In the author's words: "This book is an honest attempt to understand what it means to be educated in today's world." His argument is this: No matter how important science and technology seem to industry or government or indeed to the daily life of people, as a society we believe that those educated in literature, history, and other humanities are in some way better informed, more knowing, and somehow more worthy of the descriptor "well educated." This 19th-century (...) conception of the educated mind weighs heavily on our notions on how we educate our young. When we focus on intellectual and scholarly issues in high school as opposed to issues, such as communications, basic psychology, or child raising, we are continuing to rely on outdated notions of the educated mind that come from elitist notions of who is to be educated and what that means. To accommodate the realities of today's world it is necessary to change these elitist notions. We need to rethink what it means to be educated and begin to focus on a new conception of the very idea of education. Students need to learn how to think, not how to accomplish tasks, such as passing standardized tests and reciting rote facts. In this engaging book, Roger C. Schank sets forth the premises of his argument, cites its foundations in the Great Books themselves, and illustrates it with examples from an experimental curriculum that has been used in graduate schools and with K-12 students. Making Minds Less Well Educated Than Our Own is essential reading for scholars and students in the learning sciences, instructional design, curriculum theory and planning, educational policy, school reform, philosophy of education, higher education, and anyone interested in what it means to be educated in today's world. (shrink)

This paper argues that we need to look beyond Bayesian decision theory for an answer to the general problem of making rational decisions under uncertainty. The view that Bayesian decision theory is only genuinely valid in a small world was asserted very firmly by Leonard Savage [18] when laying down the principles of the theory in his path-breaking Foundations of Statistics. He makes the distinction between small and large worlds in a folksy way by quoting the proverbs ”Look before (...) you leap” and ”Cross that bridge when you come to it”. You are in a small world if it is feasible always to look before you leap. You are in a large world if there are some bridges that you cannot cross before you come to them. As Savage comments, when proverbs conflict, it is proverbially true that there is some truth in both—that they apply in different contexts. He then argues that some decision situations are best modeled in terms of a small world, but others are not. He explicitly rejects the idea that all worlds can be treated as small as both ”ridiculous” and ”preposterous”. The first half of his book is then devoted to a very successful development of the set of ideas now known as Bayesian decision theory for use in small worlds. The second half of the book is an attempt to develop a quite different set of ideas for use in large worlds, but this part of the book is usually said to be a failure by those who are aware of its existence.2 Frank Knight [15] draws a similar distinction between making decision under risk or uncertainty.3 The pioneering work of Gilboa and Schmeidler [7] on making.. (shrink)

Adorno's moral philosophy has often been accused of making aporetic prescriptions that are too taxing for moral agents. In this article, I defend his approach in terms of a theory of moral dilemmas. My guideline is Adorno's famous sentence that wrong life cannot be lived rightly. I argue that this claim is not distinctly prescriptive, as most of Adorno's critics believe, but is a claim about moral reality. Emphasizing realist aspects of his moral theory, I suggest that wrong (...) life is neither inconceivable nor an amoral or skeptical trope. Instead, Adorno's sentence about wrong life can be interpreted as a claim about the salience of particular moral facts. This, I conclude, allows Adorno to envisage moral reasons that motivate moral conduct case by case, although they are blocked overall. (shrink)

Psychopathy is often used to settle disputes about the nature of moral judgment. The “trolley problem” is a familiar scenario in which psychopathy is used as a test case. Where a convergence in response to the trolley problem is registered between psychopathic subjects and non-psychopathic subjects, it is assumed that this convergence indicates that the capacity for making moral judgments is unimpaired in psychopathy. This, in turn, is taken to have implications for the dispute between motivation internalists and (...) motivation externalists, for instance. In what follows, we want to do two things: firstly, we set out to question the assumption that convergence is informative of the capacity for moral judgment in psychopathy. Next, we consider a distinct feature of psychopathy which we think provides strong grounds for holding that the capacity for moral judgment is seriously impaired in psychopathic subjects. The feature in question is the psychopathic subject’s inability to make sincere apologies. Our central claim will be this: convergence in response to trolley problems does not tell us very much about the psychopathic subject’s capacity to make moral judgments, but his inability to make sincere apologies does provide us with strong grounds for holding that this capacity is seriously impaired in psychopathy. (shrink)

"Well-publicized research in psychology tells us that over half of our attempts to change habitual behavior fail within one year. Even without reading the research, most of us will intuitively sense the truth in this, as we have all tried and failed to rid ourselves of one bad habit or another. The human story of habits and the difficulty of change has been told in many books - most of which will make only a quick reference to dopamine or the (...) "lizard brain" before moving on to practical tips and tricks for behavior change. In contrast, Stuck: The Neuroscience of Why Changing Our Behavior is So Hard will tell the brain's story about why behavior is so hard to change. Russell Poldrack offers an in-depth, yet entirely accessible, guide to the neuroscientific research on habits and habit change. Part I introduces the "anatomy of a habit," starting with the argument that the resilience of our habits stems largely from a mismatch between the environment in which our brains evolved and the one in which we now live, and continuing on to introduce current work on fear and anxiety, motivation, and cognitive control that bears on habit formation. Part II focuses on what neuroscience can tell us about breaking habits, introducing evidence-based strategies that give us the best possible chance to break cycles of bad behavior. Throughout the book, Poldrack offers a clear-eyed view of what neuroscience can tell us about habit change, and what it cannot - and importantly, how we know what we know"--. (shrink)

In that book I had two different, though not unrelated aims. The first chapter was concerned with traditional scepticisms about, e.g., the external world and induction. In common with Hume and Wittgenstein (and even Heidegger) I argued that the attempt to combat such doubts by rational argument was misguided: for we are dealing here with the presuppositions, the framework, of all human thought and enquiry. In the other chapters my target was different. It was that species of (...) naturalism which tended to discredit, or somehow to reduce to more scientifically acceptable, physicalistic terms, whole regions of ordinary human thought, language, and experience -- in particular the regions of moral discourse, of the subjectively mental and of the intensional. Here my reaction, as well as my target, was different. I did not merely stress the inescapability of the natural or common human standpoint from which we normally take for granted all that is called in question by scientistic naturalism. I also allowed the latter its own validity from its own limited standpoint.2 Philosophical scepticism and scientistic naturalism represent two types of challenge to ‘central features of our ordinary thought and talk’.3 The overall aim of Scepticism and Naturalism is to respond to these challenges and thereby to vindicate what Strawson refers to elsewhere as ‘our natural metaphysics’. (shrink)

(Last modified 17th July 2007) I use Williamson’s results about necessary existents to argue that making something never involves bringing into existence something that does not exist. Rather, to make x is, for some kind k, to change x from being a non-k into being a k. I use this result to defend the position that the statue is identical to the lump of clay against one otherwise problematic appeal to Leibniz’s Law. I have presented this paper at (...) the Cornell University Departmental Workshop (handout). (shrink)

Three dialogues introducing the mathematical way of treating desire and belief, that is to say, the theory of probability interpreted as degree of belief, and decision theory in the way that Ramsey envisioned it being developed. Suitable as a textbook.

A comparative study of the Sikh philosophy and other religion.

It has been contended that we can never be truly responsible for anything we do: we do what we do because of the way we are, so we cannot be responsible for what we do unless we are responsible for the way we are; and we cannot be responsible for the way we are when we first make decisions in life, so we can never become responsible for the way we are later in life. This article argues that (...) in our consciously chosen actions we respond rationally to whole ‘gestalt’ experiences in ways that cannot be pre determined by pre choice circumstances and laws of nature and/or computational rules; and that this means we are partly responsible for what we do, even if we are not responsible for the way we are. (shrink)

In “Trompe L'Oeil”, the seventh episode of Westworld, Bernard Lowe discovers the plans for his own body. Bernard's are ready‐made by someone else and uploaded into his brain, apparently unrelated to any real events. Bernard has memories of his son Charlie, which he thought referred to a real boy with whom he had a real relationship, and whose real death is the cause of his inescapable grief. Bernard might respond that lifelong grief is an excessive response to the death of (...) a fictional character. He realizes that the memories of that trauma have been fabricated by Robert Ford. Whether Charlie is a lie, a fiction, or a stranger, by grieving for him Bernard is sharing in a very human kind of experience. As malicious as Ford's motives were, maybe he was right about the need for a “cornerstone” of suffering to make Bernard human. (shrink)

Musical prodigies reach exceptionally high levels of achievement before adolescence. Despite longstanding interest and fascination in musical prodigies, little is known about their psychological profile. Here we assess to what extent practice, intelligence, and personality make musical prodigies a distinct category of musician. Nineteen former or current musical prodigies were compared to 35 musicians with either an early or late start but similar amount of musical training, and 16 non-musicians. All completed a Wechsler IQ test, the Big Five (...) Inventory, the Autism Spectrum Quotient, the Barcelona Music Reward Questionnaire, the Dispositional Flow Scale, and a detailed history of their lifetime music practice. None of the psychological traits distinguished musical prodigies from control musicians or non-musicians except their propensity to report flow during practice. The other aspects that differentiated musical prodigies from their peers were the intensity of their practice before adolescence, and the source of their motivation when they began to play. Thus practice, by itself, does not make a prodigy. The results are compatible with multifactorial models of expertise, with prodigies lying at the high end of the continuum. In summary, prodigies are expected to present brain predispositions facilitating their success in learning an instrument, which could be amplified by their early and intense practice happening at a moment when brain plasticity is heightened. (shrink)

Some feminist discourses blame some men for gender inequality, gender domination, and gender-based violence. Some women use such discourse as a perfect scenario to criticize some men’s behavior. Indeed, they usually do so with Oppressed Traditional Masculinities but not with Dominant Traditional Masculinities, who are the men who were violent with those women and with whom some of those women chose to have relationships. However, there have always been men who have been on the side of women and have never (...) committed violence against them. Therefore, New Alternative Masculinities reject being indicated as guilty of the violence committed against women by DTM. Through a communicative approach, applying six semi-structured interviews with a communicative orientation and a communicative data analysis of all information, this article explores both women’s communicative acts that blame OTM for what DTM have done to women and NAM’s reactions to these accusations to stop such blaming to make it possible to overcome hegemonic discourses. (shrink)

This important and timely collection is the result of a conference on self-knowledge held at the University of St. Andrews in 1995. A number of papers included in it focus on the epistemology of self-knowledge. In particular, they try to provide a plausible explanation of what makes knowledge of our own mental states immediate and authoritative. Crispin Wright deals with that problem in the context of Wittgensteinian philosophy of mind. John McDowell replies to Wright’s essay by providing a different (...) picture of Wittgenstein’s later views on mind and philosophy. Christopher Peacocke considers, in his contribution, conscious attitudes, especially the possession condition of the concept of belief, and argues that a conscious belief gives rise to the relevant second-order belief in a way that is neither inferential, nor observational. Michael Martin responds by suggesting that Peacocke’s proposal applies only to conscious episodes of a certain kind. Most of the contributors to the collection are convinced that the observational model of self-knowledge is fatally flawed. Cynthia Macdonald undertakes to show that not everything is wrong with that model and its various criticisms can be effectively met. Elizabeth Fricker in her long essay offers a careful analysis of the distinction between two conceptions of selfknowledge: a special access account, according to which we have a unique privileged access to our own mental states, and a constitutive account holding that the self-ascription of a particular mental state is a necessary condition of being in that state. She finds that distinction, and the dichotomy based upon it, untenable. Akeel Bilgrami and Tyler Burge are concerned in their respective contributions with the role of self-knowledge in free, responsible agency, and in the practice of reasoning. They seem to suggest that in view of that role one should endorse a constitutive account of self-knowledge. The prevailing number of current theories of mental content accept a thesis of externalism to the effect that mental content is constituted and individuated not only by factors lying inside one’s head, or inside one’s subjective realm, but also and foremost by external and environmental factors. It seems, however, that the combination of externalism about mental content with our ordinary conception of self-knowledge leads to a certain tension and highly implausible consequences. Some philosophers, including Paul A. Boghossian, argue that the tension is genuine, and selfknowledge is simply incompatible with externalism. We have to claim this because otherwise we would have to agree on an apparently absurd extension of the domain of what can be known nonempirically or a priori. Other contributors are not convinced by Boghossian’s argument for incompatibilism. Brian McLaughlin and Michael Tye in their joint essay attempt to show that the argument does not apply to the most popular version of externalism. Martin Davies thinks the argument can be blocked by invoking principles limiting the transfer of epistemic warrant across known entailments, and Diana Raffman believes it is ultimately based upon equivocation. Moreover, as illustrated by Jim Edwards on an example of sense experience, one can accept externalism while modifying the extent of our self-knowledge in various ways. The last two contributions of the collection, by Barry C. Smith and James Higginbotham respectively, are concerned with knowledge of what we mean when we speak a language and its connections with self-knowledge in general. (shrink)

What makes us human is our special motivation to share with others how we feel, what we believe, and what we want to happen in the future. We want to share with others what is real about the world. Shared reality is crucial to what we believe--sharing is believing. It is central to our sense of self, what we strive for and how we strive. It is basic to how we get along with (...) others. It brings us together in fellowship and companionship, but it also tears us apart by creating in-group "bubbles" that conflict with one another. Our shared realities are the best of us, and the worst of us. (shrink)

This fascinating new book examines diversity in moral judgements, drawing on recent work in social, personality, and evolutionary psychology, reviewing the factors that influence the moral judgments people make. Why do reasonable people so often disagree when drawing distinctions between what is morally right and wrong? Even when individuals agree in their moral pronouncements, they may employ different standards, different comparative processes, or entirely disparate criteria in their judgments. Examining the sources of this variety, the author expertly explores (...) morality using ethics position theory, alongside other theoretical perspectives in moral psychology, and shows how it can relate to contemporary social issues from abortion to premarital sex to human rights. Also featuring a chapter on applied contexts, using the theory of ethics positions to gain insights into the moral choices and actions of individuals, groups, and organizations in educational, research, political, medical, and business settings, the book offers answers that apply across individuals, communities, and cultures. Investigating the relationship between people⁰́₉s personal moral philosophies and their ethical thoughts, emotions, and actions, this is fascinating reading for students and academics from psychology and philosophy and anyone interested in morality and ethics. (shrink)

You have the camera, or intend to. You have the desire. Now, you have personalized instruction from PC Magazine "The play of light and color on the human imagination." That's how Daniel and Sally Wiener Grotta define photography. They'll lead you through choosing a digital camera and using all its amazing features, but photography is more than technology. These renowned experts liberally share their knowledge of lighting, settings, focus, file formats, communicating with pictures, and more. Read a little, then go (...) shoot some pictures, study them, and read some more. See what you and that camera can do -- together. Go one-on-one with the pros Choose a camera that fits your needs Understand resolution, compression, pixels, and file formats Use shutter speed, lighting, and depth of field Learn about white balance and color adjustment Organize your shots on the camera Shoot photos for company publications or online auctions Pick up tips for getting great photos Get your pictures out of the camera, easily Edit, print, and e-mail photos. (shrink)

Bioethics and humanities (inclusive of medical ethics, health care ethics, environmental ethics, research ethics, philosophy and medicine, literature and medicine, and so on) seems like one field; yet colleagues come from different academic disciplines with distinct languages, methods, traditions, core curriculum and competency examinations. The author marks six related "framework" features that unite and make it one distinct field. It is a commitment to (1) work systematically on some of the momentous and well-defined sets of problems about the human (...) condition that drive our field (such as death and dying, disability, confidentiality, professionalism, informed consent, abortion, euthanasia, assisted suicide, personhood, health-care resource allocation and environmental ethics, as well as the impact of new technologies, including genetic and reproductive); (2) use interdisciplinary approaches to unravel them; (3) employ cases and practical reasoning to understand problems and solve answers; (4) apply teaching methods and goals associated with John Dewey to make students better problem-solvers; (5) find morally justifiable solutions to the problems driving our field; and (6) seek interdisciplinary and collaborative scholarship, service or teaching. (shrink)

As part of a book symposium on Nicholas Vrousalis' Exploitation as Domination: What Makes Capitalism Unjust (2023), Lucas Stanczyk argues that his reciprocity account of the central wrong-making feature of domination is superior to Vrousalis' domination account.

In [HKL00] (henceforth HKL), Hamm, Kamp and van Lambalgen declare ‘‘there is no opposition between formal and cognitive semantics,’’ notwithstanding the realist/mentalist divide. That divide separates two sides Jackendo¤ has (in [Jac96], following Chomsky) labeled E(xternalized)-semantics, relating language to a reality independent of speakers, and I(nternalized)-semantics, revolving around mental representations and thought. Although formal semanticists have (following David Lewis) traditionally leaned towards E-semantics, it is reasonable to apply formal methods also to I-semantics. This point is made clear in HKL (...) via two computational approaches to natural language semantics, Discourse Representation Theory (DRT, [KR93]) and the Event Calculus (EC) presented in [LH05]. In this short note, I wish to raise certain questions about EC that can be traced to the applicability of formal methods to E-semantics and I-semantics alike. These opposing orientations suggest di¤erent notions of time, event and representation. (shrink)

ABSTRACTA ‘complex’ theory of personal identity analyses a person P2 being the same as an earlier person P1 in terms of some particular degree of physical or mental continuity between them. All such theories are open to an objection that the postulated degree of continuity is an arbitrary one, and many of them are open to the objection that more than one subsequent person could satisfy them. Necessarily, any subsequent person is either totally the same person as P1 or not (...) at all the same as P1. P2 is identical with P1 if and only if P2 has the same soul as P1. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism” by Siegfried J. Schmidt. Upshot: Schmidt’s “philosophical argumentation” in favor of an action orientation for communication rewrites constructivism in terms of process. Though in support of his proposal, a philosophical argumentation about process works best for illuminating the writer’s own process and orienting readers to his own argument. I propose that arguments about the communication of social actors should make visible the (...) social processes about which they argue. (shrink)

Packed with practical, hands on guidance, PC Magazine’s Guide to Printing Great Digital Photos is the perfect book for computer users who are looking to get that little bit extra out of their color printer investment. Digital print expert David Karlins guides readers through everything –from selecting the right kinds of ink and paper, calibrating your computer monitor and making colors match, to getting your images ready for printing and giving your photos that professional touch with a bit (...) of editing. Readers also learn tips for printing photo projects such as invitations, stationary and greeting cards and even t-shirts! Coverage includes: Taking digital photos that will print well Optimal file size and resolution for great digital printing Editing your digital artwork for printing Matching monitor and print colors Choosing the right paper and coating Matching papers to in ks Borderless printing Matting and framing Special printing projects such as t-shirts, greeting cards, stationary and more. (shrink)

It may seem strange to associate the name of Jan Patočka with artificial intelligence. Neither a mathematician nor a logician, the phenomenology he espoused, with its emphasis on lived experience, seems worlds apart from the formalism associated with the discipline. Yet, as I hope to show, the radicality and depth of Patočka’s thought is such that it casts a wide net. The reform of metaphysics that Patočka proposed in his asubjective phenomenology also affects artificial intelligence. It shows that what (...) philosophers take as its most difficult, yet primary problem may well be the result of a category mistake. (shrink)

How and why did we become who we are? In "What Makes Us Human?" some of theorld's most brilliant thinkers offer their answers to this perennial puzzle,ncluding Susan Blackmore, Robin Dunbar, Susan Greenfield, Richard Harries,enan Malik, Richard Wrangham, Ian Tattersall, and Lewis Wolpert. Together,hey draw on a broad spectrum of disciplines, from anthropology, biochemistry,edicine, and neuroscience, to philosophy, psychology, and religion, to askhat makes us distinctively human. Is it our cognitive abilities, or our usef tools, our story-telling, our beliefs, (...) our curiosity, our ability to cook,r our culture? Are we half-ape or half-angel? "What Makes Us Human?"xplains how and why our ancestors adapted to their surroundings to produceuch clever, talented, and unlikely progeny. It is for all to enjoy. (shrink)

When it comes to questions about alternative visions for philosophical engagement, Heidegger’s work makes for an interesting case study, especially if we focus on his texts from the turbulent 1930s. As a shortcut into this contested territory, it is instructive to examine Heidegger’s anti-journalistic gestures, centered on the question whether this animosity is bound to drive a wedge between, or rather prompt a re-approximation of, philosophy and public scholarship. To render this programmatic concern more specific, the present essay aims (...) to reassess Heidegger’s profile by considering his account of language as the “most dangerous of goods” bestowed on humans. This theme can serve as an expedient starting point for scrutinizing philosophers’ self-understanding as daring explorers in pursuit of profound insights into the human condition, and their ability to balance excitement and sobriety. (shrink)

We frequently speak of certain things or phenomena being built out of or based in others. Making Things Up concerns these relations, which connect more fundamental things to less fundamental things: Karen Bennett calls these 'building relations'. She aims to illuminate what it means to say that one thing is more fundamental than another.

Is life meaningless? Does life have enough meaning to make it feel worthwhile? If we think our lives lack meaning, what can we do about it? Finding Meaning in an Imperfect World answers these and other difficult questions, while confronting head-on famous, recurrent theories that insist on life's meaninglessness. Landau shows us how to single out what is meaningful, explains why we sometimes fail to recognize meaning, and suggests ways in which we can resensitize ourselves to (...) it. (shrink)

Surprises are important in our everyday lives as well as in our scientific and philosophical theorizing—in psychology, information theory, cognitive-neuroscience, philosophy of science, and confirmation theory. Nevertheless, there is no satisfactory theory of what makes something surprising. It has long been acknowledged that not everything unexpected is surprising. The reader had no reason to expect that there will be exactly 190 words in this abstract and yet there is nothing surprising about this fact. We offer a novel theory (...) that explains when and why an unexpected fact is surprising. We distinguish between descriptive and normative notions of what is surprising; clarify the sense in which surprising facts are unexpected; and, finally, develop and defend the significance account of surprise, according to which a fact is surprising to an agent if and to the extent that it is both unexpected and significant to the agent. Since a surprising fact can be significant to an agent in various ways—personal, moral, epistemic, and aesthetic—surprise is not merely or primarily epistemic. Fitting surprise reflects more than a person’s view of what is; it reflects a person’s view of what is significant. (shrink)

No one denies that time and space are different; and it is easy to catalog differences between them. I can point my finger toward the west, but I can’t point my finger toward the future. If I choose, I can now move to the left, but I cannot now choose to move toward the past. And (as D. C. Williams points out) for many of us, our attitudes toward time differ from our attitudes toward space. We want to (...) maximize our temporal extent and minimize our spatial extent: we want to live as long as possible but we want to be thin.1 But these differences are not very deep, and don’t get at the essence of the difference between time and space. That’s what I want to understand: I want to know what makes time different from space. I want to know which difference is the fundamental difference between them. (shrink)

I offer two, complementary, accounts of the visual nature of representational picturing. One, in terms of six features of depiction, sets an explanatory task. The other, in terms of the experience to which depiction gives rise, promises to meet that need. Elsewhere I have offered an account of this experience that allows this promise to be fulfilled. I sketch that view, and defend it against Wollheim's claim that it cannot meet certain demands on a satisfactory account. I then turn (...) to Wollheim's own view, arguing that it suffers from crucial obscurities. These prevent it from meeting the explanatory commitments I describe, and are only exacerbated by the demands Wollheim himself imposes. (shrink)

We recognise certain acts as ‘sexual assault’, ‘sexual violence’, or a ‘sexual offence’, often to offer strong moral condemnation or to prescribe legal sanction. A common feature of these attacks is that they impose nonconsensual sexual contact; they are sexual attacks. While there has been extensive discussion of consent to sexual contact and of the conditions under which consensual contact is sexual, there has been little investigation into what it is for nonconsensual contact to be sexual. The purpose of (...) this article is to examine the conditions under which an attack (nonconsensual contact) is sexual. I first argue that an account of sexual attacks is important, not least because the question has pressing moral and legal implications. I then consider and reject three accounts, one appealing solely to intuitions, one appealing to the body parts involved, and one appealing to the assailant’s mental state. Finally, I develop my own account. I propose that an attack is sexual if and only if it carries a sexual expressive significance, and thereby conveys a sexual meaning. (shrink)

Certified nursing assistants (CNAs) provide up to 80% of the direct care to older adults in long‐term care facilities.CNAs are perceived as being at the bottom of the hierarchy among healthcare professionals often negatively affecting their job satisfaction. However, manyCNAs persevere in providing quality care and even reporting high levels of job satisfaction. The aim of the present investigation was to identify primary themes that may helpCNAs make meaning of their chosen career; thus potentially partially explaining increases in job satisfaction (...) among this group. Focus groups were conducted withCNAs at three long‐term care facilities. Four themes emerged from the data:CNAwork is good or special;CNAas relationship builder;CNAas expert;CNAas team member. These themes reflect the perceptions that theseCNAs held in regard to themselves and their relationships to others in the work environment and, when present, can contribute to intrinsic job satisfaction. Our meaning‐making themes support the premise thatCNAs do not passively accept the evaluations of others but instead actively frame identities that validate their importance to residents and the institution. (shrink)

Pattadath and Rose, in their thoughtful responses, create room for textual dialogue by making connections and thinking about madness, lived experience, and research and knowledge production in other contexts. I am grateful for this engagement, and the opportunity to clarify my own thoughts, as well as generate new ones.Rose makes crucial points about the relative silence in many critical fields outside of Disability and Mad Studies and their “probably unknowing refusal to see madness as political”. This (...) is often the case, and can be extended to disability and chronic illness more broadly. At times, critical scholars in other fields show how the psy-disciplines are tools used to... (shrink)

Rational decision making depends on what one believes, what one desires, and what one knows. In conventional decision models, beliefs are represented by probabilities and desires are represented by utilities. Software agents are knowledgeable entities capable of managing their own set of beliefs and desires, and they can decide upon the next operation to execute autonomously. They are also interactive entities capable of filtering communications and managing dialogues. Knowledgeability includes representing knowledge about the external world, (...) reasoning with it, and sharing it. Interactions include negotiations to perform tasks in cooperative, coordinative, and competitive ways. In this paper we focus on decision-making mechanisms for agent-based systems on the basis of agent interaction. We identify possible interaction scenarios and define mechanisms for decision making in uncertain environments. It is believed that software agents will become the underlying technology that offers the capability of distribution of competence, control, and information for the next generation of ubiquitous, distributed, and heterogeneous information systems. (shrink)

This paper reports findings from a study about school staff’s perceptions of the preferences for social interaction that young people have with similar and different others. This tension was explored empirically using scenarios of moral dilemmas to conduct in-depth semi-structured interviews with school staff from special and mainstream secondary schools. The issue was explored with reference to a tension between social inclusion, the principle of embracing difference, and homophily, the concept that similarity breeds connection. The data suggest that homophily (...) and inclusion can come into a tension with an ethical dimension. In education, the homophily/inclusion tension is one between students’ preferences for being among similar others and the moral imperative of including everybody; or between individuality and commonality. Inclusion is often translated into a demand for full participation as the only way to respond ethically to difference. However, the recognition of students’ rights to negotiate their preferences, even when they come into tension with what is considered to be politically correct, is also an ethical position. The paper concludes that the homophily/inclusion tension is constructive as it challenges the moral necessity of inclusion for all, and opens a debate about participatory decision-making and democratic school management. (shrink)

Perhaps no other population exposes the clinician to more moral and legal dilemmas than clients with an HIV-positive diagnosis. What does the therapist do about the HIV positive patient who is having sex with unnamed partners and refuses to stop? What should be said in end-of-life decisions? What of the adolescent who is HIV positive but whose guardian does not wish the youth to be informed of his status?

John Griffi n’s classic on racism, Black Like Me (1960), provides an interesting text with which to investigate the development of a dialogical self. Griffi n becomes a black man for only a short period of time, but during that time he develops a black social identity and sense of personal identity, that contrasts radically with his former white identity. When he looks into a mirror on several occasions he engages in a dialogue with himself, as both a black and (...) a white person. At fi rst these two identities are so different that there is no “sympathy” between them. But through his experience, he eventually overcomes the dichotomy of two opposing selves, and acquires a personal identity, neither white nor black, but just human. In this article, I trace the development of these dialogical selves and the emergence of this new human identity. Key words: identity, racism, self, black, white.. (shrink)

Making history - in the sense of writing it - is often set against talking about it, with most historians considering writing history to be better than talking about it. My aim in this article is to analyze the topic of making history versus talking about history in order to understand most historians' evident decision to ignore talking about history. Ultimately my goal is to determine whether it is possible to talk about history (...) with any sense.To this end, I will establish a typology of the different forms of talking practiced by historians, using a chronological approach, from the Greek and Roman emphasis on the visual witness to present-day narrativism and textual analysis. Having recognized the peculiar textual character of the historiographical work, I will then discuss whether one can speak of a method for analyzing historiographical works. After considering two possible approaches - the philosophy of science and literary criticism - I offer my own proposal. This involves breaking the dichotomy between making and talking about history, adopting a fuzzy method that overcomes the isolation of self-named scientific communities, and that destroys the barriers among disciplines that work with the same texts but often from mutually excluding perspectives. Talking about history is only possible if one knows about history and about its sources and methods, but also about the foundations of the other social sciences and about the continuing importance of traditional philosophical problems of Western thought in the fields of history and the human sciences. (shrink)

An incrementalist view of the R&Dprocess is developed, according to which R&D consists of informed trial and error. One way of avoiding expensive mistakes is to avoid choices within the R&D program that are highly sensitive to a particular scientific claim, because a great deal of time and money may have been spent to no avail should the claim turn out to befalse. The incremental view of R&D therefore entails that no choice within any R&D program is sensitive to any (...) scientific claim made at the time. Two tests are presented, antiseptic surgery and the first atomic pile, both of which confirm the incrementalist thesis. (shrink)

Harry Frankfurt and J. David Velleman both offer accounts of paradigmatic action. To greatly oversimplify, Frankfurt roots our agency in our capacity to care, while Velleman places it in our cognitive capacity to make sense of ourselves. This paper argues that both views have an important piece of the truth. The paper advances a pluralistic account of paradigmatic agency. (updated 7/30/07).

According to what I call the judgment view about welfare, a subject S’s life is going well for S only if S judges that S’s life is going well for S. This means that a person’s welfare depends, at least in part, on that person’s own judgment about her welfare. According to this view, it is not possible for a person to have a life that is going well for her if she judges that it is not. (...) In this paper, I challenge this view by showing that there can be cases where a person’s life is going well for her even if she does not judge that it is. (shrink)

In 2004 Orlando Florida was hit with an almost unprecedented series of storms and hurricanes. Within two months, Hurricanes Charley, Frances, and Jeanne hit, and Hurricane Ivan made a near miss. Billions of dollars of damage resulted from these disasters, and several dozen lives were lost. It is tempting, in the case of extreme events, to either regard them as having no need of interpretation (that is, as simply given, material events shared by everyone), or as a kind of rare (...) window on the workings of a community.1 In this paper I want to examine the public construction of the meaning of the hurricane in Orlando, particularly as represented in reports at the time in the major newspaper, the Orlando Sentinel. I am especially interested in placemaking, that is, the ways in which places gain or fail to gain meaning in times of stress. I will suggest that opportunities for place-making were lost in Orlando because of the frame the events around Hurricane Charley were given. Hurricane Frances, though, was treated differently in the Orlando press, and the discourse around the hurricanes of 2004 provides a contrast to the kind of rhetorical response that circulated during the disastrous hurricane season of 2005. In the case of some disasters, community is reinforced, and the skills of place-making are exercised. The reaction to Hurricane Charley in Orlando, on the other hand, tended not to reinforce community, and tended not to contribute to place-making. While it is extremely difficult to measure sense of place or sense of community quantitatively, it is possible to make sense out of the interpretive tools people have at their disposal in a disaster. What comes out of all this, I think, is something I want to call “place-making imagination”. This is analogous to the 1 concept of “moral imagination” in ethics (Johnson). Our moral options extend as far as our imagination will allow. A person might boil the moral universe down to polarized options – fight or flight, kill or be killed, choose A or B – when in fact a more cultivated and aware imagination may have afforded other options, perhaps better ones than either polarized one.. (shrink)

Making good moral choices should not be difficult, says Fr. Al McBride in this thoughtful book. In Christ Our Compass, he focuses on the moral teachings of the Church as found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church (Part Three, Life in Christ), emphasizing throughout that at the heart of these teachings is the love of God for humankind. Above all, a deep sense of joy and grace is woven throughout the course of this book. The (...) class='Hi'>book guides with a gentle hand in discussing topics such as sin and moral sense; family values; medical and moral issues; war; the death penalty; sexuality; honesty; grace and joy; the Church as teacher; and the Beatitudes. It offers contemporary examples of situations where moral choices were made, pointing out the relationship of actions taken to the teachings of the Church. It touches on the Ten Commandments as cornerstones of a moral life, while encouraging consideration of the Great Commandment as the guidestar in our choices. Christ Our Compass is a practical, faith-filled look at living rightly. It will be of great benefit to all who seek to live a Christian life guided by the compassionate example of Jesus and teachings of the Catholic Church. (shrink)

Note: I asked undergraduate students, graduate students as well as assistant professors about how they would explain philosophical expertise. So don’t be surprised to find also statements of undergraduate students about philosophical expertise on this website. An analysis of the anonymous answers given on my website revealed that undergraduate students mentioned other abilities when it comes to philosophical expertise than assistent professors. Quite a few assistant professors agreed to answer some more detailed questions. They are, however, still (...) working on that. I will add their answers to this website as soon as I receive it. (shrink)

The works by Graham Priest that I'm most familiar with are those of the 1980’s. I understand they belong to the logical part of his writing, as presented by the organizers of the “Towards Graham Priest” meeting at Szczecin University on 20 June, 2012. Myself, I read Priest’s works to be imprecise, to say the least. Thelack of precision is to be traced particularly in his interpretations of Alfred Tarski’s heritage. This applies to Tarski’s main points, namely: semantically closedlanguages, the (...) T-scheme, and the appreciation of natural language. The strange thing about it is that Priest does not mind other people expressing views opposite to his own, but admits he cannot determine which contradictions are true and gives only vague indications about how to judge the criticisms. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to (...) be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Commoditization seems immutable and unstoppable but, like other social processes, its prevalence is context dependent. The enabling context for commoditization has been cheap fossil fuels, economic growth, and ever-increasing energy and material throughput. In fact, the scientific findings of ecological, climate, footprint, and material flow studies all point in the same direction—excess throughput. We cannot grow our way out of growth-driven crisis; new technologies will not create new sources of energy or new waste sinks. Counter-commoditization measures can take (...) the form of formal policies or of informal social change processes, including processes now under way. Three social change processes are relational decision making, ecological language, and localization. The common thread is relations (between humans and between human systems—especially the economy—and natural systems), context (spatial and temporal, ecological and social). Applied to fossil fuels it is clear that the end of the hydrocarbon era must be accelerated. The normative imperative to support and invest in the “economy of care and connection” becomes ever stronger. (shrink)