The paper proposes a way of bridging the gapbetween physical processes in the brain and the ''''felt''''aspect of sensory experience. The approach is based onthe idea that experience is not generated by brainprocesses themselves, but rather is constituted by theway these brain processes enable a particular form of''''give-and-take'''' between the perceiver and theenvironment. From this starting-point we are able tocharacterize the phenomenological differences betweenthe different sensory modalities in a more principledway than has been done in the past. We are also (...) ableto approach the issues of visual awareness andconsciousness in a satisfactory way. Finally weconsider a number of testable empirical consequences,one of which is the striking prediction of thephenomenon of ''''change blindness''''. (shrink)

Observers inspected normal, high quality color displays of everyday visual scenes while their eye movements were recorded. A large display change occurred each time an eye blink occurred. Display changes could either involve "Central Interest" or "Marginal Interest" locations, as determined from descriptions obtained from independent judges in a prior pilot experiment. Visual salience, as determined by luminance, color, and position of the Central and Marginal interest changes were equalized. -/- The results obtained were very similar to those obtained in (...) prior experiments showing failure to detect changes occurring simultaneously with saccades, flicker, or “mudsplashes” in the visual scene: Many changes were very hard to detect, and Marginal Interest changes were harder to detect than Central Interest changes. -/- Analysis of eye movements showed, as expected, that the probability of detecting a change depended on the eye’s distance from the change location. However a surprising finding was that both for Central and Marginal Interest changes, evenwhen observers were directly fixating the change locations (within 1 degree),more than 40% of the time they still failed to see the changes. It seems that looking at something does not guarantee you “ see” it. (shrink)

In this article we argue that philosophy can facilitate improvement in cross-disciplinary science. In particular, we discuss in detail the Toolbox Project, an effort in applied epistemology that deploys philosophical analysis for the purpose of enhancing collaborative, cross-disciplinary scientific research through improvements in cross-disciplinary communication. We begin by sketching the scientific context within which the Toolbox Project operates, a context that features a growing interest in and commitment to cross-disciplinary research (CDR). We then develop an argument for the leading idea (...) behind this effort, namely, that philosophical dialogue can improve cross-disciplinary science by effecting epistemic changes that lead to better group communication. On the heels of this argument, we describe our approach and its output; in particular, we emphasize the Toolbox instrument that generates philosophical dialogue and the Toolbox workshop in which that dialogue takes place. Together, these constitute a philosophical intervention into the life of CDR teams. We conclude by considering the philosophical implications of this intervention. (shrink)

Just something I did on a whim a while ago when I saw a blog post about summarizing philosophers' works in words of one syllable. Revised since then as I spotted multisyllabic words. About 2 pages long, single-spaced.

The representational theory of phenomenal experience is often stated in terms of a supervenience thesis: Byrne recently characterises it as the thesis that “there can be no difference in phenomenal character without a difference in content”, while according to Tye, “[a]t a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character.” Consequently, much of the debate over whether representationalism is true centres on purported counter-examples – that is (...) to say, purported failures of supervenience. The refutation of putative counter-examples has been, it seems to me, by and large successful. But there is a certain class of these for which the representationalist response has been something less than completely convincing. These are the cross-modality cases. I will explain what I mean, and then argue that the response in question is not only unconvincing but actually undermines the representationalist position. (shrink)

_Purpose__._ This article aims at outlining the socio-communicative prerequisites for the influence of personality on the acquisition of rigorous scientific knowledge. _Theoretical__ basis__._ The communicative foundations of an individual’s activity in general and the functioning of his consciousness in particular were laid by the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, primarily due to his introduction of the concepts of "intersubjectivity" and "lifeworld". From these positions, attempts were made to understand the discussion of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn regarding the role of the (...) individual in science, in particular, the concept of a "normal scientist" as a participant in the lifeworld of scientists who support special intersubjective norms of reproduction of this lifeworld through scientific communication. The concept of "communicative mind", correlated with the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas, best expresses the rational and argumentative principles of achieving consensus in science. _Originality__._ Social anthropology reveals the constitutive significance of teamwork in science as a way of achieving rigorous scientific knowledge. Social phenomenology concretizes this by emphasizing the need for constant improvement of the rules of this communication. The verification of scientific knowledge by facts is strictly determined by the observance of community-recognized scientific tools for achieving such verification, in particular, the conventional agreement within a certain community of scientists regarding the language of science, which is used to describe verification, falsification, and other procedures for organizing scientific knowledge into a system. _Conclusions._ Verification of the obtained scientific knowledge critically depends on the formulation, dissemination and observance of certain institutional rules of scientific communication. This applies, in particular, to the conventionally recognized rules for the verification of scientific knowledge by empirical facts: it is not an isolated scientist who should identify, verify, organize and evaluate empirical facts, but a community of scientists who conduct scientific research in an organized manner. Team scientific work is a special case of collective action, which is characterized by a high level of reflection and application of critical thinking on a communicative basis. In particular, the legitimation of acquired scientific knowledge occurs in the process of scientific research due to the observance of procedural rules and careful work with empirical facts. (shrink)

Barry Dainton has developed a sophisticated version of the bundle theory of the subject of experiences. I shall focus on three claims Dainton makes: the identity-conditions of subjects can be specified in terms of capacities to produce experiences; the identity-conditions of token capacities are not determined by their subjects; and a subject is nothing over and above a bundle of such capacities. I shall argue that Dainton’s key notion of co-consciousness, a primitive relation of experienced togetherness, presupposes a subject common (...) to each of the experiences which are experienced together. Therefore, co-consciousness cannot be used to state the identity-conditions of subjects in a non-circular manner. I shall also argue that none of the different options Dainton offers for specifying the identity-conditions of token experiential capacities independently of their subjects are successful. I shall then outline a way in which this can be done, but argue that it undermines the claim that a subject is nothing over and above a bundle of such capacities. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Methodological Challenges to Justifying the Inclusion of Specific Women in Our Histories of Philosophy: The Case of Marie de Gournay Gournay's Text and the Querelle des Femmes Gournay's Method The Skeptical Challenge of Nurture to the Argument from Nature The Skeptical Challenge to the “Might Makes Right” Argument The Skeptical Challenge to the Argument from Woman's Creation The Skeptical Challenge from God's Privileges against the Vanity of Man Concluding Remarks Notes.

Both in antiquity and ever since the Renaissance Lucretius' De Rerum Natura has been admired – and condemned – for its startling poetry, its evangelical faith in materialist causation, and its seductive advocacy of the Epicurean good life. Approaches to Lucretius assembles an international team of classicists and philosophers to take stock of a range of critical approaches to which this influential poem has given rise and which in turn have shaped its interpretation, including textual criticism, the text's strategies for (...) engaging the reader with its author and his message, the 'atomology' that posits a correlation of the letters of the poem with the atoms of the universe, the literary and philosophical intertexts that mediate the poem, and the political and ideological questions that it raises. Thirteen essays take up a variety of positions within these traditions of interpretation, innovating within them and advancing beyond them in new directions. (shrink)

A common reading of the Cyrenaics is that they are a school of extreme hedonist presentists, recognising only the pleasure of the present moment, and advising against turning our attention to past or future pleasure or pain. Yet they have some strange advice which tells followers to anticipate future harms in order to lessen the unexpectedness of them when they occur. It’s a puzzle, then, how they can consistently hold the attitude they do to our concern with our present selves, (...) and yet endorse the practise of dwelling on possible future painful scenarios. To establish that this is a puzzle, though, we must first be convinced that the report is true. Cicero is our only clear source for the Cyrenaic advice, and scholars have noted reasons to be suspicious of the reliability of his report. I discuss these doubts, and why they ultimately fail to undermine Cicero’s testimony as a source. Defending Cicero as a source for Cyrenaic thought removes a barrier to taking seriously an aspect of Cyrenaic psychology which could radically alter our understanding of their views. (shrink)

Many philosophers of language have held that a truth‐conditional semantic account can explain the data motivating the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, but I believe this is a mistake. I argue that these data also motivate what I call “dual‐aspect” uses as a distinct but closely related type. After establishing that an account of the distinction must also explain dual‐aspect uses, I argue that the truth‐conditional Semantic Model of the distinction cannot. Thus, the Semantic Model cannot (...) explain the data for which it is developed and so fails as an account of the referential/attributive distinction. (shrink)

Of all the methodological terms used by Heidegger in the early Freiburg period, few have attracted less consensus than Formal Indication. With its relation to the earliest lecture series, critical debate has tended to focus on the extent to which this concept defines the difference between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology. The argument of this paper is that Formal Indication is best understood in its relation to Heidegger’s other key methodological term from this period, Phenomenological Destruction. Not only do both concepts (...) grow out of the same problem set, but they act in a limited sense as counter-movements to one another. Considered together, I argue, they make up Heidegger’s response to the problem of language as expressed by Paul Natorp, and first dealt with in the Kriegsnotsemester in 1919. (shrink)

What might queer theory look like if we were to consider it as a hybrid, viral, shapeshifting, post-continental philosophy with cosmopolitical world-making aspirations?

Drawing on digital sensory ethnographic research with potters during the Covid-19 pandemic in Britain, along with the literature on clay therapy, this paper explores how engagements with clay afford hedonic psychological wellbeing impacts. Adopting an embodied-enactive-ecological approach, we utilise Material Engagement Theory (MET) and the concept of therapeutic affordances to challenge internalist cognitive approaches and to argue for the active role of material engagements in shaping our affective states. We argue that clay’s materiality is central to such impacts and that (...) wellbeing arises relationally through interactions between specific individuals, materials, and their environment. This paper discusses how the tactile, cohesive, and malleable materiality of clay, as well as the variability in how it can be engaged, allows for mindful, immersive and relaxing experiences, that positively contributed to the hedonic wellbeing of our participants. Additionally, we examine how interactions between potter and clay evolve through the development of skill, as their affordance space changes. Particularly, we highlight the complex nature of control with respect to the volatility of clay and pottery; we explore the tension between the desire for and the pressures of skilful production, we analyse the enjoyment of the processes of making, and discuss the permeability of distinctions between hedonic and eudemonic wellbeing. (shrink)

One of the interesting and encouraging signs of our times is the fact that the several sciences are learning to develop and carry their own philosophy. Here psychology seems to me to be a bit backward. In this paper I am presuming to suggest that the time has come when the psychologist should take over the subject of theory of knowledge, emancipate it from the leading-strings of Mother Philosophy, and make it a phase of his own science and of its (...) organizing and interpretative philosophy. In fact, I am suggesting that thinking and knowing of whatever sort, even psychologizing and philosophizing, being matters of “mental” activity, are properly object matters for the psychologist, when he really knows his stuff; and I am presuming to say that he is now well enough advanced towards this goal so that he should accept this implied challenge and proceed to take possession of this most significant portion of his proper field. This should greatly enlarge the field of psychological experimentation; it should open up new areas, that are even more significant for our science than are animal psychology and the psychology of learning, as we have hitherto envisioned these; and it should result in a development of principles for the better organization of our findings in these fields. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The article aims to analyse the consciousness of masses in the communication system of the 20th century projecting the individual level onto the social one. _Theoretical basis._ In the fields of philosophy and other humanities since the middle of the last century there has dominated an opinion that the category of mass and its communication are second-rate and non-elitist phenomena. Condensing the experience of human history (especially – the nineteenth century – the time of the bourgeois revolutions and the (...) two world wars), such parameters were set by the creators of social psychology Gustave Le Bon and Sigmund Freud in their basic research "The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind", "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego". Since ancient times the masses have really resembled immoral emotional neoformations, which minimized the individual qualities of the components of the whole and showed the features of a predominantly animal nature. It is no coincidence that those masses were called emotional, or just a crowd, regardless of the topos of existence: streets and squares, or the infospace of the first mass media (newspapers, radio, cinema, television). However, analysing the crowd, the scientists noted that this is only an extreme modification of the mass, and, in addition to it, there may be others – quite the opposite in their nature. With the advent of the World Wide Web, the situation has changed: scientists and futurists have been talking about the mass of intellectuals, which seems to be formed and combined in the field of information technology. And it surpasses the traditional elite in many respects. _Originality._ Having analysed the works of classic and modern researchers, we came to the conclusion that in fact the masses, like individuals (according to C. G. Jung), are divided into four types. Correspondingly, each of them has its own behaviour, psychology, philosophy etc. This article focuses on beliefs and ideological positions as the basis for the functioning of emotional, sensory, intuitive and rational masses in the context of 20th century philosophy. The object of our analysis was the philosophical schools of neo-positivism, hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, existentialism, pragmatism, anthropology, phenomenology, and others. _Conclusions._ According to our assumption, regardless of the type of mass and direction of modern philosophy as a field of its implementation, rationalism comes to the fore everywhere (as a primary source and theoretical basis or motivation). Thus, it can be concluded that the rational mass now dominates, not emotional (which was thoroughly described by Le Bon and Freud). And this is quite natural in the age of digital technology. (shrink)

At the end of the last section we anticipated the concluding page of the argument, where Plato makes the soul imperishable, as well as not-dead, and where he describes finally the soul's withdrawal at the approach of death. For the conclusion that the soul never admits death, and is in that sense was probably in Plato's eyes the heart of the argument. The final page, we shall argue, will have seemed to Plato in some ways less important, and even something (...) of an embarrassment. (shrink)

In recent decades, attempts to create and argue a new ontology of existence that could provide a robust alternative to the mainstream physicalist metaphysics have been made in science and philosophy. A new book by Bernardo Kastrup, a well-known specialist in the field of philosophy of mind and neuroscience of consciousness, offers the author's conceptually clear and rigorous formulation of the philosophical system. The author proves that appearance and reality in ontology are fundamentally experiential. A universal phenomenal consciousness is the (...) sole ontological primitive, which patterns of excitation constitute existence, and a human being is dissociated mental complexes of this universal consciousness, surrounded like islands by the ocean of its mentation. Kastrup’s idea of the World has an idealist ontological underpinning. The author contrasts his vision of the world with the existing ideas of the world perception, such as physicalism, microexperientialism and cosmopsychism. The quality of the argument, which is given in the book, suggests the revival of the philosophy of idealism as the next paradigm, according to which a form of universal mind will be viewed as nature's sole fundamental entity. (shrink)

Brief article on this hedonist, follower of Socrates, and founder of the Cyrenaic school.

Overview of this minor Socratic school, including their skepticism and hedonistic ethics.

CareVisions (2022–2026) is an interdisciplinary researcj project reflecting on care experiences during and beyond the COVID-19 pandemic to re-imagine care relations, practices and policies in Irela...