Selon Kirk Lougheed, favoriser une version objective de l’argument du sens de la vie établit une sorte d’antithéisme, c’est-à-dire une perspective qui maintient que l’existence d’un Dieu théiste aggraverait les choses et qu’il est donc plus rationnel de préférer que Dieu n’existe pas. Cette version objective est présentée par Lougheed comme une amélioration par rapport à ma version subjective de l’argument du sens de la vie. Je soutiens que la version de Lougheed ne réussit pas mieux que la version subjective (...) que j’ai développée, puis rejetée. (shrink)

Inferences like these are known as extrapolations.

In this paper, we explore whether masked emotional faces can elicit changes in physiology without awareness. We also explore whether emotional miss-discrimination involves the physiological correla...

In a recent paper, Guy Kahane asks whether God’s existence is something we should want to be true. Expanding on some cryptic remarks from Thomas Nagel, Kahane’s informative and wide-ranging piece eventually addresses whether personal anti-theism is justified, where personal anti-theism is the view that God’s existence would make things worse overall for oneself. In what follows, I develop, defend, but ultimately reject the Meaningful Life Argument, according to which if God’s existence precludes the realization of certain goods that seem (...) to an agent to constitute a meaningful life, it is rational for an agent both to believe that personal anti-theism is true and to prefer that God not exist. (shrink)

Disputes between advocates of Bayesians and more orthodox approaches to statistical inference presuppose that Bayesians must regard must regard stopping rules, which play an important role in orthodox statistical methods, as evidentially irrelevant.In this essay, I show that this is not the case and that the stopping rule is evidentially relevant given some Bayesian confirmation measures that have been seriously proposed. However, I show that accepting a confirmation measure of this sort comes at the cost of rejecting two useful ancillaryBayesian (...) principles. (shrink)

Pro-theism is the view that God’s existence would be good in that God’s existence increases the value of a world. Anti-theism is the view that God’s existence would decrease the value of a world. We develop and defend the morally good agent argument for pro-theism. The basic idea is that morally good agents tend to add value to states of affairs, and God, moral agent par excellence is no exception. Thus, we argue that the existence of God would be, on (...) balance, a good thing and therefore something that one can rationally desire to be true. (shrink)

Previous research has proposed the exploratory hypotheses that hostility could differ from anger in the sense that it involves higher possibility for inflicting physical harm while anger could invo...

The recently proposed ``infinite decision puzzle'' is based on incorrect mathematics.

Andrew Shephardson contends in Who’s Afraid of the Unmoved Mover that the combined postmodern objections of Carl A. Raschke, James K. A. Smith, and me, to natural theology, fail. Here I focus only on the issue of idolatry and natural theology, as one way of demonstrating a fundamental inadequacy characteristic of Shephardson’s rebuttal of postmodern challenges to evangelical appropriations of natural theology. I argue that contrary to Shephardson’s contention, Acts 17 does not support evangelical appropriations of natural theology, but operates (...) with a view of reason consistent with my postmodern one and opens postmodern possibilities for understanding natural revelation. (shrink)

In a recent article, Elliot Sober responds to challenges to a counter-example that he posed some years earlier to the Principle of the Common Cause (PCC). I agree that Sober has indeed produced a genuine counter-example to the PCC, but argue against the methodological moral that Sober wishes to draw from it. Contrary to Sober, I argue that the possibility of exceptions to the PCC does not undermine its status as a central assumption for methods that endeavor to draw causal (...) conclusions from statistical data. 1 The PCC and the counter-example 2 Making non-stationary time series stand still 3 Sober's alternative. (shrink)

The attempt to relate distinctions in perceptual theory to different physiological systems leads to numerous exceptions and inconsistencies. A more promising approach to the reconciliation of constructivist theory and direct perception is to recognize that perception does involve inference, as the constructivists insist, but that inference is a process in logic that does not require unconscious reasoning and need be no more thought-like than resonance.

This article confronts the problems of establishing normative restrictive claims for delegitimizing conduct and attitudes of cultural appropriation. Using C. Thi Nguyen’s and Matthew Strhol’s intimacy account (IA) as a background, I offer an alternative of cultural adoption relying upon Alain Locke’s value theory and philosophical pluralism. The phenomenon of cultural adoption I propose develops some insights from Nguyen’s and Strohl’s IA, while critiquing their framework’s perceived limitations. By adding loyalty and intensity to the prerogatives of intimacy, the hope is (...) that a more nuanced approach to the ethical concerns of cultural adoption will be achieved. My contention is that Locke’s notions of a racial sense or kinship feeling provides stronger grounds for establishing an ethics of the passerby or what I will call non-intimate encounters. Next, I will argue that the interpersonal relations of groups cannot be interpreted as simple, but only as complex wholes. Instead of monoliths and exclusive binaries, we have to recognize variation within groups and learn to think in what Albert Murray calls “mulatto,” or a culture of novel hybrids. In the final section, I argue that Locke’s philosophy, broadly construed, operates as a contraceptive knowledge against the growing imperial apathy of populists and absolutists. We should work to abandon forms of political and epistemological violence by rejecting these forms of cultural abuse. It is my grand contention that human groups express in their differences a uniqueness that makes us distrust or admire and like each other. (shrink)

The following paper is an exposition and analysis of Deleuze and Guattari's (hereafter called D&G) vision for philosophy. In sections I and II I discuss two defining features of this vision: respectively, the philosopher as creator and the concept as the philosopher's creation. In the final section I argue that D&G's vision is supported by a normative principle that is itself not intuitively obvious. I conclude that while D&G's vision for philosophy charts out a brave space for philosophy, one may (...) adopt the spirit of their vision without embracing their normative principle. (shrink)

While still under the shadow of decades of trauma, a recontexualized conversation about Anabaptist theology and identity emerges in this volume that is ecumenically engaged, philosophically astute, psychologically attuned, and resolutely vulnerable. The volume offers a Trinitarian and Christological framework that holds together the importance of Scripture, tradition, and the lived experience of the Christian community, as the contributors examine a wide variety of issues such as Mennonite feminism, Anabaptist queer theology, and Mennonite theological methods. These essays interrogate the operations (...) of power, violence, exclusion, and privilege in methodology in this changed context, offering self-critical constructive alternatives for articulating Anabaptist theology and identity. (shrink)

For many species that reproduce sexually, how sex is expressed at different points across lifespan is highly contingent and dependent on various environmental factors. For example, in many species of fish, environmental cues can trigger a natural process of sex transition where a female transitions to male. For many species of turtle, incubation temperature influences the likelihood that turtle eggs will hatch males or females. What is the case for Homo sapiens? Is human sex expression influenced by contingent environmental factors (...) like we see in fish and turtles, with whom we share common ancestry and DNA? Our paper explores the current biological science of sex determination and how it applies to philosophical and theological accounts of the human person. We argue that while human sex determination is not susceptible to environmental cues to the same degree we see in other species, there is sufficient variability among the pathways of human sex development to complicate simplistic biological categories of male and female. (shrink)

According to scientific realists, the predictive success of mature theories provides a strong epistemic basis for thinking that such theories are approximately true. However, we know that many theories once regarded as well-confirmed and predictively successful were eventually replaced with successor theories, and some claim this undermines the epistemic confidence we should have in the approximate truth of current science. Selective scientific realists in turn argue that if one can show that the predictive success of some rejected theory T is (...) a function of theoretical claims consistent with current science, then T’s failure doesn’t undermine the claim that current successful theories are approximately true. As such, Selective Scientific Realism (SSR) can be tested through historical examples. Showing that the predictive success of a failed theory is the result of theoretical features later rejected provides a counterexample to SSR. Conversely, SSR is supported if its explanation of the predictive success of failed theories--namely, that the factors which lead to predictive success in the failed theory survive in the successor theory--is able to handle a wide array of historical cases. (shrink)

Otto Neugebauer’s early academic career was marked by a series of transitions. His interests shifted from physics to mathematics, and finally to the history of ancient mathematics and exact sciences. Yet even from his early years in Graz, Neugebauer was strongly attracted to the mathematical culture of Göttingen. When he arrived there in 1922, he quickly established a strong personal friendship with Richard Courant, the newly appointed Director of the Mathematics Institute. Neugebauer and Courant worked together closely up until 1933, (...) when the Nazi government decimated the Göttingen scientific community. In this essay, Neugebauer’s historical work and his vision for a new approach to the study of the exact sciences are viewed through the prism of these events. By so doing, one can easily appreciate how Neugebauer’s scholarship reflects the ideals he and Courant shared as leading representatives of the Göttingen mathematical tradition. (shrink)

No single theory so far proposed gives a wholly satisfactory account of the origin and maintenance of bird-song dialects. This failure is the consequence of a weak comparative literature that precludes careful comparisons among species or studies, and of the complexity of the issues involved. Complexity arises because dialects seem to bear upon a wide range of features in the life history of bird species. We give an account of the principal issues in bird-song dialects: evolution of vocal learning, experimental (...) findings on song ontogeny, dialect descriptions, female and male reactions to differences in dialect, and population genetics and dispersal.We present a synthetic theory of the origin and maintenance of song dialects, one that accommodates most of the different systems reported in the literature. The few data available suggest that large, regional dialect populations are genetically differentiated; this pattern is correlated with reduced dispersal between dialects, assortative mating by females, and male-male exclusion. At the same time, “subdialects” may be formed within regional dialects. Subdialect clusters are usually small and may represent vocal mimicry among a few adjacent territorial males. The relative importance of genetic and social adaptation may contribute to the emergence of subdialects; their distinctiveness may be correlated with the degree of polygyny, for example. Thus, subdialect formation is linked to one theory of the evolution of repertoire size, but data are too fragmentary to examine this idea critically. (shrink)

In a recent essay, John Norton proposes a material theory of induction, according to which all justification for inductive inference ultimately stems from the particular facts of the case at hand. Despite being sympathetic to the pluralistic spirit of this proposal, I argue that central controversies among leading theories of inductive inference turn not on material facts but upon normative judgments regarding the proper standards and aims of induction. Thus, a pluralistic approach to induction can be successfully developed only given (...) an explanation of how the choice of such aims and standards depends on features of particular cases. (shrink)

The faithfulness condition (FC) is a useful principle for inferring causal structure from statistical data. The usual motivation for the FC appeals to theorems showing that exceptions to it have probability zero, provided that some apparently reasonable assumptions obtain. However, some have objected that, the theorems notwithstanding, exceptions to the FC are probable in commonly occurring circumstances. I argue that exceptions to the FC are probable in the circumstances specified by this objection only given the presence of a condition that (...) I label homogeneity, and furthermore that this condition typically does not obtain in the FC’s intended domain of application. (shrink)

The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described as conservative change from one probabilistic belief or credence function to another in response to newinformation. Roughly: ‘Hold fixed any credences that are not directly affected by the learning experience.’ This is precisely articulated for the case when we learn that some proposition that we had previously entertained is indeed true (the rule of conditionalisation). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or (...) concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists Karni and Vierø (2013, 2015) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting. (shrink)

It is puzzling that Alain Locke and Ernst Cassirer’s philosophies of culture have been little explored. It is my contention that Locke and Cassirer posit a functional logic of value (among other ideas). Both establish the importance of functionality for developing a pluralist understanding of cultural value while also critiquing a lack of social belonging and retreat into mythic consciousness. First, I will present an overview of Locke and Cassirer’s functional logic of value, speculating that the two met at the (...) University of Berlin. Perhaps together they embraced freeing value from validity and vice versa, in the manner that Locke eloquently put it: Neither is the valuable necessarily valid, nor is the valid necessarily valuable. Although we have no evidence of such an encounter, it is difficult to believe that the two did not cross paths. Next, I will explore how both develop pluralist philosophies of culture. Notably, how race consciousness and kinship feelings-judgments add to our understanding and formation of the symbolic forms. In the final section, I will apply Locke and Cassirer’s functional axiologies to address what I call the darker political myths within the United States’ cultural context. Locke and Cassirer’s philosophies of functional value work to resist attempts to make one’s values into absolute or hegemonic ones. Overcoming closed and authoritative forms of mythic consciousness is a worthy endeavor given their current seductiveness and propensity to destroy rather than create cultural values. (shrink)

The main aim of this book is to introduce the topic of limited awareness, and changes in awareness, to those interested in the philosophy of decision-making and uncertain reasoning.

This paper examines an important issue facing academia-pay inversion. It discusses how inversion is accompanied by ethical issues including secrecy, moral dilemmas for faculty, honesty, and keeping promises. It then examines this issue from five ethical viewpoints: a legalistic perspective, ethical egoism, utilitarianism, distributive justice, and Kants deontological approach. As part of the discussion, the effect of the moral philosophy on the universitys corporate culture is examined, with attention given to morale and productivity. Finally, alternatives to pay inversion that universities (...) may want to consider are discussed. (shrink)

Critics of the ideal of value‐free science often assume that they must reject the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values. I argue that this assumption is mistaken and that the distinction can be used to clarify and defend the argument from inductive risk, which challenges the value‐free ideal. I develop the idea that the characteristic feature of epistemic values is that they promote, either intrinsically or extrinsically, the attainment of truths. This proposal is shown to answer common objections to the (...) distinction and provide a principled basis for separating legitimate from illegitimate influences of nonepistemic values in scientific inference. *Received June 2009; revised September 2009. †To contact the author, please write to: 503 S. Kedzie Hall, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824‐1032; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

A concept of diversity is an understanding of what makes a group diverse that may be applicable in a variety of contexts. We distinguish three diversity concepts, show that each can be found in discussions of diversity in science, and explain how they tend to be associated with distinct epistemic and ethical rationales. Yet philosophical literature on diversity among scientists has given little attention to distinct concepts of diversity. This is significant because the unappreciated existence of multiple diversity concepts can (...) generate unclarity about the meaning of “diversity,” lead to problematic inferences from empirical research, and obscure complex ethical-epistemic questions about how to define diversity in specific cases. We illustrate some ethical-epistemic implications of our proposal by reference to an example of deliberative mini-publics on human tissue biobanking. (shrink)

Some claim that cognitive science of religion either completely “explains religion away,” or at the very least calls the epistemic status of religious belief into question. Others claim that religious beliefs are the cognitive outputs of systems that seem highly reliable in other contexts, and thus CSR provides positive epistemic support for religious belief. I argue that CSR does not provide evidence for atheism, but if one is an atheist, CSR lends “intellectual aid and comfort,” CSR does not provide evidence (...) for theism, but if one is a theist, CSR provides qualified support for Reformed Epistemology. (shrink)

Moral gilt gemeinhin als ein System prosozialer Einstellungen, Werte und Normen. Wer moralisch handelt, der entscheidet darüber, ob er geltenden Werten gemäß leben und wie weit er sich herrschenden Normen anpassen oder ihnen zuwider handeln will. Damit ein Akteur bestimmte moralische Handlungen vollzieht, muss eine gegebene Moral als Ganze überzeugen. Dies gelingt ihr, wenn sie es schafft, Freiheit und Heteronomie in einer Balance zu halten. Es gibt jedoch moralimmanente Schwierigkeiten, die die Reichweite der Moral begrenzen: Wann ist es legitim, einen (...) anderen moralisch zu sanktionieren? Gelten moralische Normen unbedingt und muss ich mich allen herrschenden Werten anpassen? Können Tugenden und andere prosoziale Einstellungen Normen und Sanktionen ersetzen? Und schließlich: Welche Moral ist eigentlich die beste Moral? (shrink)

Preview: /Review: Tommy Shelby and Brandon M. Terry, eds. To Shape a New World: Essays on the Political Philosophy of Martin Luther King, Jr., 463 pages./ To mark the fiftieth anniversary of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination, Harvard professors Tommie Shelby and Brandon M. Terry have produced a masterful reappraisal of King’s legacy, specifically as a political philosopher. More importantly, the book can be read as a mirror through which we can see King’s struggles and resistance, that led him down (...) a “dangerous road,” having strong parallels with the dangerous road we face with current political and social upheavals. Negative reactions against globalization have heightened the sentiments of fear, paranoia, and partisanship. Racial tensions are reaching a boiling-point in the U.S. after the 2017 Charlottesville protests and a pattern of discrimination and senseless killings from the privileged campus of Yale to the country roads of Minnesota or Georgia, by law enforcement and civilians alike. One of the tendencies growing in this distressing hour of world history entails the rise of personality and celebrity cults forming around “strong” leaders. A mobocracy mentality is forming the way we think about politicians, judges, or even health specialists like chief U.S. immunologist Anthony Fauci. Celebrity fetishizing has infected Americans’ sense of reality, including the ways in which politics are practiced and interpreted. Engulfed in the quagmires of identity politics, our attempts to legitimate who has the right to fight for social justice have been paralyzed by these performative gestures of social change and action. It could be argued that the aesthetic presentation and the skills of rebranding have, in a certain sense, replaced the philosophical and moral concerns explored in the sections on “Traditions,” “Ideals,” “Justice,” and “Conscience,” respectively. What King teaches us philosophically has, more often than not, been glossed over by a superficial publicity or aesthetics of infotainment destined for the tabloids. For this reason, King’s iconic image is both a blessing and curse. In order to appreciate the full thrust of King’s thinking, we have to go deeper morally and philosophically to supplement our aesthetic religious values and interests, and that is what these fifteen essays deliver. (shrink)

Cultural identities and rituals are intersecting through increasingly overlapping social worlds. Whether one chooses to join in this mixing and to what degree, that is the question. Appropriationists and assimilationists assume a logic of domination that aims to justify forms of social entitlement, claiming exclusive possession or ownership of cultural heritages. This article argues that cultural adoption is a stronger frame for understanding how circulation of rituals and practices get distributed under “liquid,” orphan-like conditions. By accepting that no stable centers (...) or margins of culture can be securely ascertained, new semiotics of integral fakes gain cultural efficacy. Integral fakes manifest semblances and likenesses that can be adopted as one’s own, intensifying our experience of cultural freedom by expanding our sense of the familiar into unfamiliar cultural scales. Through a semiotics of cultural adoption, we hope to be attuned to an openness and hospitality that romanticized ideologies of culture suppress. (shrink)