Our socio-economic innovation ecosystem is riddled with ever-increasing complexity, as we are faced with more frequent and intense shocks, such as COVID-19. Unfortunately, addressing complexity requires a different kind of economic governance. There is increasing pressure on economics to not only going beyond its traditional mainstream boundaries but also to tackle real-world problems such as fostering structural change, enhancing sustained growth, promoting inclusive development in the era of the digital economy, and boosting green growth, while addressing the divide between the (...) financial sector and the real economy. This book demonstrates how to apply complexity science to economics, in an effective and instructive way, in the interest of life-enhancing policies. The book revolves around the non-negligible problem of why economics, to date, seems to be insufficient in guiding economic governance to navigate through real and ever-intensifying complex socio-economic and environmental challenges. With its interdisciplinary approach, the book scans the nuanced nexus between complexity and economics by incorporating, as well as transcending the state-of-the-art literature. It identifies ways to trigger opportunities for behaviour change in the economic profession with respect to how to teach and what, introducing and developing further complexity economics thinking with the configuration of its main principles and outlining the silhouette of next-generation economic governance. The book deciphers recommendations both for economic theory, practice, and education and economic governance. It will be of interest to students, scholars, academics, think tank researchers and economic policy practitioners at the national and/or supranational level. Olivér Kovács is a senior research fellow in the Department of Economics and International Economics at the University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary. (shrink)

According to Humeanism about the laws, the laws of nature are nothing over and above certain kinds of regularities about particular facts. Humeanism has often been accused of circularity: according to scientific practice laws often explain their instances, but on the Humean view they also reduce to the mosaic, which includes those instances. In this paper I formulate the circularity problem in a way that avoids a number of controversial assumptions routinely taken for granted in the literature, and against which (...) many extant responses are therefore ineffective. I then propose a solution that denies the alleged Humean commitment that laws are explained by their instances. The solution satisfies three desiderata that other solutions don’t: it provides independent motivation against the idea that Humean laws are explained by their instances; it specifies the sense in which Humean laws are nonetheless “nothing over and above” their instances; and it gives an alternative account of what does explain the laws, if not their instances. This solution, I will argue, is not only the simplest but also the oldest one: it appeals only to tools and theses whose first appearance predates the earliest statements of the circularity problem itself. (shrink)

In a series of recent papers, David Rose and Jonathan Schaffer use a number of experiments to show that folk intuitions about composition and persistence are driven by pre-scientific teleological tendencies. They argue that these intuitions are fit for debunking and that the playing field for competing accounts of composition and persistence should therefore be considered even: no view draws more support from folk intuitions than its rivals, and the choice between them should be made exclusively on the basis of (...) theoretical considerations. In this paper I argue that Rose and Schaffer draw the wrong conclusion from their own findings, which should instead push us toward sparse views about composition and persistence. Most metaphysicians (including Schaffer himself, and arguably Rose too) should be worried by this result, since they hold views that are flatly incompatible with it. (shrink)

Alex Oliver and Timothy Smiley provide a new account of plural logic. They argue that there is such a thing as genuinely plural denotation in logic, and expound a framework of ideas that includes the distinction between distributive and collective predicates, the theory of plural descriptions, multivalued functions, and lists.

In this paper, I want to make two main points. The first point is methodological: Instead of attempting to give a classical analysis or reductive definition of the term “expertise”, we should attempt an explication and look for what may be called symptoms of expertise. What this comes to will be explained in due course. My second point is substantial: I want to recommend understanding as an important symptom of expertise. In order to give this suggestion content, I begin to (...) develop an account of understanding. Finally, I will draw attention to some consequences of this approach. (shrink)

The idea that religions should be pluralist is often supported by commentators. It opposes the more rigid suggestion that a particular religion is the only valid route to the truth and salvation. A problem with the latter idea of course is that it makes dialogue meaningless, since the only point to talking to those in other faiths would be to try to convince them of the truth of your own religion. It is not difficult to find indications in many religions (...) that a variety of views on basic issues are acceptable and indeed should be welcomed as progressive. It is argued here, though, that such an approach really does not do justice to the Qur’an. Like many religions, Islam requires obedience to divine authority and is often critical of alternative ways of thinking and behaving. We may regret that this is the case, but religions are often illiberal institutions and should be accurately described as such. (shrink)

The author devotes a good number of pages to clarifying the relations between PHN, experimental psychology, and metaphysics. It is this thesis, a problem of the order of knowledge, that we wish to question. We shall first present some of the difficulties that give rise to the problem. Second, we shall indicate the kind of knowledge which PHN is. Third, we shall attempt to demonstrate that in the body of his work the kind of knowledge represented is that of the (...) "metaphysics of man" and not the "philosophy of human nature." Finally, we shall point out the importance, and non-verbal character, of a correct answer to the problem. (shrink)

Several philosophers have developed theological perspectives out of Heidegger's ontology. Yet the question of God in Heidegger's thought itself has never received full elucidation. In this revealing new study, George Kovacs poses the problem of analyzing the idea of God as a process of questioning and thus subjects Heidegger's phenomenological existentialism to a process of exposition Heidegger himself employed.

Heidegger’s understanding of the relationship between philosophy and science is expressed in his claim that they are not hostile towards each other, i.e., that philosophy is neither for nor against science, though they differ in ambition, strength, and methodology. Their interaction, as this essay suggests, may contribute to the range and diversification of philosophical thinking and to a deeper grasp of the strength and boundary (potential and limitation) of scientific inquiry and knowing. Heidegger’s rethinking of science, especially in his twenty-four (...) “propositions about science”, includes a critical assessment of the status of science in the epoch of modernity; it discerns (discovers, discloses) the truth of science in its relation to the measure of truth in beings, and to the truth of be-ing. The entire inquiry at hand is grounded in be-ing-historical thinking and mindfulness. (shrink)

Was the zoological garden a place for science in the 19th and 20th centuries? This question cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. Rather, this Special Issue suggests, we need to reconstruct how the concrete conditions of the zoo as an institution influenced, enabled, triggered, facilitated, obstructed, or impeded scientific research. The zoo was and is a multifunctional space serving different constituencies, such as scientists of different disciplines, artists, breeders, and the general public. This collection of articles argues (...) that despite or even because of its hybrid character, the zoo generated knowledge about exotic animals in often unexpected ways. This Special Issue conceives of “science at the zoo” as a an “impure,” yet very rich epistemic constellation with its very own dynamic, tensions, and contradictions. The first part of this introduction provides a historical overview of the topic. Synthesizing the existing secondary literature, it addresses the major themes of science at the zoo: the debate among scientists about the pros and cons of research conducted in and outside the cages; the gap between the promise of doing research at the zoo and the actual practices; and the emergence of new fields of knowledge such as zoo veterinary medicine, zoo biology, and conservation science. The introduction's second part draws out the common topics that connect the eight articles of this Special Issue: the multiplicity of spaces interacting with the zoo; the broad range of historical actors, including academics, animal traders, and zoo keepers; the changing roles of the zoo-going public; and the negotiation of authority and epistemic hierarchies in producing knowledge about zoo animals. The large numbers of zoos and the long temporal range these articles cover bring the constant evolution of “science at the zoo”-and hence its intrinsic historical dimension-to the fore. (shrink)

In Subjectivity without Subjects, well-known philosopher and feminist theorist Kelly Oliver looks at aspects of popular culture, film, science, and law to examine contemporary notions of paternity and maternity. Oliver studies the roles of paternal responsibility, virility, and race in such events as the Million Man March and the Promise Keeper's movement and suggests alternative ways to conceive of self-other relations and the subjective identity at stake in them. In addition she offers a detailed analysis of particular works (...) by such well-known filmmakers as Polanski, Bergman, and Varda in developing a theory of identity that opens the subject to otherness and difference. (shrink)

Mein Beitrag behandelt zentrale Probleme der Methodologie der Textinterpretation im Lichte der neueren Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie. Nach Vorbemerkungen zum Begriff der Interpretation wende ich mich den Methoden der Bildung und kritischen Prüfung von Interpretationshypothesen zu. Wie ist das Verhältnis von Daten und Hypothesen im Falle der Textinterpretation? Wie können Interpretationshypothesen epistemisch gerechtfertigt bzw. gestützt werden? Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen untersuche ich die Anwendung der Hypothetisch-Deduktiven Methode und der Methode des Schlusses auf die beste Erklärung auf die Textinterpretation. Der Vergleich zeigt, (...) dass die Methode des Schlusses auf die beste Erklärung vorzuziehen ist. (shrink)

Substance dualism is the view that there are two fundamentally different kinds of substances: physical and mental. By contrast, according to property dualism there is only one kind of substance (physical) but two fundamentally different kinds of properties: physical and mental. Property nominalism is the view that there are neither repeatable nor non-repeatable fundamentally predicable entities (i.e. neither universals nor tropes) and that things being a certain way or being related in a certain way must ultimately be accounted for in (...) terms of concrete particulars. In this paper, we consider a number of different kinds of property nominalism and argue that none of them sits well with property dualism. We pay special attention to the question of what it could mean for a property to count as mental given different nominalistic accounts of properties. Our conclusion is that property nominalism and property dualism are not a stable match. This is surprising, since property dualism has usually been understood as a thesis that is neutral about the nature of fundamental ontological categories and the relation between them. (shrink)

This paper raises objections to the constitution of these lines in the OCT. The lines are gnomic but they generalize based on an actual sequence of events just described and should contain an allusion to the offence that will cause the Greeks to perish, the outrage against Athena's temple. This, it is argued, stood in a lacuna best marked after 95. The article has three theses: (1) sacking ‘cities, temples, and tombs’ is implausible because the latter two are parts of (...) the first; (2) plundering tombs refers to nothing in the play, nor was this thought of as an offence against the gods; (3) 96–7 do not refer to the offence that causes the fool's death but are a description of his success, the destruction of the hated enemy population. That success stands in ironic contrast with his subsequent death. (shrink)

In medizinethischen Kontexten bezeichnet der Ausdruck „Odysseus-Verträge“ Selbstbindungen, die in der vorausschauenden Bitte von Patienten an ihre Ärzte bestehen, eigene spätere Behandlungspräferenzen nicht zu befolgen. Umstritten ist jedoch, ob eine vorhergehende Anweisung ein Handeln gegen den Patientenwillen in der aktualen Behandlungssituation rechtfertigt. In diesem Beitrag wird die Frage nach der Verbindlichkeit von Odysseus-Anweisungen erörtert. Zunächst wird gezeigt, dass die Befolgung einer Odysseus-Anweisung eine Form des paternalistischen Handelns darstellt und die Frage nach der Verbindlichkeit von Odysseus-Anweisungen daher in diejenige nach der (...) Rechtfertigung paternalistischen Handelns zu überführen ist . Im Folgenden wird als Rechtfertigungsmodell für paternalistisches Handeln ein Zustimmungsmodell verteidigt , dem zufolge eine paternalisierende Maßnahme durch die antizipierte spätere Zustimmung des Patienten zu dieser Maßnahme gerechtfertigt wird . Nach einer Erörterung des Einwandes, dass damit die besonderen normativen Probleme von Odysseus-Anweisungen aus dem Blick geraten , werden abschließend Fälle untersucht, in denen aufgrund eines irreversiblen Kompetenzverlustes keine spätere Zustimmung zur paternalisierenden Maßnahme mehr möglich ist. In diesen Fällen, so die These, ist ein paternalistisches Handeln gegen den aktualen Patientenwillen nicht gerechtfertigt; kommt es hier also zu einem Konflikt zwischen dem in der Vorausverfügung dokumentierten und dem aktualen Patientenwillen, ist letzterer zu respektieren .In the context of medical ethics, the term „Ulysses contract“ denotes an advance directive by means of which a patient binds himself for the future by instructing a doctor to act against his foreseen future preferences. There is some controversy, however, about whether a person’s prior decisions should be regarded as mandatory for the doctor even when they conflict with her present desires. In this contribution, I address the questions whether and under what circumstances Ulysses instructions should be regarded as binding. In Part , I attempt to show that observing a Ulysses instruction means acting paternalistically and that therefore the question whether Ulysses contracts ought to be respected should be transformed into the question how paternalistic action can be justified. Parts and are concerned with the justification of paternalistic action. On the basis of a conception of welfare as being tied to the person’s interests and preferences, I defend a consent-based model of justification . More specifically, I suggest that the patient’s anticipated later consent to a precedent paternalistic action should count as its justification . In what follows, I attempt to rebut the objection that this account does not do justice to the specific normative problems of Ulysses contracts . Finally, I examine cases in which, due to an irreversible loss of competence, a paternalistic action cannot be assented to by the patient. I argue that in these cases, acting against the patient’s present wishes cannot be justified. If in such a case a patient’s present request runs contrary to the past request expressed in the advance directive, the former should be respected. (shrink)

dicar, qua uiolens obstrepit Aufiduset qua pauper aquae Daunus agrestiumregnauit populorum ex humili potensprinceps Aeolium carmen ad Italos 13deduxisse modos. Surely there is something puzzling about 13–14? What Horace was the first to do was to write Latin poetry using the metrical schemes of the Greek lyricists, principally Alcaeus and Sappho, who wrote in the Aeolic dialect of Lesbos. There can be no reasonable doubt that Aeolium carmen refers in the first instance to Horace's adoption of Aeolic metre. For deduxisse (...) there are two possibilities, and conceivably Horace meant both to operate. The first involves motion, bringing something or someone home or into port. So Horace took Greek metres and moved them in one way or another to Italy. Secondarily deducere might mean ‘to produce ’, a usage found at Sat. 2.1.2-4 similisque meorum mille die uersus deduci posse. (shrink)

Learning to argue in a computer-mediated and structured fashion is investigated in this research. A study was conducted to compare dyads that were scripted in their computer-mediated collaboration with dyads that were not scripted. A process analysis of the chats of the dyads showed that the scripted experimental group used significantly more words, engaged in significantly more broadening and deepening of the discussion, and appeared to engage in more critical and objective argumentation than the non-scripted control group.

Christianity changed the world for the better through the development of education, charity organisations, art, music, law and medical care among others. However, not all changes initiated by Christianity were positive. The Christian religion was also responsible for division, death, destruction and war. Focusing on the positive changes, nearly 500 years after the reformation though, it seems as if Christianity has lost its renewing and transformative powers. It seems as if society, politics and the economy are pressurising Christianity to conform (...) to the world and not the other way round. Therefore, the research focuses on the question whether Christians can bring about positive change and transformation to the current problems in society. What can Christians do to provide a religious response to current persistent societal problems? Change agents - people who drive positive change - are capable and competent, make use of networks, are visible and contactable and are often also outsiders in the communities they serve. Examples of the work done by change agents - Christians within their local communities - through small-scale community projects are showcased here to suggest possible ways forward for dealing with persistent problems from a Christian point of view. (shrink)

Belying the rhetoric of “We’re all in this together,” and “COVID as the great equalizer,” the pandemic has brought into focus the “pre-existing conditions” of inequality—poverty, racism, lack of health care, lack of child care, women’s double burden, and the vulnerability of the elderly, among others. The coronavirus reveals gaping inequities in the length and quality of life caused by social and economic “pre-existing conditions.” It is the great unequalizer, the promise and ruse of “We’re all in this together.” The (...) new normal for some, is the old normal for many others. (shrink)

Via a reading of Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian and a critical appraisal of Foucault’s break with historical materialism, W. Oliver Baker finds, at the limits of the new materialisms, space for a new post-humanist critical materialism that sees utopia not in post-human assemblages, but in the abolition of colonial and capitalist structures that condition those assemblages in the first place.

Nebraska University Studies, V25, No. 2-4.

When people are performing a task, it is hard to know whether they are about to make a mistake. Klaproth, Halbrügge, Krol, Vernaleken, Zander, and Russwinkel address this by recording EEG signals while people are performing a flight control task, and show that by examining the EEG signal they can determine when people failed to notice particular stimuli, which could lead to better assistive tools.

Occam’s razor directs us to adopt the simplest hypothesis consistent with the evidence. Learning theory provides a precise definition of the inductive simplicity of a hypothesis for a given learning problem. This definition specifies a learning method that implements an inductive version of Occam’s razor. As a case study, we apply Occam’s inductive razor to causal learning. We consider two causal learning problems: learning a causal graph structure that presents global causal connections among a set of domain variables, and learning (...) context-sensitive causal relationships that hold not globally, but only relative to a context. For causal graph learning, Occam’s inductive razor directs us to adopt the model that explains the observed correlations with a minimum number of direct causal connections. For expanding a causal graph structure to include context-sensitive relationships, Occam’s inductive razor directs us to adopt the expansion that explains the observed correlations with a minimum number of free parameters. This is equivalent to explaining the correlations with a minimum number of probabilistic logical rules. The paper provides a gentle introduction to the learning-theoretic definition of inductive simplicity and the application of Occam’s razor for causal learning. (shrink)

Every materially adequate explication of the concepts ``picture''and ``the pictorial'' has to appeal to syntactical properties.From the available definitions, a conception of syntax is extractedthat is applicable to symbol systems of any sort. Against thisbackground, it is shown that a non-semantical characterization ofthe pictorial is mandatory. Finally, specific syntactical featuresare explicated that recommend themselves as necessary conditions forthe application of the concept of a picture.