Scientists often communicate using generic generalizations, which are unquantified generalizations such as ‘Americans overestimate social class mobility’ or ‘sound waves carry gravitational mass’. In this paper, I explain the role of such generic generalizations in science, based on a novel theory about their characteristic meaning. According to this theory, a scientific generalization of the form ‘Ks are F’ says that F is one property based on which category K qualifies as a scientific kind. Because what it takes to qualify as (...) a scientific kind varies depending on the discipline, what a generic sentence entails also varies. Based on this semantic theory, I discuss the benefits and drawbacks of using generic language in science. (shrink)

Evaluative theories of emotions purport to shed light on the nature of emotions by appealing to values. Three kinds of evaluative theories of emotions dominate the recent literature: the judgment theory equates emotions with value judgments; the perceptual theory equates emotions with perceptions of values, and the attitudinal theory equates emotions with evaluative attitudes. This paper defends a fourth kind of evaluative theory of emotions, mostly neglected so far: the reactive theory. Reactive theories claim that emotions are attitudes which arise (...) in reaction to perceptions of value. (shrink)

Intuitive predictions and judgements under uncertainty are often mediated by judgemental heuristics that sometimes lead to biases. Our micro-developmental study suggests that a presumption of rationality is justified for adult subjects, in so far as their systematic judgemental biases appear to be due to a specific executive-inhibition failure in working memory, and not necessarily to a lack of understanding of the fundamental principles of probability. This hypothesis was tested using an experimental procedure in which 60 adult subjects were trained to (...) inhibit the classical conjunction bias on a frequency judgement task derived from Tversky and Kahneman's work. Pre- and post-test performance was assessed via a probability judgement task. The data indicated a training effect, suggesting that subjects traditionally labelled as "irrational" with respect to the classical rules of inductive reasoning are in fact "inefficient inhibitors". These findings are discussed in terms of a polymorphous view of rationality. (shrink)

Sa célébrité à l'étranger, considérable, masque mal l'obstination française à l'ignorer, à la dénigrer ou à la récuser sans la lire vraiment. Il est vrai que des controverses, des polémiques, des malentendus ont brouillé sa réception. Surprenant, rétif à toute assignation disciplinaire, difficile donc à classer, à l'interstice entre philosophie et sociologie, Baudrillard déroute autant qu'il séduit. Sa liberté de pensée ébranle nos savoirs et nos croyances. L'objet de ce livre est donc moins de constituer une somme d'hommages posthumes que (...) de questionner une oeuvre qui, au-delà des célébrations ponctuelles, connaît un accueil à la fois fasciné et circonspect. Entretiens, études, lettres, essais l'affrontent et s'y confrontent, tantôt avec gratitude et reconnaissance, tantôt avec réticence ou résistance, parfois avec hostilité. Les textes rassemblés émanent d'universitaires, d'intellectuels, d'écrivains qui interrogent sans complaisance une oeuvre essentielle qui n'a eu de cesse d'interpeller le présent. La diversité des auteurs sollicités (Sophie Calle, Michel Deguy, Philippe Dagen, Bernard Edelman, Nathalie Heinich, Michel Maffesoli, Philippe Petit, Anna Sauvagnargues, Bernard Stiegler, Jean-Baptiste Thoret...) était essentielle. Les analyses et les propos tenus par les uns et les autres dialoguent librement avec cette pensée exigeante, féconde, souvent déroutante. Toujours en mouvement, Baudrillard voulait "promouvoir un commerce clandestin des idées, de toutes les idées irrecevables, des idées imprenables". Ce livre répond à cette exigence radicale. (shrink)

In order to understand the place Max Scheler occupied in the debates of his time around the notion of Europe, this article aims to shed some light on the possible convergences between Max Scheler and Rudolf Eucken, who was his thesis director at Jena. The article begins by outlining Rudolf Eucken's conception of Europe, then it identifies a number of points in common between the two authors, before finally measuring the extent of these convergences in Scheler's conception of Europe. At (...) the end of the discussion, it appears that the reception of Augustinianism and a shared conception of community reveal interesting links between the two authors. This connection will give the twenty-first-century reader a better understanding of the framework in which Max Scheler's reflections on Europe are set. (shrink)

This is an introduction to the topical collection Microbes, Networks, Knowledge: Disease Ecology in the twentieth Century, based on a workshop held at Queen Mary, University London on July 6–7 2016. More than twenty years ago, historian of science and medicine Andrew Mendelsohn asked, “Where did the modern, ecological understanding of epidemic disease come from?” Moving beyond Mendelsohn’s answer, this collection of new essays considers the global history of disease ecology in the past century and shows how epidemics and pandemics (...) have made “microbes complex”. (shrink)

Touch seems to enjoy some epistemic advantage over the other senses when it comes to attest to the reality of external objects. The question is not whether only what appears in tactile experiences is real. It is that only whether appears in tactile experiences feels real to the subject. In this chapter we first clarify how exactly the rather vague idea of an epistemic advantage of touch over the other senses should be interpreted. We then defend a “muscular thesis”, to (...) the effect that only the experience of resistance to our motor efforts, as it arises in effortful touch, presents us with the independent existence of some causally empowered object. We finally consider whether this muscular thesis applies to the perception of our own body. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, something can be called intermediate for Plato insofar as it occupies a place between two objects, poles, places, time, or principles. But this broad meaning of the intermediate has been eclipsed by the Aristotelian critique of the intermediate objects of the dianoia, so that it has become more difficult to think of the intermediates as functions of the soul. The aim of this paper is to show how, in the Republic, thumos is analogously treated as an intermediate with (...) other kinds of intermediate objects, and tentatively to relate this psychological intermediate in a broader theory with doxa, as its epistemological ground in the course of action. (shrink)

On entend par survenance moral la thèse selon laquelle, nécessairement, si deux entités sont parfaitement similaires en ce qui concerne toutes leurs propriétés non-morales, elles sont parfaitement similaires en ce qui concerne leurs propriétés morales. En dépit de son apparente simplicité, cette définition pose de nombreux problèmes. Ainsi, alors que la survenance morale est souvent présentée comme l’une des rares thèses faisant consensus en philosophie, il s’avère à y regarder de près que son interprétation varie grandement selon les philosophes. Trois (...) questions, en particulier, demandent à être éclaircies, sur lesquelles nous nous concentrerons ici : 1. On fait souvent appel à la survenance dans le but d’expliquer les propriétés morales. Mais à strictement parler, la survenance ne revêt par elle-même aucun caractère explicatif : quelle relation la survenance morale entretient-elle avec la relation de fondation ou d’explication morale ? 2. On tient la survenance morale pour une thèse consensuelle, mais on s’accorde peu sur la base de survenance des valeurs morales6. D’aucuns la restreignent à des propriétés naturelles ; d’autres y incluent des propriétés non-naturelles, pour peu qu’elles ne soient pas normatives ; d’autres encore y incluent des propriétés normatives, pour peu qu’elles ne soient pas morales ; d’autres enfin y incluent les principes moraux eux-mêmes. Que recouvre exactement la base de survenance des propriétés morales ? La survenance est une thèse modale (« nécessairement... »). Mais quelle modalité entre-t-elle ici en jeu ? La nécessité qui sous-tend la survenance morale est-elle métaphysique, conceptuelle, normative...? (shrink)

La pensée de Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen adresse une question forte aux processus contemporains de transition énergétique. En quoi contribuent-ils à ralentir la « marche de l’entropie »? Comment faire la différence entre les développements qui prolongent un modèle extractiviste, à fort impact sur l’environnement et le climat, et ceux qui contribuent à renouveler notre rapport aux ressources et à la terre? L’article invite à poursuivre un geste théorique, engagé par Georgescu-Roegen, qui consiste à raisonner conjointement les liens entre énergie, matière et (...) espace. Pour cela, il tire partie de l’idée simondonienne selon laquelle la mise au point des objets techniques procède moins par « rupture » que par récupération et réexploration d’états antérieurs. Cela attire l’attention sur la façon dont les expériences contemporaines de transition trouvent leurs appuis au travers d’échelles et d’héritages sociospatiaux multiples, et confèrent aux énergies investies par le passé un nouvel élan. De la même façon, tout n’aura pas été perdu si l’on sait retirer des aventures technologiques contemporaines vers les énergies renouvelables les éléments d’une nouvelle culture sociotechnique, qui concrétise un autre rapport aux techniques comme à la terre. (shrink)

Samuel Johnson claimed to have refuted Berkeley by kicking a stone. It is generally thought that Johnson misses the point of Berkeley's immaterialism for a rather obvious reason: Berkeley never denied that the stone feels solid, but only that the stone could exist independently of any mind. I argue that Johnson was on the right track. On my interpretation, Johnson’s idea is that because the stone feels to resist our effort, the stone seems to have causal powers. But if appearances (...) are to be taken at face value, as Berkeley insists, then the stone has causal powers. I argue that such causal powers threaten not only Berkeley’s view that only minds are active, but also, and more fundamentally, his central claim that sensible things depend on perception. (shrink)

_Les philosophes face au vice, de Socrate à Augustin_ explore la manière dont les philosophes de l’Antiquité ont tracé une cartographie des vices, analysé leurs causes et leurs effets, et se sont interrogés sur leurs usages. _Les philosophes face au vice, de Socrate à Augustin_ explores how ancient philosophers described the vices, delineated their various kinds, accounted for their causes and effects, and reflected on how to use them.

Philosophe majeur de notre epoque, Henri Maldiney a elabore une phenomenologie de l'existence centree sur l'Ouvert. Preconisant un - retour aux choses memes -, il refute radicalement la separation instauree entre sujet et objet, insistant sur l'experience de la rencontre comme signifiance insignifiable, transpossibilite et transpassibilite, recueil et deploiement. a partir notamment de Binswanger, Straus, Freud, Szondi, Heidegger et plus largement des textes classiques grecs, allemands, chinois, accordant une importance toute particuliere a l'art, il a contribue de maniere decisive a (...) une philosophie du sentir, du rythme et de l'avenement. Lors du colloque de Cerisy, qui a reuni chercheurs, praticiens et artistes, chacun s'est mis a l'epreuve de cette oeuvre magistrale. Les contributions rassemblees ici manifestent l'evolution et l'impact de cette pensee fondamentale pour le XXIe siecle.". (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a preferences representation model where ambiguity attitudes can be exogenous events or past experience-dependent. We adapt the Recursive Smooth Ambiguity model proposed by Klibanoff (Journal of Economic Theory 144:930-976, 2009) by introducing past experience described by a sequence of neutral events occurring up to the moment of the decision. These neutral events do not provide any information on the true process, but are likely to strengthen or weaken the decision-maker’s ambiguity aversion degree (...) by modifying emotions. Our model can explain some observed behaviors and market inefficiencies. We propose two illustrations. First, we provide a behavioral explanation for the decrease in influenza vaccination in France that followed the H1N1 crisis in 2009–2010. Second, we contribute to the broad literature on the annuity puzzle by introducing the impact of emotions on ambiguity attitudes. (shrink)

Comment interpréter le regain d'intérêt pour les réflexions sur la transcendance, la quête de sens, la morale et l'éthique dans nos sociétés contemporaines? C'est ce sur quoi Lawrence Olivier et Yves Boisvert se sont penchés dans cet ouvrage ; le premier accuse les théoriciens de la postmodernité d'être de grands fabulateurs qui font la promotion de la reconfiguration des systèmes moraux, tandis que le second reproche aux nihilistes d'être de grands nostalgiques de la Vérité qui ont sombré dans un (...) fatalisme total et un individualisme radical face à l'échec du projet de la modernité. Leur désaccord portant principalement sur l'interprétation à donner à ce retour des grands questionnements sur les valeurs et le sens de la vie, l'hypothèse de base est que les individus ont besoin de croire à une certaine forme de transcendance et qu'ils ressentent un profond besoin de donner un sens à leur vie. Invités à se prononcer sur cette question, anthropologues, philosophes, politicologues, sociologues et théologiens livrent ici leurs propres analyses de cette problématique par un riche panorama des réflexions sur la sexualité, la mort, la mode, l'art, les jeunes de la rue, les activités extrêmes, la religion et la pop psycho. Sans épuiser la problématique de la transcendance contemporaine, cet ouvrage stimulera la curiosité de tous les lecteurs intéressés aux nouvelles valeurs culturelles ou aux nouveaux comportements sociétaux. (shrink)

Social science studies often explain the emergence of collective beliefs by reference to factors that are supposed to be part of the social context. How do these macro-factors shape the beliefs of individuals? How can structural factors provide evidence supporting a given belief? In answering these questions, I propose a link connecting macro-factors and beliefs by introducing the notion of “evidential categorization.” I expect to show that our structural explanations of beliefs often contain an analysis of the socially diffused systems (...) of reasons—an important part of what we call the “epistemic context of belief-formation”—for they partially determine our evidential categorizations. Finally, I will show by an example, how structural explanations work if they include these components. (shrink)

The thesis defended is that at a certain arbitrary level of granularity, mountains have sharp, bona fide boundaries. In reply to arguments advanced by Varzi (2001), Smith & Mark (2001, 2003) I argue that the lower limit of a mountain is neither vague nor fiat. Relying on early works by Cayley (1859), Maxwell (1870) and Jordan (1872), this lower limit consists in the lines of watercourse which are defined as the lines of slope starting at passes. Such lines are metaphysically (...) sharply delineated although they are not always easy to get at when facing a mountain. Hence, the indetermination is only epistemic. In the second part of the paper, I try to combine this claim about the lower limit of a mountain with more recent claims advanced by alpinists on the right way to measure the height of a mountain, so as to capture its topographic prominence. I argue following them that the proper height of a mountain is the difference of altitude between its summit and its key-saddle, defined as the highest saddle one needs to cross in order to reach the closest higher summit. Combining this two plausible views about the lower limit and height of a mountain leads to the surprising result that the key-saddle needed to measure the height of a mountain is not necessarily located on the lower-boundary of that mountain. (shrink)

Tous les textes publiés dans l'ouvrage parlent directement de l'œuvre de Jean-Michel Berthelot. La première partie, " Sociologie de Jean-Michel Berthelot ", rassemble les contributions restituant des traits de son œuvre à l'aide d'études de cas précis ou de panoramas plus larges, et balise des domaines de recherche dans lesquels il s'est illustré : sociologie de l'éducation, du corps, des sciences, épistémologie des sciences sociales. La deuxième partie rend compte des perspectives ouvertes par ses travaux et de la manière dont (...) des chercheurs ont mis en œuvre ses réflexions pour leurs propres recherches. Il s'agit donc de restituer la façon dont on peut faire de la sociologie " avec " Jean-Michel Berthelot - à l'aide de ses travaux et des jalons qu'ils posent. La troisième partie est biographique en restituant l'itinéraire académique, intellectuel et humain de Berthelot, que ce soit son parcours universitaire et social, notamment à l'ENS durant mai 68, ou encore sa période " toulousaine " où sa carrière universitaire a débuté et qui en constitue une partie essentielle. Dirigé par Jean-Christophe Marcel et Olivier Martin, cet ouvrage rassemble les contributions de collaborateurs, d'anciens étudiants ou de proches collègues de Jean-Michel Berthelot. (shrink)

In his ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance’, Lewis argued that a particular kinematical model for chances follows from his principal principle. According to this model, any later chance function is equal to an earlier chance function conditional on the complete intervening history of non-modal facts. This article first investigates the conditions that any kinematical model for chance needs to satisfy to count as Lewis’s kinematics of chance. Second, it presents Lewis’s justification for his kinematics of chance and explains why (...) it is bound to be problematic. Third, it gives an alternative justification for Lewis’s kinematics of chance that does not appeal to the principal principle. Instead, this justification appeals to a well-supported requirement for chance, according to which any prior chance function must be a convex combination of the possible posterior chance functions. It is shown that under a plausible assumption, Lewis’s kinematics of chance is equivalent to this requirement. Finally, by focusing on this requirement, it is explained why the so-called self-undermining chances fail to obey Lewis’s kinematics of chance. (shrink)

This paper shows how a particular resiliency-centered approach to chance lends support for two conditions characterizing chance. The first condition says that the present chance of some proposition A conditional on the proposition about some later chance of A should be set equal to that later chance of A. The second condition requires the present chance of some proposition A to be equal to the weighted average of possible later chances of A. I first introduce, motivate, and make precise a (...) resiliency-centered approach to chance whose basic idea is that any chance distribution should be maximally invariant under variation of experimental factors. Second, I show that any present chance distribution that violates the two conditions can be replaced by another present chance distribution that satisfies them and is more resilient under variation of experimental factors. This shows that the two conditions are an essential feature of chances that maximize resiliency. Finally, I explore the relationship between the idea of resilient chances so understood and so-called Humean accounts of chance—one of the most promising recent philosophical accounts of chance. (shrink)

The standard principle of expert deference says that conditional on the expert’s credence in a proposition _A_ being _x_, your credence in _A_ ought to be _x_. The so-called Adams conditionalization is an attractive update rule in situations when learning experience prompts a shift in your conditional credences. In this paper, I show that, except in some trivial situations, when your prior conditional credence in _A_ obeys the standard principle of expert deference and then is revised by Adams conditionalization in (...) response to a shift in your conditional credence for a proposition _B_ given _A_, your posterior conditional credence in _A_ cannot continue to obey that principle, on pain of inconsistency. I explain why this tension between Adams conditionalization and the standard principle of expert deference is puzzling and why the option of rejecting the update rule appears problematic. Finally, I suggest that in order to avoid this inconsistency, we should abandon the standard principle of expert deference and think of an expert’s probabilistic opinion as a constraint on your posterior credence distribution rather than your prior one. (shrink)