-order beliefs could ever be false.I develop two counter-examples which show that despite the constitutive relation between first- and second-order beliefs in standard cases of self-knowledge, it is possible to be mistaken, and even self-deceived, about the content of one's own beliefs. These counter-examples do not show that the rational agency model is mistaken—rather, they show that the possibility of estrangement from one's own mental life means that, even within the rational agency model, it is possible to have false second-order beliefs about the content of one's first-order beliefs. The authority of self-knowledge does not entail that to believe that one believes that p suffices to make it the case that one believes that p. (shrink)

This article focuses on defective conditionals ? namely indicative conditionals whose antecedents are false and whose truth-values therefore cannot be determined. The problem is to decide which formal connective can adequately represent this usage. Classical logic renders defective conditionals true whereas traditional mathematics dismisses them as irrelevant. This difference in treatment entails that, at the propositional level, classical logic validates some sentences that are intuitively false in plane geometry. With two proofs, I show that the same flaw is shared by (...) a family of trivalent logics. I go on to examine the strict conditional and its derivatives. This family is the only one to avoid the faulty inference but it does so without addressing the status of the truth-value assigned to defective conditionals. (shrink)

The second German edition of Capital appeared in nine issues, from July 1872 to March 1873. Marx added an afterword in which he hoped to answer his western European critics, whom he felt did not grasp his work. To understand the afterword to the second German edition of Capital, one must take into account both what Marx wrote in his book and what Marx’s British, French, German and Russian critics said about his work between 1867 and 1872.

À partir d’un paradoxe que soulève Montaigne et de ses prolongements au XVII e siècle, cet article explore ce singulier revers de la raison qu’est la sottise. Montaigne s’étonne qu’une même tête, celle du pédant, qui cristallise par excellence la sottise, puisse à la fois être savante et n’en être pas moins sotte. L’analyse de ce paradoxe conduit Montaigne à pointer la mauvaise façon qu’ont les pédants de se rapporter à la science, et découvre que c’est la manière de l’animer (...) qui importe et qui la rend véritable. Nous éclaircissons ensuite la notion de manière, souvent convoquée au Grand Siècle pour suggérer ce qui échappe à une raison trop peu fine. Enfin, nous indiquons qu’un nouveau modèle, celui de la machine, émerge dans la postérité cartésienne pour dire la sottise. Chez La Bruyère, entre autres, le sot est ainsi celui qui parle et agit mécaniquement. (shrink)

A recurring citation in systemic risk literature reviews offers a model where what they describe as a free banking system is vulnerable to contagious bank runs through clearinghouse loans. The paper ignores key contributions to both free banking and financial history literature, such that the paper is of little relevance to the understanding of the stability of both free banking systems and clearinghouse arrangements. Our criticism concentrates on the institutions of banking absent or misrepresented. It is argued that their conclusions (...) are inapplicable to free banking. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

According to Gérard Genette, the chief function of an authorial preface is to ensure that the text is read properly. In other words, the purpose of the preface is to attract the reader’s attention and to steer him or her toward a particular understanding of the book. A preface, then, aims to get readers to read the book and often on certain terms, i.e., the author’s. As such, the authorial preface of Marx’s Capital (1867) is especially important — it allows (...) us to understand how Marx himself hoped to be understood by his readers. Commentators, whether hostile or sympathetic, usually focus on the postface to the second edition of Marx’s work. We will instead focus on the preface to the first edition, as to uncover Marx’s immediate political aims and ethical concerns. (shrink)

ONE of the books that has had a major impact on the field of ethics is Kurt Baier’s The Moral Point Of View. In it Mr Baier attempts many important things, the most important perhaps is to show how we can justify our moral judgments. In fact, the notion of ‘the moral point of view’ for him is simply a standard for justifying moral judgments: ‘I shall argue…that our moral convictions are true if they can be seen to be required (...) or acceptable from the moral point of view’ Much of the book is spent trying to specify the conditions for the moral point of view or, as he says, the defining principle of the moral point of view. (shrink)

This article maps a controversy in network science over the last 15 years, dividing the field about the epistemic status of a central notion, scale-freeness. The article accounts for the two main disputes, in 2005 and in 2018, as they unfolded in academic publications and on social media. This article analyzes the conflict, and the reasons why it reignited in 2018, to the surprise of many. It is argued that the concept of complex networks is shared by the distinct subcultures (...) of theorists and experimentalists; and that these subcultures have incompatible approaches to knowledge: nomothetic and idiographic. Following Galison, this article contends that network science is a trading zone where theorists and experimentalists can trade knowledge across the epistemic divide. (shrink)