In Leibniz’s New Essays stands out, within many important topics, his doctrine of innate ideas, which supposes the division between sense knowledge and innate knowledge and implies the distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. That doctrine is particularly relevant for Leibniz’s philosophy, but implicitly entails the epistemological difference between belief, on one hand, and certainty, on the other. In this paper I outline, according to my interpretation, how Leibniz explains that humans can have certainty about (...) innate ideas. This topic is important because if Leibniz demonstrates the possibility of having certainty of those ideas, then, it is feasible to believe in its existence. However, if his explanation is unsatisfactory his metaphysical doctrine would be seriously weakened and, at the same time, both skepticism and Locke’s empiricist doctrine would be reinforced. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Incomprehensible Certainty: Metaphysics and Hermeneutics of the Image by Thomas PfauThomas ZingelmannPFAU, Thomas. Incomprehensible Certainty: Metaphysics and Hermeneutics of the Image. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2022. xxiii + 785 pp. Cloth, $80.00Thomas Pfau reconstructs one of the most traditional and possibly most decisive philosophical debates, [End Page 559] namely, the one about the form and function of appearance (Schein). This debate is (...) taken up on the basis of the concept of image. This means that Pfau concentrates historically as well as systematically on a specific topic within this debate. The book is divided into two major sections.In the first section, Pfau examines how the history of the metaphysics and theology of the image develops, starting with Plato in the first chapter. The basic idea in this section is that the image has a crucial epistemic role in the metaphysical and theological systems of the authors addressed. Here Pfau shows that Plato, at the latest in the Sophist, develops a theory of images that revalues appearance contrary to the assumptions in the Republic. Chapter 1 is about the mediation of unity and multiplicity, as it is also shown in Plotinus. Chapter 2 attempts to show how the Byzantine icon embodies the conviction that the invisible truth of the visual world can be revealed only through images. Pfau's demonstration of various epistemic dimensions of the image then begins with chapter 3: the eschatological vision from Augustine to Bonaventure to Julian of Norwich. Chapter 4, the last of the first section, reconstructs Nicholas of Cusa's position, which attempts to understand mystical visions mediated by images of Christ.The second section examines how the metaphysics of the image—in the sense of an epistemology, which tries to establish ultimate justifications—nevertheless persists and even evolves despite two crucial switches in philosophy. On the one hand, this concerns philosophy that subordinates the visual to the abstract (for example, Hegel) and, on the other, the supposedly nonmetaphysical status of the image in the developing natural sciences. Chapter 5 then attempts to show, through Goethe's botanical investigations and reflections, how, despite the establishment of the natural sciences, Goethe attempts to defend intuition as a scientific method and appearance as a scientific object of investigation. This position is then pursued historically in chapter 6, through the work of Lyell, Darwin, and Ruskin, where the visible is understood as the connecting point of the sciences in general. Gerard Manley Hopkins is then identified in chapter 7 as representing a position that combines theological with proto-phenomenological arguments to highlight the epistemic value of images. The last chapter then deals with decisive developments at the beginning of the twentieth century. In phenomenology (Husserl), painting (Cézanne), and poetry (Rilke), a conception develops that epistemically valorizes sensual and intuitive experience.Generally speaking, Pfau attempts to trace historically what arguments and positions have been developed on the relationship between image and knowledge. His work is based on the conviction that the image is the basis for human orientation in the world and is therefore of great epistemological value. Of outstanding importance for his question is that the epistemological value of images is not to be located in the properties of images, that is, an ontology of the image; rather, Pfau is interested in those positions that reflect on the relationship between knowledge and [End Page 560] experience of images. While clarifying the ontological status of images remains important, the epistemological status of images—what role the experience and usage of images has for humans—is in the foreground. Pfau reconstructs positions that hold that the pictorial is a medium of knowledge. He puts forward the thesis that there is a tradition that is of the opinion that in and through the medium of the image—and this closes the arc to the Schein-debate—being can be experienced by man. In other words, the invisible is to become recognizable through the visible. Of particular importance is his reading of the late Platonic dialogues: While appearance and being are still thought of as distinct in these dialogues, they are not opposed, in the sense of an epistemic opposition. Plato's... (shrink)

This chapter examines Peter Markie's book, “Descartes Gambit,” Edwin Curley's work titled “Descartes Against the Skeptics” and the exchange of criticisms between the two works. The “gambit” Markie refers to in his title is Descartes' attempt to deduce a metaphysical theory of the self from premises about his knowledge of himself. The epistemological premises are that “I am certain that I think”, that “I am certain that I exist”, and that “I am uncertain that I have a body.” The (...) metaphysical theory of the self derived from these premises is, roughly, that I am a thinking, nonextended substance capable of existing apart from its body. Markie maintains that Descartes himself held that these metaphysical conclusions could be deduced from these epistemological premises without establishing God's existence and veracity. The point of contention between the two works is on the definition and relationship of three species of Cartesian certainty— psychological, moral, and metaphysical. (shrink)

During the 1630s Descartes recognized that he could not expect all legitimate claims in natural science to meet the standard of absolute certainty. The realization resulted from a change in his physics, which itself arose not through methodological reflections, but through developments in his substantive metaphysical doctrines. Descartes discovered the metaphysical foundations of his physics in 1629-30; as a consequence, the style of explanation employed in his physical writings changed. His early methodological conceptions, as preserved in the (...) Rules and sketched in Part Two of the Discourse, pertained primarily to his early work in optics. By the early 1630s, Descartes was concerned with new methodological problems pertaining to the postulation of micro-mechanisms. Recognition of the need to employ a method of hypothesis led him to lower the standard of certainty required of particular explanations in his mature physics. (shrink)

We ordinarily assume that we have reliable knowledge of our immediate surroundings, so much so that almost all the time we entrust our lives to the truth of what we take ourselves to know, without a moment’s thought. But if, as Karl Popper and others have maintained, all our knowledge is conjectural, then this habitual assumption that our common sense knowledge of our environment is secure and trustworthy would seem to be an illusion. Popper’s philosophy of science, in particular, fails (...) to do justice to the distinction we ordinarily draw between secure knowledge and mere conjecture. But Popper’s philosophy of science, in particular his attempted solution to the problem of induction, is defective. It fails to take into account that physics, in only accepting unified theories, even though endlessly empirically more successful disunified rivals are always available, makes the persistent metaphysical assumption that all disunified theories are false. Once this point is acknowledged, it becomes clear that a new conception of scientific method is required which sees science as making a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe. This provides a framework of relatively unproblematic assumptions and associated methods of science within which much more problematic assumptions and associated methods can be critically assessed and improved. This hierarchical view seems at first to intensify the problem of distinguishing certainty from conjecture, in that it emphasizes that scientific knowledge, and even humble common sense knowledge, contain usually unacknowledged cosmological conjectures. But actually it explicates the basis we have for drawing the distinction between trustworthy knowledge and mere conjecture, and even goes some way towards providing a rationale for this distinction, in so far as one exists. (shrink)

In this paper, I have made an attempt to understand the concept of moral certainty in Descartes’ philosophy. This concept has not received much attention in the Cartesian scholarship. I argue that Descartes entertains a certainty, called moral certainty, which is a lesser certainty than metaphysical certainty, which we see in his text, Meditations. Only a few Cartesian scholars have talked about this concept in relation to other areas in Descartes’ philosophy. In this paper, (...) I draw a relationship between the concept of moral certainty and the faculty of reason in the context of Descartes’ text, Discourse. I argue that Descartes entertains the testimonies of learned men when it comes to practical or moral matters, arguing that their testimonies guarantee moral certainty. I argue that Descartes claims, in the Discourse, that human beings are endowed with the faculty of reason on the basis of moral certainty. (shrink)

Hume appeals to different kinds of certainties and necessities in the Treatise. He contrasts the certainty that arises from intuition and demonstrative reasoning with the certainty that arises from causal reasoning. He denies that the causal maxim is absolutely or metaphysically necessary, but he nonetheless takes the causal maxim and ‘proofs’ to be necessary. The focus of this paper is the certainty and necessity involved in Hume’s concept of knowledge. I defend the view that intuitive certainty, (...) in particular, is certainty of the invariability or necessity of relations between ideas. Against David Owen and Helen Beebee, I argue that the certainty involved in intuition depends on the activity of the mind. I argue, further, that understanding this activity helps us understand more clearly one of Hume’s most important theses, namely that experience is the source of a distinct kind of certainty and of necessity. (shrink)

In this paper, I survey the way Wittgenstein reacts to radical philosophical doubt in his On Certainty.He deems skeptical doubt in some important cases idle, pointless or otherwise negligible. I point out that several passages of On Certainty make it difficult to judge whether Wittgenstein intends to address a skeptic or a metaphysical idealist. Drawing attention to the anti-skeptical nature of Berkeley’s idealism, I go on to argue that the question is far from trivial: rather, it affects (...) the way we should evaluate Wittgenstein’s arguments in On Certainty in general. I finally attempt to explain why Wittgenstein remained ambiguous about the target of his arguments, and discuss the possibility of making room for the idealism/skepticism distinction in On Certainty’s framework. (shrink)

In a recent number of Philosophy of Science, Mr. C. D. Hardie offers some interesting suggestions concerning the problem of other minds. In his view the fact that we feel certain of their existence constitutes a problem; and he wishes to find a rational justification for this certainty. “What grounds have I for believing in the existence of other minds?” he asks. He is attracted by the traditional argument from analogy, but finds it incomplete; for “any conclusion arrived at (...) by analogy and induction is at best only probable,” and “I am certain that other minds exist.” Again we find him remarking that “there is room for an account which makes our knowledge of them depend in some way on analogy... but which is such that we can be certain that other minds exist....”. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s On Certainty has been a source of inspiration for philosophers concerned with the notion of deep disagreement (see Fogelin in Informal Logic 25(1):3–11, 2005; Pritchard in Topoi 40:1117–1125, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9612-y ). While Wittgenstein’s examples of certainties do not include moral certainties, some philosophers have argued that an analogy can be drawn between certainty regarding the empirical world and moral certainty (Goodman in Metaphilosophy 13:138–148,1982; Hermann in On moral certainty, justification, and practice: A Wittgensteinian perspective, Palgrave (...) Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2015; Pleasants in Inquiry 51(3):241–267, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1080/00201740802120673 ). Moral certainty manifests itself in our fundamental ways of feeling, thinking, and acting morally. It is closely related to an “agreement in form of life” (Wittgenstein in Philosophical investigations, Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Third ed., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1968, § 241.), which makes moral disagreements possible in the first place. In this paper, I aim to shed light on the phenomenon of moral deep disagreement by relating it not only to the notion of moral certainty but also to the concept of deep disruption as it is currently developed and discussed in the philosophy of technology. I argue that certainty, deep disagreement, and deep disruption are all located at the level of “bedrock practices” (Williams in Wittgenstein, mind and meaning, Routledge, Milton Park, 1999, p. 198), and that the fundamentality of their objects should be understood in terms of relationality and interconnectedness. Deep disagreements can occur through deep technology-induced disruption and can take the form of a disruption of deep conceptual agreement. Conceptual common ground can be re-established by continuous interaction and a collective process of moral articulation. Deep disruption and moral deep disagreement can lead to moral progress, for instance in the form of recognising and correcting an epistemic injustice. (shrink)

This chapter explains the relationship between metaphysics and science as expounded by Descartes. The topic includes the effect of concepts of God and soul into the discovery of the scientific method. Metaphysical certainty grounds the rule of evidence in God, who is the source of all truth, and then extends from mathematics to everything so demonstrated in physics, and the knowledge that material things exist. The chapter examines in particular the stages of science's subordination to God, and some (...) of its consequences: What are the meaning and limits of the “fable” of The World? What is the difference between hypotheses, which move toward a conjunction with the real, and the “comparisons” employed in the Essays, which are not based on “principles”? Is the modern notion of a model ruled out, and with what legitimacy? (shrink)

In twentieth-century France, the word “metaphysics” had connotations of closed systems which claimed certainty for themselves. As a result, few dared to engage in metaphysical speculation. Ricœur, however, rejected this prevalent definition because he believed it came from Heidegger’s procrustean reading of the history of philosophy. While agreeing that certainty and closure were neither desirable nor possible, Ricœur did make metaphysical claims. Following Jaspers’s revival of pre-modern apophatic metaphysics for which transcendence cannot be comprehended, Ricœur, in (...) his early work, argued for “critical realism” against neo-Kantian idealism, “original affirmation” against Sartrean negativity, and the “metaphysical choice” of human freedom’s consent to the unchosen features of reality. (shrink)

This study is concerned with certainty and examines the work of Dewey for the light he sheds on this problem. Hart concentrates on the process of verification, the final stage of inquiry in Dewey's theory. He does this because he believes that, according to Dewey, through the process of verification we may attain "flexible" certainty. The first chapter discusses the background of the problem. The second chapter, "A Dewey Dictionary," contains passages selected from Dewey's works on about sixty (...) topics which Hart considers important for his later discussion. In the third chapter, a chronological account of the development of Dewey's theory of inquiry and his views on verification is meticulously presented. The fourth chapter is devoted to a systematic presentation of the place of verification in Dewey's philosophy. In the fifth chapter are the author's critical reflections: Hart holds that the basic principles of Dewey's theory cannot be justified but must be taken on faith. Here Hart does not seem sufficiently appreciative of Dewey's pragmatism. Dewey could answer: such principles are adopted because they are fruitful and will be maintained only so long as they continue to be fruitful. An epilogue concludes the study.—F. S. M. (shrink)

This paper compares Wittgenstein's conception of ?objective certainty? with Descartes's ?metaphysical certainty?. According to both conceptions if you are certain of something in these senses, then it is inconceivable that you are mistaken. But a striking difference is that for Descartes, if you are metaphysically certain of something it follows both that the something is so and that you know it is so; whereas on Wittgenstein's conception neither thing follows. I try to show that there is a (...) form of ?scepticism? in Wittgenstein's outlook on the concept of certainty, although it is not the familiar Philosophical Scepticism. The Appendix takes issue with a recent essay by John Cook which argues that the ?hinge propositions? of On Certainty are based on ?the metaphysics of phenomenalism? (shrink)

Whence the Cartesian’s advantage over competing world investigators? Descartes’s answer is that those of his persuasion do not proceed by “resting [their] reasons on any other principle than the infinite perfections of God”. The claim’s considerable opacity does not prevent it from letting this much light filter through: only Cartesian scientists operate on the right metaphysical basis.

biological theories of emotion are often used to explain and predict human desires, particularly the desire to reproduce. I propose that these desires are largely socially constructed, but that the naturalization of desires and the normalization of biological theories sustain the pursuit of biological childbearing as a biological need. Foundational metaphysical and epistemological theories have lent both authority and urgency to the idea of a biological need to bear children, which has resulted in a diminished focus on alternative modes (...) of having children.I suggest that a form of biological determinism rests on what philosopher John Dewey calls a misplaced "quest for certainty." This search is a process whereby a... (shrink)

When P(E) > 0, conditional probabilities P(H|E)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$(H|E)$$\end{document} are given by the ratio formula. An agent engages in ratio conditionalization when she updates her credences using conditional probabilities dictated by the ratio formula. Ratio conditionalization cannot eradicate certainties, including certainties gained through prior exercises of ratio conditionalization. An agent who updates her credences only through ratio conditionalization risks permanent certainty in propositions against which she has overwhelming evidence. To avoid this undesirable (...) consequence, I argue that we should supplement ratio conditionalization with Kolmogorov conditionalization, a strategy for updating credences based on propositions E such that P(E) = 0. Kolmogorov conditionalization can eradicate certainties, including certainties gained through prior exercises of conditionalization. Adducing general theorems and detailed examples, I show that Kolmogorov conditionalization helps us model epistemic defeat across a wide range of circumstances. (shrink)

In his Kitāb al-Burhān, Avicenna discusses a theoretical framework broadly inspired by Aristotle's Posterior Analytics which brings together logic, epistemology and metaphysics. One of the central questions explored in the book is the problem of the relation between knowledge, certainty and causal explanation. Burhān 1.8, in particular, is devoted to the analysis of how certainty comes about in causal as opposed to non-causal contexts. The distinction is understood in Avicenna's system as one between cases in which the conclusion (...) of an argument is warranted only in virtue of an appropriate middle term, and cases in which there is no such intermediary because the predicative link between subject and predicate of the conclusion is immediate. In this context, Avicenna makes use of the case of relative terms to clarify certain crucial aspects of his theory. The paper explores this discussion and shows how Avicenna's account of the relatively marginal role of relatives in the context of demonstration depends on insights that are central to his metaphysics and epistemology. (shrink)

I argue that we can achieve certainty about some empirical propositions. When someone is having a migraine and attending to it, she can be certain that she is in pain. I show that examples intended to undermine claims of certainty or to raise doubts about the reliability of introspection do not touch such cases. Traditional foundationalists have held that epistemically certain beliefs can serve as the basis for all one’s other justified beliefs. This is not so, because those (...) beliefs that are certain are spread too thinly to serve as broad justificatory foundations. Certainty has a different role. The best explanation for the existence of epistemically certain empirical beliefs is experientialism, the view that nondoxastic sensory experiences can justify beliefs. Experientialism then offers a framework for showing how the stream of sensory experiences can provide an adequate basis for the justification of our ordinary beliefs about the external world. (shrink)

This book provides a detailed account of Julián Marías’s metaphysical anthropology with the ultimate aim of offering a coherent and systematic analysis of Marías’s argumentation for claiming that the conscious hope for Christian salvation through resurrection — and with it the hope that Jesus Christ did actually resurrect, and more generally the hope that Christian revelation is true — is justified not because the certainty or the likelihood that this salvation will, as a matter of fact, actually occur, (...) but because this hope amounts to a self-affirming exercise, a conscious endorsement of human reality, and as such a sign of authenticity. -/- . (shrink)

In these two Bode Memorial lectures, the author grapples with the problem of formulating general principles for education in a democratic society of separate and radically different individuals--how to achieve a proper balance of unity and variety. He concludes that "our principles are to be viewed as more or less impressionistic ideals which we should seek to realize in concrete living as best we can."--R. T.

In this paper I argue that Kant's distinction in the Inaugural Dissertation between the sensible and the intelligible arises in part out of certain open questions left open by his comparison between mathematics and metaphysics in the Prize Essay. This distinction provides a philosophical justification for his distinction between the respective methods of mathematics and metaphysics and his claim that mathematics admits of a greater degree of certainty. More generally, this illustrates the importance of Kant's reflections on mathematics for (...) the development of his Critical philosophy. (shrink)

After a discussion of Bacon's views on the subject, Van Leeuwen examines a different theory of certainty. This is the theory that was elaborated by Chillingworth and Tillotson, two English Protestant clergymen, in the course of a controversy centering upon the problem of deciding with certainty which beliefs constituted a Rule of Faith, i.e., the basic requirements of belief for Salvation. Chillingworth and Tillotson attempted to avoid both dogmatism and total skepticism by insisting on the existence of levels (...) of certainty and maintaining that the criteria of common sense are appropriate for the solution of theoretical religious questions. According to Van Leeuwen, the application of this theory is extended to scientific contexts in the work of Wilkins and Glanvill and is inherent in the scientific work of such members of the Royal Society as Boyle and Newton. The exposition is good; but the author's claim to a rigorous evolutionary line in the development of the doctrine of certainty among the figures he has treated is sometimes overstated.—T. J. C. (shrink)

The paradox of philosophy has a clear relevance to the paradoxes of our times. After the early revolts in philosophy at the beginning of the century, philosophers have sought concreteness and objectivity; they have cultivated experience and existence; they have built structures to use and determine facts and data. Since experience and existence define both nature and art, there are no inexperienced facts, no ungiven data and, in general, no separate existences from which experience may derive concreteness and objectivity. What (...) we do and what we say are not mere channels to reality but the specifications and embodiments of the real. We treat facts when we act and speak, and the analysis of action and language is the analysis of what is and of what it is. But philosophies of existence and experience must treat facts and phenomena not the facts of any experience or problem; therefore, they undertake to solve no particular problem and, of course, they differ in their solutions of general problems of the nature of processes and reality, and of phenomena and existence. (shrink)

According to Flay, the theme of Hegel's Phenomenology is a quest for warranted certainty of access to reality, a quest separate from, and yet essential to, the science which will "articulate the ultimate truth about ultimate reality". Such a quest requires a presuppositionless beginning, one that cannot be questioned by either the philosophical tradition or consciousness in its natural attitude. Flay proposes that Hegel achieves such a beginning, first, by not assuming absolute access to reality as an answer already (...) given, but as a problem inherited from the philosophical tradition. Flay maintains that the natural attitude has a natural certainty of access to reality. Hegel's second requirement for a presuppositionless beginning, then, consists in critically accepting the natural attitude's certainty. The quest for certainty will simply involve determining the self-warranting grounds for this certainty. (shrink)

The ten essays making up Knowledge and Certainty appear in chronological order. With two exceptions, they fall naturally into three categories corresponding to three stages in the development of Malcolm's philosophical career: the first three essays are critical studies of other philosophers' views and contain interesting discussions of the ordinary meanings of some English expressions; the fourth, fifth, and eighth essays are, so to speak, Wittgensteinian studies; in them Malcolm is concerned with both interpreting Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and applying (...) the views he attributes to Wittgenstein to certain philosophical problems; the last two essays, written in 1961, are direct attempts at analyzing some concepts involving the idea of memory; in them Malcolm is not ostensibly working under Wittgensteinian views or prejudices, and his philosophical technique acquires a close resemblance to that of R. M. Chisholm. These are, admittedly, only two essays, but I venture to predict that Malcolm has now entered a new phase of his career, and one from which we may expect greater accomplishments. (shrink)

J. H. Lambert proved important results of what we now think of as non-Euclidean geometries, and gave examples of surfaces satisfying their theorems. I use his philosophical views to explain why he did not think the certainty of Euclidean geometry was threatened by the development of what we regard as alternatives to it. Lambert holds that theories other than Euclid's fall prey to skeptical doubt. So despite their satisfiability, for him these theories are not equal to Euclid's in justification. (...) Contrary to recent interpretations, then, Lambert does not conceive of mathematical justification as semantic. According to Lambert, Euclid overcomes doubt by means of postulates. Euclid's theory thus owes its justification not to the existence of the surfaces that satisfy it, but to the postulates according to which these "models" are constructed. To understand Lambert's view of postulates and the doubt they answer, I examine his criticism of Christian Wolff's views. I argue that Lambert's view reflects insight into traditional mathematical practice and has value as a foil for contemporary, model-theoretic, views of justification. (shrink)

For over a century, philosophers have argued that philosophy is impossible or useless, or both. Although the basic notion dates back to the days of Socrates, there is still heated disagreement about the nature of truth, reality, knowledge, the good, and God. This may make little practical difference to our lives, but it leaves us with a feeling of radical uncertainty, a feeling described by Kolakowski as "metaphysical horror." "The horror is this," he says, "if nothing truly exists except (...) the Absolute, the Absolute is nothing; if nothing truly exists except myself, I am nothing." The aim of this book, for Kolakowski, is finding a way out of this seeming dead end. In a trenchant analysis that serves as an introduction to nearly all of Western philosophy, Kolakowski confronts these dilemmas head on through examinations of several prominent philosophers including Descartes, Spinoza, Husserl, and many of the Neo-Platonists. He finds that philosophy may not provide definitive answers to the fundamental questions, yet the quest itself transforms our lives. It may undermine most of our certainties, yet it still leaves room for our spiritual yearnings and religious beliefs. The final sentence of the book captures the hopefulness that has survived the horror of nothingness when Kolakowski asks: "Is it not reasonable to suspect that if existence were pointless and the universe devoid of meaning, we would never have achieved not only the ability to imagine otherwise, but even the ability to entertain this very thought—to wit, that existence is pointless and the universe devoid of meaning?" The answer, of course, is clear. Now it is up to readers to take up the challenge of his arguments. (shrink)

This thesis attempts to argue against an influential interpretation of Kant's philosophy of mathematics according to which the role of pure intuition is primarily logical. Kant's appeal to pure intuition, and consequently his belief in the synthetic character of mathematics, is, on this view, a result of the limitations of the logical resources available in his time. In contrast to this, a reading is presented of the development of Kant's philosophy of mathematics which emphasises a much richer philosophical role for (...) intuition, beyond that of filling in deductive gaps in mathematical arguments. This role is largely determined by two factors: on the one hand, the epistemological gap in a traditional account of mathematical certainty, and on the other hand, the metaphysical worry raised by the followers of Leibniz and Wolff regarding the status of mathematics as a science consisting of truths. ;By appreciating how Kant's philosophy of mathematics developed against the background of what he saw as a conflict between the 'metaphysicians' and the 'mathematicians', we can see how the doctrine of pure intuition was required to fill the gaps in the account of the method and certainty of mathematics which Kant presents in the Prize Essay of 1764. This conflict takes its sharpest form between the monadists who uphold the metaphysical necessity of simple elements, and the geometers who uphold the infinite divisibility of space. In the Prize Essay Kant indirectly addresses this conflict by comparing the two disciplines. He asserts that the method of attaining certainty in mathematics is different from the method of metaphysics, and that as a result of this difference--primarily the different roles of definitions in each--mathematics is capable of a higher degree of certainty than metaphysics. He does not, however, explain this difference. Such an explanation seems particularly important in light of Kant's wish to secure geometry against the challenge of metaphysics. This thesis attempts to show that it is to provide such an explanation, to provide a philosophical grounding for the Prize Essay account, that Kant invokes the doctrine of pure intuition in his later account of mathematical knowledge. (shrink)

Theology involves inquiry into God's nature, God's purposes, and whether certain experiences or pronouncements come From God. These inquiries are metaphysical, part of theology's concern with the veridicality of signs and realities that are independent from humans. Several research programs concerned with the relation between theology and science aim to secure theology's intellectual standing as a metaphysical discipline by showing that it satisfies criteria that make modern science reputable, on the grounds that modern science embodies contemporary canons of (...) respectability for metaphysical disciplines. But, no matter the ways in which theology qua metaphysics is shown to resemble modern science, these research programs seem destined for failure. For, given the currently dominant approaches to understanding modern scientific epistemology, theological reasoning is crucially dissimilar to modern scientific reasoning in that it treats the existence of God as a certainty immune to refutation. Barring the development of an epistemology of modern science that is amenable to theology, theology as metaphysics is intellectually disreputable. (shrink)

The latest book of Buchler is certainly in continuity with his previous work on philosophical method and on judgment, which commands serious attention outside the circle of those having close affinities with his thought. This work deals with the problem of the one and the many from various refreshing angles. The purpose of the study is to outline a fundamental ontology through the deduction of categories all referent to complexes. Such are: integrity and scope, prevalence and alescence [[sic]], ordinality and (...) relation, possibility and actuality. The method followed to define the categories is that of description followed by comparison with various concepts occupying a parallel position in other philosophical systems. While the principal characteristic of a category is its recurrence, it remains unclear whether the deduction is transcendental or only transreferential. In any event, the method lends itself to a transference of sense from the clear and distinct traits where analysis stops to the main categories to be defined. Under these conditions it is difficult at times to decide whether the clear and distinct notions need further clarification, or whether circularity has been thoroughly avoided in the transference of sense. Such difficulties are offset by Buchler's tenacious hewing of determinateness. And the admirable part of it is that his categories manage to perfectly carve the statue without ever having to crack the marble. One finds himself with solid gains in the clarification of the meaning of these categories, with a certainty that the framework used is not going to introduce a bias, and with a suspicion that the author has stood quite at ease "on the shoulders of giants."—A. M. (shrink)

One of the foundation-stones of modern philosophy Descartes was prepared to go to any lengths in his search for certainty—even to deny those things that seemed most self-evident. In his Meditations of 1641, and in the Objections and Replies that were included with the original publication, he set out to dismantle and then reconstruct the idea of the individual self and its existence. In doing so, Descartes developed a language of subjectivity that has lasted to this day, and he (...) also took his first steps towards the view that would eventually be expressed in the epigram Cogito, ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am"), one of modern philosophy's most famous—and most fiercely contested—claims. The first part of a two-volume edition of Descartes' works in Penguin Classics, the second of which is Discourse on Method & Related Writings. For more than seventy years, Penguin has been the leading publisher of classic literature in the English-speaking world. With more than 1,700 titles, Penguin Classics represents a global bookshelf of the best works throughout history and across genres and disciplines. Readers trust the series to provide authoritative texts enhanced by introductions and notes by distinguished scholars and contemporary authors, as well as up-to-date translations by award-winning translators. (shrink)

We live in a universe that can be seen and experienced from many different perspectives. We therefore need to look at the universe from many different angles. Everything and everyone is a form of the universe being expressed in a particular way. In other words, each one of us can say with absolute certainly “We are the Universe!” Since we are the universe, each one of us provides a valuable perspective that complements the contributions of everyone and everything else around (...) us. Each of us is the universe being expressed in a particular location in a specific way. We’re all part of the same moving and evolving cosmos, but the view of it is unique from each of our respective locations. This suggests that the universe is not only omnicentric, but that it is also multiperspectival – there are many different, and equally valid, viewpoints on this. Each one of us is a cosmic laboratory within which we can discover the secrets of the universe. We speak in various ways, we are each the universe having become aware of itself in our own unique way. The insights that the universe has many different perspectives and is both cosmic and personal has great transformative potential, and is worth reflecting on deeply. (shrink)

Some metaphysicians believe that existence debates are easily resolved by trivial inferences from Moorean premises. This paper considers how the introduction of negative Moorean facts—negative existentials that command Moorean certainty—complicates this picture. In particular, it shows how such facts, when combined with certain plausible metaontological principles, generate a puzzle that commits the proponents of this method to a contradiction.

The article proposes a phenomenological journey through three concepts of uncertainty – those of Blaise Pascal, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Jan Patočka. The discussion focuses on the meaning of certainty and uncertainty and on the mutual relations between the two according to each philosopher. Adopting an embodied philosophical-poetic perspective enables the dialectical relations prevailing between these three conceptions to emerge, clarifying that, despite their differences, they share a deep attachment to the transcendent dimension of human existence. This dimension is described (...) as “uncertain certainty,” implying attention to the quiver of absolute meaning dwelling within and beyond the movement of humans and the lifeworld. (shrink)

What is arguably the central criticism of Hegel’s philosophical system by the Continental tradition, a criticism which represents a unifying thread in the diverse work of Schelling, Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Adorno, is that Hegel fails to adequately do justice to the notion of individuality. My aim in this paper is to counter the claim that Hegel’s idea of the concrete universal fails to properly explain the real uniqueness of individuals. In what follows, I argue that whilst the Continental critique (...) (as it is particularly expressed by Adorno) is prima facie attractive, it is ultimately misguided. This is because the critics of Hegel fail to correctly understand (i) his principal argument in Sense-Certainty; (ii) crucial features of his logico-metaphysics; and (iii) his notion of wholeness. I contend that carefully explicating these important parts of the Hegelian system not only shows that Hegel’s metaphysical commitments are not those which do not leave meaningful room for or make adequate sense of individuality, but that they also reveal a sophisticated treatment of the interdependency between the categories of individuality, particularity and universality in a way which conceives of individuality robustly. (shrink)

Klein aims to refute scepticism on its own terms by showing that, even if we grant the sceptic as much as possible in the way of strong necessary conditions for knowledge and weak sufficient conditions for the defeat of knowledge claims, the case for scepticism is still defective. In this I think he is totally successful at least as regards the two forms of direct scepticism he deals with. On the third type of scepticism, iterative scepticism, I think his results (...) are more open to question--but only because I think he has conceded too much to the sceptic in the course of the argument. The main sceptical argument Klein is concerned with is the evil demon argument and its associated defences. Klein's argument in his two central chapters is detailed, rigorous and often labyrinthine. The long section on the concept of justification is hard to follow and might have benefitted from further formalization, especially since parts of it and the following section consist of derivations. One consequence of Klein's cautious manner of proceeding is that reviewers are compelled to take drastic short-cuts in terminology and exposition. One hopes this will not produce distortion, but the reader who fears it has is well advised to read the book, which more than repays careful study. (shrink)

An enjoyable and well-written discussion of the change in the conception of politics from David Hume through Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill to Beatrice Webb. The longest, most interesting, and most useful section is on Hume, who expresses the dominant view of the eighteenth century that "man is a balanced whole whose object is to live decently and enjoyably." The discussion of Hume is the background for a less favorable consideration of Bentham, Mill, and Webb and although the latter (...) half of the book fails to match the first half in depth and interest, it remains a work which can be recommended and read with joy.—K. A. M. (shrink)

Despite periods of resurgence over the last decades, it is safe to say that transcendental arguments no longer enjoy a prominent presence in the philosophical landscape. One reason for their declining prominence is the sustained suspicion that despite their self‐proclaimed metaphysical neutrality, transcendental arguments are, in fact, metaphysically committed. This paper aims to revive the discussion of transcendental considerations by offering a metaphysically neutral account of transcendental arguments. I argue that a metaphysically neutral conception of transcendental arguments requires a (...) revision of two concepts constitutive of transcendental claims, namely, transcendental necessity and the a priori. I propose a transcendental reading of Wittgenstein's On Certainty, which, I maintain, provides us with an alternative, metaphysically neutral understanding of these concepts. Thus revised, transcendental claims are suitable for what Mark Sacks once described as the “post‐metaphysical” orientation of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

The author elucidates the ontological basis of elementary mathematical theories and thereby assesses their certainty as a foundation for the more complex theories of modern mathematics, such as mathematical analysis and set theory. He adduces arguments in favor of the position of Frege, who held that geometry can provide a sufficiently broad and certain foundation for mathematics.

Marx's concept of production is not only in the sense of understanding of historical materialism, but should be placed in the entire history of Western philosophy to dialysis. The theory of commodity fetishism by the specific analysis, we believe that the duality of Marx's labor theory of sublimation of Kant's thing-in theory, the relations of production areas to expose the history of Western philosophy is the pursuit of the illusion of certainty of abstract identity, revealing the dialectic essence of (...) the historical circumstances and human relations. Relations of production within the context of a critical attitude towards both the change in the basic formulation of the question of philosophy, but also reshape the basic position of philosophy, history of philosophy to achieve great change. Marx's category of mode of production should not only be interpreted in sense of historical materialism but also be melted into the integration of western philosophy history. By the concrete analyzing on Marx's theory of commodity fetishism, we come to the conclusion that not only was the theory of duality of labor as sublimation on Kant's theory of object in itself, but also Marx's category of relationship of production uncovered the abstract identity vision in which western philosophy have been in pursuit of the certitude from Enlightenment on, furthermore revealed the relation between core spirit of dialectic and human being 'historical circumstances. The critical attitude rooted into the theory of mode of production has changed the question mode as remolded the basic standpoint of philosophy and achieved the great transformation in philosophy history. (shrink)

2. That experiential statements must be unquestionably certain cannot be shown by reference to actual instances: Any sentence purporting to describe experiential data may conceivably be a lie or involve inadvertent misuse of language. Hence, experiential statements that are certain play, at best, the role of hypothetical elements in a logical reconstruction of knowledge. The assumption of such incorrigible elements is not necessary.

ABSTRACT My aim in this article is twofold. First, I hope to show that, despite its seeming rehabilitation, metaphysics as systematic, speculative philosophy is no less threatened. Second, I will argue that metaphysics as systematic, speculative philosophy is ultimately revisable. That is, metaphysics is not the aim at a closed system of apodictic truths but, rather, an open-ended, fallibilistic pursuit of ever-more-adequate accounts of reality. Specifically, building on the work of Charles Sanders Peirce and Alfred North Whitehead, I will argue (...) that we should conceive of metaphysics not as the quest for absolute certainty but as “working hypothesis.” Thus, the first part will be largely historical and critical, and the second part will be positive and exploratory. (shrink)

This ambitious study, by a professor of rhetoric, proposes itself as "intellectual history in a traditional sense" and not as philosophical discourse. Though philosophy does not appear in its title, however, much of its content will appear to philosophers as pertaining to their discipline, and the thesis it develops surely commends itself to philosophical critique. The author's aim, at least in part, is to challenge "the commonly held view" that the scientific revolution created or intensified the modern division between the (...) humanities and the sciences. In the early Renaissance, she argues, rhetoric and philosophy were seen as "pursuing different goals by different means," with rhetoric assigned to the humanities and concerned with opinion and probability and science assigned to philosophy and concerned with truth and certainty. Such a dichotomy was broken down at the onset of the modern period, she holds, particularly in seventeenth-century England, where a sceptical approach to knowledge made for common ground between humanists and scientists. The weakening of knowledge claims in the probabilistic empiricism of the period is thus, for her, the key to understanding its intellectual life and the climate of opinion in which it flourished. To make the point she devotes successive chapters to natural philosophy and empirical science; religion; history; law; witchcraft; and language, communication, and literature. The presentation is scholarly throughout and well documented in an abundance of notes at the end of the volume. Considering the difficulty of her thesis and its extremely broad range the author argues her case well; yet there are problems with it that make one wonder whether her generalization can claim validity in anything more than a trivial sense. (shrink)