According to the early versions of the causal theory of action, intentional actions were both produced and explained by a belief desire pair. Since the end of the seventies, however, most philosophers consider intentions as an irreducible and indispensable component of any adequate account of intentional action. The aim of this paper is to examine and evaluate some of the arguments that gave rise to the introduction of the concept of intention in action theory. My contention is that none of (...) them is conclusive. To sustain my claim, I first discuss some of the main differentiating functions commonly attributed to intentions. Contrary to the dominant view, I show that many of these functions, especially those attributed to distal intentions, have little to do with the causal character of action theory. I also maintain that many of the allegedly specific functions of intentions can be ascribed to the preeminent motive of the agent. Finally, I argue that the intention thesis cannot be reconciled with the motivational strength thesis, and that the latter is a decisive reason to forsake the former. (shrink)

It is often suggested that our desires vary in motivational strength or power. In a paper expressing skepticism about this idea, Irving Thalberg asked what he described, tongue in cheek, as "a disgracefully naive question" (1985, p. 88): "What do causal and any other theorists mean when they rate the strength of our PAs," that is, our "desires, aversions, preferences, schemes, and so forth"? His "guiding question" in the paper seems straightforward (p. 98): "What is it for (...) our motivational states to have some degree of power to generate behavior?" Yet, he argued, ''as soon as we endeavor to clarify what philosophers of action and drive theorists in psychology mean by motivational strength, we run across one obscurity after another" (p. 103). This essay is an attempt to answer a more specific version of Thalberg's question. (shrink)

Do people sometimes exercise self-control in such a way as to bring it about that they do not act on present-directed motivation that continues to be motivationally strongest for a significant stretch of time (even though they are able to act on that motivation at the time) and intentionally act otherwise during that stretch of time? This paper explores the relative merits of two different theories about synchronic self-control that provide different answers to this question. One is due to Sripada (...) (Noûs 1–38, 2012) and the other to Mele (Irrationality, 1987; Autonomous agents, 1995; Motivation and agency, 2003). Special attention is paid to evidence Sripada offers for an affirmative answer to the question, and some guidance is offered on the project of finding evidence for an affirmative answer. (shrink)

According to the causal theory of action---briefly, "causalism"---actions are distinguished from other events in the world by being caused by mental states of the agent. I argue that the standard argument for causalism is in fact unsuccessful, and then sketch an alternative account of action. The dominance of causalism is largely due to an apparently simple argument of Donald Davidson's: the only way to make sense of the connection between an action and the reason for which it is performed is (...) to suppose that the reason causes the action. In response, I first show that Davidson's argument has a more complicated structure than is usually supposed, turning essentially on consideration of cases in which an agent acts on one reason rather than another. Davidson's proposal is that causalism offers the best explanation of this contrastive phenomenon. ;I argue that, in order to explain Davidson's contrastive phenomenon successfully, the causalist must appeal to the additional notion of motivational strength. This undermines the causalist's argument because noncausalists can also invoke the idea that some reasons are motivationally stronger than others to explain Davidson's contrastive phenomenon. Thus, whichever side has the better account of motivational strength will have the more plausible theory of action. Standard theories of motivational strength, including causal theories, are all arguably unsatisfactory, but I conclude that a version of interpretationism offers a better account of motivational strength, suitable for a noncausal theory of action. (shrink)

One of the principal preoccupations of action theory is with the role of intention in the production of action. It should be expected that this role would be important, since an item of behavior appears to count as action just when there is some respect in which it is intended by the agent. This being the case, an account of the function of intention should provide insight into how human action might differ from other sorts of events, what the foundations (...) of human autonomy may be, etc. But the claim that intention plays an important role in action is implicitly opposed to another thesis held by many action theorists: that whenever she acts, an agent always follows her strongest motive or desire. If this is so, there may be no need for special states of intending, since these might just intervene between motive and action. Rather, it can be argued, intention conceived as an independent state should be gotten out of action theory, and its functional role imputed to the agent’s strongest desire. The tension between this reductivist view and views which credit intention with a distinctive functional role in the genesis of action is what I wish to explore in this paper. The first two sections are devoted to showing how the conflict arises. In sections III and IV I shall consider two ways of trying to resolve the conflict, neither of which seems to me adequate. Finally, I shall urge briefly that if the conflict cannot be resolved, we should favor a theory which maintains a nonreductive view of intention. (shrink)

Two main types of philosophical arguments have been given in support of the claim that the citizens of affluent societies have stringent moral duties to aid the global poor: “positive duty” arguments based on the notion of beneficence and “negative duty” arguments based on noninterference. Peter Singer’s positive duty argument (Singer 1972) and Thomas Pogge’s negative duty argument (Pogge 2002) are among the most prominent examples. Philosophers have made speculative claims about the relative effectiveness of these arguments in promoting attitudes (...) and behaviors that could lead to the alleviation of poverty. In this article we present the results of two empirical studies that evaluate these claims, and suggest that both arguments have a modest effect on people’s attitudes and behaviors regarding global poverty. In a replication of the second study, the negative duty argument, in particular, had a statistically significant effect on donations. We discuss the theoretical and practical significance of these results and suggest directions for further research on the role that philosophical arguments can play in engendering concern and action on pressing moral problems. (shrink)

It is sometimes suggested that if, whenever we act intentionally, we do, or try to do, what we are most strongly motivated to do at the time, then we are at the mercy of whatever desire happens to be strongest at the time. I have argued elsewhere that this is false (Mele 1987, ch. 5; 1992, ch. 4; 1995, ch. 3; 1996). This essay provides another route to that conclusion, but that is not my primary aim. The goal of this (...) paper is to display the bearing of some well-known experiments by physiologist Benjamin Libet on this issue. Philosophical discussion of these experiments has focused on Libet's claims about consciousness. The significance of these experiments for the topics of motivation and agential control also merits serious attention. (shrink)

Strengths-based performance appraisal focuses on identifying, appreciating, and developing employee’s qualities in line with the company goals. In this study, we investigated to what extent strengths-based performance appraisal is associated with higher levels of perceived supervisory support, and in turn a higher motivation to improve performance. We distributed a questionnaire to employees working for a large Dutch consultancy firm right after their yearly appraisal (N = 422) and linked the questionnaire data to their official performance ratings. Conditional process analysis indicated (...) that strengths-based performance appraisal had a positive effect on perceived supervisor support, and in turn on motivation to improve performance. Furthermore, the effect of strengths-based performance appraisal was particularly strong, when the performance rating was relatively low. Our findings indicate that a focus on strengths in the performance appraisal may boost employees’ optimism regarding future successes, which is especially important to safeguard a supportive relationship with the supervisor when the performance rating is relatively low. (shrink)

Having a “normal” professional job and doing research impose different social and personal connotations. These differences materialize at least in two clear ways. First, it is common that researchers in the making find it very difficult to communicate to their closest social network (e.g., family and old close friends) the content and the importance of their work, as they lose known sources of social comparison. Meanwhile, professional job titles (e.g., brand manager, auditor, lawyer) are self-explanatory, and they provide for the (...) owner an immediate social contextualization and recognition. Second, students normally receive delayed and ambiguous feedback and reinforcement while doing a PhD, contrasting with the continuous flow of assessment that companies give to their employees. In this article, I analyze how young researchers may develop a feeling of social isolation as the communication bridges with family, old friends, and undergraduate colleagues become narrower than before, making it difficult to receive external reinforcement on their social position and comparative achievement. This feeling, combined with the ambiguous feedback during the early stages of a research career, challenges the self-esteem of PhD students, forcing them to develop a self-contained personal security in order to cope with those two social contexts. Some young researchers might even withdraw from PhD programs should they fail to develop such psychological strength. I approach the issue through my own experience, first as a junior consultant in a multinational firm and then as a PhD candidate in economics. Second, I explore the behavioral phenomena that occur beneath those feelings in order to understand how to build such psychological strength. My goal is, through the exploration of my personal experience of becoming a researcher, to offer young researchers a useful narrative to help face the potentially negative feelings that may emerge when learning to balance these conflicting social roles. (shrink)

While there has been considerable interest in the nature of faith and trust in recent philosophical literature, relatively little has been said about what it is for faith or trust to be psychologically stronger or weaker. Drawing on recent accounts of propositional faith by Daniel Howard-Snyder and Lara Buchak, I argue that the strength of one’s faith can vary in two distinct dimensions. The first primarily involves the extent to which one’s confidence motivates one to take risks. The second (...) involves the resilience of the first dimension of strength to possible counterevidence. (shrink)

Hume’s distinction between the calm and violent passions is one whose boundaries are not entirely clear. However, it is crucial to understanding his motivational theory and to identifying an unusual virtue he calls “strength of mind,” the motivational prevalence of the calm passions over the violent. In this paper, I investigate the boundaries of the calm passions and consider the constitution of strength of mind and why Hume regards it as an admirable trait. These are provocative (...) issues for two reasons. First, it seems as though one might exhibit the prevalence of calm over violent passions, even if the prevailing calm passions are vicious traits of character. Second, the natural virtues for Hume are non-moral motives that garner approval for the effects they tend to produce. But strength of mind is unique in that it is not defined in terms of a particular motive, but in terms of the causal force (strength) of any number of motives in competition with others. (shrink)

References to strength of mind, a character trait implying “the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent”, occur in a number of important discussions of motivation in the Treatise and the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Nevertheless, Hume says surprisingly little about what strength of mind is, or how it is achieved. This paper argues that Hume’s theory of the passions can provide an interesting and defensible account of strength of mind. The paper concludes with (...) a brief comparison of Humean strength of mind with autonomy. (shrink)

Among philosophers of the emotions, it is common to view emotional content as purely descriptive – that is, belief-like or perception-like. I argue that this is a mistake. The intentionality of the emotions cannot be understood in isolation from their motivational character, and emotional content is also inherently directive – that is, desire-like. This view’s strength is its ability to explain a class of emotional behaviors that I argue, the common view fails to explain adequately. I claim that (...) it is already implicit in leading theories of emotion elicitation in cognitive psychology – “appraisal theories.” The result is a deeper understanding of emotional intentionality. Employing Peter Goldie’s “Feeling Theory” of the emotions as an example of the common view, I suggest that emotional feelings, too, should be understood on this model: emotional feelings toward items in the world cannot be disentangled from felt motivation. (shrink)

We present a comprehensive model that integrates virtues, values, character strengths and ethical decision making (EDM). We describe how a largely consequentialist ethical framework has dominated most EDM scholarship to date. We suggest that reintroducing a virtue ethical perspective to existing EDM theories can help to illustrate deficiencies in existing decision-making models, and suggest that character strengths and motivational values can serve as natural bridges that link a virtue framework to EDM in organizations. In conjunction with the more fully (...) formulated extant research on situational determinants, we present and discuss our model that introduces a virtue based orientation to EDM. (shrink)

Studies on how one behavior affects subsequent behaviors find evidence for two opposite trends: Sometimes a first behavior increases the likelihood of engaging in additional behaviors that contribute to the same goal (positive behavioral spillover), and at other times a first behavior decreases this likelihood (negative spillover). A factor that may explain both patterns is attitude strength. A stronger (more favorable) attitude toward an issue may make the connections between related behaviors more salient and increase the motivation to work (...) toward the underlying goal. We predicted that people with a stronger (more favorable) attitude are more likely to engage in subsequent behaviors that address an issue they care about. Two experiments tested the prediction in the contexts of pro-environmental and health behavior. Study 1 (N = 378) provided some support for the predicted moderating role of attitude toward the environment when participants recalled either an environmentally friendly or unfriendly action: A strong attitude increased the likelihood, whereas a weak attitude decreased the likelihood of carrying out successive goal-conducive behaviors. When compared to a neutral control condition in Study 2 (N = 929), participants with a weak environmental attitude supported pro-environmental petitions less strongly after an environmentally harmful action. Support for such petitions did not waver, however, among participants with a strong environmental attitude: They consistently acted environmentally friendly. Contrary to the hypothesis, in neither study did strength of attitude toward personal health moderate the effect of an initial behavior in the expected direction. In sum, the two studies provided only limited evidence for behavioral spillover: Participants mostly acted in accordance with their attitude but were hardly affected by recalling previous actions. When behavioral spillover did occur, however, a strong environmental attitude tended to increase the likelihood of acting in an environmentally friendly way, whereas the behavior of those with a weak attitude was less predictable. This research contributes to a more nuanced theoretical understanding of the role of attitude in spillover, but provides only limited evidence for its role as a moderator. (shrink)

Institutions can be strong or weak. But what does this mean? Equilibrium theories equate institutions with behavioural regularities. In contrast, rule theories explicate them in terms of a standard that people are supposed to meet. I propose that, when an institution is weak, a discrepancy exists between the regularity and the standard or rule. To capture this discrepancy, I present a hybrid theory, the Rules-and-Equilibria Theory. According to this theory, institutions are rule-governed behavioural regularities. The Rules-and-Equilibria Theory provides the basis (...) for two measures of institutional strength. First, institutions that pertain to coordination games solve problems of information. Their strength is primarily a matter of the expected degree of compliance. Second, institutions that concern mixed-motive games solve problems of motivation. Their strength can be measured in terms of the weight people attribute to its rule. (shrink)

Motivated reasoning occurs when we reason differently about evidence that supports our prior beliefs than when it contradicts those beliefs. Adult participants (N = 377) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) system completed written responses critically evaluating strengths and weaknesses in a vignette on the topic of anthropogenic climate change (ACC). The vignette had two fictional scientists present prototypical arguments for and against anthropogenic climate change that were constructed with equally flawed and conflicting reasoning. The current study tested and found support (...) for three main hypotheses: cognitive style, personality, and ideology would predict both motivated reasoning and endorsement of human caused climate change; those who accept human-caused climate change will be less likely to engage in biased reasoning and more likely to engage in objective reasoning about climate change than those who deny human activity as a cause of climate change. (144 words). (shrink)

In their logical analysis of theorems about disjoint rays in graphs, Barnes, Shore, and the author (hereafter BGS) introduced a weak choice scheme in second-order arithmetic, called the $\Sigma ^1_1$ axiom of finite choice (hereafter finite choice). This is a special case of the $\Sigma ^1_1$ axiom of choice ( $\Sigma ^1_1\text {-}\mathsf {AC}_0$ ) introduced by Kreisel. BGS showed that $\Sigma ^1_1\text {-}\mathsf {AC}_0$ suffices for proving many of the aforementioned theorems in graph theory. While it is not known (...) if these implications reverse, BGS also showed that those theorems imply finite choice (in some cases, with additional induction assumptions). This motivated us to study the proof-theoretic strength of finite choice. Using a variant of Steel forcing with tagged trees, we show that finite choice is not provable from the $\Delta ^1_1$ -comprehension scheme (even over $\omega $ -models). We also show that finite choice is a consequence of the arithmetic Bolzano–Weierstrass theorem (introduced by Friedman and studied by Conidis), assuming $\Sigma ^1_1$ -induction. Our results were used by BGS to show that several theorems in graph theory cannot be proved using $\Delta ^1_1$ -comprehension. Our results also strengthen results of Conidis. (shrink)

The question I address in this paper is what is it exactly for desires to possess a certain strength. And my aim is twofold. First, I argue for a pluralistic account of desire strength. On this view, there are several dimensions along which desires possess greater or lesser strength, and none of them is intrinsically privileged. My second aim is to highlight some time-based properties of desires, recurrence and persistence. Both desires’ degree of persistence across time and (...) their rate of episodic recurrence are, I argue, further dimensions of desire strength. (shrink)

The Peleus of Euripides’Andromachemakes claims puzzlingly incongruous with his decrepit physical state; he threatens physical violence against the much younger Menelaus and denies his advanced age outright in conversation with Andromache. Peleus’ motivations for acting in such a way, Menelaus’ cause for acting as if these claims are true, and the literary or dramatic significance of these affairs, all pose problems which this article addresses, while also offering a first step towards a comprehensive methodology for understanding old age in Euripidean (...) drama. It presents a unified view of old men across several plays, highlighting key patterns of their interaction with old age, and applies this broad perspective to a close analysis of Peleus’ portrayal in theAndromache.It argues that old men in the plays of Euripides can be viewed generally on either side of a dichotomy between giving effective counsel or participating effectively in physical conflict. Peleus subverts this dichotomy by denying the fact of his age throughout, an action which allows him to employ the skill in speaking gained by his old age as a dramatic substitute for direct physical confrontation and to occupy the social role of a younger man in the Greek household. (shrink)

The paper frames the issue of intergenerational justice by addressing an historical source and a theoretical difficulty. In relation to the historical point of view, the paper offers a preliminary re-reading of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights aimed at revealing the intergenerational commitment that lies behind it (§1). In addressing the second point, it presents the issue of intergenerational justice from a phenomenological perspective (§2). In developing such a perspective, the paper articulates a comprehensive ethical question that is constitutively (...) related to any possible shaping of an intergenerational justice theory (§3). In turn, the explanation of that question presents the opportunity to propose a theory of motivation for the elaboration and implementation of policies explicitly aimed at fulfilling the intergenerational need, beyond any skepticism arising from pragmatic objections. Finally, the paper proposes to address this need by presenting a model of obligation ranking in which the flexibility and strength of the normative bond for the present generation and future ones are considered (§4). (shrink)

This paper contributes to the theory of hybrid substructural logics, i.e. weak logics given by a Gentzen-style proof theory in which there is only alimited possibility to use structural rules. Following the literture, we use an operator to mark formulas to which the extra structural rules may be applied. New in our approach is that we do not see this as a modality, but rather as themeet of the marked formula with a special typeQ. In this way we can make (...) the specific structural behaviour of marked formulas more explicit.The main motivation for our approach is that we can provide a nice, intuitive semantics for hybrid substructural logics. Soundness and completeness for this semantics are proved; besides this we consider some proof-theoretical aspects like cut-elimination and embeddings of the strong system in the hybrid one. (shrink)

In this article I assess the ability of motivational accounts of paternalism to respond to a particular challenge: can its proponents adequately explain the source of the distinctive form of disrespect that animates this view? In particular I examine the recent argument put forward by Jonathan Quong that we can explain the presumptive wrong of paternalism by relying on a Rawlsian account of moral status. I challenge the plausibility of Quong's argument, claiming that although this approach can provide a (...) clear response to the explanatory challenge, it is only successful in doing so when it relies on the strength of its rival: the argument from personal autonomy. In doing so I illustrate that such responses are conceptually dependent on an account of respect for persons, and thus much of the relevant controversy is actually disagreement over how we respect other individuals. (shrink)

Despite the strength of arguments for veganism in the animal rights literature, alongside environmental and other anthropocentric concerns posed by industrialised animal agriculture, veganism remains only a minority standpoint. In this paper, I explore the moral motivational problem of veganism from the perspectives of moral psychology and political false consciousness. I argue that a novel interpretation of the post-Marxist notion of political false consciousness may help to make sense of the widespread refusal to shift towards veganism. Specifically, the (...) notion of false consciousness fills some explanatory gaps left by the moral psychological notion of akrasia, often understood to refer to a weakness of will. Central to my approach is the idea that animal exploitation is largely systemic and the assumption that moral motivation is inseparable from moral thinking. In this light, the primary obstacle to the adoption of veganism arises not so much from a failure to put genuine beliefs into action, but rather in a shared, distorted way of thinking about animals. Thus, common unreflective objections to veganism may be said to be manifestations of false consciousness. (shrink)

The present study investigates the interaction between personal characteristics that are considered nowadays strengths used to face difficult events or transition period. A number of 200 married or living together participants completed self-reports for common goals, motivational persistence, resilience and well-being. Results show that persistence and resilience do interact with each other at an individual level but also from a family concept perspective. Moreover, maintaining apositive outlook and family spirituality do have an impact over the intensity and direction of (...) the relationship between long term purposes pursuing (LTPP) and recurrence of unattained purposes (RUP) and changes in well-being registered in time. Resiliency as a personal characteristic and family resilience show good psychometric qualities for this study. Although some of the results are descriptive, in-depth analyses of direction and intensity of the relationships lead the finalconclusions to suggestions for further research and implications for psychological practice. (shrink)

This paper tests the hypothesis that vocational motivation among Catholic seminarians is significantly correlated with their personality profile. Data provided by 170 seminarians in Italy who completed the New Indices of Religious Orientation and the Big Five Questionnaire demonstrated that: the intrinsic orientation is high among seminarians and positively correlated with conscientiousness; the extrinsic motivation is low among seminarians and negatively correlated with emotional stability; and that the quest orientation is quite high among seminarians, positively correlated with openness and negatively (...) correlated with conscientiousness and friendliness. Attention is given to the distinctive strengths and weaknesses of the quest orientation within the context of formation for priesthood. (shrink)

The elaborated intrusion (EI) theory of desire (Kavanagh, Andrade, & May, 2005) attributes the motivational force of cravings to cognitive elaboration, including imagery, of apparently spontaneous thoughts that intrude into awareness. We report a questionnaire study in which respondents rated a craving for food or drink. Questionnaire items derived from EI theory formed a single factor alongside factors for anticipated reward/relief, resistance, and opportunity. In a multiple regression predicting strength of craving, the first three factors accounted for 36% (...) of the variance. Opportunity did not enter the model. In a second study, the difference between individuals' strong and weak cravings to take part in a sporting activity was shown to be related to visual, auditory, and general imagery, and to anticipated reward or relief from engaging in the activity. Implications for treatment of craving-related disorders are discussed in the light of these results and of other research indicating that interference with imagery can reduce the strength of craving. (shrink)

A number of neo-Kantians have suggested that an act may be morally worthy even if sympathy and similar emotions are present, so long as they are not what in fact motivates right action–so long as duty, and duty alone, in fact motivates. Thus, the ideal Kantian moral agent need not be a cold and unfeeling person, as some critics have suggested. Two objections to this view need to be answered. First, some maintain that motives cannot be present without in fact (...) motivating. Such non-motivating reasons, it is claimed, are incoherent. Second, if such motives are not in fact motivating, then nonetheless the moral agent's performance of right action will be objectionably cold and unfeeling. While the first objection is not compelling, since the alternative according to which all motives in fact motivate but differ in strength suffers from the very same problems attributed to the neo-Kantian view, the second has force, and any account of moral worth must make room for motives such as sympathy actually motivating right action. (shrink)

Jeffrey Alexander’s recent book on cultural sociology argues that sociologists must grant the realm of ideas autonomy to determine behavior, unencumbered by interference from instrumental or material factors. He criticizes the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu as “weak” for failing to give autonomy to culture by reducing it to self-interested behavior that immediately reflects class position. However, Alexander’s arguments seriously distort and misstate Bourdieu’s theory, which provides for the relative autonomy of culture through the concepts of habitus and field. Because habitus (...) is a set of durable dispositions conditioned by past structures, it may contradict the changed structures of the present. Further, the influence of the habitus is always mediated by the structure and strategies of the field of contest in which it is deployed, so that the same habitus may motivate different actions in different circumstances. However, Alexander is correct to argue that in Bourdieu’s theory culture generally serves to reproduce, not contradict social structures. Yet Bourdieu addresses this and other problems in his later work, in which he argues for the existence of certain cultural universals transcending particular structures. (shrink)

Desire theories of well-being claim that how well our life goes for us is solely determined by the fulfilment and frustration of our desires. Several writers have argued that these theories are incorrect because they fail to capture the harms of self-sacrifice and severe depression. In this paper, I argue that desire theories of well-being can account for the harm of both phenomena by rejecting proportionalism about desire and motivation. This is the view that desires always motivate proportionally to their (...) strength. If we reject this view, then we can explain the harm of many cases of self-sacrifice as arising when we act upon our weaker desires and thereby frustrate our stronger desires. Moreover, the harm of many cases of severe depression can be explained by its suppression of the motivational force of desires. This inevitably frustrates desires that we are left unmotivated to fulfil. I argue that this approach captures the experiential quality of self-sacrifice and severe depression better than rival views that seek to problematise these phenomena for desire theories of well-being. Moreover, these theories have sufficient conceptual resources to account for residual cases of self-sacrifice and severe depression that are less well explained by this approach. (shrink)

Although the literature on organizational justice enactment is becoming richer, our understanding of the role of the deontic justice motive remains limited. In this article, we review and discuss theoretical approaches to and evidence of the deontic justice motive and deontic justice enactment. While the prevalent understanding of deontic justice enactment focuses on compliance, we argue that this conceptualization is insufficient to explain behaviors that go beyond the call of duty. We thus consider two further forms of deontic behavior: humanistic (...) and supererogatory behavior. Drawing on the concepts of situation strength and person strength, we further argue that the reduced variance in behavior across morally challenging situations makes deontic justice enactment visible. We thus observe deontic justice enactment when an actor’s deontic justice motive collides with strong situational cues or constraints that guide the actor to behave differently. We formulate propositions and develop a theoretical model that links the deontic justice motive to moral maturation and deontic justice enactment. (shrink)

Although humans qualify as one of the most cooperative animal species, the scale of violent intergroup conflict among them is unparalleled. Explanations of the underlying motivation to participate in an intergroup conflict, however, remain unsatisfactory. While previous research shows that intergroup conflict increases ‘in-group love’, it fails to identify robust triggers of ‘out-group hate’. Here, we present a controlled laboratory experiment, which demonstrates that ‘out-group hate’ can be provoked systematically. We find direct and causal evidence that the intention to protect (...) the in-group is not only a crucial motivator of ‘out-group hate’ in defensive reactions, but also promotes preemptive offensive actions against out-group threat. Hence, the strength of ‘out-group hate’ depends on whether the own group is perceived to be on the offensive or the defensive side of the conflict. This finding improves our understanding of the escalation of intergroup conflicts and may have important implications for their prevention, as we find in our experiment that removing out-group threat substantially reduces intergroup aggression, leading to full peace. (shrink)

Although convergence in emotion expressions within small groups is well documented, the motives that explain why members converge are rarely explicated. We approach expressive convergence from a conformity perspective and introduce the Emotional Conformity Framework, in which we posit that members match their groupmates’ emotion expressions because they are motivated to gain an accurate understanding of reality (informational conformity motive) or to form and maintain social relationships (normative conformity motive). These motives determine members’ standards for correctness, social responses, and plausible (...) convergence mechanisms, while members’ personalities and situational properties shape the relative strength of the two motives. By explicating these motivational underpinnings, the Framework improves our capacity to understand, predict, and regulate expressive convergence and emphasizes its functionality. (shrink)

Some researchers have attributed deviations from selfish behavior to fairness. Violations of fairness theories, however, are observed in experimental dictator games with transfer rates greater than 1 (a transfer of x from the dictator yields an income of tx for the beneficiary, where x < tx): the dictator’s final income is less than the beneficiary’s. We theoretically propose that dictator giving also involves altruism, further supporting our claim with empirical evidence from four separate samples of dictator game experiments. Our nonlinear (...) specification allows the relative measurement of the independent motives in dictator behavior. (shrink)

Aristotle’s Motivation for Matter Why does Aristotle make matter so central to his account of the natural world, making it a principle of nature and one of the four causes? Although there is considerable interest in how Aristotle conceives of matter, scholars rarely investigate why he thinks of it as fundamental to the natural world. Some simply ask why Aristotle thinks there must be matter. Other interpreters do not even agree that we should ask this question; they claim that Aristotle (...) does not give reasons for needing matter because matter is an everyday notion we need not motivate. I think that in Physics I Aristotle gives us good reasons – perhaps even compelling ones – for thinking that matter is necessary for any understanding of the natural world. We, as interpreters, can use these reasons to understand what matter is for Aristotle, making progress where scholars have offered many incompatible interpretations. The first chapter of the dissertation presents my basic account of why Aristotle needs matter and what it is. I argue that Aristotle makes matter central to his natural philosophy because it is needed in order to understand change. Specifically, in order for there to be change, there must be something whose very nature is to undergo change. This is what matter is for Aristotle: the thing whose very nature is to undergo change. Since matter is picked out by its role in change, the very same thing will be matter and other things, based on what other roles it has. Just as the same person can be a doctor and a builder, so the same person can be a doctor and matter. This chapter also highlights the strength of my account by arguing against a rival interpretation of Aristotle’s motivation for matter, according to which matter is needed so that something persists through change. The second chapter argues for my interpretation through a close reading of Aristotle’s Physics I. (shrink)

We tested two consequences of a currently influential theory based on the notion of seeing adaptations to climate change as local adjustments to deal with changing conditions within the constraints of the broader economic–social–political arrangements. The notion leaves no explicit role for the strength of personal beliefs in climate change and adaptive capacity. The consequences were: adaptive action to climate change taken by an individual who is exposed to and sensitive to climate change is not influenced to a considerable (...) degree by their strength of belief in climate change and adaptive action to climate change taken by an individual who is exposed to and sensitive to climate change is not influenced to a considerable degree by their strength of belief in an adaptive capacity. Data from a 2004 questionnaire of 1950 Swedish private individual forest owners, who were assumed exposed to and sensitive to climate change, were used. Strength of belief in climate change and adaptive capacities were found to be crucial factors for explaining observed differences in adaptation among Swedish forest owners. (shrink)

Self-control has been described as the ability to master motivation that is contrary to one’s better judgement; that is, an ability that prevents such motivation from resulting in behaviour that is contrary to one’s overall better judgement (Mele, Irrationality: An essay on Akrasia, self-deception and self-control, p. 54, 1987). Recent discussions in philosophy have centred on the question of whether synchronic self-control, in which one exercises self-control whilst one is currently experiencing opposing motivation, is actional or non-actional. The actional theorist (...) maintains that such exercises are actions, whilst the non-actional theorist claims that synchronic self-control consists in the having of unmotivated thoughts which occur at times when agents experience recalcitrant motivations and which serve to attenuate the strength of those motivations. In this paper I discuss a class of cases which has been largely ignored in these discussions, cases which I argue are common synchronic self-control problems, but in which a lack of motivation is the characteristic symptom. I argue that such cases present problems for actional accounts and add some support to the non-actional approach. (shrink)

Based on the author's popular motivational workshop of the same name, a guide shows readers how to develop the powerful will necessary to get ahead in life and business, how to become better team members, and how to overcome daily challenges. IP.

This article explores and defends the claim that addictive desires—for alcohol in particular—are partly explained by the motive of self-escape. We consider how this claim sits with the neurophysiological explanation of the strength of addictive desires in terms of the effect addictive substances have on the dopamine system. We argue that nothing in the neuroscientific framework rules out pluralism about the causes of addictive desire.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many employees with task-based jobs were forced to work from home, while others were furloughed or laid off. The current study aims to investigate how Norwegian and Danish newspapers represent employee motivation and job satisfaction of remote workers in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The study used a thematic analysis of five newspapers from Norway and Denmark with different daily distributions and political orientations. The findings suggest that the newspapers in the two countries represented the topic (...) of interest from different perspectives, and this led to the use of two motivation theories: the self-determination theory and Herzberg’s two-factor theory. The SDT helps us understand why some employees feel motivated and are more productive while working from home. The need for autonomy, competence, and connectedness is being satisfied for some employees but not for all, which may affect the strength of employees’ job motivation. Herzberg’s theory helps explain physical and psychological issues as dissatisfiers, as these issues are the consequence of working in a home-based office. Furthermore, a hybrid model seems to be an optimal solution for the future job market, where employees with task-based jobs can feel motivated and job satisfied while working either from home or from the workplace. Finally, it is important for employers to look after both the physical and the psychosocial conditions if hybrid solutions are going to replace the traditional workplace. (shrink)

Poverty alleviation consumption, which we call altruistic consumption, has become a new effective way to help vulnerable groups, but there are a few empirical researches on poverty alleviation through consumption. This article takes China's poverty alleviation actions as the research object, investigates and studies the relationship between altruistic consumption motivations and altruistic consumption behaviors that aim for vulnerable groups. It is found that altruistic consumption behavior is mainly affected by benefit group motivation, benefit morality motivation, benefit demander motivation, and benefit (...) supplier motivation. There is a correspondence between the four altruistic consumption motivations and the four altruistic consumption behaviors. The strength of altruistic consumption motivations changes with changes in altruistic buying behavior. The strength of benefit group motivation decreases with the increase in the times of altruistic purchases, while the strength of benefit morality motivation, benefit demander motivation, and benefit supplier motivation increase with the increase in the times of altruistic purchases. Among the four kinds of altruistic consumption motivations that affect the times of altruistic purchases, the benefit demander motivation has a relatively greater influence. The results of this study have important guiding significance for vulnerable groups to formulating targeted proactive marketing strategies, preventing the altruistic consumption relationship dissolution, and realizing sustainable altruistic consumption. (shrink)

The epistemic modal auxiliaries must and might are vehicles for expressing the force with which a proposition follows from some body of evidence or information. Standard approaches model these operators using quantificational modal logic, but probabilistic approaches are becoming increasingly influential. According to a traditional view, must is a maximally strong epistemic operator and might is a bare possibility one. A competing account—popular amongst proponents of a probabilisitic turn—says that, given a body of evidence, must \ entails that \\) is (...) high but non-maximal and might \ that \\) is significantly greater than 0. Drawing on several observations concerning the behavior of must, might and similar epistemic operators in evidential contexts, deductive inferences, downplaying and retractions scenarios, and expressions of epistemic tension, I argue that those two influential accounts have systematic descriptive shortcomings. To better make sense of their complex behavior, I propose instead a broadly Kratzerian account according to which must \ entails that \ = 1\) and might \ that \ > 0\), given a body of evidence and a set of normality assumptions about the world. From this perspective, must and might are vehicles for expressing a common mode of reasoning whereby we draw inferences from specific bits of evidence against a rich set of background assumptions—some of which we represent as defeasible—which capture our general expectations about the world. I will show that the predictions of this Kratzerian account can be substantially refined once it is combined with a specific yet independently motivated ‘grammatical’ approach to the computation of scalar implicatures. Finally, I discuss some implications of these results for more general discussions concerning the empirical and theoretical motivation to adopt a probabilisitic semantic framework. (shrink)

The overall aim of this article is to discuss how the MUSIC Model of Motivation can be applied to L2 instruction in a manner that is consistent with positive psychology, which emphasizes individuals’ strengths and the conditions in which they thrive. The article begins by describing the MUSIC model, which is a research-based framework that organizes strategies that instructors can use to motivate students to engage in learning. The MUSIC model can be used by L2 instructors to create learning experiences (...) that consider learners’ cognition, affect, needs, and desires in order to foster their motivation and engagement in L2 classes. The article also provides teaching strategies related to the MUSIC model and presents an assessment tool (the MUSIC Model of Academic Motivation Inventory) that can be used by L2 instructors to measure students’ MUSIC perceptions of their class. The assessment tool provides feedback to instructors that can be used to improve their instruction by incorporating strategies that allow their students to flourish. Examples of how the MUSIC Inventory can be used to assess L2 instruction are provided. Although researchers have examined the use of the MUSIC model in L2 classes, this research is underdeveloped, and many questions related to its use in L2 classes remain. The article concludes by proposing unanswered questions that could lead to more effective uses of the MUSIC model in L2 classes. (shrink)

Unamuno believes that longing for immortality is what motivates nearly all of human behavior. Unfortunately, in a world in which many people despair of ever achieving true personal immortality, we increasingly turn to what he calls mere “shadows of immortality” for comforting ideas about how our names, energy, or basic material substance will carry on in our absence. Unamuno advocates fighting against such despair, staying out of the shadows, and longing for personal immortality even when it seems impossible. Unamuno’s approach (...) to this issue resembles, in a few significant ways, Kierkegaard’s struggle for the cultivation of subjective selfhood. At the same time, it also runs afoul of Nietzsche’s derisive claims about immortality-seekers. Whereas Nietzsche sees longing for immortality as a sign of being too weak to make the most of mortal life, the more Kierkegaardian Unamuno counters that it is a sign of strong appreciation for life to demand, without surrender, that there be more of it. Given the proper understanding of Nietzsche’s claims about the eternal recurrence, I think he and Unamuno might not be quite as far apart as it initially seems. However, exploring the latter’s critique of the former suggests an intriguing way of seeing the contemporary analytic debate about the desirability of immortality. Building on Unamuno’s position, one could argue that pessimism about the value of immortality is actually indicative of a flawed character and an impoverished relationship with life. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the topic of “soft skills” as an intrinsic part of successful leadership. The first part of the paper presents a literature review about the shift in perspective in recent years on what matters in leadership, and the significant changes this prompted in some areas of education and corporate recruitment. In the second part, the findings of a year round study conducted among Los Angeles based workforce members in an MBA program are presented. By utilizing a multi-method (...) approach, consisting of a survey model with three open ended, interview style questions, and data analysis in phenomenological trend, a number of interesting findings emerged, supporting the literature reviewed, that soft leadership skills, such as self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skills, are steadily on the rise, and that greater attention should be apportioned to strengthen these skills in future leaders. (shrink)