La filosofía ha reflexionado a menudo acerca de la naturaleza de la burocracia, de su lógica y método, de sus consecuencias. En este artículo se quiere presentar cómo la inimputable y, por ello, irrazonable lógica burocrática se fundamenta en una psicopatológica religiosa, “mística”. Para mostrar esta temática nos servimos de lo que han escrito Max Weber en su Economía y sociedad y Hannah Arendt en Los orígenes del totalitarismo, ya que nos parecen los autores que más han comprendido y señalado (...) el fundamento místico-religioso de la lógica burocrática. Por ello, en un primer punto mostraremos en qué consiste según estos autores la lógica del pensamiento burocrático y, en un segundo punto, señalaremos el fundamento patológico-religioso de esta lógica. (shrink)

In response to recent work on the nature of human aggression, and to shed light on the proximate, as opposed to ultimate, causes of tribal warfare, we present a record of events leading to a fatal Waorani raid on a family from another tribe, followed by a detailed first-person observation of the behavior of the raiders as they prepared themselves for war, and upon their return. We contrast this attack with other Waorani aggressions and speculate on evidence regarding their hormonal (...) underpinnings. On-the-ground ethnographic observations are examined in light of the neuroendocrinological literature. The evidence suggests a chain of causality in launching lethal violence, beginning with a perceived injury, culminating in a massacre, and terminating in rejoicing. Although no blood or saliva samples were taken at the time of this raid, the behaviors were consistent with a deliberate initiation of the hormonal cascade characterizing the “fight-or-flight” response, along with other hormonal changes. We conclude with observations on the stratified interrelationships of the cognitive, social, emotional, and neuroendocrinological causes of aggression leading to coalitional male homicide. (shrink)

When sharing a task with another person that requires turn taking, as in doubles games of table tennis, performance on the shared task is similar to performing the whole task alone. This has been taken to indicate that humans co-represent their partner’s task share, as if it were their own. Task co-representation allows prediction of the other’s responses when it is the other’s turn, and leads to response conflict in joint interference tasks. However, data from our lab cast doubt on (...) the view that task co-representation and resulting response conflict are the only or even primary source of effects observed in task sharing. Recent findings furthermore suggest another potential source of interference in joint task performance that has been neglected so far: Self-other discrimination and conflict related to agent identification (i.e., determining whether it is “my” or the other’s turn). Based on these findings we propose that participants might not always co-represent what their partner is supposed to do, but instead co-represent that another agent is responsible for part of the task, and when it is his turn. We call this account the actor co-representation account. (shrink)

Nurses have moral obligations incurred by membership in the profession to participate knowingly in health policy advocacy. Many barriers have historically hindered nurses from realizing their potential to advance health policy. The contemporary political context sets additional challenges to policy work due to polarization and conflict. Nursing education can help nurses recognize their role in advancing health through political advocacy in a manner that is consistent with disciplinary knowledge and ethical responsibilities. In this paper, the authors describe an exemplar of (...) Elizabeth Barrett's “Power as Knowing Participation in Change” theory as a disciplinary lens within a doctoral nursing health policy course. Barrett (radically) emphasizes “power as freedom” instead of “power as control.” This approach is congruent with nursing disciplinary values and enhances awareness of personal freedom and building collaborative relationships in the policy process. The theory was used in concert with other traditional policy content and frameworks from nursing and other disciplines. We discuss the role of nursing ethics viewed as professional responsibility for policy action, an overview of Barrett's theory, and the design of the course. Four student reflections on how the course influenced their thinking about policy advocacy are included. While not specific to policymaking, Barrett's theory provides a disciplinary grounding to increase students' awareness of freedom and choices in political advocacy participation. Our experience suggests that Barrett's work can be fruitful for enhancing nurses' awareness of choices to participate in change across settings. (shrink)

This collection of essays expands the focus of historical studies of international public law in modernity to include the novel insight of the cosmopolitan imagination's past and present force. Featuring a line-up of leading international scholars it argues that Europe has recurrently implemented legal cosmopolitanism at home and exported it abroad.

There is vast evidence that accounts for the association between entrepreneurial orientation and the probability of starting a business. However, there are not many studies that test how psychological factors moderate this relationship. A variable that has been little studied in this relationship is Grit. Grit is considered a personality trait defined as perseverance and passion for long-term goals. Grit considers two sub-dimensions, one linked to the consistency of interests and the other linked to perseverance in the effort. The objective (...) of this article is to analyze the moderating role that both sub-dimensions of grit plays in the relationship between EO and PSB, considering its interaction with sociodemographic variables such as age, gender, and culture. This cross-sectional study has a sample of 1,761 participants, active workers. The EO scale and a Grit Scale were applied. In addition, participants were asked, based on their perception, how likely they were to start their own business within the next 5 years. A simple moderation analysis was considered to test the moderating role of grit in the relationship between EO and PSB. Subsequently, a double moderation analysis was carried out in order to identify which sociodemographic variables moderate the moderating effect of grit on the relationship in question. The results show that only the Grit-Passion component of grit moderates the relationship between EO and PSB. Regarding the sociodemographic variables, neither age, culture, nor gender showed a moderating effect on the moderation exercised by Grit-Passion in the relationship between OE and PSB. The results are discussed in terms of psychological capital, particularly with an emphasis on explaining why only the Grit-Passion shows a moderating effect on the relationship between EO and PSB, in detriment of Grit-Perseverance. In addition, the power of grit in the field of entrepreneurship is discussed, considering that its moderating effect is transversal to variations in age, gender and culture, as well as its relevance when considering interventions and pedagogical models in the field of entrepreneurship. (shrink)

The implementation of online technologies to promote wellbeing is increasingly becoming a worldwide priority. This study includes secondary analyses of data and examined drop-out rates in an online guided self-help intervention for patients with anorexia nervosa. Specifically, rates of drop-out at end of treatment (i.e. six-week assessment), as well as intervention adherence (minimum of four of six online guided sessions) and differences between completers and drop-outs were examined. Motivation to change and associated patient variables were assessed as predictors of drop-out (...) using structural equation modelling. Ninety-nine patients were randomised to the intervention arm of the trial. Data were available for 82 individuals, 67 of whom completed the six-week assessment and attended a minimum of four online sessions. No significant differences were found between completers and drop-outs at baseline. At the end of the first week of participation, drop-outs from the six-week assessment or the intervention reported less satisfaction with their work with the mentor delivering online guidance. Greater confidence in own ability to change and higher controlled motivation (willingness to change due to pressure from others) predicted lower drop-out rates from the six-week assessment. Stronger alliance with the therapist at the treatment centre and lower psychological distress were associated with greater autonomous motivation (self-directed motivation) and importance and ability to change. Data demonstrate that a novel online guided self-help intervention for patients with anorexia nervosa is feasible. Early satisfaction with the program and external pressure to change have a protective role against drop-out rates. (shrink)

Valence is a key construct in the affective sciences and in the philosophy of emotion. Carruthers (2011, 2017) has recently offered an account of the nature of valence. He defends a (representational) version of what might be called the non-sensory signal theory of valence (NSS). According to the latter, valence is identified with inner signals—which are not themselves perceptual nor conceptual states of any sort—which mark sensory representations as good or bad. In this paper, I argue that Carruthers’s version of (...) NSS is problematic on its own, independently of the plausibility of competing theories of valence. Carruthers’s arguments to the effect that valence is non-sensory fail to rule out the hypothesis that, together with arousal, valence might also be grounded in bodily, sensory representations. Carruthers’s claim that valence is not a sensory item in the furniture of the mind needs to be then more thoroughly substantiated. Keywords: affect, valence, arousal, interoception. (shrink)

Si en la tradición cristiana suele subrayarse el carácter penitencial del “pescado”, el presente estudio pretende acercarnos a los textos de la tradición neotestamentaria y judía que lo presentan como un elemento del banquete escatológico, subrayándose, sobre todo, su perspectiva mesiánica y escatológica.

El imaginario poético que emerge de la cultura porteña del Pacífico Sur es un producto de la imaginación que responde a un ejercicio escritural histórico. Hacemos un repaso de estas manifestaciones a partir de tres momentos o sensibilidades que construyen una imagen del puerto de Valparaíso. Desde el relato de viaje, el gesto modernista y la narrativa del naturalismo, todos previos a un producto estético-literario mayor, enseñan en su mirada un modo de habitar el puerto que permiten proponer la existencia (...) de una cultura en conflicto con Occidente. Los pasajes de estas manifestaciones no pueden leerse aislados de esa poética del habitar porteño, sino como parte integral de un discurso de frontera que se pronuncia contra el olvido y a favor de la sobrevivencia histórica de estos puertos. (shrink)

Medicine is arriving at a new millenium. One of its most urgent tasks is to reconcile social health demands with a renewed medical paradigm capable of including them. This challenge requires a reexamination of the definition of medicine.This work takes up the original greek definition of medicine (Tekhne Iatrike) and the Medical Act according to P. Lain Entrago, and analyzes Heidegger's interpretation of Tekhne. It points out the two main ways in which current medical practice is sustained: the Instrumental Medical (...) Act (IMA), which organizes medical production, and the Productive Medical Act (PMA), which motivates it. (shrink)

El presente artículo apunta a discutir cómo los actos cívicos o los monumentos actuaron en los albores del siglo XX como mecanismos de articulación dinámica de la “chilenización” en el desierto tarapaqueño, particularmente en el puerto de Iquique. Se reflexiona desde una perspectiva sociohistórica en torno a las fiestas públicas como rituales simbólicos donde se materializa la integración y/o pertenencia a la comunidad nacional; eventos cívicos que no dejaron de ser menos persuasivos como otras formas mas “violentas” de implantar y (...) promover el sentido de la Nación en los nuevos territorios anexados al Estado chileno. (shrink)

In this rich cultural history, Pamela Robertson Wojcik examines America's ambivalent and shifting attitude toward homelessness through a close study of film cycles from five distinct historical moments that show characters as unhomed and placeless, mobile rather than fixed: failing, resisting, or opting out of the mandate for a home of one's own. From the tramp films of the Silent Era to the Oscar-winning Nomadland in 2021, Wojcik shows how film cycles reveal a tension in the American imaginary between (...) viewing homelessness as, on the one hand, deviant or threatening, and, on the other, emblematic of freedom and independence. Blending social history with insights drawn from a complex array of films, both canonical and fringe, Wojcik effectively 'unhomes' dominant narratives that cast aspirations for success and social mobility as the focus of American cinema, reminding us that genres of precarity have been central to the American cinema (and American story) all along. (shrink)

Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in it) also guarantees (...) that it could not be voluntary. It turns out, then, that, for failing to be voluntary, beliefs are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible. (shrink)

ABSTRACTExperiences that contradict one's core concepts elicit intense emotions. Such schema incongruence can elicit awe, wherein experiences that are too vast...

In this article, I follow the evolving visual form of the plant illustrations produced by the 17th-century physician and microscopist Nehemiah Grew. I trace the changing appearance of a variety of magnified plants throughout the course of their manifestation in illustration: beginning with their unsteady earliest appearance in 1672 in the publication The Anatomy of Vegetables Begun, into their reworking in the popular French translation, which was reissued and reprinted multiple times, and finally to Grew's magnum opus a decade later, (...) The Anatomy of Plants (1682). In addition to addressing the epistemic significance of these shifts in style, I also consider the importance of the translation process for the refining of Grew's ideas. (shrink)

I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.

Exposición realizada por el Doctor en Filosofía Adán Salinas Araya, en el ciclo de conversaciones “Crítica a la Epidemiología Política. Prácticas y racionalidad neoliberales en tiempos de pandemia”, organizado por el equipo editorial de la Revista de Filosofía Otrosiglo, octubre – diciembre 2020. Disponible en Youtube, canal Revista Otrosiglo. Lecture by Adán Salinas Araya, Ph. D., in the cycle of conversations “Criticism to the Political Epidemiology. Neoliberal practices and rationality in times of pandemics”, event organized by the editorial (...) team of the Philosophy Magazine Otrosiglo, october – december 2020. Available on Youtbe, channel Revista Otrosiglo. (shrink)

Pamela Moore; Experience and the Growth of Understanding: how does knowledge start?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages.

Artificially intelligent systems will be used to make increasingly important decisions about us. Many of these decisions will have to be made without universal agreement about the relevant moral facts. For other kinds of disagreement, it is at least usually obvious what kind of solution is called for. What makes moral disagreement especially challenging is that there are three different ways of handling it. _Moral solutions_ apply a moral theory or related principles and largely ignore the details of the disagreement. (...) _Compromise solutions_ apply a method of finding a compromise and taking information about the disagreement as input. _Epistemic solutions_ apply an evidential rule that treats the details of the disagreement as evidence of moral truth. Proposals for all three kinds of solutions can be found in the AI ethics and value alignment literature, but little has been said to justify choosing one over the other. I argue that the choice is best framed in terms of _moral risk_. (shrink)

In this paper I consider fairness of blaming a wrongdoer. In particular, I consider the claim that blaming a wrongdoer can be unfair because blame has a certain characteristic force, a force which is not fairly imposed upon the wrongdoer unless certain conditions are met--unless, e.g., the wrongdoer could have done otherwise, or unless she is someone capable of having done right, or unless she is able to control her behavior by the light of moral reasons. While agreeing that blame (...) has a characteristic force, I am skeptical of this charge of unfairness. My skepticism concerns itself less with the particular conditions of fairness proposed than with the idea that blame can be rendered unfair by its characteristic force. If to blame a person were simply to perform certain intentional actions, then, as we will see, blame could be rendered unfair by its force. But to blame a person is not just to act in certain ways. It is, at least in large part, to make certain judgments or adopt certain attitudes. However, it is unclear how these attitudes or judgments carry "force"? and also unclear whether they can be rendered unfair by their force. Examining these issues, I will suggest that much of the force of blame is found in a set of judgments--most centrally, the judgment that one person failed to show proper regard for others. But, I will argue, once it is granted that such judgments are true, their characteristic force cannot render them unfair. (shrink)

I first pose a challenge which, it seems to me, any philosophical account of forgiveness must meet: the account must be articulate and it must allow for forgiveness that is uncompromising. I then examine an account of forgiveness which appears to meet this challenge. Upon closer examination we discover that this account actually fails to meet the challenge—but it fails in very instructive ways. The account takes two missteps which seem to be taken by almost everyone discussing forgiveness. At the (...) end, I sketch an alternative account of forgiveness, one that I think meets the challenge and avoids the missteps. (shrink)

A good number of people currently thinking and writing about reasons identify a reason as a consideration that counts in favor of an action or attitude.1 I will argue that using this as our fundamental account of what a reason is generates a fairly deep and recalcitrant ambiguity; this account fails to distinguish between two quite different sets of considerations that count in favor of certain attitudes, only one of which are the “proper” or “appropriate” kind of reason for them. (...) This ambiguity has been the topic of recent discussion, under the head “the wrong kind of reasons problem.”2 I will suggest that confusion about “the wrong kind of reason” will be dispelled by changing our account of what a reason is. While I agree both that reasons are considerations and that certain.. (shrink)

As such, this volume establishes a renewed sense of aesthetic discourse and its usefulness as a tool for understanding culture.

Drawing on postmodern feminist theories of culture and identity, this article explores a model of ‘masquerading’ instead of ‘assimilation’ in analysing self-constructions of migrant women of ‘mixed race’ living in the Netherlands. Rather than as assimilated objects, these migrant women, called Indo-Dutch women, are regarded as agents who effectively intervene in the construction of national identities through masquerading strategies and ways of communication. The article also shows how masquerading strategies form a part of the conflicted colonial history of Indo-Dutch women (...) and as such constitute contemporary life narratives and identities. One incident in a life narrative is used as an example to illustrate different interpretations. (shrink)