Martin's undertaking is thus a re-examination of what it is that metaphysics is seeking, what the problem is which is basically at issue. He has chosen to do this through an analysis of the emergence of the metaphysical problem in Greek thought--coincidentally a very fine piece of scholarship in Greek philosophy--interpreting the fundamental Greek insights and their significance for present-day advance in metaphysical thought. Here I shall be able to touch on only some of the most important points.

This work includes contributions by grice, pears, strawson, hampshire, williams, buchdahl, gardiner, murdoch, and warnock. the general consensus of opinion seems to be that metaphysics is characterized by being conceptual revision. these philosophers also agree that there is no real future for such metaphysical enquiries. (staff).

METAPHYSICS, NATURE OF (Addendum) What is metaphysics? An answer to this question requires a specification both of the scope of metaphysics – that is, of the nature of the questions that metaphysicians raise and attempt to answer – and of the methods that they employ in this enterprise. The discussion falls into the following two parts: 1. The Scope of Metaphysics 2. The Methods of Metaphysics 1. The Scope of Metaphysics As regards (...) the scope, a natural answer is that metaphysics is concerned with the investigation of the ultimate nature of reality, where this involves the attempt, first, to arrive at the most fundamental truths about what exists, and second, to provide an account of the concepts that are involved in such fundamental truths. This leads immediately to the question of how metaphysics is related to science. For does not science also aim at discovering fundamental truths about reality? In response, it is suggested, first, that a central part of metaphysics involves offering accounts of concepts that are essential to scientific theories in general, but of which no account is offered within any of the sciences themselves. Then, secondly, philosophers attempt to establish necessary truths involving some of those concepts, at least some of which have no relevance to scientific theories, whereas science is typically silent on questions that have no bearing on the experimental content and predictions of scientific theories. Thirdly, physics and the other sciences involve presuppositions for which they offer no justification, such as that there is an external, physical world, whereas philosophers attempt to answer such questions. Fourthly, the sciences rely upon induction, in the form of the method of hypothesis, or inference to the best explanation, but, in contrast to philosophers do attempt to show that induction is justified – a question whose answer may very well turn upon metaphysical questions, such as that of the nature of laws of nature. 2. The Methods of Metaphysics In this second section, a number of methods that philosophers employ in metaphysics are described and discussed, including. The following: (1) The idea of direct acquaintance with mental entities. (2) The idea of direct perception of non-mental entities. (3) Various proposed inductive methods. (4) The derivation of analytical truths (5) The search for truthmakers. (6) The appeal to intuitions -/- . (shrink)

The questions of whether there is a shared nature common to all human beings and, if so, what essential qualities define this nature are among the most widely discussed topics in the history of philosophy and remain the subject of perennial interest and controversy. This book offers a metaphysical investigation of the composition of the human essence-that is, with what is a human being identical or what types of parts are necessary for a human being to exist: an (...) immaterial mind, a physical body, a functioning brain, a soul? It also considers the criterion of identity for a human being across time and change-that is, what is required for a human being to continue existing as a person despite undergoing physical and psychological changes over time? Jason Eberl's investigation presents and defends a theoretical perspective from the thirteenth-century philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas. Advancing beyond descriptive historical analysis, this book places Aquinas's account of human nature into direct comparison with several prominent contemporary theories: substance dualism, emergentism, animalism, constitutionalism, four-dimensionalism, and embodied mind theory. There are practical implications of exploring these theories as they inform various conclusions regarding when human beings first come into existence-at conception, during gestation, or after birth-and how we ought to define death for human beings. Finally, each of these viewpoints offers a distinctive rationale as to whether, and if so how, human beings may survive death. This book's central argument is that the Thomistic account of human nature includes several desirable features that other theories lack and offers a cohesive portrait of one's continued existence from conception through life to death and beyond. (shrink)

A critical yet informed and sympathetic look at metaphysics by a group of British "analytic" philosophers, all but one from Oxford. The positivistic "elimination" of metaphysics is repudiated; on the other hand, the authors agree that some of the metaphysician's traditional claims must be rejected, or at least brought up to date. The writing is semi-popular, and those acquainted with recent Oxford philosophizing will find little here that is unfamiliar.--V. C. C.

Eleven Oxford dons and one guest-speaker from Melbourne in this candid series of talks, first delivered on the radio in 1955, seem to share a conscious disadvantage in respect of their subject, the irrepressible science of metaphysics—like a group of disconcerted bankers who return to trade with a one-time bankrupt, whose currency has irresistibly hardened again and for whom they now concert a limp welcome and a scratch set of trading rules. As Mr. Warnock wryly notes: “It would be (...) impossible to deny that respect or distaste for metaphysics is, though no doubt it should be an intellectual matter, in fact very largely a matter of temperament; and disagreements of this variety are notoriously liable to be heated and vehement, liable also to be long drawn out, inconclusive, and rather unprofitable”. After the eighteenth century bankruptcy proceedings instituted by David Hume and the subsequent doldrums of university philosophy, the empiricist suspicions of Victorian Britain led to the positivist hostility of the twentieth century towards that traditional, standard science, which Europe never substantially devalued. The current return in England is both a forced retreat from brash futility in the field of urgent values and of scientific postulates, and a cautious reconnaissance of old positions. The present exploratory discussion is not unlike an international truce in its tendency to bog down in procedural analysis and to substitute this new scholasticism for an engagement in the substantial business of metaphysics. Metametaphysics buries its head in sand of its own sophisticated creation; and the individual talks are not as distinct nor as simple as their titles might suggest. (shrink)

The paper presents seven basic features of Francisco Suárez’s metaphysics. They are as follows: “Univocalization” of the concept of being and transcendental properties, “reification” of the act-potency doctrine, “ontologization” of individuality, “conceptualization” of the Scotist perspective, “existential” character of the concept of being, “epistemologization” and “methodologization” of metaphysics. Whereas the first five are indicated as remaining in the preserve of the traditional scholastic philosophy, the last two are taken as portending the methodological priority of the subjective states of (...) affairs of early modern “main-stream” philosophy. (shrink)

Most practitioners of the metaphysics of science agree that it should be a naturalized metaphysics. But, just as in other areas of philosophy, there is no consensus on what constitutes naturalism. Here I will focus on just one aspect, viz., the idea that the metaphysics of science should be epistemically naturalized. In the first section I will characterize the kind of epistemic naturalism relevant to the metaphysics of science. The main idea, drawing on the work of (...) Penelope Maddy, is that metaphysical inquiry is to be conducted and metaphysical claims justified in the very same way that scientific inquiry is conducted and scientific claims are justified. I then examine two prominent examples of metaphysicians of science proposing to “naturalize” the metaphysics of science, and argue that they fail to be epistemically natural. These are approaches due to James Ladyman and Don Ross, and to Anjan Chakravartty. Considering their failures shows us a way forward for naturalized metaphysics of science that is both more metaphysical and more scientific. (shrink)

I argue for three central theses: ‘intuition’ is ambiguous, in material object metaphysics ‘intuition’ refers to pre-theoretical beliefs, and these pre-theoretical beliefs are generated by an innate physical reasoning system. I begin by outlining the relevant background discussions on the nature of intuitions and their role in philosophy to motivate the need for a more careful investigation of the meaning of ‘intuition’ and the role of intuitions in specific sub-disciplines of philosophy. In chapters one and two I argue (...) that ‘intuition’ is ambiguous between an inflationary and deflationary sense. In the inflationary sense, ‘intuition’ refers to a priori intellectual seemings with a special phenomenology, conceptual etiology, and modal content. In the deflationary sense, ‘intuition’ refers to beliefs or inclinations to believe. In chapter three I specifically examine the use of intuitions in material object metaphysics and conclude that in this sub-community ‘intuition’ is used in the deflationary sense to refer to pre-theoretical beliefs. Drawing from research on infant cognition, in the final chapter I argue that intuitions regarding material object metaphysics are those judgments that arise from an innate physical reasoning system. Based on this empirical observation, I argue that metaphysicians ought to give preference to abstract intuitions over intuitions regarding concrete cases because these abstract intuitions reflect the innate structure of our physical reasoning mechanisms. (shrink)

There is now a considerable body of published work on the epistemology of modern chemistry, especially with regard to the nature of quantum chemistry. In addition, the question of the metaphysical underpinnings of chemistry has received a good deal of attention. The present article concentrates on metaphysical considerations including the question of whether elements and groups of elements are natural kinds. It is also argued that an appeal to the metaphysical nature of elements can help clarify the re-emerging (...) controversies among chemists regarding the placement of the elements hydrogen and helium in the periodic system and the question of whether there exists a best form of the periodic table. (shrink)

This monograph rigorously argues for a Thomistic account of the human person. Each chapter addresses different stages of...

The publication of Jurgen Habermas's Nachmetaphysisches Denken (Post-Metaphysical Thinking) and the publication of a Hans-Willi Weis article about my work prompted several people in Germany to approach me with questions about my response to those pieces. What follows is a brief reply to both.

This book defends a radical new theory of contingency as a physical phenomenon. Drawing on the many-worlds approach to quantum theory and cutting-edge metaphysics and philosophy of science, it argues that quantum theories are best understood as telling us about the space of genuine possibilities, rather than as telling us solely about actuality. When quantum physics is taken seriously in the way first proposed by Hugh Everett III, it provides the resources for a new systematic metaphysical framework encompassing possibility, (...) necessity, actuality, chance, counterfactuals, and a host of related modal notions. -/- Rationalist metaphysicians argue that the metaphysics of modality is strictly prior to any scientific investigation; metaphysics establishes which worlds are possible, and physics merely checks which of these worlds is actual. Naturalistic metaphysicians respond that science may discover new possibilities and new impossibilities. This book's quantum theory of contingency takes naturalistic metaphysics one step further, allowing that science may discover what it is to be possible. As electromagnetism revealed the nature of light, as acoustics revealed the nature of sound, as statistical mechanics revealed the nature of heat, so quantum physics reveals the nature of contingency. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to analyze the problem of metaphysical differences and to seek a pathway towards their resolution. Metaphysical conflicts have two meanings: first, Systems contradict one another by accepting different and opposite ultimate principles of explanation: second, Systems oppose one another by claiming various degrees of inclusiveness and coherence. It is maintained that both of these two views of metaphysical controversies are true. The author constructs a comprehensive scheme from which any possible metaphysics can be (...) derived. There are four categories to his meta-Metaphysics: the given, Free choice of values, Classifications, And the determinates. (staff). (shrink)

In this paper, we consider the relative significance of concrete and abstract features for the identity and persistence of a group. The theoretical background for our analysis is the position according to which groups are realizations of structures. Our main argument is that the relative significance of the abstract features with respect to the significance of concrete features can vary across different types of groups. The argumentation will be backed by introducing the examples in which we show that this difference (...) in significance can affect the identity and persistence of the group. (shrink)

I respond to Karin de Boer, Thomas Land, and Claudio La Rocca’s comments on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics (CUP 2023). I first provide a quick outline of some of the main claims I make in the book. I then directly address their criticisms, which I group into three categories. The first group of comments raises doubts concerning my characterization of the central tasks of the critique of pure reason. The second targets the fact (...) that I downplay faculty analysis as an essential characteristic of the critique. The third has to do with my claim that the Critique of Pure Reason aims to show that metaphysics is capable of architectonic unity, where this unity is only achievable when we construe metaphysics according to the worldly concept of philosophy. (shrink)

First published in 1985, D. M. Armstrong's original work on what laws of nature are has continued to be influential in the areas of metaphysics and philosophy of science. Presenting a definitive attack on the sceptical Humean view, that laws are no more than a regularity of coincidence between stances of properties, Armstrong establishes his own theory and defends it concisely and systematically against objections. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written (...) by Marc Lange, illuminating its continuing importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this influential work is available for a new generation of readers. (shrink)

In this chapter, first we will provide a brief discussion of part of the larger debates concerning metaphysics and attempt to place Masham alongside her friend John Locke in holding that the subject matter of metaphysics is usually either strictly the providence of revelation or is beyond human understanding. Next, we will explore Masham’s criticisms of Norris, Malebranche, and Leibniz to see how these views inform her objections. Here, it will become clear that Masham eschews metaphysics as (...) an a priori investigation into supernatural causes and spirits. She argues that not only do we lack positive evidence for the truth of these metaphysical hypotheses, but we have good reason – from experience and revelation – to believe them false. Finally, we will turn briefly to some of Masham’s positive views concerning the existence and nature of God, the nature of substances, and human freedom. Here, we will see that while Masham does not approve of metaphysical theses that seemingly conflict with our experience of the world, we can know some things about the nature of God and ourselves through experience and reason. This leaves room for Masham to engage in a fair amount of what we would currently consider metaphysical discourse. (shrink)

This book addresses central issues in the philosophy and metaphysics of science, namely the nature of scientific theories, their partial truth, and the necessity of scientific laws within a moderate realist and empiricist perspective. Accordingly, good arguments in favour of the existence of unobservable entities postulated by our best theories, such as electrons, must be inductively grounded on perceptual experience and not their explanatory power as most defenders of scientific realism claim. Similarly, belief in the reality of dispositions (...) such as causal powers which ground the natural necessity of scientific laws must be based on experience. Hence, this book offers a synthetic presentation of an original metaphysics of science, namely a metaphysics of properties, both categorical and dispositional, while at the same time opposing strong versions of necessitarism according to which laws are true in all possible worlds. The main theses and arguments are clearly presented in a non-technical way. Thus, on top of being of interest to the specialists of the topics discussed, it is also useful as a textbook in courses for third year and more advanced university students. (shrink)

Whitehead’s categoreal scheme in Process and Realitv is so constructed that the several basic notions presuppose one another: despite this, there is good reason to consider “creativity” to be more ultimate than the others. But just how it is that creativity can be a metaphysical ultimate is not initially clear. For Whitehead’s various characterizations of creativity are confused and seemingly conflicting: moreover, and most importantly, creativity comes into conflict with the ontological principle. An analysis of the relation between creativity and (...) the ontological principle reveals a radical turn in philosophic thought: the conception of a metaphysical ultimate which is “ontologically neutral.”. (shrink)

The idea of naturalizing metaphysics stretches back to Locke and Newton. Recently it has been revived by Ross and Ladyman et al (2007) in ‘Every Thing Must Go’. At the heart of the doctrine is the idea that metaphysics should be constrained by actual science (science which is current and institutionally valid). It is my attempt in this paper to naturalize the metaphysics of the species problem by proposing a species concept which conforms to the principles set (...) out in Ross and Ladyman et al's book. This is a concept which conforms strictly with current work in the field of evolutionary theory, with specific reference to theories in Information theory and Thermodynamics. In the end I use as an example of non-naturalized metaphysics Matthew Slater's paper ‘The Indeterminacy Problem for Species as Individuals’. (shrink)

This book advocates dispositional essentialism, the view that natural properties have dispositional essences. 1 So, for example, the essence of the property of being negatively charged is to be disposed to attract positively charged objects. From this fact it follows that it is a law that all negatively charged objects will attract positively charged objects; and indeed that this law is metaphysically necessary. Since the identity of the property of being negatively charged is determined by its being related in a (...) certain way to the property of being positively charged, in any world in which these properties exist they must be related so that all negatively charged objects attract positively charged objects.Bird opposes his dispositional essentialism to the view that properties are categorical in nature, with their identities grounded in quiddities that are not exhausted by their relations to other properties. The main exponents of this view are D.M. Armstrong and David Lewis. They take the laws of nature to be contingent though they entertain very different views about their nature: Armstrong is a necessitarian about laws, taking them to be relations of nomic necessitation between universals, while Lewis is a Humean about laws who takes them to be a special kind of regularity. The book is a sustained defence of the dispositional essentialist conception of properties and laws against the competing conceptions espoused by Armstrong and Lewis. One rough way to characterize the difference between these conceptions is to say that the categoricalist sees properties as passive and inert with the laws of nature being fixed independently of the nature of properties whereas, in contrast, the dispositional essentialist sees properties as active potencies from which the laws of nature automatically spring. A slightly more tendentious way to express the difference is to say, as Bird does, that the …. (shrink)

Some philosophers challenge the advisability of naturalizing social metaphysics by appeal to social science. They argue that social science fails to meet criteria for realist commitment, such as unity and novel predictive power, and that social science would therefore be a poor basis for naturalization. These skeptical challenges are rooted in traditions in the philosophy of science that have held the social sciences in poor esteem. Through a case study that highlights the ways in which archaeology is methodologically converging (...) on hard science, I show that the philosophical bias against social science is outmoded. I suggest that at least some of the methodological advances of archaeology and other social sciences are epistemologically significant and are relevant to the question of realism. However, I conclude with the thought that realist commitment need not be a precondition for naturalization. The paper therefore accomplishes two main things: 1) it allays objections to using social science to naturalize social metaphysics, and 2) it motivates a higher estimation of the epistemological credentials of social science as compared with more skeptical traditions. (shrink)