In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Introduction: Conflicting Interest in Medicine: Stories by Physicians on How Financing Affects Their WorkJames M. DuBois, Symposium EditorPhysicians frequently enter into special relationships that establish personal financial interests that could conflict with their patients’ best interests. Examples include receiving gifts from drug companies, sharing a patent on a medical device, or accepting funding from industry to conduct a drug study. In recent years, such “conflicts of interests” in medicine (...) have received growing attention from medical associations (Association of American Medical Colleges, 2008, 2010), policy bodies (Institute of Medicine, 2009), industry (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 2008), journalists (Caputo, 2009; Nguyen, Ornstein, & Weber, 2010), and even Congress, which included in the 2010 Patient Protection Affordable Care Act a Physician Payment Sunshine provision requiring industry to report a wide variety of ties to physicians. All of these efforts appear motivated by a similar assumption: Gifts and financially beneficial relationships can unconsciously motivate physicians to prioritize their own or industry’s interests over patients’ interests when providing care, conducting medical research, or educating physicians (American Association of Medical Colleges, 2008; Dana & Loewenstein, 2003).The call for stories produced for this narrative symposium provided the following request:We are interested in hearing about positive and negative experiences associated with a variety of financial relationships. The stories should give readers a sense of what it is like to be a physician in the midst of complex relationships to industry, physician practices, and third–party payers—relationships that go beyond ordinary reimbursement for care or research expenses.Obtaining stories proved more challenging than anticipated for reasons related to our theme. Precisely because access to physicians is considered valuable, it is highly restricted. Listservs and blogs that serve physicians typically prohibit postings from anyone except physician members, and even they are sometimes not allowed to post messages freely. While at least one listserv circulated our call to members (at the request of a member), others rejected our request, and one blog offered to post our call as a 1–month ad for $20,000. This contrasts radically with the relatively easy access we have had to other groups, including mental health consumers and living organ donors, who have broad grass root communication systems, and bioethicists, who have several listservs and blogs that readily share news about relevant scholarly opportunities.The collection of stories obtained resulted from extensive personal networking and a small amount of arm twisting. The collection was not what we expected to obtain, but is in many ways even more interesting. One story (Hodges) explicitly addresses the impact that pharmaceutical representatives can have on prescribing patterns—the classic, voluntary, conflicted relationship, insofar as sales reps are [End Page 65] welcomed in facilities, often bearing free samples, free lunches, and glossy articles on their products, all in the hopes of influencing prescribing patterns. But most stories do not fit the typical mold found in discussions of conflicts of interest. Among those expressing concerns about the impact of financial factors on medical practice, one focuses on the insufficient management of bias within the Food and Drug Administration (Perlmutter); three focus on the bias that is introduced through our current fee–for–service reimbursement system (Mikulec, Nagaldine, and Zientek)—of these, two illustrate ways that third parties seek to manipulate physician practices to maximize profits; one notes how any kind of clinical trial—whether government or industry sponsored—may affect patient care decisions (Cruz); while two argue that worries over industry sponsorship of research are disproportionate (Bierut and Sofair), and two address widespread concerns about industry sponsorship of educational activities, with one illustrating how bias might be reduced (Seitz & Diao), and another illustrating the potential harms of prohibiting educational sponsorship (Peppin).To be clear, all of these narratives are responsive to our call for stories that “describe positive and negative experiences associated with a variety of financial relationships.” Yet they are not classic conflict of interest stories; rather, they represent the conflicting interests that concern physicians today—conflicts that are often intrinsic to our current healthcare and research systems rather than special relationships courted by physicians.While making no pretense of representativeness or comprehensiveness, these stories provide fertile ground for reflection, as seen in our... (shrink)

Continued scientific and medical progress in Central and Eastern Europe depends on the development of an atmosphere that is conducive to implementing the changes that are necessary to bring better health and longer lives for everyone. Privatization and commercialization are threatening the objectivity of clinical research and the availability of health care because uncontrolled market mechanisms focused on profit are nurturing conflict of interest that generate bias and unreliability into research and medicine. Changes are needed that address the following: – (...) The amount of public support for basic and clinical research and health care, – standards for the conduct of clinical trials and delivery of health care, – administrative procedures for responding to the conflict of interest problem. (shrink)

This article summarizes the April 5–6, 2002 conference on Conflict of Interest and Its Significance in Science and Medicine. Several themes are identified and addressed, including the globalization of science, the widespread presence of conflicts, the increased interest and involvement in conflict of interest by a number of organizations, the difference between academic research and research conducted by industry, and the tension between science and medicine. At the heart of the matter lies objectivity in research and the need for transparency (...) to ensure objectivity. Several future activities were discussed, including the need to share specific examples of how conflict has been managed, and the need for behavioral research to provide a sound empirical understanding of the best ways to provide informed consent for research subjects. (shrink)

The Physician Payments Sunshine Act requires health care product manufacturers to report to the federal government payments more than $10 to physicians. Bringing unprecedented transparency to medicine, PPSA holds great potential for enabling medical stakeholders to manage conflicts of interest and build patient trust—crucial responsibilities of medical professionalism. The authors conducted six focus groups with 42 physicians in Chicago, IL, San Francisco, CA, and Washington, DC, to explore attitudes and experiences around PPSA. Participants valued the concept of transparency but (...) were wary of the law's design and consequences. They downplayed PPSA's potential and felt it undermined public trust. Showing broad unawareness of COI, they dismissed the notion of industry influence and welcomed company “perks.” Misapprehensions may leave physicians unprepared to advance the opportunities PPSA holds for professionalism. The authors offer recommendations for government and medicine to improve physicians' and other stakeholders' understandings and use of the data. (shrink)

As the debate over how to manage or discourage physicians? financial conflicts of interest with the drug and medical device industries has become more heated, critics have questioned or dismissed the concept of ?conflict of interest? itself. A satisfactory definition relates conflict of interest to concerns about maintaining social trust and distinguishes between breaches of ethical duty and temptations to breach duty. Numerous objections to such a definition have been offered, none of which prevails on further analysis. Those concerned about (...) conflicts of interest have contributed to misunderstandings, however, by failing to demonstrate when social arrangements leading to temptations to breach duties are in themselves morally blameworthy. Clarifying ?conflict of interest? is important if we are eventually going to develop productive modes of engagement between medicine and for-profit industry that avoid the serious ethical pitfalls now in evidence. (shrink)

The ethical implications of the growth of for-profit health care institutions are complex. Two major moral criticisms of for-profit medicine are analyzed. The first claim is that for-profit health care institutions fail to fulfill their obligations to do their fair share in providing health care to the poor and so exacerbate the problem of access to health care. The second claim is that profit seeking in medicine will damage the physician-patient relationship, creating conflicts of interest that will diminish the quality (...) of care and erode patients' trust in their physicians and the public's trust in the medical profession. The authors conclude that while the continued expansion of for-profit health care may exacerbate in some respects problems of access, trust and conflicts of interest, it is a mistake to consider these problems as unique to for-profit health care; they are problems for not for-profit health care as well. Though these issues justify continuing moral concern, they do not at this time provide decisive grounds for substantially curbing or eliminating for-profit enterprise in health care. (shrink)

The continuous growth of the pharmaceutical industry is expected to require a considerable output of new drugs, with speedy development and approval processes. This profit-driven expansion of the drug market may broaden the already established erosion of the role of academia in favor of commercial clinical research organizations. Less and less control on the clinical trial design, its conduct and the resulting publication[s] is the likely consequence. Academic medicine and governments should find means to sustain the development of independent clinical (...) research. (shrink)

As the debate over how to manage or discourage physicians’ financial conflicts of interest with the drug and medical device industries has become more heated, critics have questioned or dismissed the concept of “conflict of interest” itself. A satisfactory definition relates conflict of interest to concerns about maintaining social trust and distinguishes between breaches of ethical duty and temptations to breach duty. Numerous objections to such a definition have been offered, none of which prevails on further analysis. Those concerned about (...) conflicts of interest have contributed to misunderstandings, however, by failing to demonstrate when social arrangements leading to temptations to breach duties are in themselves morally blameworthy. Clarifying “conflict of interest” is important if we are eventually going to develop productive modes of engagement between medicine and for-profit industry that avoid the serious ethical pitfalls now in evidence. (shrink)

To investigate the phenomenon of patient–physician mistrust in China, a qualitative study involving 107 physicians, nurses and health officials in Guangdong Province, southern China, was conducted through semi-structured interviews and focus groups. In this paper we report the key findings of the empirical study and argue for the essential role of medical professionalism in rebuilding patient-physician trust. Health professionals are trapped in a vicious circle of mistrust. Mistrust leads to increased levels of fear and self-protection by doctors which exacerbate difficulties (...) in communication; in turn, this increases physician workloads, adding to a strong sense of injustice and victimization. These factors produce poorer healthcare outcomes and increasingly discontented and angry patients, escalate conflicts and disputes, and result in negative media coverage, all these ultimately contributing to even greater levels of mistrust. The vicious circle indicates not only the crisis of patient-physician relationship but the crisis of medicine as a profession and institution. Underlying the circle is the inherent conflict of interest in the healthcare system by which health professionals and hospitals have become profit-driven. This institutional conflict of interest seriously compromises the fundamental principle of medical professionalism—the primacy of patient welfare—as well as the traditional Chinese ideal of “medicine as the art of humanity”. Patient trust can be restored through rectifying this institutional conflict of interest and promoting medical professionalism via a series of recommended practical measures. (shrink)

This paper examines the ethical issues of conflict of interest raised by the burgeoning development of physician involvement in for-profit entrepreneurial activities outside their practice. After documenting the nature and extent of these activities, and their potential for conflicts of interest, the paper assesses the major arguments for and against physicians' referral of patients to facilities they own or in which they invest. The paper concludes that an outright ban on such activity seems ethically warranted.

As it has historically been the case with many pandemics, the Covid-19 experience will induce many philosophers to reconsider the value of medical practice. This should be a good opportunity to critically scrutinize the way medical research and medical interventions are carried out. For much of its history, medicine has been very inefficient. But, even in its contemporary forms, a review of common protocols in medical research and medical interventions reveal many shortcomings, especially related to methodological flaws, and more importantly, (...) conflicts of interests due to profit incentives. In the face of these problems, we propose a program of “gentle medicine”. This term, originally formulated by philosopher Jacob Stegenga, describes a form of medicine in which physicians intervene less than they currently do. As part of this general program, we advance a series of reform recommendations that could be enacted both by medical staff in their everyday practice, but also by public health officials and policymakers. (shrink)

Bioethics, once a four-letter word in the private sector, is now an integral part of the decisionmaking process of biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. And bioethicists, once confined to the classroom and limited to abstract, philosophical discussions about what is right and wrong in medicine and medical research, now play an important role in the practical implementation of ethical boundaries. Bioethicists increasingly are hired by biomedical companies as consultants to highlight and help resolve complex ethical issues that arise in the companies’ (...) normal business practices. Whether motivated by profit, reputation, or a genuine desire to act morally, these companies are willing to pay bioethicists substantial consultation fees for their “expert” opinions. This fairly recent phenomenon has caused some to be concerned about the potential for bioethicists to encounter conflicts of interests. Specifically, many critics of this new relationship between bioethicists and the private sector “are concerned about the appropriateness of ethicists who should have broader interests, such as concerns about social justice, serving clients whose primary interest is profit-maximizing.”. (shrink)

Professional sports with high rates of concussion have become increasingly concerned about the long-term effects of multiple head injuries. In this context, return-to-play decisions about concussion generate considerable ethical tensions for sports physicians. Team doctors clearly have an obligation to the welfare of their patient (the injured athlete) but they also have an obligation to their employer (the team), whose primary interest is typically success through winning. At times, a team’s interest in winning may not accord with the welfare of (...) an injured player, particularly when it comes to decisions about returning to play after injury. Australia’s two most popular professional football codes—rugby league and Australian Rules football—have adopted guidelines that prohibit concussed players from continuing to play on the same day. I suggest that conflicts of interest between doctors, patients, and teams may present a substantial obstacle to the proper adherence of concussion guidelines. Concussion management guidelines implemented by a sport’s governing body do not necessarily remove or resolve conflicts of interest in the doctor–patient–team triad. The instigation of a concussion exclusion rule appears to add a fourth party to this triad (the National Rugby League or the Australian Football League). In some instances, when conflicts of interest among stakeholders are ignored or insufficiently managed, they may facilitate attempts at circumventing concussion management guidelines to the detriment of player welfare. (shrink)

Public disclosure of industry payments to physicians is one way to address financial conflicts of interest in medicine. As part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the Physician Payment Sunshine Act requires pharmaceutical, medical device, and biologics manufacturers who have at least one product reimbursed by Medicare or Medicaid to disclose payments to physicians and teaching hospitals on a public website starting in 2014. The physician payment data will contain individual physician names, monetary values, and specific products (...) connected to payments.According to the Final Regulations issued by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in February 2013, the law will make transparent the extent and nature of relationships between physicians, teaching hospitals, and manufacturers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Narrative Symposium:Conflicting Interests in MedicineLaura Jean Bierut, Sal Cruz-Flores, Laura E. Hodges, Anthony A. Mikulec, Govind K. Nagaldinne, Erine L. Bakanas, John F. Peppin, Joel S. Perlmutter, William H. Seitz Jr., Edward Diao, Andre N. Sofair, and David M. Zientek• To Recruit or Not to Recruit for a Clinical Trial• An Unexpected Lesson• Am I on call for the entire Midwest?• Why is Medicare Wasting Away?• The Downside of (...) the Informed Consent Juggernaut• Expert Testimony at the Food and Drug Administration: Who Wants the Truth?• Crossroads: The Intersection of Personal, Professional Society, and Industry Relationships• A Change of Heart• The Evolution of Conflicts of Interest in a New Subspecialty: A Case Study of the Development of Interventional CardiologyCopyright © 2011 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Disease-mongering, or the medicalisation of aspects of daily life in an attempt to generate commercial profit for a party other than the person whose complaint is medicalised, is a newly recognized and legitimate source of concern for both consumers and deliverers of health care. The interest brought to this area by the academy has the potential to acknowledge and address the consequences of the practice. However, before disease-mongering can establish itself firmly as an area of scholarly concern, researchers must understand (...) that the critique is not just about identifying commercial intent, but also about naming the mechanism through which discourses of health, cure and self-management are positioned. In this paper, I argue that a critical reflection on the construction of disease concepts and the mongering of their cure must include discussions of the foundations of health and the clinical encounter. I identify a number of pivotal issues within these themes that should be explored in order to ensure an unambiguous and productive discussion of disease-mongering and its correlates. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to review the rising influence of commercialism in American medicine and to examine some of the consequences of this trend. Increased competition subverts physician collegiality, draws hospitals into for-profit ownership and behavior, and leads clinical investigators into secrecy and possibly into bias and abuse. Medicine faces a deprofessionalization evidenced in loss of control over the clinical setting and over self-regulation. Health care becomes a commodity relying on cultivation of desires instead of satisfaction of needs, (...) even as many basic needs go unmet. Patients become consumers empowered with lawsuits and the connection of medicine to the relief of suffering is attenuated. Medical encounters are increasingly impersonal, dominated by specialization, technology, and bureaucracy. Patients are losing their physician-advocates to new conflicts of interests, physicians are losing their impulse to charity, and trust in the doctor-patient relationship and in medicine generally is eroding. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest serve as a cipher for a radical rupture in the Flexnerian paradigm of medicine, and they can only be addressed if we recognize that health care is now practiced by institutions, not just individual physicians. By showing how "appropriate utilization of services" or "that which is medically indicated" is a function of socioeconomic factors related to institutional responsibilities, I point toward an administrative and organizational ethic as a needed component for addressing conflicts of interest. The argument is (...) developed by reviewing three important books. First, I consider Mark Rodwin's attempt to configure the economic structures of medicine so that classical fiduciary and scientific ideals can be fostered. Second, I consider E. Haavi Morreim's attempt to modify the classical ideals in order to account for new economic realities. Finally, by considering essays in a recent volume on conflicts of interest edited by Spece, Shimm, and Buchanan, I argue for a constructive dialectic between the approaches of Rodwin and Morreim. In order to properly address conflicts of interest, there must be a radical reassessment of medicine that accounts for the interrelation between scientific, ethical, and economic concerns. Until institutions come into view and professional ethics is developed to account for their role, legitimate interests and obligations of diverse parties cannot be harmonized. (shrink)

Many physicians are involved in relationships that create tension between a physician's duty to work in her patients’ best interest at all times and her financial arrangement with a third party, most often a pharmaceutical manufacturer, whose primary goal is maximizing sales or profit. Despite the prevalence of this threat, in the United States and globally, the most common reaction to conflicts of interest in medicine is timid acceptance. There are few calls for conflicts of interest to be banned, and, (...) to our knowledge, no one calls for conflicted practitioners to be reprimanded. Contrast our attitudes in medicine with public attitudes toward financial conflicts among government employees. When enforcement of rules against conflict of interest slackens in the public sector, news organizations investigate and publish their criticism. Yet even when doctors are quoted in the media promoting specific drugs, their personal financial ties to the drug maker are rarely mentioned. Policies for governmental employees are strict, condemnation is strong, and criminal statutes exist. Yet the evidence that conflict is problematic is, if anything, stronger in medicine than in the public sector. Policies against conflicts of interest in medicine should be at least as strong as those already existing in the public sector. (shrink)

Many physicians are involved in relationships that create tension between a physician's duty to work in her patients’ best interest at all times and her financial arrangement with a third party, most often a pharmaceutical manufacturer, whose primary goal is maximizing sales or profit. Despite the prevalence of this threat, in the United States and globally, the most common reaction to conflicts of interest in medicine is timid acceptance. There are few calls for conflicts of interest to be banned, and, (...) to our knowledge, no one calls for conflicted practitioners to be reprimanded. Contrast our attitudes in medicine with public attitudes toward financial conflicts among government employees. When enforcement of rules against conflict of interest slackens in the public sector, news organizations investigate and publish their criticism. Yet even when doctors are quoted in the media promoting specific drugs, their personal financial ties to the drug maker are rarely mentioned. Policies for governmental employees are strict, condemnation is strong, and criminal statutes exist (allowing for corruption charges). Yet the evidence that conflict is problematic is, if anything, stronger in medicine than in the public sector. Policies against conflicts of interest in medicine should be at least as strong as those already existing in the public sector. (shrink)

Historically the primary role of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) has been "to assure, both in advance and by periodic review, that appropriate steps are taken to protect the rights and welfare of humans participating as subjects in research" (U.S. FDA, 1996). However, there is much to suggest that IRBs have been unable to fulfil this mandate, particularly in regard to the matter of informed consent. Part of the problem in this regard is that the competing interests of other stakeholders (...) often undermine the IRB's capacity to serve the best interests of research subjects. This paper proposes an alternative view of the role of the IRB. It begins by treating the interests of other stakeholders as legitimate matters of concern for IRBs. Hence the process established to review and monitor human research should be treated as an exercise in social justice in which the interests of all legitimate stakeholders must be represented and considered. A variation of Rawls' (1971) heuristic "the veil of ignorance" is employed to explore the dynamic relationship between knowledge and interests that ensues when the role of the IRB is characterized in this manner. Inadequacies in the informed consent process are taken as illustrative of the inability of IRBs as they are presently construed to attend to the interests of research subjects. The major normative implication of the analysis offered here is that the role of the IRB must be expanded to include the granting of a provisional proxy consent on behalf of prospective research subjects. This provision is necessary, it is argued, if the interests of research subjects are to be fairly assessed by IRBs as a matter of social justice. It is necessary as well to ensure that an adequate standard of informed consent is attained. Somewhat paradoxically it is argued competing sets of interests the IRB must serve, rather than as the primary concern of the IRB. (shrink)

The heart of the matter -- The evolution of the French medicine -- Coping with physicians' conflicts of interest in France -- The rise of a protected medical market : the United States before 1950 -- The commercial transformation : the United States, 1950-1980 -- The logic of medical markets : the United States, 1980 to the present -- Coping with physicians' conflicts of interest in the United States -- The evolution of Japanese medicine -- Coping with physicians' conflicts of (...) interest in Japan -- Reforms -- Professionalism reconsidered. (shrink)

When confronting the issues related to developments in modern medicine and biotechnology, we must repeatedly ask ourselves anew what can and cannot be justified in an ethical sense. For radically new ethical questions seem to arise through innovative techniques such as stem cell research or preimplantation diagnosis — and with them new areas of conflicting interests. If one scrutinizes the previous positions related to this subject, it becomes conspicuous that a multitude of questions has quickly piled up — however, (as (...) in the case of Germany) comprehensive and differentiated views have mostly been lacking. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest are rampant in the American medical community. Today it is not uncommon for doctors to refer patients to clinics or labs in which they have a financial interest (40% of physicians in Florida invest in medical centers); for hospitals to offer incentives to physicians who refer patients (a practice that can lead to unnecessary hospitalization); or for drug companies to provide lucrative give-aways to entice doctors to use their "brand name" drugs (which are much more expensive than (...) generic drugs). In Medicine, Money and Morals, Marc A. Rodwin draws on his own experience as a health lawyer--and his research in health ethics, law, and policy--to reveal how financial conflicts of interest can and do negatively affect the quality of patient care. He shows that the problem has become worse over the last century and provides many actual examples of how doctors' decisions are influenced by financial considerations. We learn how two California physicians, for example, resumed referrals to Pasadena General Hospital only after the hospital started paying $70 per patient (their referrals grew from 14 in one month to 82 in the next). As Rodwin writes, incentives such as this can inhibit a doctor from taking action when a hospital fails to provide proper service, and may also lead to the unnecessary hospitalization of patients. We also learn of a Wyeth-Ayerst Labs promotion in which physicians who started patients on INDERAL (a drug for high blood pressure, angina, and migraines) received 1000 mileage points on American Airlines for each patient (studies show that promotions such as this have a direct effect on a doctor's choice of drug). Rodwin reveals why the medical community has failed to regulate conflicts of interest: peer review has little authority, state licensing boards are usually ignorant of abuses, and the AMA code of ethics has historically been recommended rather than required. He examines what can be learned from the way society has coped with the conflicts of interest of other professionals --lawyers, government officials, and businessmen--all of which are held to higher standards of accountability than doctors. And he recommends that efforts be made to prohibit and regulate certain kinds of activity (such as kickbacks and self-referrals), to monitor and regulate conduct, and to provide penalties for improper conduct. Our failure to face physicians' conflicts of interest has distorted the way medicine is practiced, compromised the loyalty of doctors to patients, and harmed society, the integrity of the medical profession, and patients. For those concerned with the quality of health care or medical ethics, Medicine, Money and Morals is a provocative look into the current health care crisis and a powerful prescription for change. (shrink)

The various statements and declarations of the World Medical Association that address conflicts of interest on the part of physicians as (1) researchers, and (2) practitioners, are examined, with particular reference to the October 2000 revision of the Declaration of Helsinki. Recent contributions to the literature, notably on conflicts of interest in medical research, are noted. Finally, key provisions of the American Medical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics (2000–2001 Edition) that address the various forms of conflict of interest that can (...) arise in the practice of medicine are outlined. (shrink)

There is an increasing emphasis on clear disclosure of conflict of interest in medical communities, following repeated scientific frauds in clinical trials. However, incomplete COI statements continue to be prevalent in the medical community, as appears to have occurred in the Capecitabine for Residual Cancer as Adjuvant Therapy trial, which was recently published in the New England Journal of Medicine. The authors of the article did not clearly report the roles of the Japan Breast Cancer Research Group, a sponsor and (...) funder of the study, although a majority of the Japanese authors served in important positions in the organization. Furthermore, the conflict of interest related to Chugai Pharmaceutical Company, a Japanese distributor of capecitabine, was not correctly disclosed. More transparent statements of conflict of interest and clarification of sponsors and funders’ roles, as well as rigorous review by academic journals are required to fairly interpret the findings of clinical trials, including and beyond the single case of the CREATE-X trial. (shrink)

The policy changes governing the relations between the pharmaceutical, medical device and service industries and academic clinical research physicians, recommended by the Institute of Medicine,1 the American Academy of Medical Colleges,2 and much discussed in the media and on our campuses, aim to create some protective ethical firewalls. However, some potentially critical consequences of these steps are missed if we do not acknowledge what else is on the table, and who is sitting at it. By only reacting defensively to (...) the juggernaut of righteous indignation over the loss of purity in a faculty physician's approach to medical problem solving, we are allowing the process to blind us to the difficulties in establishing fair and equitable management of all of the potential conflicts of commitment and conflicts of interest we incur, not only as faculty members, but also as departments and academic medical centres . Critically, this involves all sources of revenue—private, commercial and public—that support our professional and institutional commitments as well as our personal finances.i To counter the present crackdown on inappropriate financial relationships effectively, we will need to reframe the questions, and convince all stakeholders to the process that there is more to this crisis than can be resolved through our public confessions of commercial largesse obliged. The Phrma Code guidelines3 have resulted in what is believed to be a defensible, if as yet legally untested, compartmentalisation of the commercial sector's marketing, medical education and research sponsorship activities. We at the AMC are a long way from understanding how those same missions, as they emanate from our multifarious commitments, can be isolated and individually managed. Defining the parameters for establishing institutional conflicts of interest and commitment are beyond our essay's scope, but with the very public emphasis on capitalist subversion of …. (shrink)

This collection explores the subject of conflicts of interest. It investigates how to manage conflicts of interest, how they can affect well-meaning professionals, and how they can limit the effectiveness of corporate boards, undermine professional ethics, and corrupt expert opinion. Legal and policy responses are considered, some of which (e.g., disclosure) are shown to backfire and even fail. The results offer a sobering prognosis for professional ethics and for anyone who relies on professionals who have conflicts of interest. The contributors (...) are leading authorities on the subject in the fields of law, medicine, management, public policy, and psychology. The nuances of the problems posedby conflicts of interest will be highlighted for readers in an effort to demonstrate the manyways that structuring incentives can affect decision making and organizations' financial well-being. (shrink)

Why do physicians have financial conflicts of interest? They arise because society expects physicians to act in their patients’ interest, while simultaneously, financial incentives encourage physicians to practice medicine in ways that promote their own interests or those of third parties. Because physicians’ clinical choices, referrals, and prescriptions affect the fortune of third parties, these third parties may offer physicians financial incentives to make income-driven clinical choices. In the past, physicians and scholars typically conceived of conflicts of interest as an (...) ethical issue to be resolved according to individual judgment or professional and organizational norms. However, society can mitigate or eliminate conflicts of interest by changing financial and organizational arrangements in medicine. Conflicts of interest, therefore, are as much matters of public policy and management as individual choices or social norms. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest pose special problems for the professions. Even the appearance of a conflict of interest can undermine essential trust between professional and public. This volume is a comprehensive and accessible guide to the ramifications and problems associated with important issue. It contains fifteen new essays by noted scholars and covers topics in law, medicine, journalism, engineering, financial services, and others.

Conflict of interests in medicine are typically taken to be financial in nature: it is often assumed that a COI occurs when a healthcare practitioner’s financial interest conflicts with patients’ interests, public health interests, or professional obligations more generally. Even when non-financial COIs are acknowledged, ethical concerns are almost exclusively reserved for financial COIs. However, the notion of “interests” cannot be reduced to its financial component. Individuals in general, and medical professionals in particular, have different types of interests, many of (...) which are non-financial in nature but can still conflict with professional obligations. The debate about healthcare delivery has largely overlooked this broader notion of interests. Here, we will focus on health practitioners’ moral or religious values as particular types of personal interests involved in healthcare delivery that can generate COIs and on conscientious objection in healthcare as the expression of a particular type of COI. We argue that, in the healthcare context, the COIs generated by interests of conscience can be as ethically problematic, and therefore should be treated in the same way, as financial COIs. (shrink)

The current legal framework within the Lithuanian health system is described including a review of the physician’s autonomy, rights and duties, and patients’ rights including the right to reimbursement. The role of ethical codes and the law are discussed.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Conflicts—and Consensus—about Conflicts of Interest in MedicineMatthew K. Wynia and Bette–Jane Crigger*This fascinating collection of essays about individual experiences of conflict of interest leaves little doubt that physicians remain divided about the importance, impact and meaning of conflicts of interest in their work. These essays offer differing views about what conflicts of interest look and feel like “on the ground” and about whether specific conflicts of interest are bad, (...) just a fact of life, or maybe even good.Conflict, Conflict EverywhereThese essays situate conflict of interest in a variety of contexts: the treatment recommendations a physician makes for an individual patient; the relationship between teaching physician and medical student or practicing physician and health care organization; the interaction between academic researchers and industry collaborators or professional bodies and industry supporters. In this, the narratives taken together reflect the scope of concern about conflict of interest in medicine familiar in the literature. In his classic 1993 essay, Dennis Thompson noted that concerns about conflict of interest encompass issues of physician self–referral, risk sharing between physicians and health care institutions, gifts from industry, hospital purchasing practices, as well as sponsored research and research with patients (Thompson 1993). To that list have subsequently been added relationships with industry in medical education at all levels, physicians’ service as consultants to industry or members of industry speakers bureau, and development of clinical practice guidelines (Lo & Fields 2009).That almost none of these essays draw attention to some widely publicized situations of conflict of interest—for example, gifts to physicians or the provision of drug samples—should, we think, be seen more as an artifact of the authors’ varied individual experiences than as a failure by the authors to engage key concerns in the ongoing professional and public debate. It could also be that the authors, asked to submit personal stories, assumed that yet another essay about the ‘traditional’ issues in the conflicts of interest literature would be seen as redundant, routine or even boring. Or, there is the tantalizing possibility that the absence of some of the more familiar conflicts from these narratives is the early fruit of efforts to address these traditional issues through policies governing interactions between physicians and industry promulgated by academic medical centers and health systems, medical specialty societies, and industry.One significant area of concern that has emerged in recent years is conflict of interest in the development of clinical practice guidelines. E.g., Choudry et al. 2002; Sniderrman & Furberg 2009; Guyatt et al. 2010. Although none of the essays in this [End Page 101] collection address it head on, Perlmutter touches on several key issues. His depiction of how an FDA committee process limited the input he was able to provide as an expert, undermined his potential to contribute to the professional dialogue, and raised concerns about the objectivity of the drug approval process echoes concerns about objectivity, the role of expert opinion, and the presence on guideline development panels of individuals with financial interests in the recommendations to be developed that have been explored at some length in the literature, most recently by the Institute of Medicine in reports on evidentiary standards (Eden et al 2011) and principles for guideline development (Graham et al. 2011).Conflict of Interest or Dual Agency?Several essays set out physicians’ experience in navigating situations of diverging expectations. Bierut, for example, reflects on the disjunction between the goals and products of academic researchers and commercial sponsors. She saw herself advancing basic knowledge and was forced to grapple with the reality of sponsors’ goals to advance commercial ends as well. Nagldinne and Mikulec each recall struggles to reconcile their obligation to exercise professional judgment on behalf of patients with the demands of health care organizations focussed also on the bottom line. Cruz–Flores attests to the challenge of making recommendations for care when one is both a practicing clinician and a clinical investigator engaged in research that might offer benefit to a patient for whom there are limited options.Thompson defined conflicts of interest as “a set of conditions in which professional judgment concerning a primary interest (such as a patient’s welfare or the validity of... (shrink)

Conflicts of Interest and the Future of Medicine: The United States, France, and Japan Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 383-386 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9326-y Authors Adam Licurse, Division of Internal Medicine, Department of Medicine, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, Boston, MA, USA Aaron S. Kesselheim, Harvard Medical School, Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics, Department of Medicine, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, 1620 Tremont St. Suite 3030, Boston, MA, USA Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume (...) Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume 8, Number 4. (shrink)

Individual and institutional conflict of interests in biomedical research have becomes matters of increasing concern in recent years. In the United States, the growth in relationships — sponsored research agreements, consultancies, memberships on boards, licensing agreements, and equity ownership — between for-profit corporations and research universities and their scientists has made the problem of conflicts, particularly financial conflicts, more acute. Conflicts can interfere with or compromise important principles and obligations of researchers and their institutions, e.g., adherence to accepted research norms, (...) duty of care to patients, and open exchange of information. Disclosure is a key component of a successful conflict policy. Commitments which conflict with a faculty member's primary obligations to teaching, research, administrative responsibilities, or patient care also need attention. Institutional conflict of interests present different problems, some of which are discussed in an analysis of an actual problem posed by two proposed clinical trials. (shrink)

Sports medicine clinicians face conflicts of interest in providing medical care to athletes. Using a survey of college football players, this study evaluates whether athletes are aware of these conflicts of interest, whether these conflicts affect athlete trust in their health care providers, or whether conflicts or athletes' trust in stakeholders are associated with athletes' injury reporting behaviors.

Recently a great deal of attention has been paid to conflicts of interest in medical research, and the Institute of Medicine has called for more research into this important area. One research question that has not received sufficient attention concerns the mechanisms of action by which conflicts of interest can result in biased and/or flawed research. What discretion do conflicted researchers have to sway the results one way or the other? We address this issue from the perspective of selective inertia, (...) or an unnatural selection of research methods based on which are most likely to establish the preferred conclusions, rather than on which are most valid. In many cases it is abundantly clear that a method that is not being used in practice is superior to the one that is being used in practice, at least from the perspective of validity, and that it is only inertia, as opposed to any serious suggestion that the incumbent method is superior, that keeps the inferior procedure in use, to the exclusion of the superior one. By focusing on these flawed research methods we can go beyond statements of potential harm from real conflicts of interest, and can more directly assess actual harm. (shrink)

In June 2017, Japanese and Korean authors published the results of the CREATE‐X trial in the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM). After we identified their inadequate disclosures of Financial Conflict of Interests (FCOIs), the authors made a post‐publication correction of their FCOIs. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the accuracy of the post‐publication corrections by the Japanese authors of the CREATE‐X trial. All the Japanese authors of the CREATE‐X trial were included in the study. We determined the (...) payments received by these authors in 2016 using publicly available data published by 78 pharmaceutical companies based on the stipulated Japanese transparency guidelines. We retrieved the original and revised versions of the FCOI disclosures as published on the NEJM website, and compared the payments reported by the pharmaceutical companies and the original and revised FCOI disclosures of the authors. Of the 12 authors, nine received payments made by the drug manufacturer involved in the CREATE‐X trial. Of these nine, only three (33.3%) originally disclosed their relationships, and another three (33.3%) later disclosed such relationships in the post‐publication corrections. Similarly, of the 11 receiving at least one payment from other manufacturers of breast cancer products, none correctly disclosed the payments in the original or the revised disclosure. In the CREATE‐X trial, FCOIs with pharmaceutical companies were not properly disclosed by 11 of the 12 Japanese authors, even after the post‐publication corrections, which highlights the need to pay more attention to the accuracy of FCOI disclosures in academic publications. (shrink)

An interest in economic development has been extended to a set of research universities which since the late nineteenth century had been established, or had transformed themselves, to focus upon discipline-based fundamental investigations.21 The land-grant model was reformulated, from agricultural research and extension, to entrepreneurial transfers of science-based industrial technology by faculty members and university administrators.The norms of science, a set of values and incentives for proper institutional conduct,22 have been revised as an unintended consequence of the second revolution. This (...) has happened through an accretion of gradual organisational changes that often go unnoticed, and through conflict that disrupts the status quo and makes change evident. The two forms of normative change became apparent in the emergence of group research and in controversies over conflicts of interest. With extensive financial support from government, large research groups began to replace the traditional form of professor and graduate student—still commonplace in the humanities—as the typical way of organising research, although group leaders were called “individual investigators”.23 Possessing many of the characteristics of a small business, apart from the profit motive, some of these research groups or “quasi firms” are only a short step away from turning into companies when the opportunity arises.Disputes about conflicts of interest are a step towards the transformation of norms. How they are resolved suggests the shape of the new norm; their continuation indicates that the outcome is still in question; their intensification increases the likelihood that a practice will be defined as deviant. Some conflicts of interest will be resolveable as norms change; others will be defined as fraud and be dealt with by the legal system. Conflicts of commitment may also be amenable to resolution, for example, by granting leave to establish a company. Integrating campus and company research reduces some of the potential for conflict, especially when the university holds the intellectual property rights in question.Under these new normative conditions what is left of the idea of the university as a source of disinterested expertise? As molecular biology departments have developed a complex network of industrial ties a new critical discipline of environmental science has grown up in academia. Universities are flexible institutions, capable of reconciling many diverse missions. (shrink)