Charles Peirce claimed that the principal ingredient in assertion is an act of “taking responsibility” for the truth of what is asserted. Some people writing about the Commitment Theory of Assertion have at times construed Peirce’s claim as his espousal of that contemporary theory, but this, I argue, is mistaken. Peirce saw “taking responsibility” as the assumption, not of an obligation, but instead of a liability, a penalty to be incurred if one’s assertion turned out to be false. I then (...) consider how this point connects to other parts of Pierce’s analysis of assertion, specifically his claims that we assert to persuade, that assertion involves an intentional exhibition of our assumption of liability, and that this assumption of liability furnishes evidence for what is asserted. I conclude by sketching on Peirce’s behalf how the assumption of liability could constitute, and be intelligibly offered as, evidence for what is asserted. (shrink)

According to Eleonore Stump, Thomas Aquinas rejects a “popular” (roughly, penal substitutionary) account of the atonement. For Stump’s Aquinas, God does not require satisfaction or punishment for human sin, and the function of satisfaction is remedial, not juridical or penal. Naturally, then, Aquinas does not, on this reading, see Christ’s passion as having saving effect in virtue of Christ substitutionally bearing the punishment for human sin that divine justice requires. I argue that Stump is incorrect. For Aquinas, divine justice does (...) require satisfaction; satisfaction involves punishment ( poena) and has a penal function; and one way Christ’s death has saving effect is in virtue of his satisfying that requirement on people’s behalf. Christ saves by “paying our debt,” bearing in the place of humans the penalty or punishment required by divine justice. My argument implies that Aquinas’s account of satisfaction in the atonement significantly resembles key aspects of Stump’s “popular account”—and of the Penal Substitution Theory it represents. (shrink)

In this work, Peter Breiner explores the implications of Max Weber's political sociology for political judgment and democratic theory.

This book takes an exciting perspective on language change, by explaining it in terms of Darwin's evolutionary theory. Looking at a number of developments in the history of sounds and words, Nikolaus Ritt shows how the constituents of language can be regarded as mental patterns, or 'memes', which copy themselves from one brain to another when communication and language acquisition take place. Memes are both stable in that they transmit faithfully from brain to brain, and active in that their (...) success at replicating depends upon their own properties. Ritt uses this controversial approach to challenge established models of linguistic competence, in which speakers acquire, use, and shape language. In Darwinian terms, language evolution is something that happens to, rather than through, speakers, and the interests of linguistic constituents matter more than those of their human 'hosts'. This book will stimulate debate among evolutionary biologists, cognitive scientists and linguists alike. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the famous ‘Mannheim paradox’ regarding the ideological understanding of ideology in Ideology and Utopia merely serves as a preparation for a far more complex and persistent paradox that poses a recurrent problem for any political science seeking to understand the relation of political ideologies to political reality: namely, when we try to understand contending political ideologies at any one historical moment and test them for their ‘congruence’ with historical and sociological ‘reality’, our construction of this context (...) is itself informed by these ideologies or our partisan understanding of them. To deal with this paradox Mannheim suggests a new political science based on Marx and Weber. This political science seeks to construct fields of competing ideologies—such as conservatism, liberalism, and socialism—and play off the insight and blindness of each to create a momentary ‘synthesis’ of the relation between political ideas and a dynamic political reality. (shrink)

Although it is well-recognized that Max Weber was of central importance to many of the emigre social scientists who fled Hitler, commentators have overlooked both Weber’s attempt to found a new dynamic political science that would test partisan commitments and the endeavors of emigre political scientists to develop this project. This article lays out this new Weberian political science and assesses the fate of the various attempts on the part of the emigres to translate it into their new setting. It (...) shows that Weber forged a notion of political science that combined an existential notion of politics as inexorable power struggle with a sociology of the business of politics that provided the setting in which that struggle was to take place. It also shows that the central purpose of this political science was to aid political partisans in clarifying the meaning of their political commitments by forcing them to view these commitments as they are shaped in the socio-political context that determines the struggle for power. I then show that Mannheim sought to radicalize this approach to political science by seeking to construct the political backdrop for the testing of political ideas out of a political field not out of parties, politicians, and state institutions but out of competing ideologies, each of which could be shown to have some insight into the dynamics of political conflict. For Mannheim we could now test political ideas against political reality by playing them off against each other. I call this project of testing political ideas against existential and sociological notions of the political field the Weber–Mannheim project. I then show how three emigre political scientists – Arnold Brecht, Hans Morgenthau, and Franz Neumann – sought to carry on the Weber–Mannheim project in their new setting. I argue that, of the three, Franz Neumann in his great work Behemoth, was most successful in staying true to that project. For he was able to find in his analysis of the Weimar Republic and the fascist regime a way of demonstrating the dynamics under which democracy and dictatorship fail or succeed while still maintaining openings for political will. Both Brecht and Morgenthau seem to have flattened the dynamic aspect of the Weberian and Mannheimian notions of a prudential political science – though it was Morgenthau who had the most successful reception in political science. (shrink)

Commentators have frequently noted the discrepancy in il Principle between the figure of the new prince and the impossibility of exemplifying him. Against interpretations that claim Machiavelli's text either traps a prince in a web of self-destructive advice or destabilizes the very political knowledge it provides, the author argues that it uses the figure of the new prince to locate us in the primordial moment of acquisition of political power, a moment that is never overcome but is constantly replayed in (...) maintaining states and beneath established institutions. Thus given the impossibility for a new prince to ever get beyond "the primordial moment of acquisition," there can be no overall theoretical resolution to this tension, and thus no closure to this text. Therefore the text addresses a reader--actor who has to assemble the maxims and examples in light of the necessities governing primordial acquisition as they play out in his/her historical location. (shrink)

The explanation of everything by economic causes alone is never exhaustive in any sense whatsoever, in any sphere of cultural phenomena, not even in the economic sphere itself. Max Weber, “Objectivity”in Social Science and Social Policy (1904).

Nachfolgend veroffentlichen veröffentlichen wir in deutscher Ubersetzung Übersetzung zwei Berichte tiber über die die im im April April 1958 in Moskau abgehaltene Tagung zur Frage der 'Widersprtiche': 'Widersprüche': 'Konferencija po voprosam protivoreCij' von G. A. Volkov, erschienen in den 'Voprosy Filosofii', Moskau, 1958, 12, 163-173, und 'Konference 0 otazce rozponl rozpon1 ve svetle soudoM soudobe vedy a praxe' von N. V. Karabanov, erschienen im 'Filosoficky casopis', Prag, 1959, 1, 131-133; weiterhin den Originaltext der auf derselben Tagung gehaltenen Vortrage Vorträge von (...) E. Kolman, 'Material'naja suscnost' protivoreCija i ee otrazenie v myslenii', veröffentlicht veroffentlicht im 'Filosoficky casopis', Prag, 1959, 3, 381-391, und von A. A. Zinov'ev, '0 logiceskoj neprotirecivosti istinnych suZdenij ob izmenenijach i svjazach meZdu predmetami', veröffentlicht veroffentlicht in der polnischen Zeitschrift 'Studia Filosoficzne', 1959, 1, 124-133; und schliesslich einen kurzen Abschnitt des neuen offiziellen Lehrbuches des dialektischen und historischen Materialismus 'Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii', Moskau 1958, S. 256f., 259f. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Arbeit entstand im Auftrag des Osteuropa-Institutes der Universitat FreiburgjSchweiz und wurde in groBziigiger Weise von der Rockefeller Foundation unterstutzt. Ich machte diesen Institutionen hiermit meinen Dank aussprechen; insbesondere aber machte ich dem Herausgeber der Reihe "Sovietica", meinem verehrten Lehrer Prof. Dr. J. M. Bochenski danken, dem ich zahlreiche konkrete Hinweise verdanke. Da uber die marxistisch-Ieninistische Philosophie in der CSR m. W. keine einzige westliche Untersuchung vorliegt - und sei sie noch so bescheiden-, auf eigene Forschung angewiesen. Was allerdings (...) nicht war ich vallig philosophische Fragen betrifft, so konnte ich mich auf zahlreiche Hin weise von Spezialisten stiitzen; in diesem Zusammenhang machte ich mich bei den Herren Dr. H. Dahm von der Redaktion der "Ost-Probleme", Bonn, O. Kostrba yom "Radio Free Europe", Munchen, Dr. Kuhn yom Sudetendeutschen Archiv, Munchen, sowie Dr. R. Urban yom Johann Gottfried Herder-Institut, Marburg, bedanken. Zu besonderem Dank bin ich Dr. H. Slapnicka, Linz, verpfiichtet, von dem ichin wenigen Stunden oft mehr gelernt habe, als ich dureh monate1anges Studium Mtte erfahren kannen. SchlieBlieh machte ieh aueh Herrn O. Sagner von der Buchhandlung Kubon & Sagner, Munchen, danken; seiner oft muhe vollen Sueharbeit verdanke ich fast aIle Zeitschriften und Bucher, die mir zur Verfiigung standen. Der informierte Leser wird vermutlieh zahlreiche Lucken, Ungenauig keiten oder gar Fehler entdecken; ieh muG wohl nieht besonders hervor heben, wie dankbar ieh fUr entsprechende Hinweise bin, die mieh stets uber den Verlag Reidel, Dordrecht, erreichen. (shrink)

Our aim in this chapter is to contribute to a greater appreciation of Bourdieu’s work within debates on embodied, extended and distributed cognition, grouped under the general heading of externalism (Rowlands 2003, Carter et al. 2014). We seek to draw out several pertinent elements of Bourdieu’s theory of social practice, and show how they variously resonate with, enrich, or problematize key externalist theses. We begin with an overview of the main elements of Bourdieu’s theoretical enterprise, in order to provide essential (...) background for the ensuing discussion. We then address a number of themes connecting Bourdieu’s theory with facets of cognitive externalism, which we organize under the headings of diachronic co-dependence, instrumental dependence, and co-constitutive dependence. Following this we turn our attention to epistemic externalism, where we find promising ground for dialogue with Bourdieu in recent developments in virtue epistemology, focusing our analysis on a recent proposal concerning knowledge-how by Carter & Pritchard (2015). We conclude with an assessment of Bourdieu’s standing with respect to these currents, and prospects for further engagement. (shrink)

One aim of this article is to explore the connection between the Knobe effect and the epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE). Additionally, we report evidence about a further generalization regarding probability judgments. We demonstrate that all effects can be found within German material, using ‘absichtlich’ [intentionally], ‘wissen’ [know] and ‘wahrscheinlich’ [likely]. As the explanations discussed with regard to the Knobe effect do not suffice to explicate the ESEE, we survey whether the characteristic asymmetry in knowledge judgments is caused by a differing (...) perception of probabilities concerning the occurrence of the side-effects. Our findings show that a negative side-effect is judged more probable, even if the objective probabilities would suggest otherwise. We argue that the best explanation for these results is that the Knobe effect applies to the perception of probabilities as well: a probabilistic side-effect effect. (shrink)

Trust in the media has become an increasingly important issue in communication research. Traditional credibility research and modern media skepticism studies have bred a multiplicity of empirical findings illustrating the attitudes of the recipients toward the mass media, possible reasons for trust or skepticism, and possible consequences of media trust for the individual and society. However, the psychological causes of trust in the media have not attracted much attention in communication research. This is especially true for personality traits such as (...) individual level of interpersonal trust, which, as a global attitude, might be considered as one possible reason for the development of further trust relationships. In this paper it is assumed that the individual level of generalized social trust is one possible reason for the development of trust in the media. It is assumed that people tending to generally trust their fellow humans also express high levels of trust in the media and in other institutions. Based on a representative telephonic survey of the German population, it was found that there are positive correlations between interpersonal trust, trust in the media, and trust in other institutions. (shrink)

Words are processed more easily when they have canonical phonotactic shapes, i.e., shapes that are frequent both in the lexicon and in usage. We explore whether this cognitively grounded constraint or preference implies testable predictions about the implementation of sound change. Specifically, we hypothesise that words with canonical shapes favour, or ‘select for’, sound changes that produce words with the same shapes. To test this, we investigate a Middle English sound change known as Open Syllable Lengthening. OSL lengthened vowels in (...) disyllables such as ME /ma.kə/ make, but more or less only when they became monosyllabic and when their vowels were non-high. We predict that word shapes produced by this implementation pattern should correspond to the shapes that were most common among morphologically simple monosyllables and disyllables at the time when OSL occurred. We test this prediction against Early Middle English corpus data. Our results largely confirm our prediction: monosyllables produced by OSL indeed conformed to the shapes that were most frequent among already existing monosyllables. At the same time, the failure of OSL to affect disyllables prevented them from assuming shapes that were far more typical of morphologically complex word forms than of simple ones. This suggests that the actuation and implementation of sound changes may be even more sensitive to lexical probabilities than hitherto suspected. Also, it demonstrates how diachronic data can be used to test hypotheses about constraints on word recognition and processing. (shrink)

This paper discusses the view that subjectifications are primarily motivated by speakers’ need for self-expression. Approaching the issue from the perspective of animal signalling, we propose that semantic subjectifications are at least equally likely to reflect evaluations and attitudes read into utterances by listeners who attempt to read speakers’ minds. We compare speaker-based and listener-based theories with regard to their predictions, sketch ways in which they can be tested and report findings from first attempts at doing so. First, we report (...) evidence from diachronic corpora. Second, we describe a game-theoretic model that relates listener’s interest in speaker intentions to the average degree of speaker-honesty in a population. Third, we report preliminary results of an experiment in which we tested if listeners were more likely to interpret an utterance as indexing speaker subjectivity when they perceived speakers as more powerful. We conclude that the listener-based hypothesis of subjectification is solid enough to warrant further investigation. (shrink)

Am 10. Dezember 2018 jahrte sich zum siebzigsten Mal die Verabschiedung der Menschenrechtserklarung der Vereinten Nationen. Diese Untersuchung vergleicht das in der Menschenrechtserklarung ausgedruckte Verstandnis von Wurde und Freiheit mit der christlichen und kantischen Konzeption dieser fundamentalen Werte. So wird deutlich, worin ihr innovativer Charakter besteht und wie sehr diese Erklarung die ersten beiden Artikel des Grundgesetzes der Bundesrepublik Deutschland beeinflusst hat. Zugleich soll der Vergleich der vier Konzeptionen von Wurde und Freiheit zeigen, weshalb beispielsweise in Konfliktfallen am Lebensanfang und (...) Lebensende, bei der Frage nach der Zulassigkeit von Todesstrafe und Folter, beim Ringen um Religions-, Meinungs- und Gewissensfreiheit, beim Umgang mit Diskriminierung wegen des Geschlechts oder der sexuellen Orientierung und bei der Frage nach einem angemessenen Asylrecht diese vier Konzeptionen nicht zu denselben Antworten kommen. Deshalb ist dieses Buch als ein Angebot zu verstehen, sich selbst mit diesen Konzeptionen von Wurde und Freiheit auseinanderzusetzen, ihre jeweiligen Voraussetzungen besser zu verstehen und die hier vertretene Interpretation von Wurde und Freiheit im Hinblick auf die benannten Konfliktfalle zu beurteilen. (shrink)

First English translation of Roger Bacon’s Letter to Pope Clement IV. which has been edited by F. A. Gasquet in 1897. It is Roger Bacon’s introductory letter to the Opus maius, which he sent to Pope Clement IV in 1267 together with his fundamental work, and which summarizes his project of reforming the sciences and society of his time as described in his Opus maius.

Although he spoke rarely about them, J.M.Bochenski considered values important.However, as he was little if at all familiarwith metaethics as developed by analyticphilosophers, he was convinced that the bestdiscussion of values is to be found in thewritings of Max Scheler. The paper tries toshow that to defend Scheler's ideas on thesubject is difficult today. Indeed the authorsuggests that to talk about values is to beeasily seduced into a discussion ofpseudo-problems.