Heft 1. Der Laie über die Weishelt, von E. Bohnenstädt.--Heft 2. Über den Beryll. von K. Fleischmann.--Heft 3. Drei Schriften vom verborgenen Gott. De Deo abscondito. De quaerendo Deum. De filiatione Dei. Hrsg. von E. Bohnenstaedt.--Heft. 5. Von Gottes Sehen. De visione Dei. Von E. Bohnenstaedt.--Heft 4. Der Laie über Versuche mit der Waage. Idiota de staticis experimentis. Von H. Menzel-Rogner.--Heft 6-7. Sichtung des Alkorans. Cribratio Alkoran. 1. Buch von P. Naumann. 2.-3. Buch von G. Hölscher.--Heft 8. Über den Frieden (...) im Glauben. De pace fidei. Von L. Mohler.--Heft 9. Vom Können-Sein. De possest. Vom Gipfel der Betrachtung. De apice theoriae. Von E. Bohnenstaedt.--Heft 10. Der Laie über den Geist. Idiota de mente. Von M. Honecker und H. Menzel-Rogner.--Heft 11. Die manthematischen Schriften, übers. von J. Hofmann, mit einer Einführung und Anmerkungen versehen von J.E. Hofmann.-- --Heft 13. Vom Globusspiel. De ludo globi, übers. und mit Einführung und Anmerkungen versehen, von G. von Bredow. --Heft. 15. De docta ignorantia. Die belehrte Unwissenheit. Übers. und mit Vorwort und Anmerkungen von P. Wilpert. (2 v.)--Heft. 16. Compendium. Kompendium. Übers. und mit Einleitung und Anmerkungen hrsg. von B. Decker und K. Bormann.--Heft 17. De coniecturis. Mutmassungen. Übers. und mit Einführung und Anmerkungen hrsg. von J. Koch und W. Happ.--[18] Über den Ursprung. De principio. Deutsch mit Einführung von Maria Feigl.--Heft 19. Die höchste Stufe der Betrachtung. Herausgegeben von Hans Gerhard Senger. (shrink)

Der Körper hat Konjunktur. Als ausgestellter, verfüg- und verführbarer begegnet er uns täglichim Übermaß. Es war nur eine Frage der Zeit, bis im Spiel der sich in den Wissenschafteneinander ablösenden turns auch ein corporeal (oder body) turn ausgerufen würde. Dabeibleibt im genannten turn der Gegenstand der Untersuchung nicht selten reduziert auf das, wasman im deutschen Sprachgebrauch »Körper« nennt: ein physisches Substrat, das wie ein Dingunter Dingen beschreibbar ist. Gegen diese Verkürzung stellt der Begri des »Leibes«,spätestens seit Edmund Husserl, eine präzise (...) theoretische Intervention in die wissenschaftlicheund philosophische Diskussion um Körper und Körperlichkeit dar: Dem objektiv beobachtbaren Körper, den wir haben, wird der lebendige Leib, der wir sind, gegenübergestellt. Diesem »Leib«, seiner Geschichte, seinen Varianten und seinem Versprechen gehen dieAutoren der vorliegenden Beiträge nach. Inhaltsübersicht Emmanuel Alloa/Thomas Bedorf/Christian Grüny/Tobias Nikolaus Klass: Einleitung I. Der Leibbegriff in der Phänomenologie Emmanuel Alloa / Natalie Depraz: Edmund Husserl – „Ein merkwürdig unvollkommenkonstituiertes Ding“ – Stefan Kristensen: Maurice Merleau-Ponty I – Körperschema undleibliche Subjektivität – Emmanuel Alloa: Maurice Merleau-Ponty II – Fleisch und Dierenz – David Espinet: Martin Heidegger – Der leibliche Sinn von Sein – Thomas Bedorf: EmmanuelLevinas – Der Leib des Anderen – Karel Novotný: Körper, Leib, Aektivität in Jan Pato č kasPhänomenologie der natürlichen Welt – Julia Scheidegger: Michel Henry – TranszendentaleLeiblichkeit – Jörg Sternagel: Bernhard Waldenfels – Responsivität des Leibes – Kerstin Andermann: Hermann Schmitz – Leiblichkeit als kommunikatives Selbst- und Weltverhältnis II. Zur Geschichte des Leibbegris Emmanuel Alloa: Archaische Leiblichkeit. Die griechische Antike und die Entdeckung desKörpers – Theresia Heimerl: Der Leib Christi und der Körper des Christen: Körper und Leib alszentrale Problemzonen des Christentums – Marc Rölli: Philosophische Anthropologie im 19. Jahrhundert – Zwischen Leib und Körper – Tobias Nikolaus Klass: Friedrich Nietzsche – Denkenam „Leitfaden des Leibes“ – Andreas Cremonini: Sigmund Freud – Der gelebte vs. derphantasmatische Leib – Uta Noppeney: Kurt Goldstein und Frederik Buytendijk – Der Leib-Begri in der organismischen Biologie – Volker Schürmann: Max Scheler und Helmuth Plessner– Leiblichkeit in der Philosophischen Anthropologie – Marion Lauschke: Ernst Cassirer und AbyWarburg – Kulturanthropologie III. Grenzen und Kritik des Leibbegris Christian Grüny: Theodor W. Adorno – Soma und Sensorium – Ulrich Johannes Schneider: Michel Foucault – Der Körper und die Körper – Burkhard Liebsch: Paul Ricoeur – Das leiblicheSelbst begegnet dem Widerstand des Anderen – Mirjam Schaub: Gilles Deleuze – Was weiß ein„Körper ohne Organe“ vom Leib? – Kathrin Busch: Jean-Luc Nancy – Exposition und Berührung– Shaun Gallagher: Embodiment: Leiblichkeit in den Kognitionswissenschaften – Marie-Luise Angerer: Gender und Performance – Ist leibliche Identität ein Konstrukt? – Thomas Bedorf/Selin Gerlek: Praxistheorien – Leibkörperliche Praktiken im Vollzug. (shrink)

Unlike conceptual analysis, conceptual engineering does not aim to identify the content that our current concepts do have, but the content which these concepts should have. For this method to show the results that its practitioners typically aim for, being able to change meanings seems to be a crucial presupposition. However, certain branches of semantic externalism raise doubts about whether this presupposition can be met. To the extent that meanings are determined by external factors such as causal histories or microphysical (...) structures, it seems that they cannot be changed intentionally. This paper gives an extended discussion of this ‘externalist challenge’. Pace Herman Cappelen’s recent take on this issue, it argues that the viability of conceptual engineering crucially depends on our ability to bring about meaning change. Furthermore, it argues that, contrary to first appearance, causal theories of reference do allow for a sufficient degree of meaning control. To this purpose, it argues that there is a sense of what is called ‘collective long-range control’, and that popular versions of the causal theory of reference imply that people have this kind of control over meanings. (shrink)

In "The Quest for Consciousness," Caltech neuroscientist Christof Koch explores the biological basis of consciousness.

In which a scientist searches for an empirical explanation for phenomenal experience, spurred by his instinctual belief that life is meaningful. What links conscious experience of pain, joy, color, and smell to bioelectrical activity in the brain? How can anything physical give rise to nonphysical, subjective, conscious states? Christof Koch has devoted much of his career to bridging the seemingly unbridgeable gap between the physics of the brain and phenomenal experience. This engaging book--part scientific overview, part memoir, part futurist (...) speculation--describes Koch's search for an empirical explanation for consciousness. Koch recounts not only the birth of the modern science of consciousness but also the subterranean motivation for his quest--his instinctual belief that life is meaningful. Koch describes his own groundbreaking work with Francis Crick in the 1990s and 2000s and the gradual emergence of consciousness as a legitimate topic for scientific investigation. Present at this paradigm shift were Koch and a handful of colleagues, including Ned Block, David Chalmers, Stanislas Dehaene, Giulio Tononi, Wolf Singer, and others. Aiding and abetting it were new techniques to listen in on the activity of individual nerve cells, clinical studies, and brain-imaging technologies that allowed safe and noninvasive study of the human brain in action. Koch gives us stories from the front lines of modern research into the neurobiology of consciousness as well as his own reflections on a variety of topics, including the distinction between attention and awareness, the unconscious, how neurons respond to Homer Simpson, the physics and biology of free will, dogs, Der Ring des Nibelungen, sentient machines, the loss of his belief in a personal God, and sadness. All of them are signposts in the pursuit of his life's work--to uncover the roots of consciousness. (shrink)

A philosopher argues that state-sponsored cyberattacks against central military or civilian targets are always acts of war. What is this philosopher doing? According to conceptual analysts, the philosopher is making a claim about our concept of war. According to philosophical realists, the philosopher is making a claim about war per se. In a quickly developing literature, a third option is being explored: the philosopher is engineering the concept of war. On this view, the philosopher is making a proposal about which (...) concept we should have – even if it deviates from the extant concept, and even if it does not capture ‘what war really is’. The activity or method of proposing such revisionary definitions, as well as the metaphilosophical reflection on it, has become known as conceptual engineering. (shrink)

One aim of this article is to explore the connection between the Knobe effect and the epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE). Additionally, we report evidence about a further generalization regarding probability judgments. We demonstrate that all effects can be found within German material, using ‘absichtlich’ [intentionally], ‘wissen’ [know] and ‘wahrscheinlich’ [likely]. As the explanations discussed with regard to the Knobe effect do not suffice to explicate the ESEE, we survey whether the characteristic asymmetry in knowledge judgments is caused by a differing (...) perception of probabilities concerning the occurrence of the side-effects. Our findings show that a negative side-effect is judged more probable, even if the objective probabilities would suggest otherwise. We argue that the best explanation for these results is that the Knobe effect applies to the perception of probabilities as well: a probabilistic side-effect effect. (shrink)

Normative criteria adopted to assure just, equitable, and efficient allocation of donor organs to potential recipients has been widely praised as a model for the allocation of scarce medical resources. Because the organ transplantation program relies upon voluntary participation by potential donors, all such programs necessarily rely upon public confidence in allocation decision making protocols. Several well publicized cases have raised questions in North America about the efficacy of allocation procedures. An analysis of those cases, and the relevant technical literature, (...) suggest consistent structural deficits exist in the organ allocation process as it is applied by many individual transplantation centres. These irregularities are based upon both the failure of rank waiting as a method to guarantee just treatment and a general failure to recognize the extent to which prescriptive criteria — social values — are commonly used to screen potential organ transplant candidates. Resulting idiosyncratic determinations, and a devaluation of rank waiting as a criterion, raise fundamental questions regarding justice, fairness, and equability in the application procedure at large. To correct these structural problems in organ allocation procedures, a multicriterion model defining prescriptive criteria through the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is proposed. (shrink)

It seems natural to think that Carnapian explication and experimental philosophy can go hand in hand. But what exactly explicators can gain from the data provided by experimental philosophers remains controversial. According to an influential proposal by Shepherd and Justus, explicators should use experimental data in the process of ‘explication preparation’. Against this proposal, Mark Pinder has recently suggested that experimental data can directly assist an explicator’s search for fruitful replacements of the explicandum. In developing his argument, he also proposes (...) a novel aspect of what makes a concept fruitful, namely, that it is taken up by the relevant community. In this paper, I defend explication preparation against Pinder’s objections and argue that his uptake proposal conflates theoretical and practical success conditions of explications. Furthermore, I argue that Pinder’s suggested experimental procedure needs substantial revision. I end by distinguishing two kinds of explication projects, and showing how experimental philosophy can contribute to each of them. (shrink)

During the first 16 days after fertilization, the developing embryo has the capacity to separate into two genetically identical embryos, or monozygotic twins (triplets, etc.). Because of this capacity, philosophers typically argue that the pre-16 day embryo is not a human being. On a Biological Account of Personal Identity (BAPI), which considers us human beings as essentially organisms, the development of the embryo into an organism at 16 (or 21) days marks our origins. The development of an embryo into an (...) organism is also said to mark the point at which the embryo loses its potential to give rise to monozygotic twins. This is considered a strength of the Biological account of our origins. I will argue here that it is the BAPI's own criteria that will have to allow cases of monozygotic twinning occurring even after 16 days, and that in virtue of this a Biological Account faces twinning puzzles usually reserved for earlier accounts of our origins. (shrink)

This book takes an exciting perspective on language change, by explaining it in terms of Darwin's evolutionary theory. Looking at a number of developments in the history of sounds and words, Nikolaus Ritt shows how the constituents of language can be regarded as mental patterns, or 'memes', which copy themselves from one brain to another when communication and language acquisition take place. Memes are both stable in that they transmit faithfully from brain to brain, and active in that their (...) success at replicating depends upon their own properties. Ritt uses this controversial approach to challenge established models of linguistic competence, in which speakers acquire, use, and shape language. In Darwinian terms, language evolution is something that happens to, rather than through, speakers, and the interests of linguistic constituents matter more than those of their human 'hosts'. This book will stimulate debate among evolutionary biologists, cognitive scientists and linguists alike. (shrink)

A personable teenager with Down's syndrome became a Canadian cause célèbre a few months ago when University Hospital in Edmonton, Alberta, denied him a position on the organ transplantation waiting list. Terry Urquart lacked “reasonable” intelligence, hospital officials said, a criterion for all transplant candidates at that hospital. Protests by the boy's family, and by groups active in the cause of those with developmental disabilities, became well-photographed stories on the nightly television news and in the nation's newspapers. It did not (...) hurt the Urquart cause one bit that the 17-year-old teenager had won a gold medal in skiing at the International Special Olympics. (shrink)

The world of disability theory is currently divided between those who insist it reflects a physical fact affecting life quality and those who believe disability is defined by social prejudice. Despite a dialogue spanning bioethical, medical and social scientific literatures the differences between opposing views remains persistent. The result is similar to a figure-ground paradox in which one can see only part of a picture at any moment. This paper attempts to find areas of commonality between the opposing camps, and (...) thus to rearrange the figures of the paradox at a fundamental level. The purpose is first to identify areas in which common ground can be achieved, and secondarily, to clarify the areas in which disagreement continues. While a general and unified theory of physical difference/disability is beyond the scope of this paper the result may advance that general goal. (shrink)

Conceptual engineers aim to revise rather than describe our concepts. But what are concepts? And how does one engineer them? Answering these questions is of central importance for implementing and theorizing about conceptual engineering. This paper discusses and criticizes two influential views of this issue: semanticism, according to which conceptual engineers aim to change linguistic meanings, and psychologism, according to which conceptual engineers aim to change psychological structures. I argue that neither of these accounts can give us the full story. (...) Instead, I propose and defend the Dual Content View of Conceptual Engineering. On this view, conceptual engineering targets concepts, where concepts are understood as having two kinds of contents: referential content and cognitive content. I show that this view is independently plausible and that it gives us a comprehensive account of conceptual engineering that helps to make progress on some of the most difficult problems surrounding conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Nachfolgend veroffentlichen veröffentlichen wir in deutscher Ubersetzung Übersetzung zwei Berichte tiber über die die im im April April 1958 in Moskau abgehaltene Tagung zur Frage der 'Widersprtiche': 'Widersprüche': 'Konferencija po voprosam protivoreCij' von G. A. Volkov, erschienen in den 'Voprosy Filosofii', Moskau, 1958, 12, 163-173, und 'Konference 0 otazce rozponl rozpon1 ve svetle soudoM soudobe vedy a praxe' von N. V. Karabanov, erschienen im 'Filosoficky casopis', Prag, 1959, 1, 131-133; weiterhin den Originaltext der auf derselben Tagung gehaltenen Vortrage Vorträge von (...) E. Kolman, 'Material'naja suscnost' protivoreCija i ee otrazenie v myslenii', veröffentlicht veroffentlicht im 'Filosoficky casopis', Prag, 1959, 3, 381-391, und von A. A. Zinov'ev, '0 logiceskoj neprotirecivosti istinnych suZdenij ob izmenenijach i svjazach meZdu predmetami', veröffentlicht veroffentlicht in der polnischen Zeitschrift 'Studia Filosoficzne', 1959, 1, 124-133; und schliesslich einen kurzen Abschnitt des neuen offiziellen Lehrbuches des dialektischen und historischen Materialismus 'Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii', Moskau 1958, S. 256f., 259f. (shrink)

This book originated at a small and informal workshop held in December of 1992 in Idyllwild, a relatively secluded resort village situated amid forests in the ...

Linguistic interventions aim to change our linguistic practices. A commonly discussed type of linguistic intervention is meaning revision, which seeks to associate existing words with new or revised meanings. But why does retaining old words matter so much? Why not instead introduce new words to express the newly defined meanings? Drawing on relevant psycholinguistic research, this paper develops an empirically motivated, general, and practically useful pro tanto reason to retain rather than replace the original word during the process of conceptual (...) improvement. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Arbeit entstand im Auftrag des Osteuropa-Institutes der Universitat FreiburgjSchweiz und wurde in groBziigiger Weise von der Rockefeller Foundation unterstutzt. Ich machte diesen Institutionen hiermit meinen Dank aussprechen; insbesondere aber machte ich dem Herausgeber der Reihe "Sovietica", meinem verehrten Lehrer Prof. Dr. J. M. Bochenski danken, dem ich zahlreiche konkrete Hinweise verdanke. Da uber die marxistisch-Ieninistische Philosophie in der CSR m. W. keine einzige westliche Untersuchung vorliegt - und sei sie noch so bescheiden-, auf eigene Forschung angewiesen. Was allerdings (...) nicht war ich vallig philosophische Fragen betrifft, so konnte ich mich auf zahlreiche Hin weise von Spezialisten stiitzen; in diesem Zusammenhang machte ich mich bei den Herren Dr. H. Dahm von der Redaktion der "Ost-Probleme", Bonn, O. Kostrba yom "Radio Free Europe", Munchen, Dr. Kuhn yom Sudetendeutschen Archiv, Munchen, sowie Dr. R. Urban yom Johann Gottfried Herder-Institut, Marburg, bedanken. Zu besonderem Dank bin ich Dr. H. Slapnicka, Linz, verpfiichtet, von dem ichin wenigen Stunden oft mehr gelernt habe, als ich dureh monate1anges Studium Mtte erfahren kannen. SchlieBlieh machte ieh aueh Herrn O. Sagner von der Buchhandlung Kubon & Sagner, Munchen, danken; seiner oft muhe vollen Sueharbeit verdanke ich fast aIle Zeitschriften und Bucher, die mir zur Verfiigung standen. Der informierte Leser wird vermutlieh zahlreiche Lucken, Ungenauig keiten oder gar Fehler entdecken; ieh muG wohl nieht besonders hervor heben, wie dankbar ieh fUr entsprechende Hinweise bin, die mieh stets uber den Verlag Reidel, Dordrecht, erreichen. (shrink)

Charles Peirce claimed that the principal ingredient in assertion is an act of “taking responsibility” for the truth of what is asserted. Some people writing about the Commitment Theory of Assertion have at times construed Peirce’s claim as his espousal of that contemporary theory, but this, I argue, is mistaken. Peirce saw “taking responsibility” as the assumption, not of an obligation, but instead of a liability, a penalty to be incurred if one’s assertion turned out to be false. I then (...) consider how this point connects to other parts of Pierce’s analysis of assertion, specifically his claims that we assert to persuade, that assertion involves an intentional exhibition of our assumption of liability, and that this assumption of liability furnishes evidence for what is asserted. I conclude by sketching on Peirce’s behalf how the assumption of liability could constitute, and be intelligibly offered as, evidence for what is asserted. (shrink)