What is given to us in conscious experience? The Given is an attempt to answer this question and in this way contribute to a general theory of mental content. The content of conscious experience is understood to be absolutely everything that is given to one, experientially, in the having of an experience. Michelle Montague focuses on the analysis of conscious perception, conscious emotion, and conscious thought, and deploys three fundamental notions in addition to the fundamental notion of content: the (...) notions of intentionality, phenomenology, and consciousness. She argues that all experience essentially involves all four things, and that the key to an adequate general theory of what is given in experience lies in giving a correct specification of the nature of these four things and the relations between them. (shrink)

Despite being an aristocrat and a woman, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu made herself a writer. Hard-hitting, eloquent, and often funny, this is a revised edition of her non-epistolary writings.

Freedom, Philosophy, and Faith: The Transformational Role of Freedom in the Thought of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas highlights the essential role freedom plays in the Catholic intellectual tradition. Montague Brown argues that that freedom, taken in its most essential form as understood by the Judeo-Christian tradition, has been transformative in all aspects of human thought, from metaphysics to politics.

Although people generally agree that innocent targets of culpable aggression are justified in harming the aggressors in self-defence, there is considerable disagreement regarding whether innocents are justified in defending themselves when their doing so would harm other innocent people. I argue in this essay that harming innocent aggressors and active innocent threats in self-defence is indeed justified under certain conditions, but that defensive actions in such cases are justified as permissions rather than as claim rights. This justification therefore differs from (...) that of self-defence against culpable aggressors, since defensive acts of the latter type are justified as claim rights rather than mere permissions. I argue, however, that the two justifications are alike in that both rest on considerations of distributive justice. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

Many contemporary philosophers have been concerned about whether there is a fundamental distinction between perception and cognition. Although I do not think there is a fundamental distinction between perception and cognition, at least given what I take perception to be, I do think there is a fundamental distinction between sense and cognition, which I will argue is best understood in terms of a distinction between two irreducible kinds of phenomenology: sensory and cognitive.

I reject the contention that an important theoretical difference exists between formal and natural languages.

Presents a broad collection of essays on love and friendship. It draws on the rich tradition handed down from Greek philosophers and the Holy Scriptures, illuminated by the wisdom of the medieval theologians, and reflected upon by Jacques Maritain, his students, and other contemporary Catholic intellectuals.

A study of reason, as an invitation to explore and discover a new life of meaning, The Romance of Reason is an attempt to put the philosophical basis of Aquinas' thinking into nontechnical language and make it accessible to the general reader.

This set of 12 papers collates together experiences, lessons, and good practice drawn from Oxfam GB and its partners' global program work on the theme of "the Right to be Heard". Each paper focuses on a different project and demonstrates varying ways of working which can strengthen the participation of people in poverty as active citizens in the shaping of policy decisions. Many poor people around the world are denied the opportunity to have their say. Politics generally works well for (...) those in power, but those in poverty are often excluded from forums on issues that directly affect their welfare and so are unable to hold decision-makers to account. Due to this lack of opportunity to influence debates, many government policies and resource allocations systematically marginalize the people who most need support and assistance and so block progress towards reducing poverty and suffering. These papers cover different approaches, lessons learned, and useful case examples on issues ranging from local community budget monitoring to popular mobilization and media work. Throughout the papers, the authors highlight how addressing a lack of voice and ability to speak out against injustice, as well as the more tangible aspects of the situation, can make a big difference to people's ability to achieve greater well-being and get out of poverty, and so work towards a point where poor and marginalized women and men are more powerful and able to access their rights. (shrink)

In this paper I consider the uses to which certain psychological phenomena—e.g. cases of seeing as, and linguistic understanding—are put in the debate about cognitive phenomenology. I argue that we need clear definitions of the terms ‘sensory phenomenology’ and ‘cognitive phenomenology’ in order to understand the import of these phenomena. I make a suggestion about the best way to define these key terms, and, in the light of it, show how one influential argument against cognitive phenomenology fails.

THE MORAL INDEFENSIBILITY OF STANDING YOUR GROUND (Abstract) This paper examines the moral status of the central provision of Stand Your Ground laws: that people lawfully occupying public spaces are legally permitted to inflict self-defensive harm on aggressors even if the defenders can easily and safely retreat. The relation of this provision to existing theories of self-defense is examined, and critiques are offered of two attempts at defending it. Then reasons are presented for concluding that the provision is morally indefensible.

'Propositionalism' is the widely held view that all intentional mental relations-all intentional attitudes-are relations to propositions or something proposition-like. Paradigmatically, to think about the mountain is ipso facto to think that it is F, for some predicate 'F'. It seems, however, many intentional attitudes are not relations to propositions at all: Mary contemplates Jonah, adores New York, misses Athens, mourns her brother. I argue, following Brentano, Husserl, Church and Montague among others, that the way things seem is the way (...) they are, and that propositionalism must be abandoned. (shrink)