This paper explores the work of Nicolas Rashevsky, a Russian émigré theoretical physicist who developed a program in "mathematical biophysics" at the University of Chicago during the 1930s. Stressing the complexity of many biological phenomena, Rashevsky argued that the methods of theoretical physics -- namely mathematics -- were needed to "simplify" complex biological processes such as cell division and nerve conduction. A maverick of sorts, Rashevsky was a conspicuous figure in the biological community during the 1930s (...) and early 1940s: he participated in several Cold Spring Harbor symposia and received several years of funding from the Rockefeller Foundation. However, in contrast to many other physicists who moved into biology, Rashevsky's work was almost entirely theoretical, and he eventually faced resistance to his mathematical methods. Through an examination of the conceptual, institutional, and scientific context of Rashevsky's work, this paper seeks to understand some of the reasons behind this resistance. (shrink)

Syllogisms (e.g. “All A are B; All B are C; What is true about A and C?”) are a long‐studied area of human reasoning. Riesterer, Brand, and Ragni compare a variety of models to human performance and show that not only do current models have a lot of room for improvement, but more importantly a large part of this improvement must come from examining individual differences in performance.

where ‘aa’ is a plural term, and ‘F’ a plural predicate. Following George Boolos (1984) and others, many philosophers and logicians also think that plural expressions should be analysed as not introducing any new ontological commitments to some sort of ‘plural entities’, but rather as involving a new form of reference to objects to which we are already committed (for an overview and further details, see Linnebo 2004). For instance, the plural term ‘aa’ refers to Alice, Bob and Charlie simultaneously, (...) and the plural predicate ‘F’ is true of some things just in case these things cooperate. A natural question that arises is whether the step from the singular to the plural can be iterated. Are there terms that stand to ordinary plural terms the way ordinary plural terms stand to singular terms? Let’s call such terms superplural. A superplural term would thus, loosely speaking, refer to several ‘pluralities’ at once, much as an ordinary plural term refers to several objects at once.1 Further, let’s call a predicate superplural if it can be predicated of superplural terms. It is reasonably straightforward to devise a formal logic of superplural terms, superplural predicates, and even superplural quantifiers (see Rayo 2006). But does this formal logic reflect any features of natural languages? In particular, does ordinary English contain superplural terms and predicates? The purpose of this article is to address these questions. We examine some earlier arguments for the existence of superplural expressions in English and find them to be either.. (shrink)

This article provides a philosophical response to the need for truth-telling about colonial history, focussing on the Australian context. The response consists in inviting philosophers and the public to engage in social-justice practices specified by a model called Distributed Truth-Telling (DTT), which integrates the historiography of injustices affecting Indigenous peoples with insights from social philosophy and cultural evolution theory. By contrast to official and large-scale truth commissions, distributed truth-telling is a set of non-elitist practices that weave three components: first, multisite, (...) multiformat, and multiscale inquiries into injustices; second, remedial imaginings and reasoning about moral repair and reconciliated futures; and finally, emotions suitable for motivating agents to cooperatively plan and implement moral revolutions. Distributed truth-telling can entrench virtuous feedback loops that contribute to moral revolutions. However, vicious feedback loops associated with collective denial and biases can impair distributed truth- telling and thwart moral revolutions. (shrink)

Can animals be agents? Do they want to be free? Can they have meaningful lives? If so, should we change the way we treat them? This paper offers an account of animal agency and of two continuums: between human and nonhuman agency, and between wildness and captivity. It describes how a wide range of human activities impede on animals’ freedom and argues that, in doing so, we deprive a wide range of animals of opportunities to exercise their agency in ways (...) that can give meaning to their lives. (shrink)

Il est assez commun de se représenter le bûcheron comme un être plutôt fruste, qualifié avant tout par sa force au service d’une tâche peu valorisée. Or cette représentation se révèle tronquée, car l’équation qui associe la force à l’outil ne peut se réaliser sans le contrôle du geste. Plus encore, l’écoute des témoignages recueillis auprès des forestiers nous apprend que ce travail réclame d’efficaces systèmes de précision. C’est là une qualification oubliée, pourtant reconnue à part entière dès l’Iliade, qui (...) nous en donne deux témoins privilégiés par l’anthropologie historique de la Grèce, la mètis, l’« intelligence rusée », prêtée au kybérnêtês, le pilote du navire, au conducteur de char et, en bonne première place, au bûcheron. La théorie du contrôle nous permet maintenant de dépasser le flou conceptuel de la notion historiquement pré-théorique de mètis, la ruse s’appliquant à des cas bien trop divers, pour lui préférer les développements les plus récents d’une science du contrôle de l’action, théorisée depuis Wiener, nourrissant aujourd’hui les projets les mieux financés de cyber-cerveaux informatiques, au service des neurosciences et de la médecine. Le travail forestier, qui réclame une coordination maîtrisée des gestes, y compris de leurs commandes vocales dans le chant de travail — qu’un seul ou plusieurs bûcherons en équipe soient mobilisés —, nous en fournit une parfaite illustration. The woodcutter is commonly represented as a fairly boorish person, reduced to brute force and low-level tasks. But this representation is partial because a simplistic inferential link between an axe and strength obliterates that nothing can happen without any modus operandi, i.e. a set of neural controls over gestures. Indeed, listening to woodcutter’s testimonies led us to elicit that this work needs efficient precision systems. This high level of qualification was acknowledged at least since Homer’s Iliad as evidenced by two favourite telltales from historical anthropology of Ancient Greece: mètis ascribed to kybérnêtês, the ship’s pilot as to the chariot-driver and in the first rank to the woodcutter. Control theory allows now to avoid the fuzziness of meaning of the pre-theoretical notion of mètis to focus on a domain steadily developed since Wiener, now part of costly cyber-brain projects in informatics, for neuroscience and medicine. Forest work, which requires skilled gesture coordination, with vocal commands in a worksong—for one or more woodcutters being engaged in the task—is such a telling case. (shrink)

Do scientific theories limit human knowledge? In other words, are there physical variables hidden by essence forever? We argue for negative answers and illustrate our point on chaotic classical dynamical systems. We emphasize parallels with quantum theory and conclude that the common real numbers are, de facto, the hidden variables of classical physics. Consequently, real numbers should not be considered as ``physically real" and classical mechanics, like quantum physics, is indeterministic.

In order to describe the logic of morality, "contractualist" philosophers have studied how individuals behave when they choose to follow their moral intuitions. These individuals, contractualists note, often act as if they have bargained and thus reached an agreement with others about how to distribute the benefits and burdens of mutual cooperation. Using this observation, such philosophers argue that the purpose of morality is to maximize the benefits of human interaction. The resulting "contract" analogy is both insightful and puzzling. On (...) one hand, it captures the pattern of moral intuitions, thus answering questions about human cooperation: why do humans cooperate? Why should the distribution of benefits be proportionate to each person's contribution? Why should the punishment be proportionate to the crime? Why should the rights be proportionate to the duties? On the other hand, the analogy provides a mere as-if explanation for human cooperation, saying that cooperation is "as if" people have passed a contract-but since they didn't, why should it be so? To evolutionary thinkers, the puzzle of the missing contract is immediately reminiscent of the puzzle of the missing "designer" of life-forms, a puzzle that Darwin's theory of natural selection essentially resolved. Evolutionary and contractualist theory originally intersected at the work of philosophers John Rawls and David Gauthier, who argued that moral judgments are based on a sense of fairness that has been naturally selected. In this book, Nicolas Baumard further explores the theory that morality was originally an adaptation to the biological market of cooperation, an arena in which individuals competed to be selected for cooperative interactions. In this environment, Baumard suggests, the best strategy was to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation in a fair way, so that those who offered less than others were left out of cooperation while those who offered more were exploited by their partners. It is with this evolutionary approach that Baumard ultimately accounts for the specific structure of human morality. (shrink)

This monograph proposes a new way of implementing interaction in logic. It also provides an elementary introduction to Constructive Type Theory. The authors equally emphasize basic ideas and finer technical details. In addition, many worked out exercises and examples will help readers to better understand the concepts under discussion. One of the chief ideas animating this study is that the dialogical understanding of definitional equality and its execution provide both a simple and a direct way of implementing the CTT approach (...) within a game-theoretical conception of meaning. In addition, the importance of the play level over the strategy level is stressed, binding together the matter of execution with that of equality and the finitary perspective on games constituting meaning. According to this perspective the emergence of concepts are not only games of giving and asking for reasons, they are also games that include moves establishing how it is that the reasons brought forward accomplish their explicative task. Thus, immanent reasoning games are dialogical games of Why and How. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper examines consequences of the computer revolution in mathematics. By comparing its repercussions with those of conceptual developments that unfolded in the nineteenth century, I argue that the key epistemological lesson to draw from the two transformative periods is that effective and successful mathematical practices in science result from integrating the computational and conceptual styles of mathematics, and not that one of the two styles of mathematical reasoning is superior. Finally, I show that the methodology deployed by applied (...) mathematicians in modern scientific computing is a paradigmatic instance of this key lesson. (shrink)

Les « collectifs en ligne » proposent un modèle original qui cherche à rendre compatible d'une part la production de quasi-unanimités avec l'exigence de ne pas perdre de temps dans la production de consensus, d'autre part l'intérêt pour la discussion argumentée avec la mise en oeuvre de techniques de délibération et de vote. L'article explore le fonctionnement de ces communautés virtuelles, en faisant l'hypothèse qu'elles construisent un modèle souverainiste de délibération.The "online group" . Propose an original model that seeks to (...) make it compatible with a production share of almost unanimities with the requirement not to lose time in the production of consensus, On the other hand the interest in reasoned discussion with the technical implementation of deliberation and vote. The article explores how these virtual communities, assuming they construct a model of deliberation sovereignty. (shrink)

Synaesthesia is a heterogeneous phenomenon, even when considering one particular sub-type. The purpose of this study was to design a reliable and valid questionnaire for grapheme-colour synaesthesia that captures this heterogeneity. By the means of a large sample of 628 synaesthetes and a factor analysis, we created the Coloured Letters and Numbers questionnaire with 16 items loading on 4 different factors . These factors were externally validated with tests which are widely used in the field of synaesthesia research. The questionnaire (...) showed good test–retest reliability and construct validity . Our findings are discussed in the light of current theories and new ideas in synaesthesia research. More generally, the questionnaire is a useful tool which can be widely used in synaesthesia research to reveal the influence of individual differences on various performance measures and will be useful in generating new hypotheses. (shrink)

This paper intends to bring Austinian themes into methodological discussion about models. Using Austinian conceptual vocabulary, I argue that models perform actions in and outside of the academic field. This multiplicity of fields induces a variety of felicity conditions and types of performed actions. If for example, an inference from a model is judged according to some epistemological criteria in the scientific field, the representation of the world which the model carries will not be judged by the same criteria outside (...) the scientific field. A model can be considered as a standard in a strict scientific framework, while not being used as part of public policies, or vice versa. However, we focus on the dynamics between different fields. (shrink)

Drawing from the example of Asian elephant conservation in Laos, this article primarily intends to reveal the elephantocentric vision adopted by mainstream conservation project in direction to the species. In the second part, I will present some ethnographic notes collected among local population who daily live and work with pachyderms. These notes will help in opening up a broader and more ecocentric approach of elephant conservation by highlighting links between biological and cultural diversity. By revealing the cosmo-ecological view of elephants (...) as thought locally, I will then propose an enlarged vision of elephant conservation. (shrink)

We present a new proof of soundness/completeness of tableaux with respect to dialogical games in Classical First-Order Logic. As far as we know it is the first thorough result for dialogical games where finiteness of plays is guaranteed by means of what we call repetition ranks.

(in press, under contract with MIT Press, accepted on June 30th, 2006). Attention, Information and Epistemic Perception. In Terzis, G. & Arp, R. (Eds) Information and the Living Systems: Essays in the Philosophy of Biology. The MIT Press. (14,000 words).

" Une nouvelle philosophie politique, d'abord par l'interrogation qu'elle peut aujourd'hui et doit conduire sur elle-même. Ses défis concrets ne sont pas aussi évidents que du temps d'Aristote, de Locke et de Kant. Son implication est nécessairement plus forte dans les champs ouverts par l'histoire, les sciences de la société, le droit et l'économie, avec le risque qu'elle s'abandonne elle-même à la tentation de perdre sa spécificité. " Les chapitres de cet ouvrage sont pour l'essentiel inédits. Ils explorent différents aspects (...) de cette nouvelle philosophie politique et illustrent la fécondité d'un aller et retour constant entre la philosophie et la politique réelle. La philosophie doit désormais s'affronter aux faits, accepter de s'inscrire dans l'histoire et répondre de sa vérité. Un antidote contre les supercheries politiques et philosophiques. (shrink)

In the past decade, experiments on altruistic punishment have played a central role in the study of the evolution of cooperation. By showing that people are ready to incur a cost to punish cheaters and that punishment help to stabilise cooperation, these experiments have greatly contributed to the rise of group selection theory. However, despite its experimental robustness, it is not clear whether altruistic punishment really exists. Here, I review the anthropological literature and show that hunter-gatherers rarely punish cheaters. Instead, (...) they avoid dealing with them and switch to other partners. I suggest that these data are better explained by individual selection, and in particular by partner choice models, in which individuals are in competition to be recruited by cooperative partners. I discuss two apparent problems for partner choice theories: large-scale cooperation and punishments in economic games. I suggest that rather than favouring group selection theory, these two phenomena provide evidence in favour of individual selection: (1) people produce large-scale cooperation through institutions in which punishment is not altruistic but rewarded on an individual basis; (2) punishment in experimental games can be explained without altruism and is indeed often better explained by individual interests. (shrink)

This article argues for a novel approach to the measurement of freedom of choice, on which the availability of an option is a matter of degree, rather than a bivalent matter of being either available or not. This approach is motivated by case studies involving weakness of will, where deficiencies in willpower seem to impair individual freedom by making certain alternatives much harder to pursue. This approach is perfectly general, however: its graded analysis of option availability can be extended to (...) cases where weakness of will is not involved and can be used to generalize numerous existing measures of freedom. (shrink)

Despite being one of the most dependable methods used by applied mathematicians and engineers in handling complex systems, the finite element method commits variational crimes. This paper contextualizes the concept of variational crime within a broader account of mathematical practice by explaining the tradeoff between complexity and accuracy involved in the construction of numerical methods. We articulate two standards of accuracy used to determine whether inexact solutions are good enough and show that, despite violating the justificatory principles of one, the (...) finite element method nevertheless succeeds in obtaining its legitimacy from the other. (shrink)

Republican and so-called independence conceptions of freedom stand out from other conceptions by embedding strong modal conditions on what it takes for a person to count as being free to do something. For this reason, the extent of one’s freedom, conceived under republican/independentist lights, cannot be measured by any of the measures of freedom that have been developed so far in the literature on freedom, since these do not register the requisite modal constraints. In this paper I propose a measure (...) of freedom that does capture the requisite modal concerns. I do so by relying on work in the semantics of counterfactuals to define a measure of how modally robustly available an option is to an individual. (shrink)

La autenticidad de la Heroida 15 de Ovidio (Sappho Phaoni) fue objeto de grancontroversia crítica. Sin adentrarnos en la misma, pero a la luz de ella, mostramoslos mecanismos intratextuales, narrativos y estilísticos que instauran esta epístolacomo instancia de transición entre las simples (1-15) y las dobles (16-21).Abordamos fundamentalmente dos aspectos: en qué medida la Heroida 15 seconstruye como un “proemio en el medio” que determina la arquitectura global dela obra, y de qué manera su inscripción en el discurso elegíaco anticipa (...) algunosrasgos del Ars y delimita ciertos ejes de la praxis literaria ovidiana. (shrink)

Evidencia reciente ha revitalizado el interés en los llamados “efectos Whorf” en la percepción, dando lugar a nuevas explicaciones de sus alcances y mecanismos subyacentes. En este trabajo propongo que pueden distinguirse dos tipos de propuestas: autores como Lupyan (2012) explican estos efectos postulando mecanismos específicamente dedicados a producirlos, mientras que autores como Casasanto (2008) atribuyen tales efectos al funcionamiento de procesos generales, como los de aprendizaje asociativo. Luego, muestro cómo el enfoque grounded acerca de los conceptos en ciencias cognitivas (...) (e.g. Barsalou 1999, 2016) podría resultar pertinente para el estudio de los efectos Whorf en lingüística, antropología, filosofía y psicología cognitiva. En particular, defenderé que la evidencia ofrecida en favor de este enfoque favorece explicaciones de mecanismo general como la de Casasanto (2008), por encima de propuestas de mecanismo específico como la de Lupyan (2012). (shrink)

El ajedrez nunca ha sido un mero juego de tablero sino también reflejo de las tensiones filosóficas, ideológicas y sociales que vivieron sus jugadores en muchos periodos de la historia. Así pues, cuando los musulmanes reciben este juego a partir de las conquistas de Persia, lo modifican para que sea compatible con su sociedad. Con la expansión del Islam en la Península Ibérica, el juego entra en contacto con el mundo latino y español donde el rey Alfonso X hereda algunas (...) problemáticas filosóficas en torno al juego, y lo utiliza como alegoría de los conflictos socio-políticos que atraviesa su propio reinado. (shrink)

To become more broadly applicable, positions on AI ethics require perspectives from non-Western regions and cultures such as China and Japan. In this paper, we propose that the addition of the concept of harmony to the discussion on ethical AI would be highly beneficial due to its centrality in East Asian cultures and its applicability to the challenge of designing AI for social good. We first present a synopsis of different definitions of harmony in multiple contexts, such as music and (...) society, which reveals that the concept is, at its core, about well-balanced relationships and appropriate actions which give rise to order, balance, and aesthetically pleasing phenomena. The mediator for these well-balanced relationships isTaktwhich is an ability to act thoughtfully and sensibly according to the specific situation and to put things into proportion and order. We propose that the central challenge of building harmonizing AI is to make intelligent systems tactful and also to design and use them tactfully. For an AI system to become tactful, it needs to be able to have an advanced sensitivity to the specific contexts which it is in and their social and ethical implications and have the capability of approximately inferring the emotional and cognitive states of people with whom it is interacting. (shrink)

This article offers a justification for accommodating claims of conscience. The standard justification points to the pain that acting against one’s conscience entails. But that defense cannot make sense of the state’s refusal to accommodate individuals where the law interferes with their deeply meaningful but nonmoral projects. An alternative justification, we argue, arises once one recognizes the connection between conscience and moral address: One’s lived moral convictions determine when and with what force one can hold others to account. Acting against (...) one’s convictions can undermine one’s standing to blame others who act in similar ways. When the state compels someone to act against conscience, it renders her complicit in conduct she takes to be wrong and thereby impairs her ability to condemn similar conduct in the future, in a manner akin to the hypocrite. The reason the state should not compel people to act against conscience, then, is that doing so would undercut their moral standing. (shrink)

Recent models of the conceptual system hold that concepts are grounded in simulations of actual experiences with instances of those concepts in sensory-motor systems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2003; Solomon & Barsalou, 2001). Studies supportive of such a viewhave shown that verifying a property of a concept in one modality, and then switching to verify a property of a different concept in a different modality generates temporal processing costs similar to the cost of switching modalities in perception. In addition to non-emotional (...) concepts, the present experiment investigated switching costs in verifying properties of positive and negative (emotional) concepts. Properties of emotional concepts were taken from vision, audition, and the affective system. Parallel to switching costs in neutral concepts, the study showed that for positive and negative concepts, verifying properties from different modalities produced processing costs such that reaction times were longer and error rates were higher. Importantly, this effect was observed when switching from the affective system to sensory modalities, and vice-versa. These results support the embodied cognition view of emotion in humans. (shrink)

Abstract: Friends of plural logic—like Oliver & Smiley (2001), Rayo (2002), Yi (2005), and McKay (2006)—have argued that a semantics of plurals based on mereological sums would be too weak, and they have adduced several examples in favor of their claim. However, they have not considered various possible counter-arguments. So how convincing are their own arguments? We show that several of them are easily answered, while some others are more problematic. Overall, the case against mereological singularism—the idea that mereological sums (...) can serve as the semantic values of plurals—turns out to be much less strong than what it is usually presented to be. (shrink)

Since the Industrial Revolution, human societies have experienced high and sustained rates of economic growth. Recent explanations of this sudden and massive change in economic history have held that modern growth results from an acceleration of innovation. But it is unclear why the rate of innovation drastically accelerated in England in the eighteenth century. An important factor might be the alteration of individual preferences with regard to innovation resulting from the unprecedented living standards of the English during that period, for (...) two reasons. First, recent developments in economic history challenge the standard Malthusian view according to which living standards were stagnant until the Industrial Revolution. Pre-industrial England enjoyed a level of affluence that was unprecedented in history. Second, behavioral sciences have demonstrated that the human brain is designed to respond adaptively to variations in resources in the local environment. In particular, Life History Theory, a branch of evolutionary biology, suggests that a more favorable environment should trigger the expression of future-oriented preferences. In this paper, I argue that some of these psychological traits – a lower level of time discounting, a higher level of optimism, decreased materialistic orientation, and a higher level of trust in others – are likely to increase the rate of innovation. I review the evidence regarding the impact of affluence on preferences in contemporary as well as past populations, and conclude that the impact of affluence on neurocognitive systems may partly explain the modern acceleration of technological innovations and the associated economic growth. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to show that and how animal organisms are appropriate subjects of normative evaluation, on Hegel's view. I contrast my reading with the interpretive positions of Sebastian Rand and Mark Alznauer. I disagree with Rand and agree with Alznauer that animal organisms are normatively evaluable for Hegel. I substantiate my disagreement with Rand, and supplement Alznauer's interpretation, by spelling out the role that the ‘generic process’ or ‘genus process [Gattungsprozess]’ plays within Hegel's account of animal (...) organisms and their normative evaluability. In the course of my discussion, I highlight the main differences that Hegel purports to identify between animal and vegetable organisms and suggest that the upshot of those differences is that some but not all plants are normatively evaluable, by his lights. I also situate Hegel's discussion of theGattungsprozesswithin the debate on biological functions in the philosophy of biology over the last few decades. (shrink)