A realist theory of truth for a class of sentences holds that there are entities in virtue of which these sentences are true or false. We call such entities ‘truthmakers’ and contend that those for a wide range of sentences about the real world are moments (dependent particulars). Since moments are unfamiliar, we provide a definition and a brief philosophical history, anchoring them in our ontology by showing that they are objects of perception. The core of our theory is the (...) account of truthmaking for atomic sentences, in which we expose a pervasive ‘dogma of logical form’, which says that atomic sentences cannot have more than one truthmaker. In contrast to this, we uphold the mutual independence of logical and ontological complexity, and the authors outline formal principles of truthmaking taking account of both kinds of complexity. (shrink)

Husserl seems to have devoted roughly equal amounts of energy and pages to the description of perception, judgement, and imagination. By “description,” he meant the analysis of the traits and components of mental states or acts and their objects. As his views changed over the years about the nature of intentionality and philosophy, the descriptive psychology of the Logical Investigations (1900/01) gave way to descriptive programmes in which the objects of perception and of judgement were conceived of in terms of (...) a new, analytic framework; in particular Husserl lost interest in describing the things and processes in the real world that are the objects of perception and judgement and so too in describing their relations to these acts. His new analytic framework, particularly as it applies to perception, has been thoroughly expounded and discussed in the literature. My aim here is to expound Husserl's first descriptions of perception within the framework of the Investigations and to incorporate as far as possible his later descriptive results to the extent that these are separable from his later turn to idealism. (shrink)

Kevin Mulligan | : La philosophie des valeurs cognitives, et des vertus et des vices intellectuels, prête peu d’attention au phénomène de la liberté intérieure et de son rapport à la sottise. On doit au poète et penseur polonais, Czesław Miłosz, une étude classique de ce rapport, La pensée captive (1953), examinée ici. Il est aussi question ici de l’apport d’une autre analyse de Miłosz au sujet du coeur de Julien Sorel et du ressentiment à la philosophie de (...) la sottise. | : The philosophy of cognitive values and of intellectual vices and virtues pays little attention to the phenomenon of inner freedom and its relation to foolishness. We owe to the Polish poet and philosopher, Czesław Miłosz, a classic study of this relation, The Captive Mind (1953). I examine the contribution of this study and of an earlier and little known analysis by Miłosz of the heart of Julien Sorel and resentment to the philosophy of foolishness. (shrink)

There are at least three well-known accounts of value and evaluations which assign a central role to emotions. There is first of all the emotivist view, according to which evaluations express or manifest emotional states or attitudes but have no truth values. Second is the dispositionalist view, according to which to possess a value or axiological property is to be capable of provoking or to be likely to provoke emotional responses in subjects characterised in certain ways. Third, there is an (...) epistemology of values that is sometimes invoked by the naïve realist. If the naïve realist is one for whom evaluations are made true by the possession by objects of monadic, mind-independent axiological properties, then one natural question is: What sort of cognitive access do we have to such properties? These value properties, the realist may say, are properties we come to know of by virtue of our emotions. Emotions, he may say, present value properties to us. One variant of this view is the claim that values are the "formal objects" of emotions. Closely related to these claims is the view that our emotions are appropriate to value properties, or not. Indignation and injustice, it is sometimes said, are related in one or more of these three ways. (shrink)

‘What is characteristic of every mental activity’, according to Brentano, is ‘the reference to something as an object. In this respect every mental activity seems to be something relational.’ But what sort of a relation, if any, is our cognitive access to the world? This question – which we shall call Brentano’s question – throws a new light on many of the traditional problems of epistemology. The paper defends a view of perceptual acts as real relations of a subject to (...) an object. To make this view coherent, a theory of different types of relations is developed, resting on ideas on formal ontology put forward by Husserl in his Logical Investigations and on the theory of relations sketched in Smith's "Acta cum fundamentis in re". The theory is applied to the notion of a Cambridge change, which proves to have an unforeseen relevance to our understanding of perception. (shrink)

This is a review article on Franz Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology published in 1982. We provide a detailed exposition of Brentano’s work on this topic, focusing on the unity of consciousness, the modes of connection and the types of part, including separable parts, distinctive parts, logical parts and what Brentano calls modificational quasi-parts. We also deal with Brentano’s account of the objects of sensation and the experience of time.

The three young philosophers Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith have become well-known in the last few years especially in German-speaking analytical philosophy and phenomenology circles. This is on the one hand as a result of their historical and systematic philosophical work; but it is also because of the provocative way in which they represent their philosophy. Because they often appear in threes, they have become known as the "gang of three" or "three musketeers" or even – (...) and this in an admiring sense – "mafiosi" (Rescher). They are known primarily for the small workshops they have been organizing in uncomplicated Anglo-Saxon manner all over Europe. Their goal has been to show that analytic philosophy as it has been pursued up to now is in need of reform and also that the history of scientific philosophizing is not identical to the history of Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy. Above all, they have tried to make more well known the Austrian tradition of scientific philosophy, and they can be given credit for having done much to promote the current interest in this tradition, which means: the history of Austrian philosophy of the 19th and early 20th centuries and its historical context in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. (shrink)

Les trois conférences qui suivent continuent l’exploration et l’évaluation des rapports complexes entre les descriptions de l’esprit et du langage données par Wittgenstein et celles données par ses prédécesseurs austro-allemands, les héritiers de Brentano et de Bolzano. La première considère le rapport entre quelques distinctions et thèses qui se trouvent dans le Tractatus et quelques distinctions et thèses similaires esquissées auparavant par le phénoménologue réaliste Max Scheler. La deuxième conférence est consacrée à l’examen des descriptions des émotions, du vouloir dire, (...) du vouloir, du vouloir faire et du souvenir données par Wittgenstein et par les premiers phénoménologues — des descriptions dont les sources sont explicitées dans la première conférence. Enfin, dans la troisième conférence, la description du langage et la philosophie de la signification dans la philosophie austro-allemande sont analysées.The three lectures which follow continue the exploration and evaluation of the complex relations between the descriptions of language and the mind given by Wittgenstein and those given by his Austro-German predecessors, the heirs of Bolzano and Brentano. The first lecture considers the relation between some distinctions and theses to be found in the Tractatus and similar distinctions and theses set out earlier by the realist phenomenologist Max Scheler. The second lecture is devoted to an examination of the descriptions of emotions, meaning something, willing, intending and remembering given by Wittgenstein and the first phenomenologists ; the descriptions discussed in this lecture build on ideas set out in the first lecture. The third and last lecture analyses the description of language and the philosophy of meaning in Austro-German philosophy. (shrink)

What is the relation between the intentionality of states and attitudes which can miss their mark, such as belief and desire, and the intentionality of acts, states and attitudes which cannot miss their mark, such as the different types of knowledge and simple seeing? Two theories of the first type of intentionality, the theory of correctness conditions and the theory of satisfaction conditions, are compared. It is argued that knowledge always involves knowledge of formal objects such as facts and values, (...) that emotions are reactions to (apparently) known values and that beliefs are reactions to known or apparently known facts or to the objects of relational states. (shrink)

Even the most cursory reader of Husserl’s writings must be struck by the frequent references to essences (“Wesen”, “Essenzen”), Ideas (“Idee”), kinds, natures, types and species and to necessities, possibilities, impossi- bilities, necessary possibilities, essential necessities and essential laws. What does Husserl have in mind in talking of essences and modalities? What did he take the relation between essentiality and modality to be? In the absence of answers to these questions it is not clear that a reader of Husserl can (...) be said to understand him. (shrink)

The paper seeks to develop an account of indexical phenomena based on the highly general theory of structure and dependence set forth by Husserl in his Logical Investigations. Husserl here defends an Aristotelian theory of meaning, viewing meanings as species or universals having as their instances certain sorts of concrete meaning acts. Indexical phenomena are seen to involve the combination of such acts of meaning with acts of perception, a thesis here developed in some detail and contrasted with accounts of (...) indexicals suggested by Frege, Wittgenstein and by the later Husserl himself in his Ideas I. Implications are drawn also for our understanding of the categorial grammar sketched by Husserl in his 4th Logical Investigation, as also for our understanding of the nature of proper names and other candidate indexical expressions. (shrink)

Batı’da teorik felsefe; Analitik Felsefe (AF), Kıta Felsefesi (KF) ve Felsefe Tarihi (FT) olmak üzere üçe ayrılır. Fakat üçünde de işler yolunda değildir. AF, felsefenin bir bilim olabileceği iddiasından kuşku duyduğu için gerçek dünyayla ilgilenmiyorken başından beri uygun bir teorik yöntem izlemeyen Kıta Felsefesinin uygulanışı, belirli politik ve etik yargılara hizmet edecek şekilde özelleştirilmiştir. FT çalışmalarının gidişatı ise eldeki eserin nesnel değerinden daha çok ilgili filozofun ait olduğu ulus veya kültüre göre bölgesel bir temelde gelişmiştir. Felsefede ilerleme sağlanacaksa bu ancak (...) bahsi geçen tuzaklardan kaçınılarak gerçekleşebilir. (shrink)

Consider "Sam is sad" and "Sam exemplifies the property of being sad". The second sentence mentions a property and predicates the relation of exemplification. It belongs to a large class of sentences which mention such formal objects as propositions, states of affairs, facts, concepts and sets and predicate formal properties such as the truth of propositions, the obtaining of states of affairs and relations such as falling under concepts and being members of sets. The first sentence belongs to a distinct (...) class of sentences in which only non-formal objects are mentioned and only non-formal properties and relations are predicated. We can, it seems, infer validly from the first sentence to the second. They are also equivalent. And Sam exemplifies the property of sadness because Sam is sad. What is the relation between inference, equivalence and explanation in the case of our two sentences and in analogous cases? What right have we to assume that there are formal objects? (shrink)

Philosophy in the West divides into three parts: Analytic Philosophy (AP), Continental Philosophy (CP), and History of Philosophy (HP). But all three parts are in a bad way. AP is sceptical about the claim that philosophy can be a science, and hence is uninterested in the real world. CP is never pursued in a properly theoretical way, and its practice is tailor-made for particular political and ethical conclusions. HP is mostly developed on a regionalist basis: what is studied is determined (...) by the nation or culture to which a philosopher belongs, rather than by the objective value of that philosopher’s work. Progress in philosophy can only be attained by avoiding these pitfalls. (shrink)

A definition of emotion common to the affective sciences is an urgent desideratum. Lack of such a definition is a constant source of numerous misunderstandings and a series of mostly fruitless debates. There is little hope that there ever will be agreement on a common definition of emotion, given the sacred traditions of the disciplines involved and the egos of the scholars working in these disciplines. Our aim here is more modest. We propose a list of elements for a working (...) definition of emotion and discuss the justification for the inclusion of elements from our respective perspectives (philosophy and psychology). This working partial definition may at least serve as a litmus test to examine theories of emotion, old and new, across disciplinary boundaries. (shrink)

La philosophie autrichienne, depuis Bolzano jusqu’à Musil et Wittgenstein en passant par Mach et la tradition brentanienne, est marquée par une obsession singulière : la clarté et la précision. Quelques traits de cette obsession, en particulier la critique sévère des différentes formes de bavardage philosophique, sont décrits et situés par rapport à la culture autrichienne en général. Mais chaque vertu a son vice, et les vertus cognitives de la pensée autrichienne n’échappent pas à la règle. Quatre exemples de la pathologie (...) de la précision sont analysés : Freud, Ehrenfels, Weininger et le dernier Husserl .Austrian philosophy from Bolzano, Mach and the Brentanian tradition to Musil and Wittgenstein is characterised by an obsession : clarity and exactness. Some features of this obsession, in particular the harsh criticisms of different types of philosophical blethering, are described, as is their place within Austrian culture. Each virtue has its vice and the cognitive virtues of Austrian thought are no exception. Four examples of the pathology of exactness are analysed : Freud, Ehrenfels, Weininger and the later Husserl. (shrink)

« Husserl s’est complètement disloqué... il hésite et raconte des banalités à faire pitié... il commence à pressentir que plus personne ne le suit — il pense naturellement que c’est trop difficile — naturellement, une mathématique de l’éthique, personne n’y comprend rien...et aujourd’hui, à Berlin, ça veut sauver le monde... »(Heidegger, 1923 — souligné par moi ; Heidegger & Jaspers 1990, 43]) « Notre propre agir tout comme celui de nos congénères s’accompagne de nos jugements permanents sur...

Suppose that realism about values is true, that there are objects and states of affairs which are intrinsically valuable, that some objects and states of affairs are intrinsically more valuable than others and that some objects and states of affairs are intrinsically valuable for Sam, and others for Maria.

We conclude that the commentators seem to fundamentally agree on the substance of our proposal of a partial real definition of emotion as a dynamic episode which has to fulfill a certain number of conditions to count as a member of the class. We raise the issue of prescriptive functions of a definition, suggesting parallels to biomedical ontologies. We also clarify the issues of linguistic and cultural relativity and of differences in the nature of individual emotions.

Kevin Mulligan; VI*—Justification, Rule-breaking and the Mind1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 99, Issue 1, 1 June 1999, Pages 123–140, https:/.

Predication and the problems of universals and individuation have preoccupied philosophers from Plato (if not before) to the present. Concerns about relations and the special problems posed by relational predication came later - along with the explicit recognition of facts as purported entities that make a judgment true, rather than false, and resultant questions about the structure of such grounds of truth. The essays in the volume explore aspects of the history of the classic issues raised as well as alternative (...) attempts to deal with such issues. (shrink)

The answer I shall sketch is not mine. Nor, as far as I can tell, is it an answer to be found in the voluminous literature inspired by Kripke’s work. Many of the elements of the answer are to be found in the writings of Wittgenstein and his Austro-German predecessors, Martinak, Husserl, Marty, Landgrebe and Bühler. Within this Austro-German tradition we may distinguish between a strand which is Platonist and anti-naturalist and a strand which is nominalist and naturalist. Thus Husserl’s (...) account of what he calls “directly referring” uses of singular terms invokes senses or individual concepts, albeit simple, not descriptive senses. But the account of reference fixing and reference given by Landgrebe, Bühler and Wittgenstein rejects senses.1 I confine further reference to these writers to footnotes since my aim here is to develop and unify some of their suggestions, in particular by comparing them with more recent work (cf. Mulligan 1997). (shrink)

Ernst Mach's atomistic theory of sensation faces problems in doing justice to our ability to perceive and remember complex phenomena such as melodies and shapes. Christian von Ehrenfels attempted to solve these problems with his theory of "Gestalt qualities", which he sees as entities depending one-sidedly on the corresponding simple objects of sensation. We explore the theory of dependence relations advanced by Ehrenfels and show how it relates to the views on the objects of perception advanced by Husserl and by (...) the Gestalt psychologists. (shrink)

Many of the most important questions about primitive certainty have to do with the distinction between primitive certainty as a practical attitude or disposition and primitive certainty as a psychological attitude and with the distinction between these and primitive, objective certainty.

Born 80 years ago, Continental Philosophy is on its last legs. Its extraordinary career has been helped along by an almost total absence of interest on the part of analytic or other exact philosophers in what the Australian philosopher David Stove calls "the nosology of philosophy" 1, the exploration of the manifold forms taken by bad philosophy. Stove points out that such an enterprise involves doing history. A nosology of Continental Philosophy is, at least in the first instance, inseparable from (...) the history of this strand in twentieth century philosophy, a history which would make clear the relations, philosophical and historical, between it and exact philosophy. Rorty is quite right to point to the absence of such a historical perspective. (shrink)

This paper examines the pretence theories of irony of Jancke (1929) and Currie (2007) and argues for a pretence theory according to which the evaluations of the ironist are more important than his emotions, negative and positive, and bear principally on cognitive values. The formal object of irony is foolishness and not any ethical, political or aesthetic disvalue. I suggest that the view of irony outlined resembles in many respects the conception of irony to be found in the writings of (...) Robert Musil. (shrink)

Derrida uses ideas and claims of Husserl to formulate his philosophy of deconstruction. I show that he provides a garbled account of Husserl and suggest that his misunderstandings explain many features of the philosophy of deconstruction.