To date authors are unsure about Nietzsche's self-critical attitude regarding his Thus Spoke Zarathustra. While few doubt that the narrative reaches a dramatic climax at the end of its third part, the largely satirical fourth part invites to take this climax cum grano salis. I provide an interpretation of the dramatic structure of Thus Spoke Zarathustra by focusing on the tragic nature of Nietzsche's ideal of the Übermensch and the comical relief provided by part four. Accordingly, the completion at the (...) end of part three is relegated to a noble lie to assuage the tragic nature of Zarathustra's ideal. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is both to examine Plato's own use of the noble lie in politics and to examine it within the context of contemporary political philosophy, a context wherein at least three different assessments of the noble lie are possible. First I will consider the strengths of those (e.g. Karl Popper) who see the noble lie as part of, or at least leading to, totalitarian politics. Second I will also consider the degree to which (...) contemporary (Leo Straussian) defenders of Plato can adequately defend the noble lie. Thirdly, I will articulate and defend a third (John Rawlsian) view that mediates between the above two views, albeit in a way that finds the noble lie morally objectionable even if it is not necessarily seen as part of totalitarian political aspirations. In effect, I lean more towards the Popperian assessment of the noble lie than towards the Straussian one, even if it must be admitted that the Popperian assessment is hyperbolic. (shrink)

As is well known, the rule of the philosophers is what ultimately completes the political project in Plato's Republic. Only if the philosophers accept to rule, may the city see the light of day. Yet, as is equally well known, the philosophers are reluctant to rule. But ruling is what they are designed to do. Their entire education was constructed to prepare them for this task. And therefore, as Plato's repeatedly puts it, they will need to be compelled. How? As (...) this paper sets out to argue, it is what Plato calls the noble lie that does the job. Established in the philosophers' souls during their childhood, and tested like "gold in the fire", it is only the city-love established by the noble lie that can counteract their otherworldly desire for truth and knowledge. Designed to imbue their souls with a sense of responsibility and care, the noble can outweigh their political reluctance, and turn their eyes back to the city. (shrink)

To enact democracy, which is to live in communication with difference, requires a formative process that involves an education of the whole person for and through civic life. Drawing on Charles Mills's theory of Herrenvolk ethics and Jonathan Lear's analysis of psychosocial lapses that ail us, Sheron Fraser-Burgess and Chris Higgins pursue a critical, historiographical, and psychosocial reading of our failures to live up to this aspiration, offering (1) a critique of our tendency to saddle ourselves with a false choice (...) between a homogenizing unity and a differentiated but fractured republic; (2) a demonstration of why we must eschew a thin universalism of principles and confront difference as embodied; (3) an argument from the ethics of risk against the urge to reify and compartmentalize difference; and (4) an evocation of how deep pluralism itself might serve as a unifying creed. Civic education is not a matter of informing but of forming and cultivating vision and values. In pursuing the credal deep pluralism that is required to do justice to the prospects and perils of our democracy-in-the-making, the task of the formative educator may be more difficult; but by embracing this creed, teachers may inspire their students to do the same. (shrink)

『국가』를 올바름(正義)보다는 거짓말에 관한 대화편으로 천착하는 본 논문은 플라톤의 거짓말 이론의 씨실과 날실을 단계적으로 검토하면서 나쁜 통치와 좋은 통치라는 정치 지대에서 고상한 거짓말 이론을 정당화하려는 데에 그 목적이 있다. 고상한 거짓말 이론이야말로 시민 기만과 권력남용을 둘러싼 윤리적이고 정치 철학적인 문제를 제기함과 동시에 거짓말이 고상할 수 있는 가능한 조건과 그 이로움에 관해서 다각적으로 검토할 학문적 필요성을 제기하기 때문이다.BR/ 이를 위해 거짓말에 관한 소크라테스의 발언들을 점검하면서 아름다운 나라(kallipolis)의 정치에서 거짓말이 정당화될 수 있는 조건들 하나하나를 찾아 규명하는 작업을 시도한다. 무엇보다도 교육 수단으로서의 거짓말 (...) 문제를 다루면서, 나쁜 거짓말의 세 가지 사례를 통해 교육용 설화와 거짓말의 양립 가능성을 심층적으로 검토하고 있다. 다음으로 ‘진짜 거짓’과 ‘말을 통한 거짓’ 간의 비교 담론을 통해 약리학적 거짓말의 독특한 위상을 진단한 후, 어떤 차원에서 통치자가 거짓말을 할 권리를 갖게 되는지를 주의 깊게 따져보고 있다. 거짓말에 관한 이상의 몇 가지 예비적 고찰을 토대로 고상한 거짓말의 신화 분석에 본격적으로 착수하여, 신화의 전반부로는 꿈꾸는 상태와 깨어 있는 상태의 대조를 통해 교육과 양육의 문제를 다루는 토착 주민 신화를, 후반부는 공화주의적 정의를 구현하고 국가 내 계급 분화를 정당화하는 금속의 신화를 각각 살펴본다. 이 과정에서 설득의 최우선 대상이 통치자라는 조건이 거짓말의 도덕성에 필수 요건이 되는 지평을 궁구하고 있다.BR/ 고상한 거짓말 이론은 이상 국가 내에서 사회 질서, 조화 그리고 안정성을 유지하는 수단일 뿐 아니라 시민들 상호 간의 통합과 헌신을 가능하게 만듦으로써 국가 전체의 행복에 이바지할 수 있다. 또한 금속의 신화는 본래적 성향을 기반으로 사회적 역할을 부과하는 통치 과업의 중요성을 일깨우고 있다. 나아가 현대 정치의 이데올로기 차원에서 볼 때, 플라톤의 고상한 거짓말 개념은 진리와 조작 간의 예술적인 균형을 궁구하는 범례이기도 하다. 복잡하게 얽혀있는 오늘날의 국내외적인 정치 시스템에서 고상한 거짓말은 앞으로도 진리의 본질, 정의 그리고 정부의 역할에 관한 논쟁과 성찰을 끊임없이 불러일으킬 플라톤의 정치 철학적 유산임에 틀림없다. 그의 고상한 거짓말 이론은 이상 국가의 근간을 이루고 통치의 본질과 사회적 결속에 대해 깊은 통찰을 제공해 주는 원천이기 때문이다. 이 이론은 더 이상 이상 국가 프로그램에 포함된 ‘야비한’(ignoble) 오점이나 흠결이 아니라 도덕적으로 수용 가능한 선택이자 ‘고상한’(noble) 전략이다. 따라서 본래 불의하고 비도덕적이라고 간주되는 거짓말을 배척할 것이 아니라 덕의 발달과 자유 실현에 도움이 되는 도덕적으로 존경할 만한 거짓말의 합법적 차원을 새롭게 갱신해 나가야 한다. (shrink)

A special edition of the journal Social Epistemology on Fuller’s Thomas Kuhn.

“Could we contrive one noble lie?” implies there is one noble lie. The Autochthony Claim and the Hierarchical Claim follow. The article argues the former is the “one” noble lie. It argues the claims are both normative and descriptive propositions; both descriptively true about worldly polities in Plato’s day and historically. While the Hierarchical Claim is normatively true of the Best City, the Autochthony Claim is normatively false. The article offers a tentative explanation why jointly they comprise (...) a foundational myth of political life. (shrink)

Plato’s programme for establishing his ideal state involved propagating two foundation myths for it, described by Socrates as a “noble lie”, which were designed to persuade its citizens to embrace the classes of society to which they had been assigned, and their roles within them, contentedly and in harmony with their fellow citizens. Because most citizens were judged incapable of understanding the truth about the most important matters, the rulers of the ideal state were authorised to tell them whatever (...) stories, true or false, would induce them to behave well. Advocates of the management of corporate culture similarly emphasise the potency of story-telling and myth-making in inducing employees to adopt the beliefs, values and assumptions that corporate leaders consider desirable for both corporate performance and employee wellbeing. There are similarities between Plato’s programme for his ideal state and the programmes recommended by advocates of the management of corporate culture. There are also similarities between them in the ethical questions that they raise. Do corporate leaders have the moral authority to shape people’s beliefs, values and assumptions in the ways that these programmes entail? Are the outcomes to which those programmes lead really beneficial for all those who are affected by them? Even assuming that those outcomes are beneficial, how likely are the strategies proposed for realising them to be successful? Literature that explores these ethical issues is sparse, and this paper argues that it is doubtful whether any of these questions can be answered decidedly in the affirmative. (shrink)

The tradition of the political lie infamously commences with Platos Noble Lie in the Republic. It is woven with great care into his utopian state on the premise that Philosopher-Rulers are incorruptible wielders of political power.Most treatments of the Noble Lie understand this and then proceed to dismiss Plato on the basis of his unrealistic assumptions about human nature. But when consideration is extended to the Laws, one finds a far more nuanced and relevant Plato uncomfortable with the (...) > practice of political deception. This article elaborates on the Noble Lie and its assumptions, and then explains how the later Platos increased scepticism about human nature informed a different policy in his Laws. (shrink)

Philosophers from Plato and Augustine to Heidegger, Nozick, and Baudrillard have warned us of the dangers of living on too heavy a diet of illusion and make-believe. But contemporary cultural life provides broader, more attractive opportunities to do so than have existed at any other point in history. The gentle forms of self-deceit that such experiences require of us, and that so many have regarded as ethically unwholesome or psychologically self-destructive, can in fact serve as vital means to political reconciliation, (...) cultural enrichment, and even (a kind of) utopia. -/- The first half of the book provides a highly schematic definition of simulated experience and compares it with some claims about the nature of simulation made by other philosophers about what it is for one thing to be a simulation of another. The author then provides a critical survey of the views of some major authors about the value of certain specific types of simulated experience, mainly in order to point out the many puzzling inconsistencies and ambiguities that their thoughts upon the topic often exhibit. In the second half of the book, the author defends an account of the positive social value of simulated experience and compares his own position to the ideas of a number of utopian political thinkers, as well as to Plato's famous doctrine of the "noble lie." He then makes some tentative practical suggestions about how a proper appreciation of the value of simulated experience might influence public policy decisions about such matters as the justification of taxation, paternalistic "choice management," and governmental transparency. (shrink)

Hume scholars have been anxious to point out that when Hume calls Justice, chastity and so on artificial virtues, he is in no way denying that they are real virtues. I shall argue that they are mistaken, and that anyone who wants to understand Hume's account of Justice and his category of artificial virtues must take seriously his choice of the word ‘artifice,’ recognizing that it means not only ‘Skill in designing and employing expedients,’ but also ‘address, cunning, trickery.'My suggestion (...) will seem strange given Hume's own repeated plea that we not take the term ‘artifice’ too seriously. Yet while it is generally good policy to take people - at least philosophers - at their word, this is a Justified exception, Justified not only by Hume's known proclivities to irony and subtlety, but also by the implications of hearkening to his plea. To see the implications of not taking the terms ‘artificial’ and ‘artifice’ seriously, one can read either Duncan Forbes’ or Barry Stroud's criticisms of Hume's account of Justice. (shrink)

The _Paris Agreemen_t requires that States take action to avoid dangerous climate change. It is informed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that summarizes hundreds of scientific articles, yet the language of the treaty does not mirror the scientific literature. Instead, the Agreement encourages States to join in a collective effort without assigning responsibility for past emissions. The Agreement tells a story that does not track the truth. One justification is to see it as a "noble lie," and (...) that, like in the _Republic_, it could be the story that States need to hear to do what must be done. (shrink)

For the traditional legalistic discourse on the International Criminal Court, “politics” is a bête noire that compromises the independence of the Court and thus needs to be avoided and overcome. In response to this legalistic approach, a burgeoning body of literature insists that the Court does not exist and operate “beyond politics”, arguing that the ICC is an institution where law and politics are intimately connected. The present article seeks to contribute to this “non-traditional” literature by addressing two of its (...) fundamental weaknesses: First, writers of the “non-traditional camp” often present a rather limited view of “politics”; in particular, they have shied away from taking the radical step of portraying and analysing the ICC as a “political actor”. This undermines both its critical and constructive potential. Secondly, these commentators offer a simplistic explanation as to why “traditionalists” treat politics as the ICC’s bête noire: Traditionalists, they claim, are “legalists” with scant interest in and understanding of politics. By focusing on the ICC’s nature as a political actor, this article does not only paint a more nuanced picture of the ICC but also demonstrates the constructive potential of this understanding of the ICC to shed light on the so-called “peace versus justice dilemma”. And secondly, it demonstrates that precisely because the ICC is and ought to be a prudent political actor, it must officially disavow politics. The “noble lie” of disavowing politics, therefore, is a prudential strategy to avoid dangerous moral and political consequences and, ultimately, to secure the continued existence of the ICC itself. (shrink)

Abstract:The Paris Agreement requires that States take action to avoid dangerous climate change. It is informed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that summarizes hundreds of scientific articles, yet the language of the treaty does not mirror the scientific literature. Instead, the Agreement encourages States to join in a collective effort without assigning responsibility for past emissions. The Agreement tells a story that does not track the truth. One justification is to see it as a "noble lie," and (...) that, like in the Republic, it could be the story that States need to hear to do what must be done. (shrink)

In this chapter, I examine the writings of Mark Twain on lying, especially his essays "On the decay of the Art of Lying" and "My First Lie, and How I Got Out of It." I show that Twain held that there were two kinds of lies: the spoken lie and the silent lie. The silent lie is the lie of not saying what one is thinking, and is far more common than the spoken lie. The greatest silent lies, according to (...) Twain, were the national silent lies that there was nothing wrong with slavery (the U.S.), that there was nothing wrong with the prosecution of Alfred Dreyfus (France), and that there was nothing wrong with imperialism (UK). According to Twain, lying is unavoidable. Since lying is unavoidable, one must simply avoid injurious lies, and tell beneficial lies. (shrink)

“The human being embodies a tension between a nature which has since been lost and an unreachable Divine Creator,” writes Rudolf Borchardt in his book The Passionate Gardener. And he continues: “The garden stands at precisely the center of this tension and displaces itself, in accord with its fluctuations in the epoch and the individual, toward one or the other: toward nature or creativity. This is the deepest reason for which the human being dreams that our origins lie in a (...) garden, and that the garden is the place in which we achieve enlightenment; this is why we hope to find redemption in a garden, and why we look for solace there.”2What Borchardt articulates so well is that a garden is not just an enactment of a.. (shrink)

This article undertakes to examine the reception of Platonic theories of falsification in the contemporary philosophy of Leo Strauss and his adherents. The aim of the article is to consider the Straussian response to, and interaction with, Platonic ideas concerning deception and persuasion with an emphasis on the arguments found in the Laws. The theme of central interest in this analysis is Plato’s development of paramyth in the Laws. Paramyth entails the use of rhetorical language in order to persuade the (...) many that it is to their advantage to obey certain laws. It does so without explaining in detail why a given law is ethically correct and its use assumes that the audience, on the whole, is not capable of understanding the finer philosophical underpinnings of the law. The so-called ‘noble lie’ of the Republic is also considered in this context. The crucial issue, for Plato if not for Strauss, is whether or not an instance of falsification, however minor, for the purposes of persuasion contains ‘truth-value’, that is, whether it is morally justifiable in terms of ends and means. In terms of Strauss’s reception of Plato, such issues as ancient Hebrew mysticism, Medieval Jewish and Islamic scholarship and Heideggerian Phenomenology figure in the argument. Ultimately, the article finds that Strauss and his followers have constructed a particular view of Platonic ideas that, while unique, is not compatible with their original signification. (shrink)

From nearly the author's first experience entering the underwater city of Rapture in BioShock, she is treated to a taste of Andrew Ryan's propaganda. Andrew Ryan regularly says that citizens of Rapture need to avoid all contact with the surface world because it's filled with parasites who seek to destroy Rapture. Even though what Ryan says about the outside world is true, he's lying because he believes it to be false. According to Harry Frankfurt, bullshit is when the speaker doesn't (...) particularly care whether what she says is true or false. The analysis in this chapter suggests that propaganda is more closely connected to bullshitting than lying. The author says that if propaganda is more closely associated with bullshit than lies, then this also means that one should be particularly worried by governments (or individuals with power, such as Andrew Ryan) that engage in lots of propaganda. (shrink)

This chapter examines the views of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle on lying. It it outlines the differences between different kinds of falsehoods in Plato (real falsehoods and falsehoods in words), the difference between myths and lies, the 'noble' (i.e., pedigree) lie in The Republic, and how Plato defended rulers lying to non-rulers about, for example, eugenics. It considers whether Socrates's opposition to lying is consistent with Socratic irony, and especially with his praise of his interlocutors as wise. Finally, it (...) looks at Aristotle's condemnation of lies, and asks whether lies to enemies, and self-deprecating lies by the magnanimous person, are not base. (shrink)

Socrates' attitude towards falsehood is quite puzzling in the Republic. Although Socrates is clearly committed to truth, at several points he discusses the benefits of falsehood. This occurs most notably in Book 3 with the "noble lie" (414d-415c) and most disturbingly in Book 5 with the "rigged sexual lottery" (459d-460c). This raises the question: What kinds of falsehoods does Socrates think are beneficial, and what kinds of falsehoods does he think are harmful? And more broadly: What can this tell (...) us about the relationship between ethics and epistemology? The key to answering these questions lies in an obscure and paradoxical passage in Book II; at 382a-d Socrates distinguishes between "true falsehoods" and "impure lies." True falsehoods are always bad, but impure lies are sometimes beneficial. Despite Socrates' insistence that he is not saying anything deep, his distinction is far from straightforward. Nevertheless, in order to determine why some falsehoods are beneficial and why some are always harmful, we must understand what exactly true falsehoods are and how they differ from impure lies. In this paper, I argue that true falsehoods are a restricted class of false beliefs about ethics; they are false beliefs about how one should live and what one should pursue. I refer to these beliefs as "normative commitments." False normative commitments are always pernicious because they create and sustain psychological disharmony. Unlike true falsehoods, impure lies can be about anything. Nevertheless, they are only beneficial when they help produce and sustain true normative commitments. I argue that the upshot of this is that practical concerns have a kind of primacy over theoretical concerns. (shrink)

Samuel Johnson has an interesting comment on consequences and the telling of “white lies.” For example “Sick People and Children are often to be deceived for their Good.” David Hume apparently endorses this concept in one of his letters. Both Johnson and Rousseau anticipate Kant’s argument about consequences in that one is to tell the truth under all circumstances. Hume, I argue, would take issue with this claim in that there are cases that warrant telling white lies. Elsewhere he speaks (...) about “harmless liars” who indulge in “lying or fiction... in humorous stories.” And he says “Noble pride and spirit may openly display itself when one lies under calamity [defamation or slander] or opposition of any kind,” especially if the opposition puts one’s life in grave danger, so one’s self-preservation is threatened. Under situations like these, lying is justified. In regard to fiction, if lying is for the purpose of entertainment and where “truth is not of any importance,” it is permissible. These cases are discussed in some detail, and they offer, along with their analysis, a pragmatic defense of Hume’s position. (shrink)

The purpose of the present article is to explicate and criticize the most detailed philosophical appreciation of the ‘noble’ and other lies in Plato on a Straussian basis: Carl Page’s instructive 1991 article titled ‘The Truth about Lies in Plato’s Republic’. I carefully summarize and criticize Page’s sober, scholarly approach to the subject matter in question. Ultimately I reject his attempt to justify the ‘noble’ and other lies told by both Plato and contemporary government leaders.

A more provocative subject than “lying in politics” is difficult to imagine. Everybody, from the proverbial “Joe Sixpack” to ivory-tower philosophers, can wax eloquently on the subject, if only because easy-to-find, shocking examples abound. If moral outrage were judged an essential vitamin, then condemning dishonesty undoubtedly guarantees a daily megadose. Unfortunately, at least for those who crave self-indulgent outrage, the anti-lying case is less than 100 percent compelling. It is a quagmire of the first order, if only because those who (...) cherish frankness also usually confess to lying. Hannah Arendt once suggested that lies are a necessary and justifiable tool of the statesman's trade. Formulating damnation criteria invites mind-boggling paradoxes, and strident defenders of truth-telling, with scant exception, admit that falsehoods are “sometimes” permitted for “good” reasons. And what might be these “good reasons”? Who can say for sure? Centuries of erudite scholarship on this point might be encapsulated as “Lying to me is bad, but I can consent to deceiving others for noble purposes, as artfully decided by myself.”. (shrink)

In Plato’s Laws, the Athenian Stranger maintains that law should consist of both persuasion (πειθώ) and compulsion (βία) (IV.711c, IV.718b-d, and IV.722b). Persuasion can be achieved by prefacing the laws with preludes (προοίμια), which make the citizens more eager to obey the laws. Although scholars disagree on how to interpret the preludes’ persuasion, they agree that the preludes instill true beliefs and give citizens good reasons for obeying the laws. In this paper I refine this account of the preludes by (...) arguing that the primary purpose of the preludes is to motivate correct action, and that for citizens who lack rational-governance this is achieved via useful false beliefs. That is to say, in many cases, the prelude functions as a “noble lie” (γενναῖον ψεῦδος). (shrink)

Many scholars have viewed the noble lie as fundamentally a device for educating the non-philosophers in the Kallipolis. On this reading, the elite and sophisticated philosopher rulers lie to the non-philosophers, who are unable to fully grasp the truth; such lies help motivate the non-philosophers towards virtuous activity and the promotion of the common good. Hence, according to many scholars, the falsehoods of the noble lie play no role in motivating fully accomplished adult philosophers towards virtue. The motivation (...) for this view is that it would seem strange that the wisest citizens, who have knowledge of the Forms, believe something as far-fetched as the myth of the metals. However, this paper challenges this tradition by arguing that the falsehoods of the noble lie are fundamental to the philosophers’ virtuous dispositions. More precisely, this paper argues that the non-reasoning part of the rulers believes the falsehoods of the noble lie and that these false beliefs have positive ethical value because the non-reasoning part of the soul is too unsophisticated to grasp the complete truth. Thus, the non-reasoning part of a philosopher’s soul requires false beliefs in the same way that non-philosophers require false beliefs. (shrink)

The Republic’s noble lie is widely read as an endorsement of political difference that opposes the democratic ideals of its Athenian setting. Once the text’s exclusionary political realities and rhetorical structure are attended to, however, the passages no longer appear as the template for an essentialist politics or the act of political deception they are typically taken to be. What they do is lay bare the ‘artifice’ (mēchanē) by which regimes – including classical Athens – produce membership status as (...) a ‘natural’ category. Plato presents the regulatory fiction that one’s political ‘kind’ (genos) expresses a pre-given status as an open secret. Given the privileged awareness he affords the reader, the noble lie may be fruitfully read as revealing – not concealing – that the ‘natural’ distinctions of an exclusionary citizenship politics are the effects of willful political power. This narrative strategy takes on specific significance in the context of the blood-based membership politics of Athens, which had its own noble lie. Accordingly, Plato’s text is shown to provoke insights into questions of democratic difference usually assumed beyond its purview. The Republic is read as exposing the workings of an essentialist politics it is typically thought instead to originate and prescribe. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: -/- [99] JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 23:1 JANUARY 198 5 Book Reviews Kenneth Dorter. Plato's 'Phaedo': An Interpretation. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982. Pp. xi + 233. $28.50. Kenneth Dorter of the University of Guelph has given us a useful and unusual study of the Phaedo, which will attract the interest of a variety of Plato's readers. He provides the careful studies of the dialogue's (...) arguments for immortality to be expected in a sound commentary, paying close attention to the text as well as to recent scholarship, and displaying a good sense of argument. What gives the book additional interest, however, are its features as an interpretation of the Phaedo. Two stand out. First, Dorter wishes to give full weight not only to the logic of the arguments but also to the dramatic details of Plato's writing, believing these to be important in disclosing Plato's intentions. Secondly, he reads the Phaedo in light of a more general understanding of Plato's philosophy, especially the nature of the soul in its cosmic as well as individual aspects. Much of this is set out in a final speculative chapter, where Dorter seeks to make intelligible Plato's developing conception of soul by means of such notions as energy and poles of consciousness. Not every reader will be persuaded; but Dorter is to be commended for an attempt to move the discussion beyond the Phaedo and Plato's own vocabulary. The study gains its coherence from Dorter's belief that Plato's view of soul cannot support the ostensible aim of the dialogue, to provide reassurance of personal immortality. Although he has no doubt that for the Platonic Socrates there is "a meaningful sense in which we may be called immortal" (94, cf. 159), Dorter's analysis must be stretched to provide that sense. In part this is a result of his assessment of the arguments. The first, from reciprocity in nature, can at most show that, given the eternal nature of the world, soul and corporeality in general must continue to exist. The argument from recollection can point only to a non-empirical element in our knowledge ; that from the soul's kinship with the divine is best seen as an analogy developed to awaken within us a sense of eternity. The final argument, though containing fallacies (157), will support the conclusion that immortal soul is imperishable as long as soul is regarded as motive force in the universe, in the first argument's sense. In none of these discussions, then, can Plato's reasoning yield up personal survival. But there is another part to Dorter's case, underlying this conclusion. For Plato the individual human being is a composite of soul and body; so even if Plato were to prove the immortality of the soul he could never establish personal survival (63-64). It is not surprising then that Dorter is left with a doctrine of immortality either reduced to a "discovery of eternity within ourselves" (77), or else dissolved into a principle of enduring cosmic energy. So in neither case does it seem meaningful for Plato to say that we are immortal: the eternal which we sense is no more us than it is anything else. Although it is of course possible that Plato did not intend this consequence of his arguments, Dorter thinks otherwise. In support he invokes literary features of the dialogue to argue that Plato operates on one level for the less sophisticated (who wish to be persuaded of personal survival) and on another for the philosophically reflective reader. Dorter treats the textual evidence for this claim with an appropriate modesty, and tries to justify Plato's apparent duplicity as an attempt to convince the weak by a 'noble lie' (95-97). Nevertheless this leads Dorter to mix together too quickly for this reader popular religion, myth, and metaphor. To the fact that Plato does not espouse the language of popular religion literally, Dorter adds his own view of myth as an imaginative appeal to emotion that can be translated without loss into rational discourse (7, 165, a95). So the accounts of the afterlife at 8oc-84 b... (shrink)

This lecture asks whether judges might sometimes be morally justified in covert law-breaking in the interests of justice, the rule of law or good governance. Many historical examples of this phenomenon, are provided, drawn mainly from the British legal tradition, but also from Australia, Canada, India and the United States. Judicial noble lies are distinguished from fig-leaves and wishful thinking, and the relative importance of logic and pragmatism in legal reasoning is discussed. After examining arguments for and against judicial (...) subterfuge, it is concluded that in modern liberal democracies subterfuge is justified only to avoid extreme injustices or violations of the rule of law. (shrink)

The nihilists are right, admits philosopher Loyal Rue. The universe is blind and aimless, indifferent to us and void of meaning. There are no absolute truths and no objective values. There is no right or wrong way to live, only alternative ways. There is no correct reading of a text or a picture or a dance. God is dead, nihilism reigns. But, Rue adds, nihilism is a truth inconsistent with personal happiness and social coherence. What we need instead is a (...) new myth, a noble lie. Only a noble lie can save us from the psychological and social chaos now threatened by the spread of skepticism about the meaning of life and the universe. In By the Grace of Guile, Loyal Rue offers a wide ranging look at the importance of deception in nature and in human society, concluding with an argument for a noble lie to replace the religious beliefs rejected by modern thought. Most of the book is a provocative apology for deception, illuminating its role in the shaping of history, evolution, personality, and society. Ranging from the Bible and Greek philosophy, to Saint Augustine and Montaigne, to Galileo, Kirkegaard, and Freud, Rue shows that it may be more accurate to describe the history of our culture as a flight from deception than as a quest for truth. He turns then to the natural world to reveal how deception works at every level of life, ranging from plants that mimic dung, carrion, or prey to lure insects that then spread pollen, to a remarkable African insect (Acanthaspis petax) that bedecks itself with dead ants and enters the ant colony undetected to binge at will. Moreover, he points out that psychological research has shown that strategies of deception and self-deception are essential to our personal well-being, that we sometimes shore up our self-esteem by deceptive means, by leaving others in a state of ignorance, by manipulating others into a state of false belief, by suppressing information from consciousness, and by fabricating or distorting our own sense of reality. And he argues that social coherence is achievable only within certain optimal limits of deception--the social fabric would be threatened by an overabundance of lies and false promises, of course, but it would also collapse if everyone were perfectly honest all the time. Finally, he argues that society is caught up in a Kulturkampf with nihilists promoting intellectual and moral relativism and realists defending objective and universal truths. The noble lie, says Rue, would introduce a third voice, one which first agrees with the nihilists that universal myths are pretentious lies, but then insists, against the nihilists, that without such lies humanity cannot survive. The challenge, he concludes, is ultimately an aesthetic one: it remains for the artists, poets, novelists, musicians, filmmakers, and other masters of illusion to seduce us into an embrace with a noble lie. We need a new myth that tells us where we have come from, what our nature is, and how we should live together--a story with the courage and presumption to say how things really are and what really matters. (shrink)

En el Fedón, tras ofrecer numerosos argumentos a favor de la inmortalidad del alma, se introduce un mythos acerca de su vida ultraterrena. Dado el tenor del tema en cuestión y las limitaciones humanas para dar con un logos estrictamente verdadero al respecto, Sócrates y sus allegados acuerdan en que se debe buscar el “más difícil de refutar” (85d1) entre los logoi humanos. Este trabajo intenta determinar en qué medida la asociación entre el mito presentado hacia el final del diálogo (...) y los argumentos precedentes contribuye a ese objetivo. En este sentido pretende mostrar, por un lado, que el mito mencionado posee los caracteres atribuidos a la noble mentira en R. II-III –texto que plantea la necesidad de acudir a relatos que, aunque ficticios, resultan útiles para instaurar la justicia en el alma del auditorio–; y, por el otro, que en virtud de su carácter persuasivo, el mito contribuye a fortalecer el logos hasta allí desarrollado para volverlo lo más irrefutable posible, generando confianza en la necesidad de llevar adelante una vida virtuosa, inclusive en el auditorio que no forma parte del círculo filosófico. (shrink)

This paper examines the attitudes toward political persuasion at work in the writings of Han Feizi (280-233 BCE). Particular attention is given to differentiating Han Feizi's thought from Western analogs under which it has suffered hermeneutically, especially comparisons with Plato's so-called "noble lie." After probing some of the psycho-social assumptions of ancient Greek versus Chinese political discourse, Han Feizi's own view is reconstructed, according to which practices of deception and secrecy are permissible under specific moral and political conditions. It (...) is argued that not only is the account which emerges a more charitable interpretation of Han Feizi, but also that it is independently attractive as a helpful and realistic lens through which to view contemporary anxieties concerning political discourse and transparency. (shrink)

Socrate's dialogue with the young student, Theaetetus, is a case of the highest form of education: a ‘divine service’ to the state of Athens, to Theaetetus' family and friends, and to Theaetetus himself. It is less a means for Socrates (or Plato) to present his theory of knowledge than a sort of ‘noble lie’ designed and intended by Socrates to keep Theaetetus both appropriately humble and hungry for wisdom. The progress of the dialogue is an allegory of moral education, (...) a picturing of what Aristotle later laid out more pedantically in the Nicomachean Ethics. (shrink)

Let me first explain what I am not attacking in this paper. I am not attacking, for instance, the right of free speech or any of the other specific rights listed in the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights or the United Nations' Charter. I am, rather, attacking any specific right's being called a ‘human right’. I mean to show that any such designation is not only fraudulent but, in case anyone might want to say that there can be noble (...) lies, grossly wicked, amounting indeed to genocide. (shrink)

The surprising story of how Greek classics are being pressed into use in contemporary China to support the regime’s political agenda As improbable as it may sound, an illuminating way to understand today’s China and how it views the West is to look at the astonishing ways Chinese intellectuals are interpreting—or is it misinterpreting?—the Greek classics. In Plato Goes to China, Shadi Bartsch offers a provocative look at Chinese politics and ideology by exploring Chinese readings of Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, and (...) other ancient writers. She shows how Chinese thinkers have dramatically recast the Greek classics to support China’s political agenda, diagnose the ills of the West, and assert the superiority of China’s own Confucian classical tradition. In a lively account that ranges from the Jesuits to Xi Jinping, Bartsch traces how the fortunes of the Greek classics have changed in China since the seventeenth century. Before the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the Chinese typically read Greek philosophy and political theory in order to promote democratic reform or discover the secrets of the success of Western democracy and science. No longer. Today, many Chinese intellectuals use these texts to critique concepts such as democracy, citizenship, and rationality. Plato’s “Noble Lie,” in which citizens are kept in their castes through deception, is lauded; Aristotle’s Politics is seen as civic brainwashing; and Thucydides’s criticism of Athenian democracy is applied to modern America. What do antiquity’s “dead white men” have left to teach? By uncovering the unusual ways Chinese thinkers are answering that question, Plato Goes to China opens a surprising new window on China today. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:167 THE HUME LITERATURE FOR 1982 The Hume literature from 1925 to 1976 has been thoroughly covered in my book Fifty Years of Hume Scholarship: A Bibliographical Guide (Edinburgh University Press, 1978; £9.50), which also lists the main earlier writings on Hume. Publications of the years 1977 to 1981 were listed in Hume Studies in previous Novembers. What follows here will bring the record up to the end of (...) 1982. Readers are invited to inform me of any omissions, and to send me offprints of their own articles and reviews. The intention is to maintain a complete bibliographical record of critical work on Hume, by the regular publication in Hume Studies of an annual bibliography, with addenda consisting of items omitted through ignorance in previous years. References to recently-appearing reviews (of books from earlier lists) are given at the end. The following abbreviations of journal titles are used here: APQAmerican Philosophical Quarterly JHIJournal of the History of Ideas JHPJournal of the History of Philosophy JPJournal of Philosophy PASProceedings of the Aristotelian Society PBPhilosophical Books PQPhilosophical Quarterly PRPhilosophical Review RIPRevue Internationale de Philosophie RMReview of Metaphysics TLSTimes Literary Supplement Other abbreviations should be obvious enough, and mainly follow the British Standard (no. 4148). 168 AIKEN, H. D. 'The Originality of Hume's Theory of Obligation', Phil. & Phenomenol. Res. 42, 374-83. BADIA CABRERA, M. A. 'Milagro, testimonio y verdad. El significado de la crítica de Hume', Dialogos (Puerto Rico) 17, 37-52. BAIER, A. 'Hume's Account of our Absurd Passions', JP_ 79, 643-51. [652] BARON, M. 'Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of his Artificial Virtues', Can. J. Phil. 12, 539-55. BERRY, CJ. Hume, Hegel and Human Nature, pt. 2 (55124 ). The Hague, etc. [Hume Studies 9 (1983) 200-3] BERRY, CJ. 'Hume on Rationality in History and Social Life', History & Theory 21, 234-47. BUNZL, M. 'Humean Counterfactuals', JHP 20, 171-7. CALLICOTT, J. B. 'Hume's Is/Ought Dichotomy and the Relation of Ecology to Leopold's Land Ethic', Environmental Ethics 4, 163-74. CAPALDI, N., KING, J. & LIVINGSTON, D. 'The Hume Literature of the 1970s', Philosophical Topics 12, no. 3, 167-92. COLWELL, G.G. 'On Defining Away the Miraculous', Philosophy 57, 327-37. DAVIES, B. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 52-9 and 108-18. Oxford. DEL BARCO COLLAZOS, J. L. 'Evidencia y verdad en la epistemologia de Hume', Anuario filosófico 15, 175-84. DEL BARCO COLLAZOS, J. L. 'La teoría de la impresión en Hume', Anuario filosofico 15, 85-112. DRAPER, T. 'Hume and Madison: The Secrets of Federalist Paper No. 10', Encounter 58, (Feb.) 34-47. FARR, J. 'Humean Explanations in the Moral Sciences', Inquiry 25, 57-80. FERN, R. L. 'Hume's Critique of Miracles: An Irrelevant Triumph', Relig. Studies 18, 337-54. FITZPATRICK, J. 'Lonergan and Hume [I-IV: various aspects]', New Blackfriars 63, 122-30, 219-28, 275-86, 364-72. 169 FLAGE, D.E. 'Relative Ideas Revisited: A Reply to Thomas', Hume Studies 8, 158-71. FLAGE, D.E. 'Hume's Dualism', Nous 16, 527-41. FLEW, A. 'Another Idea of Necessary Connection', Philosophy 57, 487-94. FLEW, A. '"Hume on Space and Geometry": One Reservation ', Hume Studies 8, 62-5. [66-9] FORBES, D. 'Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment', in R. H. Campbell & A. S. Skinner, The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, 186204. Edinburgh. FORCE, J. E. 'Hume and Johnson on Prophecy and Miracles: Historical Context', JH_I 43, 463-75. FRIEMAN, J. 'Boswell Confronts Hume: An Encounter with the Great Infidel', Free Inquiry 2, 22-5. GALGAN, G.J. The Logic of Modernity, 118-36 ('Hume: The Breakdown of Certitude'). New York S London. HALL, R. 'The Hume Literature for 1981', Hume Studies 8, 172-7. HALLER, R. Urteile und Ereignisse, 76-85 ('Humes Analyse'). Munich. HAUSMAN, A. 'It Ain't Necessity, So... (with Apologies to George Gershwin)', Hume Studies 8, 87-101. HILL, E. 'Hume and the Delightful Tragedy Problem', Philosophy 57, 319-26. HOERSTER, N. 'David Hume', in N. Hoerster, Klassiker des philosophischen Denkens, vol. 2, 7-46. Munich. JONES, G. E. 'Vindication, Hume and Induction', Can. J. Phil. 12, 119-29. JONES, P. 'Laughter', PAS... (shrink)

Despite his strong objections to anti-Semitism, it will be argued that Nietzsche held a curious conspiracy theory about the Jews that is uniquely his own. Modern Jews, he declared, had the power to have mastery over Europe. And Ancient Jews exercised a remarkable power of self-preservation when they got others to accept the slave morality of Christianity. The second claim is shown to have a setting in Nietzsche’s own theory of the genealogy of morals. But it is argued that that (...) theory is defective as an explanation of the genealogy of the Judeo-Christian morality Nietzsche despised. It is also argued that Nietzsche thinks that the noble lie, as opposed to the asceticism of truth seeking, is itself an expression of the “will to power”. But this raises a serious problem for what Nietzsche thought was the status of his own genealogical enterprise. Is his genealogy of morals an example of ascetic truth seeking to be depreciated? Or is it a (not so) “noble lie” that Nietzsche has tried to foist upon us? This is not a profound issue of Nietzsche hermeneutics that Nietzsche apologists might have us believe; rather it is an epistemological muddle on the part of Nietzsche. (shrink)