Society is at a crossroads. Interconnected systems, radical transparency, and rapidly increasing sophistication in skills, communications, and technologies provide a unique context for fostering social innovation at a planetary scale. We argue that unprecedented rates of systemic social change are possible for co-creating a future where humans and all life can thrive. Yet, this requires innovation in the conceptions, practice, teaching, and researching of social innovation itself to reimagine what it is and can be. As a multidisciplinary group of academics, (...) practitioners, and educators, we integrate our perspectives on social innovation and humanistic management to suggest the notion of systemic social innovation. We introduce the concept of “transformative collaboration” as central to facilitating systemic social innovation and propose a multilevel model for accelerating systems change. We then develop an integrated framework for conceptualizing systemic social innovation. Four levels of social impact are identified, and these levels are bracketed with a call for transforming individual consciousness at the micro level and new collective mindsets at the macro level. Blooom is presented as a case study to illustrate transformative collaboration, demonstrate the role of mindset shift in practice, and introduce four key ingredients to systemic social innovation. Finally, a call to action is issued for social innovation practice, teaching, and research. Most importantly, we seek to inspire and accelerate systemic social innovation that enables the flourishing of every human being and all life on earth. (shrink)

Comment penser l’enracinement phénoménologique de l’éthique? La question demande à être posée par le sens même qu’Aristote assignait à cette articulation d’une disposition et d’un caractère qui constitue la dimension éthique de notre être au monde. Sur cette voie l’ouverture proprement phénoménologique est opérée par la cinquième Méditation cartésienne décrivant l’altération originaire dans l’auto-appréhension charnelle et le transfert analogique qu’elle autorise comme l’opération où l’ego découvre l’altérité de l’autre dans l’intercorporéité. Poursuivre au-delà, vers la signifiance éthique de ce transfert, de (...) cette méta-phore, E. Lévinas, comme on sait, s’y est d’abord engagé dans une conférence de 1962 avant d’abandonner ce thème pour une formulation plus radicale de l’injonction venue de l’autre, sans réciprocité. Mais n’était-ce pas renoncer par là même au lien unissant responsabilité et reconnaissance? C’est ce lien au contraire vers lequel l’analyse ricœurienne de la dimension ontologique de la « métaphore vive » ouvre un accès. Il s’agit de décrire la ressource de sens d’un être-comme métaphorique faisant paraître l’articulation de la sollicitude et de l’estime de soi. (shrink)

Organisationen spielen in modernen Gesellschaften eine zentrale Rolle. Der Beitrag geht davon aus, dass in den mittlerweile etablierten Formen von Ethik und Ethikberatung in Einrichtungen des Gesundheitssystems eine angemessene Reflexion des Organisationsbezugs oft ausbleibt bzw. eine besondere Herausforderung darstellt. Wir konzipieren deshalb eine „prozedurale Organisationsethik“, die sich kritisch mit der organisationalen Passung der Prozesse ethischer Reflexion auseinandersetzt. Daraus lassen sich als Anregung für Theorie und Praxis von ethischen Prozessen praktische Schlussfolgerungen ableiten. Sie betreffen die Orte der Differenzsetzung für die Frage (...) nach dem Guten; die ethischen Hintergrundtheorien und die Frage nach der organisatorischen Verknüpfung der Reflexionssettings. (shrink)

In this introduction to a special subsection of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics comprising separate reviews of the Springer Handbook of the Philosophy of Medicine, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine, and The Bloomsbury Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Medicine, I compare the three texts with respect to their overall organization and their approach to the relation between the science and the art of medicine. I then indicate two areas that merit more explicit attention in developing a comprehensive philosophy of (...) medicine going forward: health economics and systematic relations within the field as a whole. The reviews that follow speak for themselves. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article demonstrates why Husserl struggled to understand the conditions of possibility of false memory, and how only the genetic dimension of his phenomenology enabled him to conceive of a specifically mnemic form of falsehood. For a false memory to deceive us, we must trust that it is true, but in order to have a phenomenology of its falsehood, the memory must appear as false. Husserl’s theory of false memory responds to both of these demands by showing how distorting (...) syntheses conceal themselves, without making it impossible to discover their distorting effects. Key to meeting these two demands is Husserl’s account of how the unconscious functions as the “untrue” basis of memory, and how all recollections require affective, associative syntheses between present conscious experience and past unconscious experience, syntheses that are subject to many vicissitudes. (shrink)

In his published work and even more in conversations, Tarski emphasized what he thought were important philosophical aspects of his work. The English translation of his more philosophical papers [56m] was dedicated to his teacher Tadeusz Kotarbinski, and in informal discussions of philosophy he often referred to the influence of Kotarbinski. Also, the influence of Leiniewski, his dissertation adviser, is evident in his early papers. Moreover, some of his important papers of the 1930s were initially given to philosophical audiences. For (...) example, the famous monograph on the concepotf truth ([33”], [35b]) was first given as twol ectures to the Logic Section of the Philosophical Society in Warsaw in 1930. Second, his paper [33], which introduced the concepts of co-consistency and co-completeness as well as the rule of infinite induction: was first given at the Second Conference of the Polish Philosophical Society in Warsaw in 1927. Also [35c] was based upon an address given in 1934 to the conference for the Unity of Science in Prague; C361 and [36a] summarize an address given at the International Congress of Scientific Philosophy in Paris in 1935. The article [44a] was published in a philosophical journal and widely reprinted in philosophical texts. This list is of course not exhaustiveb ut only representative of Tarski’s philosophical interactions as reflected in lectures given to philosophical audiences, which were later embodied in substantial papers. After 1945 almost all of Tarski’s publications and presentations are mathematical in character with one or two minor exceptions. This division, occurring about 1945, does not, however, indicate al oss of interest in philosophical questionbsu t is a result of Tarski’s moving to the Department of Mathematics at Berkeley. There he assumed an important role in the development of logic within mathematics in the United States. (shrink)

Some interpreters claim Kant distinguishes between organisms and living things. I argue that this claim is underdetermined by the textual evidence. Once this is recognized, it becomes a real possibility that Kant’s various remarks about the essential properties of living things generalize to organisms as such. This, in turn, generates a puzzle. Kant repeatedly claims that the capacity for representation is essential to the nature of a living thing. If he does not distinguish between living things and organisms, then how (...) might the capacity for representation be essential to the latter? Drawing on the writings of Kant and his contemporaries, I reconstruct a framework within which representational capacities might conceivably be thought to play this role. On this view, what distinguishes an organism from mechanically explicable products of nature is its capacity for endogenous behavior that is instinctual and representationally mediated. (shrink)

The well-known classification of legal procedure into “four feet” presents certain conceptual problems for the Indian legal tradition that various Smṛtikāras and commentators have attempted to resolve in different and sometimes contradictory ways. These difficulties arise because the four feet originally referred in Indian legal theory to four distinct, hierarchical legal domains rather than procedural means for reaching a verdict. The earliest attested discussion of the four feet, found in Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra, indicates that early legal theorists understood the greater legal (...) order as being comprised of four hierarchical domains and that these domains were ordered by the state as expressed in the original formulation of the four feet. Among the four legal domains, that of vyavahāra was developed by the state itself as a realm of public, transactional law meant to address disputes that could not be resolved in other legal forums. From this we can conclude that the origin of Indian jurisprudence lies with state efforts to formalize and enforce the laws of public transactions. The reinterpretation of the four feet by later jurists was motivated perhaps by resistance to one of the fundamental relationships expressed in the four feet, namely that royal authority possessed the greatest legal authority, independent of Brāhmaṇical law. (shrink)

Albert Einstein's attitude towards quantum mechanics—and statistical physics in general—was a puzzle to many of his contemporaries, and has remained a puzzle to the present. Though he made many significant contributions to statistical physics, he continually refused to regard that branch of science as fundamental. The present essay demonstrates that his attitude towards statistical physics was formed during his earliest investigations—between 1901 and 1903. In particular, it is shown that in Einstein's view, statistical laws are based upon non-statistical assumptions. This (...) view influenced much of his later thinking. A few illustrations are offered, concluding with a discussion of his opposition to quantum mechanics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article I consider alternate but often complementary models for women’s republicanism from those discussed by Sandrine Bergès. In particular, I make use of Bergès’s insights about extending philosophical inquiry beyond traditional texts to analyse how militant political action was both informed by and informed the creation of philosophical texts, and consider the possibility of bringing direct action into the realm of philosophical investigation.

Many professional associations have policies explaining when it is or is not acceptable for health-care professionals to refuse to participate in the administration of certain interventions on grounds of conscience. In both Canada and the United States, nursing associations tend to have much more detailed, permissive policies than medical associations. There are reasons to think that this distinction is not justifiable, and I argue that some specific North American medical associations should endorse policies regarding conscientious refusals that are modeled on (...) those endorsed by nursing associations and the United Kingdom’s General Medical Council. (shrink)

L’essentiel des œuvres de Patočka et du dernier Foucault peut se lire à la lumière de la figure de Faust. Celle-ci éclaire en effet, au fil de ses variantes, ce qui oppose savoir de spiritualité et savoir de connaissance. Si l’on entend par spiritualité l’effort pour penser ensemble l’acte de connaissance et une transformation dans l’être du sujet, la légende faustienne illustre autant qu’elle questionne la pratique qui établit l’individu comme un être à même de se soucier de soi. Nous (...) préciserons cette idée à partir d’un exemple, celui de l’idéalisme allemand, en nous demandant s’il a su prendre la mesure de cette dimension faustienne de la philosophie et chercherons à savoir si c’est effectivement « le souci du souci de soi » qui l’a mis en mouvement ou l’a conduit à rechercher les conditions d’une spiritualité moderne. Nous nous demanderons, pour le dire dans des termes plus proches de ceux de Patočka, si l’on peut déjà apercevoir dans le postkantisme quelque chose qui anticipe l’idée d’une vue intellectuelle rendue possible par le phénomène. (shrink)

In this paper, I advocate a value realist interpretation of Kant’s ethics by examining, in some detail, both Kant’s discussion of the grounding of the moral law in Groundwork II and his discussion of the “paradox of method” in the Critique of Practical Reason. On a plausible reading of both the Groundwork and second Critique, Kant maintains that human beings, and more generally, rational beings, have dignity or inner worth. We cognize through the moral law that our existence and inner (...) value is the objective ground of the law and that we are the “subject[s] of the moral law.” This dignity of rational beings is fundamental and irreducible. This qualifies as a distinctive kind of value realism. (shrink)

In this paper we devise some technical tools for dealing with problems connected with the philosophical view usually called mathematical instrumentalism. These tools are interesting in their own right, independently of their philosophical consequences. For example, we show that even though the fragment of Peano's Arithmetic known as IΣ₁ is a conservative extension of the equational theory of Primitive Recursive Arithmetic (PRA). IΣ₁ has a super-exponential speed-up over PRA. On the other hand, theories studied in the Program of Reverse Mathematics (...) that formalize powerful mathematical principles have only polynomial speed-up over IΣ₁. (shrink)

Perhaps, nothing matters. Life might be devoid of value and meaning. Such thoughts can prompt feelings of angst. What kind of philosophical view could provide us with comfort? Some moral realists think that moral realism can. Moral realism does not comfort me. I think the comfort it gives others is an illusion. If we are moral realists, moral facts may be forever beyond our grasp. However, if we are anti-realist sentimentalists, then moral facts are built for us to find. If (...) we want to avoid angst, we can find solace in sentimentalism. That is not a reason to think sentimentalism is true. However, it is a reason to prefer that it is true. (shrink)

Harm minimisation has been proposed as a means of supporting people who self-injure. When adopting this approach, rather than trying to stop self-injury immediately the person is allowed to injure safely whilst developing more appropriate ways of dealing with distress. The approach is controversial as the health care professional actively allows harm to occur. This paper will consider a specific objection to harm minimisation. That is, it is a misguided collaboration between the health care professional and the person who self-injures (...) that is morally and clinically questionable. The objection has two components. The first component is moral in nature and asserts that the health care professional is complicit in any harm that occurs and as a result they can be held morally responsible and subject to moral blame. The second component is clinical in nature and suggests that harm minimisation involves the health care professional in colluding in the perpetuation of self-injury. This element of the objection i... (shrink)

This paper provides a response to Hanna Pickard and Stephen Pearce’s paper ‘Balancing costs and benefits: a clinical perspective does not support a harm minimisation approach for self-injury outside of community settings.’ This paper responded to my article ‘Should healthcare professionals sometimes allow harm? The case of self-injury.’ There is much in the paper that I would agree with, but I feel it is important to respond to a number of the criticisms of my paper in order to clarify my (...) position and to facilitate ongoing debate in relation to this important issue. (shrink)

In Cinema II Deleuze proposes, via early film theorists, that cinema can realise the potential inherent in art to act directly on the nervous system. Cinema had the ‘sublime’ capacity to shock thought into activity, and awaken the ‘spiritual automaton’ in us through vibrations and affects, rather than representations. Deleuze finds a variant of this argument in the writings of Artaud on cinema, in which film forces the realisation of an impotence at the heart of thought. Deleuze then proposes that (...) the only response to this impotence is belief in the connection between man and the world, as expressed and realised in a corporeal cinema of gestures, the prime example of which, in his view, is the work of Philippe Garrel. I will address Garrel's film Le Révélateur in relation to these propositions, focussing also on how the film works primarily at the level of sensory and gestural dynamics, rather than narrative or representation. (shrink)

This article discusses some orthographical questions which relate to the text of Sophocles. It pays special attention to the editor’s duty to present the evidence for ancient orthography accurately, consistently, and efficiently.

Contrairement à ce que l'on admet généralement, la mesure de l'audience en continu , bien que l'instrument ait été inspiré par les publicitaires et serve en principe à la fixation des tarifs des spots de publicité, ne signifie pas la fin de la censure politique au profit d'une pure soumission aux logiques économiques. La course à l'audience entre les chaînes généralistes, loin de favoriser une diversification de l'offre de programmes, a conduit à une recherche des programmes rassemblant le maximum de (...) téléspectateurs. Tout se passe comme si les programmes étaient désormais soumis au vote des téléspectateurs dans une sorte de «démocratie culturelle». La mesure de l'audience instantanée a ainsi imposé, dans le domaine culturel, un nouveau principe de légitimité, hétéronome parce que politique, qui repose sur la loi de la majorité.Contrary to what is generally admitted, although non-stop audience rating is a tool designed by advertisers to evaluate the prices of TV advertising spots, this does not mean that political censorship is thus being replaced by pure submission to economic logic. The competition for audience between the traditional channels has not led to a greater level of variety in the programmes they offer since they have tended rather to tailor their schedules to attract the most viewers possible. Everything happens as if schedules were from now submitted to the viewers’ vote in a kind of "cultural democracy". In the cultural field, instant audience ratings have imposed a new principle of legitimacy which is heteronomous because it is political and which is based on majority rule. (shrink)