Time and time consciousness have always been for Edmund Husserl a kind of torment, a stimulus, an enigma, an 'ultimate and true absolute', as he wrote in the _Ideen_. This paper aims to show that Husserl addressed this topic, after the _Vorlesungen_, especially in his last published book _Erfahrung und Urteil_, presenting a solution that introduces a possible new perspective on thought. The conceptual core of this solution is found in the complex and fascinating analysis of passive temporal synthesis. Consciousness, (...) temporality and perception become the terms of multiple equations in their fundamental, mobile and unguaranteed basis, in a way that challenges the centuries-old concept of the central unity of the constant ego. In the middle of dark times, aware of his 'discoveries' of the 1930s such as pre-predictivity, _Lebenswelt_, anonymous and functioning intentionality, and always on behalf of the new rationalism, this also seems to be one of the most important final responses given by Husserl to Heidegger, as well as one of his most fruitful legacies and challenges to further thinking. (shrink)

This paper studies the effects of social comparison on risk taking behavior. In our theoretical framework, decision makers evaluate the consequences of their choices relative to both their own and their peers’ conditions. We test experimentally whether the position in the social ranking affects risk attitudes. Subjects interact in a simulated workplace environment where they perform a work task, receive possibly different wages, and then undertake a risky decision that may produce an extra gain. We find that social comparison matters (...) for risk attitudes. Subjects are more risk averse in the presence of small social gain than social loss. In addition, risk aversion is decreasing in the size of the social gain. (shrink)

Franz Rosenzweig devoted particular attention to the problem of individuality in Hermann Cohen’s philosophy. He writes that, in comparison with the individuality of the man of religion, “the human being about which aesthetics knew [...] fades now in all its aesthetic individuality to a ‘mere type’”. This statement is actually based on Cohen’s writings: in Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls, Cohen explicitly maintains that the human being that is the object of artistic representation is not a type, but rather an individual. (...) Just three years later, however, in his first book about philosophy of religion, Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie, Cohen states that the human being that is represented by art is not really an individual; only the man of religion is really individual; the human being represented by art is merely a type. In this paper my aim is to argue for the thesis that these opposite statements belong to different points of view. From an aesthetic point of view the human being represented by art has to be considered as truly individual, but the systematic overview adopted in Der Begriff der Religion can teach us that the individuality of the human being represented by art can’t be maintained from a different point of view than the aesthetic one. (shrink)

“The Messiah [...] is the source of all religious art.” This statement, which we find in Cohen’s Über den ästhetischen Wert unserer religiösen Bildung, seems to be not fully consistent with the whole of Cohen’s aesthetics and with Cohen’s thought about the possibility of art having religious themes. In order to explain this statement and Cohen’s perspective about Messianism in art, in §§ 1-3 I examine Cohen’s reflections about this topic in his main works about art and religion; in § (...) 4 I maintain that the goal of this statement is to underline a difference between Jewish and Christian religious art. Finally, in § 5, I offer a short examination of some 20th or 21th century artworks that can be compared to Cohen’s views about Messianism in art: namely, Marc Chagall’s crucifixions, Gustav Mahler’s 4th symphony, and Michelangelo Pistoletto’s Terzo Paradiso. (shrink)

A central topic in Cohen’s Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls is the artistic representation of the human figure; in Cohen’s reflections on this topic, the nude has a fundamental importance. The first aim of this paper is to examine Cohen’s theses on the role of the nude in figurative arts, as well as his comments about sculptural and pictorial works representing nude figures. This will bring us to take into consideration Cohen’s judgement about eroticism in art. Some brief considerations about the (...) nude in contemporary art, and above all in photography, will be expressed in order to evaluate the topicality of Cohen’s aesthetics concerning this theme. These considerations, however, will make it necessary to rethink Cohen’s judgement regarding eroticism in art. (shrink)

Jewish monotheism forbids every representation of God. In ancient Greece, on the contrary, great sculptural art was mainly representation of several gods. I wonder whether, according to Hermann Cohen, sculpture and paganism are necessarily bound together. What, then, is the meaning of artistic representation of Jesus Christ? Is he the ideal of an unification of God and Man?

Il concetto dell'anima svolge nel pensiero di Michel Henry un'importantissima funzione di filo conduttore nell'esame di alcuni momenti fondamentali della storia della filosofia. Dal momento che le interpretazioni henriane del pensiero dei filosofi del passato hanno sempre uno scopo teoretico, lo studio di questo utilizzo del tema dell'anima in funzione di filo conduttore permette sia di comprendere meglio alcuni aspetti importanti delle tesi filosofiche di Henry, sia di valutarne con maggiore consapevolezza l'importanza per lafilosofia e per la cultura di oggi.

This paper is about Michel Henry’s interpretation of the topic of the soul in Kant’s thought. Two aspects of this topic will be particularly examined: Kant’s criticism of the concept of the soul as a substance and the I think as the consciousness that every representation of mine is a representation for me. Henry thinks that the insertion of this consciousness in Kant’s thought is a necessary incoherence that shows the impossibility to reduce appearing to representation. At the end it (...) will be shown that, in the context of henrian thought, the abandonment of the concept of the soul as a substance is a condition to assert the radical difference between human beings and things. (shrink)

Rudolf Pannwitz è una delle più complesse, ma spesso sottovalutate figure intellettuali dell'area germanofona, autore linguisticamente sapido di una bibliografia enorme e poliedrica, il quale ha raccolto in vita la stima di personalità tra le più importanti del panorama culturale europeo. Né si può trascurare una biografia contrastata, sofferta, eccentrica, che solo nella sua ultima fase consentirà una sistemazione matura del pensiero. Questo volume ricostruisce compiutamente per la prima volta la dottrina filosofica pannwitziana; quella filosofia che per autodichiarazione risulta essere (...) la categoria cui appartiene ciò che di più importante la sua persona ha espresso. La formulazione definitiva coincide col grande dittico della maturità - costituito dalle opere Der Aufbau der Natur e Das Werk des Menschen - che introduce la distinzione fondamentale tra mondo disponibile e mondo prodotto. Ma Pannwitz è anche un grande europeo. Particolare attenzione è allora riservata alla sua filosofia politica, il cui carattere profetico è in alcuni passaggi sorprendente, e che prospetta soluzioni che anticipano in modo appassionato e vibrante i capisaldi del dibattito a venire. In prima traduzione italiana con originale tedesco a fronte viene proposto in appendice il testo Aufgaben Europas, una relazione pubblica tenuta da Pannwitz nel 1955. (shrink)

Cohen deals with the question of the possibility for art to represent God or the divine in some of his works, throughout all his philosophical production, but obviously above all in his main aesthetic work, sthetik des reinen Gefhls. We can state that in Cohen's works this problem is posed with reference to three different religious fields: Greek polytheism, Jewish monotheism and Christianity. The topic of this essay will be Cohen's thought about the artistic representation of the divine in Christianity (...) or in Christian art through the representation of Jesus. This topic will be examined with reference both to Kants Begrndung der sthetik and to sthetik des reinen Gefhls ; whereas in Kants Begrndung der sthetik Cohen devotes to the representation of Jesus just a short consideration in the historical introduction of the book, in sthetik des reinen Gefhls the representation of Jesus is object of far more attention. Here, Cohen's answer to the question of the possibility to represent the divine through the representation of Jesus is that Jesus' divinity, in the artistic representation of his figure, can only have a metaphorical value, the real meaning of which is that Jesus' story is the ideal story of the human being; in Kants Begrndung der sthetik and in other writings of the 80s, on the contrary, the idea of incarnation and of the divinity of Jesus is object of a different appreciation by Cohen. The comparison between these different stances can be a contribution to the comprehension of the changes in Cohen's view of Christianity through the years. (shrink)

Gli studi qui raccolti mostrano dunque come il riutilizzo di materiale musicale preesistente all’interno di una nuova composizione, a volte frettolosamente condannato come un plagio, produca risultati creativi, realizzandosi in moltissime forme nate dalle più varie radici: si può parlare così di una comunanza di visione tra compositori diversi, o dell’appartenenza (consapevole o inconsapevole) di un certo autore alla propria tradizione, oppure del suo cosciente far riferimento a una tradizione specifica, magari appunto con l’intenzione di trasfigurarla, o ancora dell’applicazione di (...) un metodo creativo consistente nella realizzazione di immagini delle musiche del passato... e questo elenco potrebbe continuare ulteriormente. In generale, ciò che emerge da questi contributi è insomma che ci sono moltissimi casi e contesti in cui «rubare» la musica non è (o non dovrebbe essere considerato) certamente un furto: questo succede quando, come accade molto spesso, «rubare» la musica è non soltanto l’involontaria assimilazione dell’apporto creativo di un altro artista o il modo per veicolare culture o tradizioni musicali che altrimenti potrebbero cadere nell’oblio, ma anche un autentico contributo alla trasmissione creativa del sapere musicale e a nuove ulteriori creazioni. (shrink)

Nijhawan argues convincingly that predictive mechanisms are pervasive in the central nervous system (CNS). However, scientific understanding of visual prediction requires one to formulate empirically testable neurophysiological models. The author's suggestions in this direction are to be evaluated on the basis of more realistic experimental methodologies and more plausible assumptions on the hierarchical character of the human visual cortex.

The present paper discusses different approaches to metaphysics and defends a specific, non-deflationary approach that nevertheless qualifies as scientifically-grounded and, consequently, as acceptable from the naturalistic viewpoint. By critically assessing some recent work on science and metaphysics, we argue that such a sophisticated form of naturalism, which preserves the autonomy of metaphysics as an a priori enterprise yet pays due attention to the indications coming from our best science, is not only workable but recommended.

The free-energy principle states that all systems that minimize their free energy resist a tendency to physical disintegration. Originally proposed to account for perception, learning, and action, the free-energy principle has been applied to the evolution, development, morphology, anatomy and function of the brain, and has been called a postulate, an unfalsifiable principle, a natural law, and an imperative. While it might afford a theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship between environment, life, and mind, its epistemic status is unclear. Also (...) unclear is how the free-energy principle relates to prominent theoretical approaches to life science phenomena, such as organicism and mechanism. This paper clarifies both issues, and identifies limits and prospects for the free-energy principle as a first principle in the life sciences. (shrink)

Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this paper, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The Bayesian research program in cognitive science does not possess special epistemic virtues over alternative approaches for explaining mental phenomena involving uncertainty. In particular, the Bayesian approach is not simpler, more unifying, or more rational than alternatives. It is also contentious that the Bayesian approach (...) is overall better supported by the empirical evidence. So, to develop philosophical theories of mind on the basis of a realist interpretation of results from Bayesian cognitive science is unwarranted. Naturalistic philosophers of mind should instead adopt an anti-realist attitude towards these results and remain agnostic as to whether Bayesian models are true. For continuing on with an exclusive focus and praise of Bayes within debates about the predictive processing theory will impede progress in philosophical understanding of scientific practice in computational cognitive science as well as of the architecture of the mind. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop an organizational account that defines biological functions as causal relations subject to closure in living systems, interpreted as the most typical example of organizationally closed and differentiated self-maintaining systems. We argue that this account adequately grounds the teleological and normative dimensions of functions in the current organization of a system, insofar as it provides an explanation for the existence of the function bearer and, at the same time, identifies in a non-arbitrary way the norms that (...) functions are supposed to obey. Accordingly, we suggest that the organizational account combines the etiological and dispositional perspectives in an integrated theoretical framework. IntroductionDispositional ApproachesEtiological TheoriesBiological Self-maintenance Closure, teleology, and normativityOrganizational differentiationFunctions C1: Contributing to the maintenance of the organization C2: Producing the functional trait Implications and Objections Functional versus useful Dysfunctions, side effects, and accidental contributionsProper functions and selected effectsReproductionRelation with other ‘unitarian’ approachesConclusions. (shrink)

According to the received view of evolution, only genes are inherited. From this view it follows that only genetically-caused phenotypic variation is selectable and, thereby, that all selection is at bottom genetic selection. This paper argues that the received view is wrong. In many species, there are intergenerationally-stable phenotypic differences due to environmental differences. Natural selection can act on these nongenetically-caused phenotypic differences in the same way it acts on genetically-caused phenotypic differences. Some selection is at bottom nongenetic selection. The (...) argument against the received view involves a reformulation of the concepts of inheritance and heritability. Inherited factors are all those developmental factors responsible for parent–offspring similarity; some inherited factors are genetic and some are not. Heritable variation is intergenerationally-stable phenotypic variation; some such variation is genetically-caused and some is not. The received view and its critics The possibility of nongenetic selection (the lucky butterfly) The reality of nongenetic selection 3.1 Imprinting mechanisms 3.2 Other learning mechanisms 3.3 Other nongenetic mechanisms Genetic and nongenetic inheritance mechanisms Genetic and nongenetic inherited factors Genetic and nongenetic heritability Conclusions + Current address: Dr Matteo Mameli, Research Fellow, King's College, Cambridge, CB2 1ST, United Kingdom, matteo.mameli{at}kings.cam.ac.uk' + u + '@' + d + ''//-->. (shrink)

We put forward a new, ‘coherentist’ account of quantum entanglement, according to which entangled systems are characterized by symmetric relations of ontological dependence among the component particles. We compare this coherentist viewpoint with the two most popular alternatives currently on offer—structuralism and holism—and argue that it is essentially different from, and preferable to, both. In the course of this article, we point out how coherentism might be extended beyond the case of entanglement and further articulated.

This paper argues that biological organisation can be legitimately conceived of as an intrinsically teleological causal regime. The core of the argument consists in establishing a connection between organisation and teleology through the concept of self-determination: biological organisation determines itself in the sense that the effects of its activity contribute to determine its own conditions of existence. We suggest that not any kind of circular regime realises self-determination, which should be specifically understood as self-constraint: in biological systems, in particular, self-constraint (...) takes the form of closure, i.e. a network of mutually dependent constitutive constraints. We then explore the occurrence of intrinsic teleology in the biological domain and beyond. On the one hand, the organisational account might possibly concede that supra-organismal biological systems could realise closure, and hence be teleological. On the other hand, the realisation of closure beyond the biological realm appears to be highly unlikely. In turn, the occurrence of simpler forms of self-determination remains a controversial issue, in particular with respect to the case of self-organising dissipative systems. (shrink)

The notion of subject matter is a key concern of contemporary philosophy of language and logic. A central task for a theory of subject matter is to characterise the notion of sentential subject matter, that is, to assign to each sentence of a given language a subject matter that may count as its subject matter. In this paper, we elaborate upon David Lewis’ account of subject matter. Lewis’ proposal is simple and elegant but lacks a satisfactory characterisation of sentential subject (...) matter. Drawing on linguistic literature on focus and on the question under discussion, we offer a neo-Lewisian account of subject matter, which retains all the virtues of Lewis’ but also includes an attractive characterisation of sentential subject matter. (shrink)

The paper investigates the ethics of information transparency (henceforth transparency). It argues that transparency is not an ethical principle in itself but a pro-ethical condition for enabling or impairing other ethical practices or principles. A new definition of transparency is offered in order to take into account the dynamics of information production and the differences between data and information. It is then argued that the proposed definition provides a better understanding of what sort of information should be disclosed and what (...) sort of information should be used in order to implement and make effective the ethical practices and principles to which an organisation is committed. The concepts of “heterogeneous organisation” and “autonomous computational artefact” are further defined in order to clarify the ethical implications of the technology used in implementing information transparency. It is argued that explicit ethical designs, which describe how ethical principles are embedded into the practice of software design, would represent valuable information that could be disclosed by organisations in order to support their ethical standing. (shrink)

Teller argued that violations of Bell’s inequalities are to be explained by interpreting quantum entangled systems according to ‘relational holism’, that is, by postulating that they exhibit irreducible (‘inherent’) relations. Teller also suggested a possible application of this idea to quantum statistics. However, the basic proposal was not explained in detail nor has the additional idea about statistics been articulated in further work. In this article, I reconsider relational holism, amending it and spelling it out as appears necessary for a (...) proper assessment, and application, of the position. †To contact the author, please write to: FB Philosophie‐Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz, Universitätstraße 10, 78464, Konstanz, Germany; e‐mail: matteo.morganti@uni ‐konstanz.de. (shrink)

Courtesy of its free energy formulation, the hierarchical predictive processing theory of the brain (PTB) is often claimed to be a grand unifying theory. To test this claim, we examine a central case: activity of mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic (DA) systems. After reviewing the three most prominent hypotheses of DA activity—the anhedonia, incentive salience, and reward prediction error hypotheses—we conclude that the evidence currently vindicates explanatory pluralism. This vindication implies that the grand unifying claims of advocates of PTB are unwarranted. More generally, (...) we suggest that the form of scientific progress in the cognitive sciences is unlikely to be a single overarching grand unifying theory. (shrink)

This paper puts forward the hypothesis that the distinctive features of quantum statistics are exclusively determined by the nature of the properties it describes. In particular, all statistically relevant properties of identical quantum particles in many-particle systems are conjectured to be irreducible, ‘inherent’ properties only belonging to the whole system. This allows one to explain quantum statistics without endorsing the ‘Received View’ that particles are non-individuals, or postulating that quantum systems obey peculiar probability distributions, or assuming that there are primitive (...) restrictions on the range of states accessible to such systems. With this, the need for an unambiguously metaphysical explanation of certain physical facts is acknowledged and satisfied. (shrink)

In recent work, the interrelated questions of whether there is a fundamental level to reality, whether ontological dependence must have an ultimate ground, and whether the monist thesis should be endorsed that the whole universe is ontologically prior to its parts have been explored with renewed interest. Jonathan Schaffer has provided arguments in favour of 'priority monism' in a series of articles (2003, 2004, 2007a, 2007b, forthcoming). In this paper, these arguments are analysed, and it is claimed that they are (...) not compelling: in particular, the possibility that there is no ultimate level of basic entities that compose everything else is on a par with the possibility of infinite 'upward' complexity. The idea that we must, at any rate, postulate an ontologically fundamental level for methodological reasons ( Cameron 2008 ) is also discussed and found unconvincing: all things considered, there may be good reasons for endorsing 'metaphysical infinitism'. In any event, a higher degree of caution in formulating metaphysical claims than found in the extant literature appears advisable. (shrink)

This open access book assesses the prospects of (re)adopting organization as a pivotal concept in biology. It shows how organization can nourish biological thinking and practice, by reconnecting with the idea of biology as the science of organized systems. The book provides a comprehensive state-of-the-art picture of the characterizations and uses of the concept of organization in both biological science and philosophy of biology. It also deals with a variety of themes – including evolution, organogenesis, heredity, cognition and ecology – (...) with respect to which the concept of organization can guide the elaboration of original models and new experimental protocols. It will be of interest to biologists and scholars working in philosophy of science alike. (shrink)

According to the free energy principle, life is an “inevitable and emergent property of any random dynamical system at non-equilibrium steady state that possesses a Markov blanket” :20130475, 2013). Formulating a principle for the life sciences in terms of concepts from statistical physics, such as random dynamical system, non-equilibrium steady state and ergodicity, places substantial constraints on the theoretical and empirical study of biological systems. Thus far, however, the physics foundations of the free energy principle have received hardly any attention. (...) Here, we start to fill this gap and analyse some of the challenges raised by applications of statistical physics for modelling biological targets. Based on our analysis, we conclude that model-building grounded in the free energy principle exacerbates a trade-off between generality and realism, because of a fundamental mismatch between its physics assumptions and the properties of actual biological targets. (shrink)

Some enlightenment regarding the project to mechanise reason. The assembly line of machine learning: data, algorithm, model. The training dataset: the social origins of machine intelligence. The history of AI as the automation of perception. The learning algorithm: compressing the world into a statistical model. All models are wrong, but some are useful. World to vector: the society of classification and prediction bots. Faults of a statistical instrument: the undetection of the new. Adversarial intelligence vs. statistical intelligence: labour in the (...) age of AI. (shrink)

A widely shared view in the cognitive sciences is that discovering and assessing explanations of cognitive phenomena whose production involves uncertainty should be done in a Bayesian framework. One assumption supporting this modelling choice is that Bayes provides the best approach for representing uncertainty. However, it is unclear that Bayes possesses special epistemic virtues over alternative modelling frameworks, since a systematic comparison has yet to be attempted. Currently, it is then premature to assert that cognitive phenomena involving uncertainty are best (...) explained within the Bayesian framework. As a forewarning, progress in cognitive science may be hindered if too many scientists continue to focus their efforts on Bayesian modelling, which risks to monopolize scientific resources that may be better allocated to alternative approaches. (shrink)

The concept of innateness is a part of folk wisdom but is also used by biologists and cognitive scientists. This concept has a legitimate role to play in science only if the colloquial usage relates to a coherent body of evidence. We examine many different candidates for the post of scientific successor of the folk concept of innateness. We argue that none of these candidates is entirely satisfactory. Some of the candidates are more interesting and useful than others, but the (...) interesting candidates are not equivalent to each other and the empirical and evidential relations between them are far from clear. Researchers have treated the various scientific notions that capture some aspect of the folk concept of innateness as equivalent to each other or at least as tracking properties that are strongly correlated with each other. But whether these correlations exist is an empirical issue. This empirical issue has not been thoroughly investigated because in the attempt to create a bridge between the folk view and their theories, researchers have often assumed that the properties must somehow cluster. Rather than making further attempts to import the folk concept of innateness into the sciences, efforts should now be made to focus on the empirical questions raised by the debates and pave the way to a better way of studying the development of living organisms. Such empirical questions must be answered before it can be decided whether a good scientific successor – in the form of a concept that refers to a collection of biologically significant properties that tend to co-occur – can be identified or whether the concept of innateness deserves no place in science. (shrink)