The North American Nietzsche Society held the first of its stand-alone conferences at Hunter College’s Roosevelt House in New York City on October 14–17, 2016. The three-day event featured invited keynotes by Bernard Reginster, Christopher Janaway, and Beatrix Himmelmann. In addition, the program committee selected seven blind-reviewed abstracts from a pool of over sixty submissions. The conference concluded with a group discussion on Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy, featuring invited presentations by Paul Loeb, Jacqueline Scott, and Daniel Conway....

We examined the associations between the characteristics of Instagram users and the features of their photographs. Narcissism, life satisfaction, and loneliness were employed for user variables and the features at high- and low-levels were employed to analyze the Instagram photographs. An online survey was conducted with 179 university students, and their Instagram photographs, 25,394 in total, were collected and analyzed. High-level features were extracted using Computer Vision and Emotion Application Programming Interfaces in Microsoft Azure Cognitive Services, and low-level features were (...) extracted utilizing the program written by the authors. The results of correlation analysis indicate that narcissism, life satisfaction, and loneliness were significantly associated with a part of photograph features at high- and low-levels. The results of the predictive analysis suggest that narcissism, loneliness in total, and social loneliness could be predicted with acceptable accuracy from Instagram photograph features, while characteristics such as life satisfaction, family loneliness, and romantic loneliness could not be predicted. Implications of this research and suggestions for further research were presented. (shrink)

Summary Justifications of the humanities often employ a mythos that exceeds their historical dispositions and reach. This applies to justifications that appeal to an ?idea? of the humanities grounded in the cultivation of reason for its own sake. But the same problem affects more recent accounts that seek to shatter this idea by admitting an ?event? capable of dissolving and refounding the humanities in ?being?. In offering a sketch of the emergence of the modern humanities from early modern humanism, the (...) paper argues that these twin philosophical justifications fail to capture both the array of intellectual arts that have informed the humanities disciplines and the variety of uses to which these arts have been put. Nonetheless, the two philosophical constructions have had a concrete impact on the disposition of the modern humanities, seen in the respective structuralist and poststructuralist reconfigurations of the disciplines that began to take place under the banner of ?theory? during the 1960s. In discussing the effects of theory on the humanities in Australia, the paper focuses on the unforeseeable consequences of attempts to provide arts-based disciplines with a foundation either in cognitive structures or in an ?event? that shatters them. (shrink)

This article is a response to Fredric Jameson's criticisms of the author's 'The History of Theory'. For Jameson's article, 'How Not to Historicise Theory', see Critical Inquiry, 34, Spring 2008. The author situates Jameson's arguments in the context of the historicisation of theory, treating them as an example of the theoretical program to think the historical determinations of thought. It is argued that this program is an instrument for the formation of the privileged intellectual persona of the theorist.

I argue that while practical reasoning is essentially first personal it does not require having essentially first personal thoughts. I start with an example of good practical reasoning. Because there is debate about what practical reasoning is, I discuss how different sides in those debates can accommodate my example. I then consider whether my example involves essentially first personal thoughts. It is not always clear what philosophers who would claim that it must have in mind. I identify two features of (...) essentially personal thoughts that they share with their impersonal counterparts: they have the same truth conditions and can have the same evidential bases. I next argue that my example of good practical reasoning does not involve any thoughts other than the impersonal ones of the kind I identified. I defend this conclusion against several objections. One pair of objections starts from claims to the effect that there can be no difference in two people’s actions, or in the reasons they have, without a difference in their beliefs or desires. I argue that these claims are false. I then consider an alleged skeptical possibility that often motivates the idea that practical reasoning requires special first personal beliefs. I conclude the paper by suggesting that what Anscombe called an ‘overly contemplative’ conception of knowledge and belief encourages this skeptical possibility. If we think of having a belief as like having a map of the world, then we will easily think that we need self-locating beliefs the way we need ‘I am here’ stickers on maps. The best response, I suggest, is to reject the image that beliefs are like maps. (shrink)

In reading Wittgenstein one can, and for the most part perhaps should, treat the expression ‘language-game’ as a term of art, a more or less arbitrarily chosen item of terminology meaning something like ‘an actual or possible way of using words’. It would then be a fairly routine task to work out answers to such questions as what features of the ways a word is used are emphasized by this term of art, what philosophical purposes are served by the description (...) of primitive language-games or of variations on actual language-games, or in exactly what way those purposes are supposed to be served. (shrink)

This comprehensive history of philosophy is designed for use in high schools, academies, and colleges. It covers the major philosophical movements and thinkers throughout history, from ancient Greek philosophy to modern existentialism. The book provides clear explanations of complex concepts and includes insightful analysis of key philosophical texts. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the (...) United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The paper examines how the Religious Edict, seen as a public-law instrument for the management of religious peace, might provide a new context for Kant's theology, now seen as an unsettling public intervention in a concrete religious and political culture. I shall begin by outlining a revisionist account of the Religious Edict as a representative instance of Prussian 'enlightened absolutist' Religionspolitik ; then move on to a sketch of Kant's philosophical theology as a rational religious intervention in the volatile North (...) German religious Aufklarung ; before concluding with some remarks on the historical significance of Kant's religious and political metaphysics in the context of his encounter with the censors. (shrink)

This erudite book is aimed more directly at specialists in theories of right and law, than at Leibniz scholars. Acknowledging a debt of inspiration to the remarkable historical work of André de Muralt, the author introduces in variable detail the legal philosophy of Suarez, Grotius, Pufendorf, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Kant, with substantial forays into Augustine, Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham. Leibniz fits into this study less as its raison d’être than as a piece in the puzzle, one local system of (...) thought amid the galaxy of the modern school of natural right. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue a position that has almost never been held: that Leibniz was a materialist. At the conclusion of my article, I consider whether the difficulty of reconciling Leibnizs idea of concluding that there is instead a Leibnizian idea of which does a better job.

In “Moral Responsibility for Dreams,” Harvey Mullane maintains that although there is something inappropriate about blaming people for their dreams, this is because we do not have very direct control over our dreams: but although this is the case, it is not the case that we have no control over them. We can work at having the right dreams, or not having the wrong ones, as we can work at blushing and not blushing and at loving our neighbour: and therefore (...) presumably there must be a sense in which or a degree to which we can be responsible for what we dream. There are a number of aspects of this question, and of Mullane's treatment of it, which I would like to explore further. (shrink)

Patrick Fuery _New Developments in Film Theory_ London: MacMillan Press, 2000 ISBN 0-333-74490-X HB; 0-333-74491-8 PB 211 pp.

Steven Nadler hopes to interest a readership wider than just professional philosophers in a largely forgotten debate he admits was not one of philosophy’s “marquee events.” It sounds like an uphill battle, even for a writer as skilled and for a historian of modern philosophy as accomplished as Nadler. Yet The Best of All Possible Worlds succeeds in unfolding a compelling tale without distorting the fundamental doctrines of its protagonists.And what protagonists they were, however much the passing centuries have dimmed (...) their renown. G. W. Leibniz is still likely to have some name recognition with the target audience. But it would be unsafe to assume it for either the Oratorian Nicolas Malebranche or the Jansenist Antoine Arnauld. So Nadler weaves enough historical and biographical detail into his story, both to introduce all three and to create a background of human interest against which their philosophical differences are displayed. (shrink)