Debates about the modularity of cognitive architecture have been ongoing for at least the past three decades, since the publication of Fodor’s landmark book The Modularity of Mind (1983). According to Fodor, modularity is essentially tied to informational encapsulation, and as such is only found in the relatively low-level cognitive systems responsible for perception and language. According to Fodor’s critics in the evolutionary psychology camp, modularity simply reflects the fine-grained functional specialization dictated by natural selection, and it characterizes virtually all (...) aspects of cognitive architecture, including high-level systems for judgment, decision making, and reasoning. Though both of these perspectives on modularity have garnered support, the current state of evidence and argument suggests that a broader skepticism about modularity may be warranted. (shrink)

We present a general theory of series-parallel mental architectures with selectively influenced stochastically non-independent components. A mental architecture is a hypothetical network of processes aimed at performing a task, of which we only observe the overall time it takes under variable parameters of the task. It is usually assumed that the network contains several processes selectively influenced by different experimental factors, and then the question is asked as to how these processes are arranged within the network, e.g., (...) whether they are concurrent or sequential. One way of doing this is to consider the distribution functions for the overall processing time and compute certain linear combinations thereof (interaction contrasts). The theory of selective influences in psychology can be viewed as a special application of the interdisciplinary theory of (non)contextuality having its origins and main applications in quantum theory. In particular, lack of contextuality is equivalent to the existence of a “hidden” random entity of which all the random variables in play are functions. Consequently, for any given value of this common random entity, the processing times and their compositions (minima, maxima, or sums) become deterministic quantities. These quantities, in turn, can be treated as random variables with (shifted) Heaviside distribution functions, for which one can easily compute various linear combinations across different treatments, including interaction contrasts. This mathematical fact leads to a simple method, more general than the previously used ones, to investigate and characterize the interaction contrast for different types of series-parallel architectures. (shrink)

Mediaeval psychological theory was a “faculty psychology”: a confederation of semiautonomous sub-personal agents, the interaction of which constitutes our psychological experience. One such faculty was intellective appetite, that is, the will. On what grounds was the will taken to be a distinct faculty? After a brief survey of Aristotle's criteria for identifying and distinguishing mental faculties, I look in some detail at the mainstream mediaeval view, given clear expression by Thomas Aquinas, and then at the dissenting views of John (...) Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. I conclude with some reflections on why the mainstream mediaeval view was discarded by Descartes. (shrink)

_Varieties of the Self_ discusses human perspectives of the Paraclete (founded in 1129) on sacrifice, intentionality, and views on body and soul. The anthropological approach connects different works written by Peter Abelard to views on the individual within this community.

The debate between the theory-theory and simulation has largely ignored issues of cognitive architecture. In the philosophy of psychology, cognition as symbol manipulation is the orthodoxy. The challenge from connectionism, however, has attracted vigorous and renewed interest. In this paper I adopt connectionism as the antecedent of a conditional: If connectionism is the correct account of cognitive architecture, then the simulation theory should be preferred over the theory-theory. I use both developmental evidence and constraints on explanation in psychology to support (...) this claim. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to understand the functional role of mental representations and intentionality in skilled actions from a systems related perspective. Therefore, we will evaluate the function of representation and then discuss the cognitive architecture of skilled actions in more depth. We are going to describe the building blocks and levels of the action system that enable us to control movements such as striking the tennis ball at the right time, or grasping tools in manual action. (...) Based on this theoretical understanding the measurement of mental representations and related research results concerning mental representation in skilled action are presented in an overview. This leads to the question how mental representations develop and change during learning. Finally, to consolidate the functional understanding of mental representation in skilled action and interaction, we provide examples how to use the measurement of mental representation in humans to inform technical systems. (shrink)

Mental spatial knowledge processing often uses spatio-analogical or quasipictorial representation structures such as spatial mental models or mental images. The cognitive architecture Casimir is designed to provide a framework for computationally modeling human spatial knowledge processing relying on these kinds of representation formats. In this article, we present an overview of Casimir and its components. We briefly describe the long-term memory component and the interaction with external diagrammatic representations. Particular emphasis is placed on Casimir’s working memory and (...) control mechanisms. Regarding working memory, we describe the conceptual foundations and the processing mechanisms employed in mental spatial reasoning. With respect to control, we explain how it is realized as a distributed, emergent facility within Casimir. (shrink)

This essay samples and describes the state of architectural scholarship across various platforms in the age of Cognitive Capitalism. The premise is that, much like scholarship in the Arts and Humanities generally, architectural scholarship suffers from the Either/Or schism between traditional academic research of a non-utilitarian form and the heavily mediatic practices of the mainstream – “mainstream” defined as both online and print publications that eschew the long-form essay or book in favor of the populist modality that serves the neo-liberalization (...) of the discipline. -/- The sampling includes the devolution of the thesis or dissertation to socio-cultural report and/or pseudo-scientific study, with speculative works relegated to the margins of architectural discourse. This shift, while emblematic of the “trade school” mentality of many architecture schools today, also signals a bias at large in the post-recession 2010s where research must be monetized to justify funding, or speculative work must adhere to a format that is dictated from the outside (from the regimes of capitalization imposed by publishers). (shrink)

It is a characteristic feature of our mental make-up that the same perceptual input situation can simultaneously elicit conflicting mental perspectives. This ability pervades our perceptual and cognitive domains. Striking examples are the dual character of pictures in picture perception, pretend play, or the ability to employ metaphors and allegories. I will argue that traditional approaches, beyond being inadequate on principle grounds, are theoretically ill-equipped to deal with these achievements. I will then outline a theoretical perspective that has (...) been emerging from a theoretical convergence of perceptual psychology, ethology, linguistics, and developmental research. On the basis of this framework, I will argue that corresponding achievements are brought forth by a specific type of functional architecture whose core features are: (i) a perceptual system that is biologically furnished with a rich system of conceptual forms, (ii) a triggering relation between the sensory input and conceptual forms by which the same sensory input can be exploited by different types or systems of conceptual forms, and (iii) computational principles for handling semantically underspecified conceptual forms. Characteristic features of the proposed theoretical framework will be pointed out using the Heider-Simmel phenomenon as an example. (shrink)

The debate between the theory‐theory and simulation has largely ignored issues of cognitive architecture. In the philosophy of psychology, cognition as symbol manipulation is the orthodoxy. The challenge from connectionism, however, has attracted vigorous and renewed interest. In this paper I adopt connectionism as the antecedent of a conditional: If connectionism is the correct account of cognitive archi‐tecture, then the simulation theory should be preferred over the theory‐theory. I use both developmental evidence and constraints on explanation in psychology to support (...) this claim. (shrink)

This book is a comprehensive development and defense of one of the guiding assumptions of evolutionary psychology: that the human mind is composed of a large number of semi-independent modules. The Architecture of the Mind has three main goals. One is to argue for massive mental modularity. Another is to answer a 'How possibly?' challenge to any such approach. The first part of the book lays out the positive case supporting massive modularity. It also outlines how the thesis should (...) best be developed, and articulates the notion of 'module' that is in question. Then the second part of the book takes up the challenge of explaining how the sorts of flexibility and creativity that are distinctive of the human mind could possibly be grounded in the operations of a massive number of modules.Peter Carruthers's third aim is to show how the various components of the mind are likely to be linked and interact with one another - indeed, this is crucial to demonstrating how the human mind, together with its familiar capacities, can be underpinned by a massively modular set of mechanisms. He outlines and defends the basic framework of a perception / belief / desire / planning / motor-control architecture, as well as detailing the likely components and their modes of connectivity. Many specific claims about the place within this architecture of natural language, of a mind-reading system, and others are explained and motivated. A number of novel proposals are made in the course of these discussions, one of which is that creative human thought depends upon a prior kind of creativity of action.Written with unusual clarity and directness, and surveying an extensive range of research in cognitive science, this book will be essential reading for anyone with an interest in the nature and organization of the mind. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Lyngzeidetson [1990] has claimed that a type of parallel computer called the ‘Connection Machine’ instantiates architectural principles which will ‘revolutionize which "functions" of the human mind can and cannot be modelled by (non-human) computational automata.’ In particular, he claims that the Connection Machine architecture shows the anti-mechanist argument from Gödel's theorem to be false for at least one kind of parallel computer. In the first part of this paper, I argue that Lyngzeidetson's claims are not supported (...) by his arguments; in the second part I consider some other aspects of parallel computation which may be of theoretical significance in cognitive science. (shrink)

This article tackles an old, classical problem, which is acquiring a new epochal relevance with the techno-aesthetic processing of form and substance, expression and content. The field of digital architecture is embarked in the ancient controversy between the line and the curve, binary communication and fuzzy logic. Since the 1990s, the speculative qualities of digital architecture have exposed spatial design to the qualities of growing or breeding, rather than planning. However, such qualities still deploy the tension between discrete spaces and (...) continual curving. In this context, the article suggests the computational coexistence of discrete coding with continual morphing, defying any easy resolution for an aesthetic of continuity or discontinuity, the superiority of the analog or the meta-logic of the digital. The metaphysical dimension of such coexistence needs to include the abstract capacities of experiencing the transition from one state to another as the registering of algorithmic processing. Computation is intrinsic to microperceptions, incomputable quantities deploying the infectious property of the digital code. The article draws on the digital architecture of Greg Lynn to explore whether the computational nature of the digital calculus has the potential to challenge the bifurcation between the biological and the mathematical, the physical and the mental. (shrink)

This volume presents new essays on the propositional imagination by leading researchers. The propositional imagination---the mental capacity we exploit when we imagine that everyone is colour-blind or that Hamlet is a procrastinator---plays an essential role in philosophical theorizing, engaging with fiction, and indeed in everyday life. Yet only recently has there been a systematic attempt to give a cognitive account of the propositional imagination. These thirteen essays, specially written for the volume, capitalize on this recent work, extending the theoretical (...) picture of the imagination and exploring the philosophical implications of cognitive accounts of the imagination. The book also investigates broader philosophical issues surrounding the propositional imagination. The first section addresses the nature of the imagination, its role in emotion production, and its sophistication manifestation in childhood. The essays in the second section focus on the nature of pretence and how pretence is implicated in adult communication. The third section addresses the problem of 'imaginative resistance', the striking fact that when we encounter morally repugnant assertions in fiction, we seem to resist imagining them and accepting them as fictionally true. In the final section, contributors explore the relation between imagining, conceiving, and judgements of possibility and impossibility. The Architecture of the Imagination will be an essential resource for the growing number of philosophers and psychologists studying the nature of the imagination and on its role in philosophy, aesthetics, and everyday life. (shrink)

This paper explores the difference between Connectionist proposals for cognitive a r c h i t e c t u r e a n d t h e s o r t s o f m o d e l s t hat have traditionally been assum e d i n c o g n i t i v e s c i e n c e . W e c l a i m t h a t t h (...) e m a j o r d i s t i n c t i o n i s t h a t , w h i l e b o t h Connectionist and Classical architectures postulate representational mental states, the latter but not the former are committed to a symbol-level of representation, or to a ‘language of thought’: i.e., to representational states that have combinatorial syntactic and semantic structure. Several arguments for combinatorial structure in mental representations are then reviewed. These include arguments based on the ‘systematicity’ of mental representation: i.e., on the fact that cognitive capacities always exhibit certain symmetries, so that the ability to entertain a given thought implies the ability to entertain thoughts with semantically related contents. We claim that such arguments make a powerful case that mind/brain architecture is not Connectionist at the cognitive level. We then consider the possibility that Connectionism may provide an account of the neural (or ‘abstract neurological’) structures in which Classical cognitive architecture is implemented. We survey a n u m b e r o f t h e s t a n d a r d a r g u m e n t s t h a t h a v e b e e n o f f e r e d i n f a v o r o f Connectionism, and conclude that they are coherent only on this interpretation. (shrink)

The idea that there is a “Number Sense” (Dehaene, 1997) or “Core Knowledge” of number ensconced in a modular processing system (Carey, 2009) has gained popularity as the study of numerical cognition has matured. However, these claims are generally made with little, if any, detailed examination of which modular properties are instantiated in numerical processing. In this article, I aim to rectify this situation by detailing the modular properties on display in numerical cognitive processing. In the process, I review literature (...) from across the cognitive sciences and describe how the evidence reported in these works supports the hypothesis that numerical cognitive processing is modular. I outline the properties that would suffice for deeming a certain processing system a modular processing system. Subsequently, I use behavioral, neuropsychological, philosophical, and anthropological evidence to show that the number module is domain specific, informationally encapsulated, neurally localizable, subject to specific pathological breakdowns, mandatory, fast, and inaccessible at the person level; in other words, I use the evidence to demonstrate that some of our numerical capacity is housed in modular casing. (shrink)

Iannis Xenakis (1922–2001), composer, architect, engineer and media artist, designed together with Le Corbusier the Philips-pavilion for the 1958 Brussels World Fair. This pavilion is an early example of (“hybrid”) combined media and architectural space as it contained a Poème Électronique, an electronic synthesis of visual projections (conceived by Le Corbusier ) and acoustic events (composed by Varèse). The pavilion's architecture with its hyperbolic-paraboloid shells had a dynamic expression. Xenakis continued this research into complex material architectural forms. He also worked (...) on the complex ephemeral architectures of light and sound events. What is specific to Xenakis is the way he used forms in different fields and transferred them from one field to another, from engineering to music, from music to architecture and visual events. This experience of working simultaneously and applying the same (mental) structures in different fields opened him the way (partly supported by the universal computer instrument) for the practice of transferring mathematical-scientific structures into artistic production. In this context Xenakis pleads for the development of a “General Morphology”, a research concerned with the understanding of form and its generation. Xenakis's ‘material’ architectural work is to be seen in continuity with his architectures of music and light. (shrink)

Thomas & Karmiloff- Smith raise the excellent and, in retrospect, obvious point that in a dynamic learning environment where feedback is possible, we should expect networks to adapt to damage by altering details of their behavior. We should therefore not expect that developmental disorders should result in “normal” modules. The implications of this point go much further, since interprocess dependency in the brain does not rely only on learned neural connections. This argues strongly against behavioral and process-related definitions, as opposed (...) to structural and architecture-related definitions, of mental modularity. (shrink)

Diagrams are a form of spatial representation that supports reasoning and problem solving. Even when diagrams are external, not to mention when there are no external representations, problem solving often calls for internal representations, that is, representations in cognition, of diagrammatic elements and internal perceptions on them. General cognitive architectures—Soar and ACT-R, to name the most prominent—do not have representations and operations to support diagrammatic reasoning. In this article, we examine some requirements for such internal representations and processes in (...) cognitive architectures. We discuss the degree to which DRS, our earlier proposal for such an internal representation for diagrams, meets these requirements. In DRS, the diagrams are not raw images, but a composition of objects that can be individuated and thus symbolized, while, unlike traditional symbols, the referent of the symbol is an object that retains its perceptual essence, namely, its spatiality. This duality provides a way to resolve what anti-imagists thought was a contradiction in mental imagery: the compositionality of mental images that seemed to be unique to symbol systems, and their support of a perceptual experience of images and some types of perception on them. We briefly review the use of DRS to augment Soar and ACT-R with a diagrammatic representation component. We identify issues for further research. (shrink)

The Parallel Architecture is a conception of the organization of the mental representations involved in language and of the role of language in the mind as a whole. Its basic premise is that linguistic representations draw on three independent generative systems—phonological, syntactic, and semantic structures—plus a system of interface links by which they communicate with each other. In particular, words serve as partial interface links that govern the way they compose into novel sentences.It is shown that this architecture also (...) provides a natural way to account for our ability to talk about what we see: semantic structure in language has to communicate via interface links with a level of spatial representation that encodes understanding of the physical world. It is suggested that such configurations of independent but linked representations are a widespread feature of cognition. (shrink)

What are the elements from which the human mind is composed? What structures make up our _cognitive architecture?_ One of the most recent and intriguing answers to this question comes from the newly emerging interdisciplinary field of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychologists defend a _massively modular_ conception of mental architecture which views the mind –including those parts responsible for such ‘central processes’ as belief revision and reasoning— as composed largely or perhaps even entirely of innate, special-purpose computational mechanisms or ‘modules’ (...) that have been shaped by natural selection to handle the sorts of recurrent information processing problems that confronted our hunter-gatherer forebears (Cosmides and Tooby,192; Sperber, 1994; Samuels, 1998a). (shrink)

The view that moral cognition is subserved by a two-tieredarchitecture is defended: Moral reasoning is the result both ofspecialized, informationally encapsulated modules which automaticallyand effortlessly generate intuitions; and of general-purpose,cognitively penetrable mechanisms which enable moral judgment in thelight of the agent's general fund of knowledge. This view is contrastedwith rival architectures of social/moral cognition, such as Cosmidesand Tooby's view that the mind is wholly modular, and it is argued thata two-tiered architecture is more plausible.

How can a subjective experience claim universal validity? This question, posed by Kant in his Critique of Judgment, is also at the heart of Hegel's aesthetic project as I understand it. This article seeks to corroborate this proposition by analyzing how works of art transmit knowledge according to Hegel. I argue that one of the things that works of art can show according to Hegel are the apparently private subjective mental states that accompany our experience of worldly objects. Thus, (...) art has the capacity to make structures of the mind that we usually understand as internal to subjectivity and, as such, only accessible to the activity of reflection, accessible objects external to and capable of being perceived. In my view, this thesis is closely linked to the social character of Hegel's theory of mind. By making subjective mental states visible, artworks have, according to Hegel, the capacity to exert an influence on how viewers will perceive the world after encountering such works. Thus, artworks are also crucial sites for understanding how rational minds construct their perceptual world together. I first develop this interpretation abstractly, then apply it to the specific fields of poetry and architecture, before discussing the question of the poetics of architecture in the work of contemporary author Renee Gladman. (shrink)

For the last thirty years, cognitive scientists have attempted to describe the cognitive architecture of typically developing human beings, using, among other sources of evidence, the dissociations that result from developmental psychopathologies such as autism spectrum disorders, Williams syndrome, and Down syndrome. Thus, in his recent defense of the massive modularity hypothesis, Steven Pinker insists on the importance of such dissociations to identify the components of the typical cognitive architecture (2005, 4; my emphasis): This kind of faculty psychology has numerous (...) advantages (...). It is supported by the existence of neurological and genetic disorders that target these faculties unevenly, such as a difficulty in recognizing faces (and facelike shapes) but not other objects, or a difficulty in reasoning about minds but not about objects or pictures. Similarly, Simon Baron-Cohen writes (1998, 335; my emphasis; see also Temple, 1997): I suggest that the study of mental retardation would profit from the application of the framework of cognitive neuropsychology (…). In cognitive neuropsychology, one key question running through the investigator’s mind is “Is this process or mechanism intact or impaired in this person?” When cognitive neuropsychology is done well, a patient’s cognitive system is examined with specific reference to a model of the normal cognitive system. And, not infrequently, evidence from the patient’s cognitive deficits leads to a revision of the model of the normal system. However, in recent years, the use of developmental psychopathologies to identify the components of the typical cognitive architecture has come under heavy fire. In a series of influential articles, neuropsychologist Annette Karmiloff-Smith has argued that findings about the pattern of impairments and preserved capacities in people with developmental psychopathologies say nothing about the cognitive architecture of.. (shrink)

The dynamic approach to understanding of the human consciousness, its cognitive activities and cognitive architecture is one of the most promising approaches in the modern epistemology and cognitive science. The conception of embodied mind is under discussion in the light of nonlinear dynamics and of the idea co-evolution of complex systems developed by the Moscow scientific school. The cognitive architecture of the embodied mind is rather complex: data from senses and products of rational thinking, the verbal and the pictorial, logic (...) and intuition, the analytical and synthetic abilities of perception and of thinking, the local and the global, the analogue and the digital, the archaic and the post-modern are intertwined in it. In the process of cognition, co-evolution of embodied mind as an autopoietic system and its surroundings takes place. The perceptual and mental processes are bound up with the structure of human body. Nonlinear and circular connecting links between the subject of cognition and the world constructed by him can be metaphorically called a nonlinear cobweb of cognition. Cognition is an autopoietic activity because it is directed to the search of elements that are missed; it serves to completing integral structures. According to the theory of blow-up regimes in complex systems elaborated by Sergey P.Kudyumov and his followers, the idea of co-evolution is connected with the concept of tempoworlds. To co-evolve means to start to develop in one and the same tempoworld and to use the possibility – in case of a proper intergation into a whole structure – to accelerate the tempo of evolution. The cognitive activities of the human being can be considered as a movement (active walk) in landscapes of co-evolution when he cognizes and changes environment and is changed himself by the very activities. The similar conclusion can be drawn from Francisco Varela’s conception of enactive cognition. (shrink)

This study examined individual differences in spatial abilities of architecture students. Students at different educational levels were assessed on spatial ability tests that varied in their domain-specificity to architecture, with the hypothesis that larger differences between beginner and advanced students will emerge on more domain-specific tests. We also investigated gender differences in test performance and controlled for general reasoning ability across analyses. In a cross sectional study, master students (N= 91) outperformed beginners (N= 502) on two novel tests involving perspective (...) taking and object composition, as well as on a standardized visualization of cross-sections test, but not on a standardized mental rotations test. Longitudinally (N= 117), spatial performance improved after the first bachelor year on visualization of cross-sections, object composition and mental rotation. Although both genders showed higher spatial test performance with increased experience, male students outperformed females across tests and levels of education. The results overall confirmed improvements in spatial performance during architecture studies, with partial support for the domain-specificity hypothesis. A gender gap among advanced students calls for further examining architecture-specific spatial thinking. (shrink)

Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind (ToM) has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest since (...) it suggests a parsimonious cognitive architecture can account for apparent domain specificity. We argue for such an architecture in two stages. First, on conceptual grounds, contrasting the case of language with ToM, and second, by showing that recent evidence in the form of fMRI and lesion studies supports the more parsimonious hypothesis. 1. Theory of Mind, Metarepresentation, and Modularity2. Developmental Components of ToM3. The Analogy with Modularity of Language4. Dissociations without Modules5. The Evidence from Neuroscience6. Conclusion. (shrink)

The central contention of The Implicit Mind is that understanding the two faces of spontaneity-its virtues and vices-requires understanding the "implicit mind." In turn, Michael Brownstein maintains that understanding the implicit mind requires the consideration of three sets of questions. First, what are implicit mental states? What kind of cognitive structure do they have? Second, how should we relate to our implicit attitudes? Are we responsible for them? Third, how can we improve the ethics of our implicit minds?

The representational nature of human cognition and thought in general has been a source of controversies. This is particularly so in the context of studies of unconscious cognition, in which representations tend to be ontologically and structurally segregated with regard to their conscious status. However, it appears evolutionarily and developmentally unwarranted to posit such segregations, as,otherwise, artifact structures and ontologies must be concocted to explain them from the viewpoint of the human cognitive architecture. Here, from a by-and-large Classical cognitivist viewpoint, (...) I show why this segregation is wrong, and elaborate on the need to postulate an ontological and structural continuity between unconscious and conscious representations. Specifically, I hypothesize that this continuity is to be found in the symbolic-based interplay between the syntax and the semantics of thought, and I propose a model of human information processing characterized by the integration of syntactic and semantic representations. (shrink)

This article describes the Adaptive Control of Thought–Rational (ACT–R) cognitive architecture (Anderson et al., 2004; Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) and its detailed application to the learning of algebraic symbol manipulation. The theory is applied to modeling the data from a study by Qin, Anderson, Silk, Stenger, & Carter (2004) in which children learn to solve linear equations and perfect their skills over a 6‐day period. Functional MRI data show that: (a) a motor region tracks the output of equation solutions, (b) (...) a prefrontal region tracks the retrieval of declarative information, (c) a parietal region tracks the transformation of mental representations of the equation, (d) an anterior cingulate region tracks the setting of goal information to control the information flow, and (e) a caudate region tracks the firing of productions in the ACT–R model. The article concludes with an architectural comparison of the competence children display in this task and the competence that monkeys have shown in tasks that require manipulations of sequences of elements. (shrink)

We present a general cognitive architecture that tightly integrates symbolic, spatial, and visual representations. A key means to achieving this integration is allowing cognition to move freely between these modes, using mental imagery. The specific components and their integration are motivated by results from psychology, as well as the need for developing a functional and efficient implementation. We discuss functional benefits that result from the combination of multiple content-based representations and the specialized processing units associated with them. Instantiating this (...) theory, we then discuss the architectural components and processes, and illustrate the resulting functional advantages in two spatially and visually rich domains. The theory is then compared to other prominent approaches in the area. (shrink)

We relate the theory of presupposition accommodation to a computational framework for reasoning in conversation. We understand presuppositions as private commitments the speaker makes in using an utterance but expects the listener to recognize based on mutual information. On this understanding, the conversation can move forward not just through the positive effects of interlocutors’ utterances but also from the retrospective insight interlocutors gain about one anothers’ mental states from observing what they do. Our title, ENLIGHTENED UPDATE, highlights such cases. (...) Our approach fleshes out two key principles: that interpretation is a form of intention recognition; and that intentions are complex informational structures, which specify commitments to conditions and to outcomes as well as to actions. We present a formalization and implementation of these principles for a simple conversational agent, and draw on this case study to argue that pragmatic reasoning is holistic in character, continuous with common-sense reasoning about collaborative activities, and most effectively characterized by associating specific, reliable interpretive constraints directly with grammatical forms. In showing how to make such claims precise and to develop theories that respect them, we illustrate the general place of computation in the cognitive science of language. (shrink)

It’s been more than three hundred years since William Molyneux posed his now-famous question to John Locke. While it’s clear that Locke agrees with Molyneux that someone born blind and made to see would be unable to recognize at first sight the objects he knew previously only by touch (cross-modal recognition), why Locke thinks this is difficult to understand given Locke’s apparent reluctance to engage much with Molyneux’s question. I argue here that due to the lack of clear textual support, (...) and because previous attempts to account for Locke’s negative answer fail to recognize just how little justification Locke provides, motivate the need for a new approach to explain Locke’s answer to Molyneux’s question. My new approach is to consider what successful Lockean cross-modal recognition might look like given his “Architecture of Ideas,” the work of his Essay to account for mental content, from simple sensory ideas to knowledge. This allows us to identify which ideas and mental faculties he might likely consider essential for success at Molyneux’s task, and which, if lacking, explain the newly sighted man’s failure. Furthermore, this approach yields some surprising results: there is more than one reason the newly sighted person would fail. And adjusting the question to involve a cross-modal comparison of two-dimensional shapes does not suggest Locke would change his answer to ‘yes’. (shrink)

According to Carruthers ants and bees have minds. This claim is to be understood realistically. We do not interpret the overt behaviour of ants and bees by ascribing to them beliefs and desires in an instrumental manner. They rather possess minds in the relevant cognitive sense. In this paper, I propose to pave the way for a reductio against such a polemic view. In particular, I shall argue that if ants and bees have minds, by the same token, plants do (...) have minds too. In my view, the problem has to do with Carruthers' underlying technical concept of cognitive architecture; a concept which, as I shall argue, can be called into question both on empirical and conceptual grounds. Según Carruthers, las hormigas y las abejas tienen mente. Esta afirmación debe entenderse de modo realista. No es que interpretemos la conducta abierta de hormigas y abejas en términos de creencias y deseos atribuidos instrumentalmente. Se trata más bien de que tienen tales estados mentales en el sentido cognitivo relevante. En este trabajo, me propongo llevar esta polémica concepción a una reductio. En particular, argumentaré que si las hormigas y las abejas tienen mente, por la misma razón las plantas también la tendrían. A mi modo de ver, el problema tiene que ver con el concepto técnico de arquitectura cognitiva de Carruthers ; un concepto que puede ser cuestionado sobre bases empíricas y conceptuales, según argüiré. (shrink)

Heuristics are often invoked in the philosophical, psychological, and cognitive science literatures to describe or explain methodological techniques or "shortcut" mental operations that help in inference, decision-making, and problem-solving. Yet there has been surprisingly little philosophical work done on the nature of heuristics and heuristic reasoning, and a close inspection of the way(s) in which "heuristic" is used throughout the literature reveals a vagueness and uncertainty with respect to what heuristics are and their role in cognition. This dissertation seeks (...) to remedy this situation by motivating philosophical inquiry into heuristics and heuristic reasoning, and then advancing a theory of how heuristics operate in cognition. I develop a positive working characterization of heuristics that is coherent and robust enough to account for a broad range of phenomena in reasoning and inference, and makes sense of empirical data in a systematic way. I then illustrate the work this characterization does by considering the sorts of problems that many philosophers believe heuristics solve, namely those resulting from the so-called frame problem. Considering the frame problem motivates the need to gain a better understanding of how heuristics work and the cognitive structures over which they operate. I develop a general theory of cognition which I argue underwrites the heuristic operations that concern this dissertation. I argue that heuristics operate over highly organized systems of knowledge, and I offer a cognitive architecture to accommodate this view. I then provide an account of the systems of knowledge that heuristics are supposed to operate over, in which I suggest that such systems of knowledge are concepts. The upshot, then, is that heuristics operate over concepts. I argue, however, that heuristics do not operate over conceptual content, but over metainformational relations between activated and primed concepts and their contents. Finally, to show that my thesis is empirically adequate, I consider empirical evidence on heuristic reasoning and argue that my account of heuristics explains the data. (shrink)

In this paper architectural forms are presented as symbolic forms issued from the complex semiosis that characterises human cognition (Ferreira (2007, 2010)). Being semiotic objects, these symbolic forms are, consequently, context- dependent_they emerge and have meaning, i.e., they are assigned a functional and/or aesthetic value, in particular physical, social and cultural frameworks. As it happens with all semiotic objects, architectural forms, whatever their nature, are not static but highly interactive. In fact, they act as agents of specific semiotic processes, engaged (...) in a permanent dialectic relationship with the environment they are embedded in. From this dialectics important physical, social, cultural and economic changes frequently arise, redefining this way the original framework for decades to come. As Pallasmaa (2009) points out: “Architecture is existentially rooted, and it expresses fundamental existential experiences, the complex condensation of how it feels to be human being in this world. Architecture grounds and frames existence and creates specific horizons of perception, understanding and identity.” Architecture happens in the context of particular landscapes both natural and man-made, individuating spaces, assigning them an identity, turning the frequently undifferentiated physical environment into “locus”, “place”, “site”, “ort”, definitely contributing to the definition of the mental map that individual minds are able to share collectively. The fundamental role played by architectural forms in the definition of “place” and identity and in the shaping or reshaping of a physical, social and cultural environment is analysed in this paper through a case study that observes the consequences of this dynamics in the development of the social and cultural tissue of a particular city. (shrink)

The rapid acceleration of societal change has subjected contemporary individuals to prolonged periods of diverse pressures, leading to substantial psychological strain, resulting in anxiety, depression, and compromised mental well-being. Within this context, the home has evolved into a vital refuge for modern individuals, offering both physical and psychological respite. Through experimental intervention, this study examines two distinct residential groups: those adhering to traditional housing and those residing in characteristic folk houses, specifically Gannan Hakka architecture. Analysing the psychological state of (...) contemporary individuals and integrating Gannan Hakka architectural elements into folk house design through a psychologically informed approach, this research aims to enhance residents’ aesthetic experiences and alleviate psychological distress. The study involved 120 volunteers with varying psychological stress levels, categorised into characteristic and traditional folk house groups. Psychological assessments evaluated stress, self-efficacy, and quality of life. Findings reveal significantly improved psychological well-being, self-efficacy, and quality of life among the characteristic residential group, affirming the benefits of Gannan Hakka architecture integration. This research underscores the importance of addressing modern individuals’ environmental needs and proposes the integration of Gannan Hakka cultural elements into residential design to enhance well-being. Contribution: This study demonstrates the application of Hakka culture in contemporary housing profoundly influences residents’ lives, enabling both relaxation and a deeper cultural connection. This integration facilitates a comprehensive understanding of Hakka culture, promoting its preservation. Notably recognised for hospitality and diligence, Hakka culture enhances individuals’ appreciation of tradition, fostering physical and mental rejuvenation. These findings offer valuable insights for practical theology scholars and practitioners exploring the impact of religious aspects on modern residential design from a psychological perspective. (shrink)

Despite their popularity, relatively scant attention has been paid to the upshot of Bayesian and predictive processing models of cognition for views of overall cognitive architecture. Many of these models are hierarchical ; they posit generative models at multiple distinct "levels," whose job is to predict the consequences of sensory input at lower levels. I articulate one possible position that could be implied by these models, namely, that there is a continuous hierarchy of perception, cognition, and action control comprising levels (...) of generative models. I argue that this view is not entailed by a general Bayesian/predictive processing outlook. Bayesian approaches are compatible with distinct formats of mental representation. Focusing on Bayesian approaches to motor control, I argue that the junctures between different types of mental representation are places where the transitivity of hierarchical prediction may be broken, and I consider the upshot of this conclusion for broader discussions of cognitive architecture. (shrink)

There is an aesthetic undercurrent traversing Deleuze's philosophy along confluent trajectories of Baruch Spinoza and Friedrich Nietzsche, which harbours untapped potentials and far-reaching consequences for contemporary discussions of art and architecture. According to this subterranean stream, aesthetic experience is generated, neither in ready-made mental faculties of a subject, nor in essential qualities of an object, but through affective interactions of a relational field. A cartographic inquiry of affective aesthetics constitutes the subject matter of this paper, beginning with a philosophical (...) elaboration that connects aesthetic theories of Spinoza, Nietzsche and Deleuze, evolving via a comparative analysis of aesthetic processes specific to Francis Bacon's artistic assemblages and Vogelkop bowerbirds' architectural constructs, and concluding with the possibility of a non-anthropocentric aesthetics. (shrink)

In this paper we compare two theories about the cognitive architecture underlying morality. One theory, proposed by Sripada and Stich (forthcoming), posits an interlocking set of innate mechanisms that internalize moral norms from the surrounding community and generate intrinsic motivation to comply with these norms and to punish violators. The other theory, which we call the M/C model was suggested by the widely discussed and influential work of Elliott Turiel, Larry Nucci and others on the “moral/conventional task”. This theory posits (...) two distinct mental domains, the moral and the conventional, each of which gives rise to a characteristic suite of judgments about rules in that domain and about transgressions of those rules. We give an overview of both theories and of the data each was designed to explain. We go on to consider a growing body of evidence that suggests the M/C model is mistaken. That same evidence, however, is consistent with the Sripada and Stich theory. Thus, we conclude that the M/C model does not pose a serious challenge for the Sripada and Stich theory. (shrink)

Architectural aesthetics mainly creates architectural beauty according to the law of beauty and realizes the interaction between creative subject and object, and receptor. Its essence has been soaked and attached to all kinds of materialized carriers and behavioral subjects in the living environment. Through the aesthetic optimization of residential house type, this paper analyzes the ventilation efficiency of representative house type, which affects the prevention and control of community infectious diseases and the physical and mental health of residents. Take (...) multiple measures to strengthen the aesthetic design of residential house type, and promote the healthy development of community ecology and the cultural inheritance of harmonious society. It is helpful for architectural designers to improve their understanding of the effect of natural ventilation and provide reference means for designers to reasonably organize indoor natural ventilation in architectural design. (shrink)

Le lecteur moderne demeure dérouté par les ekphraseis de bâtiments des textes byzantins. Il est en effet difficile de les considérer comme des sources pour l'archéologie ou l'Histoire de l'art, et la recherche tend à leur égard à adopter deux approches : l'une, plutôt liée à l'Histoire et à l'Histoire de l'art, s'emploie à retrouver des éléments réels de bâtiments ou d'œuvres d'art dans ces textes ; l'autre, plutôt philologique, cherche à considérer ces textes en eux-mêmes pour leur valeur littéraire. (...) Serait-il cependant possible de chercher une voie médiane? Une voie qui accepterait qu'une part de l'étrangeté de ces textes, nécessairement due à la langue et à l'époque, le soit également parce que l'expérience de lecture entre Moyen Âge et époque moderne a radicalement changé. Il manquerait au lecteur moderne, non l'imagination, mais les mécanismes et les résultats de l'imagination médiévale. Les échos lexicaux et thématiques qui balisent le texte et qui en dessinent l'architecture en seraient la clef aboutiraient à un texte en 3D, c'est-à-dire une projection mentale de l'objet décrit non pas comme simple image donnée par l'information contenue dans le texte, mais comme image construite par la composition du discours. Ainsi, au fur et à mesure qu'un auteur décrit un bâtiment, le texte le construit en mots et in fine en a épousé la forme. (shrink)

It is a characteristic feature of our mental make-up that the same perceptual input situation can simultaneously elicit conflicting mental perspectives. This ability pervades our perceptual and cognitive domains. Striking examples are the dual character of pictures in picture perception, pretend play, or the ability to employ metaphors and allegories. I argue that traditional approaches, beyond being inadequate on principle grounds, are theoretically ill equipped to deal with these achievements. I then outline a theoretical perspective that has emerged (...) from a theoretical convergence of perceptual psychology, ethology, linguistics, and developmental research. On the basis of this framework, I argue that corresponding achievements are brought forth by a specific type of functional architecture whose core features are as follows: (1) a perceptual system that is biologically furnished with a rich system of conceptual forms, (2) a triggering relation between the sensory input and conceptual forms by which the same sensory input can be exploited by different types or systems of conceptual forms, and (3) computational principles for handling semantically underspecified conceptual forms. Characteristic features of the proposed theoretical framework are pointed out using the Heider–Simmel phenomenon as an example. (shrink)