Since Donald Davidson issued his challenge to anticausalism in 1963, most philosophers have espoused the view that our actions are causally explained by the reasons why we do them. This Davidsonian consensus, however, rests on a faulty argument. Davidson’s challenge has been met, in more than one way, by anticausalists such as C. Ginet, G. Wilson, and S. Sehon. Hence I endeavor to support causalism with a stronger argument. Our actions are correlated with our motivating reasons; to wit, we often (...) do what we have reason to do. In yet other words, we are often rational. Our frequent rationality is easily explained if causalism is correct, but looks like a staggering coincidence otherwise. Anticausalism thus appears to be ill-equipped to account for the very existence of rational behavior, and so far no attempts in this direction have succeeded. (shrink)

This paper analyses the ways in which human knowledge of the golden jackal ( Canis aureus) is formed in the case of a rural community of the Romanian Danube Delta. We focus on the territory where humans and jackals overlap and, by using wildlife monitoring alongside interviews and participant observation with humans, we detail how villagers come to have a particularly negative view of this resident canid. Foregrounding the jackal's highly symbolic nature, we trace the development of the community's knowledge (...) of this animal via historical, ecological and geographical factors. Finally, we recommend ways in which our findings could be used in future management plans and draw out the implications for future rewilding practices. (shrink)

In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the resources of semantic contextualism. (...) To this end the article describes and advocates a contextualist solution inspired by supervaluationist truth-value gap approaches. The solution presented here, however, does not require truth value gaps; it preserves both logical bivalence and non-relative truth, even while it acknowledges and explains the possibility of faultless disagreement. The solution is motivated by the correlation between assertions’ being true and their being useful. This correlation, furthermore, is used not only to tell which assertions are true, but also to determine which linguistic intuitions are reliable. (shrink)

The etiological account of teleological function is beset by several difficulties, which I propose to solve by grafting onto the etiological theory a subordinated goal-contribution clause. This approach enables us to ascribe neither too many teleofunctions nor too few; to give a unitary, one-clause analysis that works just as well for teleological functions derived from Darwinian evolution, as for those derived from human intention; and finally, to save the etiological theory from falsification, by explaining how, in spite of appearances, the (...) theory can allow for evolutionary function loss. (shrink)

The biomedical literature makes extensive use of the concept of a genetic program. So far, however, the nature of genetic programs has received no satisfactory elucidation from the standpoint of computer science. This unsettling omission has led to doubts about the very existence of genetic programs, on the grounds that gene regulatory networks lack a predetermined schedule of execution, which may seem to contradict the very idea of a program. I show, however, that we can make perfect sense of genetic (...) programs, if only we abandon the preconception that all computers have a von Neumann architecture. Instead, genetic programs instantiate the computational architecture of Post–Newell Production Systems. That is, genetic programs are unordered sets of conditional instructions, instructions that fire independently when their conditions are matched. For illustration I present a paradigm Production System that regulates the functioning of the well-known lac operon of E. coli. On close reflection it turns out that not only genes, but also proteins encode instructions. I propose, therefore, to rename genetic programs to biomolecular programs. Biomolecular and/or genetic programs, and the cellular computers than run them, are to be understood not as von Neumann computers, but as Post–Newell production systems. (shrink)

At the heart of the human experience lies anxiety caused by the realization that the world is unknown, forever eluding our control. And out of this anxiety arise the master passions of ambition and envy, which we repress to mask their power over our lives. Discussion of the role of the emotions in our lives is not new, but Mihnea Moldoveanu and Nitin Nohria go much further, showing how these passions shape not only our individual lives but our social (...) and organizational culture as well.The master passions are not pretty, and so we cover them with the more socially acceptable faces of reason and morality. Moldoveanu and Nohria guide the reader in revealing the real impetus behind such actions as firing a friend, leaving a lover, or even pillaging your own people. Below the rational explanation, they show, often lies a willingness to hurt or even destroy others to fuel our own ambitions or quench the fires of envy. The authors offer intriguing thought experiments and examples from their own lives as they expose the power of the master passions. Deftly weaving ideas from psychology, sociology, literature, and philosophy with the personal, they build a strong argument that society would be much healthier if we faced the deception and self-deception that pervade our lives. (shrink)

In 2008, Ecuador became the first country in history to grant constitutional rights to nature. What is termed the indigenous symbol played a significant role in this event. The rights of nature are used as an occasion to interrogate the indigenous symbol in order to reveal what it does, as opposed to what it says. The account of the rights of nature originating in indigenous sensibilities is presented, and subsequently critiqued. The argument makes use of the notion of representative claim (...) to show the strategic construction of indigeneity as ecologically harmonious. An alternative genesis of the rights of nature is presented. It is further showed that the indigenous symbol is employed as a veneer of moral authority hiding the strategic machinations of representative politics. (shrink)

Bence Nanay has argued that we must abandon the etiological theory of teleological function because this theory explains functions and functional categories in a circular manner. Paul Griffiths argued earlier that we should retain the etiological theory and instead prevent the circularity by making etiologies independent of functional categories. Karen Neander and Alex Rosenberg reply to Nanay similarly, and argue that we should analyze functions in terms of natural selection acting not on functional categories, but merely on lineages. Nanay replies (...) that these lineages cannot be individuated except by reference to functional categories. Worryingly, Neander and Rosenberg themselves have previously argued persuasively that homology often depends on function. This article addresses their arguments and shows how to escape them: Regardless whether the arguments are right about long-term homological categories, they do not apply to generation-to-generation homology. The latter, moreover, is sufficient for individuating the lineages needed to explain teleological functions. (shrink)

Dobre, Mihnea and Bujor, Ioana (eds.). “Antoine Le Grand and Jacques Rohault: Le Grand and his Annotations to Rohault’s Treatise on Natural Philosophy.” Society and Politics, vol. 16/1 (31), 2022. [Open Access].

This paper argues that the concept of responsibility can and should ground an ethics of ecological restoration. It starts with William Jordan’s concept of restoration, namely the creation of mutually beneficial human-nature relationships. It builds a concept of responsibility using the works of Hans Jonas and Martin Drenthen, understood as a correlate of our technological capacity, as well as a relationship to the possibility of meaningfulness today and in the indefinite future. It is argued that we are responsible in a (...) deep sense for engaging in projects of restoration in order to ensure the survival of embodied meaningfulness in the world. (shrink)

Studies point out that populism, a concept still in dire need of clarifications, resembles more of a rhetorical strategy than a fully-fledged ideology. Actually, populism has become a concept so frequently used that its orginial meaning seems to have been lost, leaving it as an empty shell, at least from an ideological point of view. I argue that in spite of this – or rather as a means of compensation – populism uses a very robust mythological apparatus, creating narratives that (...) allow voters to easily understand its messages. The current article underlines that in an attempt to over-simplify its discourse, populism makes use of all four political myths identified by Raoul Girardet. The conspiracy myth represents the main element revolving around the populist discourse. Politicians who embrace this rhetoric denounce a secret society that is rigorously organized, the actions of which defy morality, using all means to attain political power. The other three political myths, i.e. the myth of unity, the myth of the savior and the myth of the golden age, act together only as a counterweight for the first. The paper also points out that the success of Euroscepticism lies in the fact that it represents the perfect embedding for such myths, and that the EU needs to generate its own narratives if it hopes to confront the so-called “populist temptation”. (shrink)

This article argues that non-consensual vaccination is morally impermissible, for the same reasons for which sexual assault is not permissible. Likewise, mandatory vaccination is morally akin to sexual harassment, and therefore is not to be allowed.

“Cartesian Visual Cosmology: Ways Towards a Digital Platform” (with Ovidiu Babeș and Ioana Bujor) In Recent Advances in Digital Humanities: Romance Language Applications, Eds. Anca Dinu, Mădălina Chitez, Liviu Dinu and Mihnea Dobre. Berlin, Germany: Peter Lang, 2022.

Recent literature contains influential arguments for variabilism, the view that we should understand proper names as analogues not of constants but of variables. In particular, proper names are said to sometimes take semantic values that are not referential but purely general. I present a counter-example to this view.

Electoral manifestos represent tools of political communication which do not only inform the electorate upon the fundamental values of a party, but which also legitimize future actions that the party might undertake once in power. The electoral manifesto of the European People’s Party, drafted before the 2009 European elections brings together the main elements which define the action plan of the party. Religious values lie at the core of the Christian-democratic ideology. But given the dynamic of politics and the sometimes (...) sudden shifts in the preferences of the electorate, manifestos can rapidly become out of touch with the needs of the voters. The current paper will analyze how much of what the EPP Manifesto contains on issues related to religiosity is truly in line with the general opinion of the Christian-democratic electorate in four European countries:Austria,Bulgaria, The Netherlands andPortugal. Moreover, using data collected through the Vote Advice Application data, the paper will also tap into the differences which still persist (or which are fading away) in the attitude of the right-wing versus the left-wing electorate on the issues related to religion. Communicating with the electorate is the main key in attracting those who share the ideas and values of a party. But what if the core ideas of a party are slowly becoming unappealing for its own electorate? (shrink)

Contemporary phenomenal externalists are motivated to a large extent by the transparency of experience and by the related doctrine of representationalism. On their own, however, transparency and representationalism do not suffice to establish externalism. Hence we should hesitate to dismiss phenomenal internalism, a view shared by many generations of competent philosophers. Rather, we should keep both our options open, internalism and externalism. It is hard, however, to see how to keep open the internalist option, for although transparency and representationalism have (...) not yet definitively established externalism, they have indeed made it quite intuitive. Internalism, by comparison, comes across at first sight as antiquated and ridden with difficulties. This is why I propose the Stained Glass model of consciousness. I do so with the following two aims: first, to make internalism intuitive in the age of transparency, and second, to show how to resist the many recent anti-internalist arguments. In particular, I argue that phenomenal internalism need not be epistemically worrisome, that it is compatible at once with transparency, representationalism, and content externalism, and that although it requires an error theory, this error theory is a harmless one. (shrink)

Covaluation is the generalization of coreference introduced by Tanya Reinhart. Covaluation distributes in patterns that are very similar yet not entirely identical to those of binding. On a widespread view, covaluation and binding distribute similarly because binding is defined in terms of covaluation. Yet on Reinhart's view, binding and covaluation are not related that way: binding pertains to syntax, covaluation does not. Naturally, the widespread view can easily explain the similarities between binding and covaluation, whereas Reinhart can easily explain the (...) dissimilarities. Reciprocally, the widespread view finds it harder to explain the dissimilarities, whereas Reinhart finds it harder to explain the similarities. Reinhart and others have proposed more than one explanation of the similarities, but as I argue, these explanations do not work. Hence although I adopt Reinhart's view, I propose a new explanation of the similarities and dissimilarities between binding and covaluation: While Reinhart has invoked semantic structure only to explain dissimilarities, I do so to explain both similarities and dissimilarities at once. Finally, I examine in light of this approach the topics of language acquisition, only-constructions, the identity predicate, the Partee/Bach/Higginbotham problem, the Dahl puzzle and its recent versions by Roelofsen. (shrink)

Philosophers have justified extant theories of singular thought in at least three ways: they have invoked wide-ranging theories motivated by data from other philosophical areas, they have elicited direct intuitions about which thoughts are singular, and they have subjected propositional attitude reports to tests such as Russellian substitution and Quinean exportation. In these ways, however, we haven’t yet been able to tell what it takes to have singular thoughts, nor have we been able to tell which of our thoughts they (...) are. I propose, therefore, a methodological contribution, a new source of data about singular thought. We can tell whether a thought is singular if we ask what we can coherently deny at the same time at which we agree with the thought. When we agree with a thought that is general, we cannot coherently deny about the thought’s subject a certain description, the one that occurs in the thought’s subject position. To show how to use this new data source, I develop a linguistic method for testing whether a speaker expresses a singular or a general thought. (shrink)

I argue for a more complicated but nonetheless computationally feasible and algorithmically intelligible interplay between exploration and exploitation and for admitting into our conceptual toolkit regimes of exploitative exploration and exploratory exploitation that can enhance the novelty and usefulness of the results of either problemistic or serendipitous search.

While innovation has evolved into a common concept for quite a few decades now, especially given the need for new forms of development that require technology transfer and creativity mechanisms, less so is the case of social innovation. The latter remains a rather controversial concept, caught between two extremes: some authors consider it to be useless for academic research given its vagueness, while others point to its sacrosanctity given the need for new ways of societal and political development. Knowledge-creation, idea (...) generation and openness are mechanisms that any type of innovation relies upon. However, social innovation takes these concepts one step further and seeks to become a driving force for institutional change, therefore strongly linked with how liberal democracy works. The current paper aims to look at how social innovation is linked to the participative component of liberal democracy by looking at case studies from the European Union. (shrink)

Lucrarea de față explorează receptarea cosmologiei lui René Descartes ca “fizică mozaică”. În mod tradițional, teoria lui Descartes despre formarea și structura lumii a fost citită în lumina unei explicații mecanice bazate pe teoria vârtejurilor. La un nivel mai general, problemele discutate în lucrarea de față se circumscriu unui cadru mai amplu de dezbateri, specifice cosmologiei filosofice.

The appearance of scientific journals in the second half of the seventeenth century not only presented new opportunities for the dissemination of knowledge, but also offers the historian a privileged view of the shared knowledge within the scientific community. The Journal des Sçavans, founded in 1665, proclaimed its ambition to disseminate news about books and people concerning the République des lettres. Given the reportedly high interest in and opposition to the rise of Cartesianism among contemporary philosophers, this paper explores the (...) discussion of Cartesianism within the pages of the Journal. It is shown that debates on Cartesianism formed only a small portion of the articles in the Journal. Although the majority of commentaries referred to the metaphysical foundations of Cartesian philosophy, a considerable number of instances were found referring to empirical tests of the theory. Finally, as the Journal does not mention the condemnations or censorship of Cartesianism, we cannot speak of a general feeling of hostility against Cartesian philosophers among the editors or intended audience of the Journal. (shrink)

Paper presented in the 3rd edition of Bucharest Colloquium on Early Modern Science.

This article addresses the problem of Jacques Rohault’s Cartesianism. It aims to enrich the current portrayal of Rohault (1618–72) as a Cartesian natural philosopher concerned with experimentation. The modern evaluation of Rohault as an experimentalist can benefit from another explanatory layer, emphasizing the mathematical physics that shapes his natural philosophy. In order to argue for this complementary account, I focus on an early episode in Rohault’s career, represented by his reply to Fermat’s attacks against Descartes’s law of refraction (1658). The (...) source has been discussed, so far, solely as part of the dispute in optics between Fermat and the Cartesians. The reading endorsed here explores the source from a different angle, suggesting an alternative account grounded on a more contextual understanding of Rohault’s contribution to Cartesianism. More diverse dimensions of Rohault’s intellectual formation are revealed, which in turn provides a more complex picture of this strain of Cartesian natural philosophy. (shrink)

"Jacques Rohault, Preface to the Traité de Physique. A critical edition and commentary of four early modern versions of Rohault’s preface.” (critical edition and scholarly study; co-edited with Ovidiu Babeș, Ioana Bujor, and Grigore Vida). Special issue of Society and Politics, vol. 15/1 (29), 2021. [Open Access].

Can we explain the advantage natural languages enjoy over ideographies in a way that enables us to attempt the design of an ideography that “works”? I deploy an adapted version of Shannon's source- and channel-coding partitioning of a communication system to explain the communicative dynamics and shortfalls of ideographies, and reveal ways in which entrenchable, generalist ideographies could be designed.