This note discusses P. Oppenheimer and E. Zalta's ?A Computationally-Discovered Simplification of the Ontological Argument? [this journal, 2011]. I try to explain why the simplification presented there was successful and comment on the technical aspects of the method they applied.

The present contribution is an attempt at showing that Tocqueville’s conception of liberty transcended the divisions between negative and positive aspects of freedom. The author starts by juxtaposing it with the opposition drawn by Constant between liberty of the ancients and liberty of the moderns. While Tocqueville and Constant shared a concern for the preservation of individual rights, as Claude Lefort has rightly pointed out, Tocqueville was much more reluctant to accept the modern loss of the communal dimension of liberty. (...) He did not accept the view that jouissances privées, private pleasures, are the main compensation that the modern world has to offer for the lost ancient treasure of political participation. The article then looks into the relevance of Tocqueville’s standpoint for current debates between liberal defenders of negative freedom and republican advocates of freedom as non-domination. Opponents in this discussion seem to be so devoted to demonstrating that their particular approach provides the best guarantees against any threats to liberty, both factual and potential, that they overlook the fact that their definitions of freedom remain significantly similar. By arguing that 'to be free is to be guided by one’s own will' contemporary republicans, as well as their liberal counterparts, move along the lines drawn by Constant and towards private pleasures. By questioning the inevitability of this turn, Tocqueville provides us with a valuable contribution to crucial discussions in contemporary political philosophy. (shrink)

Philosophy in technology is a research program that studies the philosophical roots of engineering and technology. Technologists, by virtue of their education, believe that the limits, goals, possibilities, and effects of technology on society and humankind are exclusively technological problems, hence their solutions must lie exclusively in technology. In contrast, philosophy in technology asserts that the resolutions to these problems need to be rooted in an understanding of their philosophical origins. This program paper defines the objectives of philosophy in technology, (...) the kinds of questions it explores, the methods it uses, and how it differs from the philosophy of technology. (shrink)

Die Beiträge dieses Buches untersuchen die Vielfalt der Herangehensweisen an die diversen Erscheinungsformen von Sprache, an das Wort und die Wortsemantik sowie an den Gebrauch von Sprache. Der Band enthält Arbeiten, die linguistische Fragestellungen zu sprachsystematischen Aspekten der Wort-, Satz-, Text- und Diskursebene behandeln sowie Perspektiven eröffnen, um diverse Aspekte von Sprache in einem über diese Domänen hinausgehenden Rahmen zu betrachten. Die Beiträger diskutieren Fragen der lexikalischen Semantik, Pragmalinguistik, Morphologie und der Lexikographie. Das Buch setzt seine Schwerpunkte neben der Wortsemantik (...) auf die Eingebundenheit lexikalischer Bedeutungen in registerspezifische Diskursmuster, öffentliche, interpersonelle und geschäftlich-beruflich orientierte Diskurse. (shrink)

Due to the rapid advances in medical technology, medical students are now being faced with increasingly complex and unparalleled ethical and practical dilemmas during their training. The new and future challenges of high-tech medicine demand improvements in current medical education, not only by meeting the needs of students through humanized training programs, but also by involving them in finding solutions to the ethical and legal quandaries they encounter. Today’s students of medical universities must acquire knowledge and understanding of the ethical (...) and legal issues relevant to the practice of medicine, and we have to do everything possible to introduce these students to the current discussions on more or less controversial ethical and legal topics. Although final answers may not be found, the very discussion, argumentation, and awakening of students’ interest should become an essential part of the core curriculum of every doctor. (shrink)

Author: Bytniewski Paweł Title: “WHAT IS AN AUTHOR?” ON FOUCAULT’S CONSCIOUSNESS OF AN AUTHORSHIP („Kim jest Autor?” O krytycznej świadomości autorstwa) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2010, vol:.10, number: 2010/1, pages: 73-106 Keywords: FOUCAULT, AUTHOR, LITERATURE, LANGUAGE, EXPERIENCE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:One of the major obstacles to reconstructing Foucault’s attitude towards an authorship issue is multiplicity of his own roles which as an author he fulfilled. An Authorship as a (...) theme of his texts, as a prefiguration of nonexistent “Man” and his own authorship as a problem, as a way of “detaching myself from myself” – all these are the forms of Foucauldian ideas about an authorship and, at the same time, forms of his consciousness of his own authorship. Foucault historicizes and dissipates an authorship: an author is a function rather than the originator of texts. Writing, in this perspective, is a kind of conversion, decomposition of subjectivity into something else and even explosion. To say “I” doesn’t prove to be an ego. Additionally, Foucault notoriously suggests that his books are fiction. To be an author in this way is a way of being within the discourse and, as a consequence of it, to be trapped in its power. Foucault’s own rewriting of his theoretical biography includes turns and returns: as he repeatedly claims, he wrote in order to transform himself. He uses the processes of writing to simulate production of his subjective identity and, at the same time, to summarize, recapitulate his own oeuvre from current position. To cope with this suggestive and bizarre claims one should employ Roland Barthes distinction: écrivains (authors) et écrivants (writers). When Foucault-écrivain decomposes his ego, his own mode of existence by the use of writing, Foucault-écrivant, in an act of writing, writes himself, as an author. When Foucault-écrivain “writes fictions”, Foucault écrivant, in an act of “self-writing” (l’écriture de soi), establishes the object of a critique – Foucault. (shrink)

This paper aims to present and discuss an argumentation against the Turing test (TT), which we shall call the CCSC (Complete Conversation System Claim). Exemplary arguments of the CCSC type include Lem’s “Space Gramophone,” the “machine equipped with a dictionary” proposed by Shannon and McCarthy, Block’s “Aunt Bubbles,” and Searle’s “Chinese Room” argument. CCSC argumentation is constructed to show that the TT is not properly designed and, consequently, is not a good hallmark of intelligence. Based on the original TT rules (...) reconstruction, I argue that CCSC-type argumentation seems to be aimed at a certain interpretation of the TT, which, as I demonstrate, commits the straw man fallacy. In light of the results presented by Łupkowski and Wiśniewski, I also discuss whether a complete conversation system is theoretically possible. (shrink)

Psychedelic substances elicit powerful, uncanny conscious experiences that are thought to possess therapeutic value. In those who undergo them, these altered states of consciousness often induce shifts in metaphysical beliefs about the fundamental structure of reality. The contents of those beliefs range from contentious to bizarre, especially when considered from the point of view of naturalism. Can chemically induced, radically altered states of consciousness provide reasons for or play some positive epistemic role with respect to metaphysical beliefs? In this paper, (...) I discuss a view that has been underexplored in recent literature. I argue that psychedelic states can be rationally integrated into one’s epistemic life. Consequently, updating one’s metaphysical beliefs based on altered states of consciousness does not have to constitute an instance of epistemic irrationality. (shrink)

Paweł Florenski starał się sformułować ontologiczną teorię miłości. Uważał on, że miłość jest nie tylko zjawiskiem psychicznym, lecz zakłada takżejakiegoś rodzaju rzeczywiste zjednoczenie. Florenski proponował, by rozumieć je jako współistotność. Dwa numerycznie różne podmioty mogą stać się czymś jednym dzięki swojej numerycznie tożsamej istocie. Prócz tego Florenski zarysował teorię ontologiczną opartą na odróżnieniu między rzeczami a osobami. Wydaje się, że uznawał on wiązkową teorię przedmiotów i nominalizm tropowy dla kategorii rzeczy i teorię substratu połączoną z realizmem dla kategorii osób. (...) Pogląd Florenskiego można więc uznać za jedno ze stanowisk w dyskusji o zasadzie identyczności nieodróżnialnych. Staram się także pokazać, że można przezwyciężyć pewne poważne problemy filozoficzne i teologiczne ontologii miłości Florenskiegojeśli doda się do niej patrystyczne rozróżnienie między istotą a energią. (shrink)

Are perceptual experiences epistemically appraisable? In this paper, I argue, contra Siegel (Rationality of perception, Oxford 2017) that they are not (§§ 2–3). I also show how the problem of hijacked experience can be solved without endorsing the view that perceptual experience is epistemically appraisable (§§ 4–5). A key idea behind my proposal is a disjunctivist view on rationalising and epistemic powers of perceptual experience.

Pavel Florensky (1882–1937), a Russian theologian, philosopher, and mathematician, argued that the religious discourse is essentially contradictory and put forward the idea of the logical theory of antinomies. Recently his views raised interesting discussions among logicians who consider him a forerunner of many non-classical logics. In this paper I discuss four interpretations of Florensky’s views: paraconsistent, L-contradictory, non-monotonic and rhetorical. In conclusion I argue for the integral interpretation which unites these four approaches.

No more than a few years ago could open an article concerning neurophenomenology with a statement describing recent rediscovery of the problem of consciousness by the cognitive sciences and pointing to the fact that right now, explaining conscious experience in neuroscientific or computational terms poses the greatest challenge for those sciences. Today however, constatations of this sort start to sound like trivial descriptions of a universally recognized state of affairs. The question of “how the water of the physical brain is (...) turned into a wine of consciousness” is now among the mainstream problems of cognitive science. (shrink)

The paper is a comment on the formalization of the antinomy of futura contigentia in the form of a (inconsistent) theory formulated by Marcin Tkaczyk in the language of classical predicate calculus. I argue that some features of the formalization in question are controversial from the viewpoint of formal semantics and ontology, and suggest two ways of removing some of those controversies.

These considerations seek to show whether it is possible to build a formal theory of the state of affairs, which would be sufficiently well founded in philosophy. Our analysis focuses on a case study in the form of the ontology of the state of affairs proposed by Roman Ingarden. The principal part of this analysis is devoted to Ingarden’s exposition. As its result, the author formulates a list of conditions that should be fulfilled by a formal theory, so that it (...) could aspire to be called “Ingarden’s ontology of the state of affairs.”. (shrink)

According to the predictive coding theory of cognition , brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of sorts, in (...) the sense that it postulates that our cognitive contact with the world is mediated by internal representations. However, the exact sense in which PCT is representational remains unclear; neither is it clear that it deserves such status—that is, whether it really invokes structures that are truly and nontrivially representational in nature. In the present article, I argue that the representational pretensions of PCT are completely justified. This is because the theory postulates cognitive structures—namely action-guiding, detachable, structural models that afford representational error detection—that play genuinely representational functions within the cognitive system. (shrink)

Like most goods‐producing sectors in the West, modern health‐care systems have been profoundly changed by globalization and the neoliberal policies that attend it. Since the 1970s, the role of the welfare state has been considerably reduced; funding and management of health systems have been subjected to wave upon wave of reorganization and assimilated to the private sector. At the same time, neoliberal policy has imposed the notion of patient empowerment, thus turning patients into consumers of health. The literature on nursing (...) has accordingly reported on the significant repercussions on all aspects of the profession, from delivery of care and treatment, through training for new nurses, to legislated policy reforms regarding the role and responsibilities of modern nurses. In light of these developments, this paper analyses and theorizes about the way the injection of neoliberal policy is linked to and affects the practice of nursing. Drawing on a number of Nietzschean arguments, we begin with an exploration of the complex effects of neoliberalism, bureaucratization, and technocratization on the health system and the practice of nursing. Our main theoretical point here is that neoliberal policy engenders and promotes a neoliberal tide, which results in the conversion of the values that drive modern nursing practice. We then examine this tide in the light of Nietzsche's concepts. Starting with an analysis based on the ontology of the will to power, we show that nurses are dominated by neoliberal values embedded in technocratic and bureaucratic ideologies. Finally, we argue that the application of neoliberal policy constitutes a form of domestication from which one might potentially be freed through the Nietzschean concept of transvaluation of values. This transvaluation, as its freeing from some of the neoliberal tide, may be accomplished in accordance with a hierarchy of specific life‐affirming values for nursing culture and practice. (shrink)

Debunking arguments aim to undermine common sense beliefs by showing that they are not explanatorily or causally linked to the entities they are purportedly about. Rarely are facts about the aetiology of common sense beliefs invoked for the opposite aim, that is, to support the reality of entities that furnish our manifest image of the world. Here I undertake this sort of un-debunking project. My focus is on the metaphysics of ordinary physical objects. I use the view of perception as (...) approximate Bayesian inference to show how representations of ordinary objects can be extracted from sensory input in a rational and truth-tracking manner. Drawing an analogy between perception construed as Bayesian hypothesis testing and scientific inquiry, I sketch out how some of the intuitions that traditionally inspired arguments for scientific realism also find application with regards to proverbial tables and chairs. (shrink)

This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a “fuel of success”, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using (...) system. Then, we discuss crucial differences between S-representations and indicators or detectors, showing that—contrary to claims made in the literature—there is an important theoretical distinction to be drawn between the two. (shrink)

Classical logic of formal provability includes Löb’s theorem, but not reflection. In contrast, intuitions about the inferential behavior of informal provability (in informal mathematics) seem to invalidate Löb’s theorem and validate reflection (after all, the intuition is, whatever mathematicians prove holds!). We employ a non-deterministic many-valued semantics and develop a modal logic T-BAT of an informal provability operator, which indeed does validate reflection and invalidates Löb’s theorem. We study its properties and its relation to known provability-related paradoxical arguments. We also (...) argue that T-BAT is a fairly sensible candidate for a formal logic of informal provability. (shrink)

Abstract:Invertebrates are generally excluded from ethical consideration in scientific research and in environmental protection. In this paper I present and characterize controversies related to the use of freshwater benthic invertebrates in biological monitoring in the light of diverse ethical concepts. I consider the inherent contradictions which arise from simultaneously treating wild animals as: items possessing bio-indicative value, ecologically important elements of ecosystems, representatives of rare and endangered species and finally, as sentient beings with the capacity to suffer. The analysis is (...) based on numerical data collected during projects related to biological monitoring of Polish watercourses. Among the ethical concepts discussed, only the evolutionary inclusive one allows for a coherent classification of all animals according to the innate values assigned to individuals, and only this concept provides us with convincing arguments enabling the incorporation of individual invertebrates within the scope of ethical considerations. (shrink)

Modernity and What Has Been Lost comes out of a conference held at the Jagiellonian University in Krakw̤, Poland, on June 4-5, 2009 that sought to identify Leo Strauss's intellectual background in re: the repudiation of a modern idea of homogenous, universal state (considered as an illegitimate synthesis of Jerusalem and Athens, i.e., the claims of Reason and Revelation). The world we live in, molded by science and historical relativism, may be described as hostile to human dignity or perfection, or (...) abhorrent to those who love the search for wisdom. Straussian teaching consisted in the steady effort to reopen "the quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns," and refers to the esoteric way of writing practiced by the most profound thinkers of the past which has been apparently forgotten in the last three centuries. Strauss binds the concept of natural right with the question of maintenance of conditions for philosophizing, and it probably seems to him that such defense of philosophy is the highest task in our times. However, one must be well aware that philosophizing always means a perilous way of life. Indeed, it may be destructive of the city (polis) itself as far as the city exists due to some crucial beliefs the philosopher might put in doubt. Reflecting on those issues, Strauss engaged in several highly important debates with his contemporaries, in an open way with, e.g., Carl Schmitt, Karl Lw̲ith and Alexandre Kojv̈e, and more tacitly with Martin Heidegger"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

We prove that in a locally finite variety that has definable principal congruences , solvable congruences are nilpotent, and strongly solvable congruences are strongly abelian. As a corollary of the arguments we obtain that in a congruence modular variety with DPC, every solvable algebra can be decomposed as a direct product of nilpotent algebras of prime power size.

The aim of the paper is to compare and contrast a few select ways in which the poetic use of parataxis can convey a specific political message. Parataxis is understood here broadly, as a certain organizational principle based on a cycle of denarrativization and renarrativization. The first part of the paper reflects on the role the paratactic technique has played within the language of the reactionary populists, both historically and in the recent years. Then, building on the observation that the (...) denarrativized, seemingly „straightforward” nature of the paratactic speech makes it particularly useful for the purposes of right-wing populism, I ask whether parataxis can be reclaimed as a progressive force. In order to answer this question, I go back to some of the issues discussed by Ron Silliman, Fredric Jameson and Bob Perelman in the context of the Language movement and the so-called New Sentence. Here, the work of de- and renarrativization performed as a consequence of the paratactic loosening of conventional textual links and structures is seen as a direct response to the denarrativized nature of everyday life under late capitalism. In the final part of the paper, I contrast the New Sentence parataxis with a more practical, more spontaneous approach embodied by June Jordan. The paratactic structures of her writing remain focused on denarrativization in all of its disruptive and provocative potential, allowing for a certain kind of immediate political intervention. (shrink)

Recent estimates by the Pew Research Center show that Poland is one of the fastest secularizing countries in the world. Despite the growing role of such attitudes in Poland and other countries around the world, still little is known about the psychosocial functioning and mental health of nonbelievers. The present study aimed to fill in this knowledge gap by examining various factors that may contribute to nonbelievers’ well-being, including perceived social support, emotion regulation strategies, secular beliefs (humanism and belief in (...) science), and clarity of self-beliefs. Five hundred Polish nonbelievers took part in this study, of whom 38% reported no nominal affiliation with any religious or secular group, 33% affiliated with Roman Catholics, and 22% identified as Atheists. Comparing these groups, we found that while Catholics and Atheists did not differ significantly in terms of their overall well-being, religious “nones” scored lower than Catholics on overall well-being (but not meaning in life or social support). In addition, it was found that—at the level of the whole sample—having greater clarity of self-beliefs, using functional emotion regulation strategies, as well as having greater perceived social support were all positively associated with the presence of meaning in life and well-being. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that if reproductive human cloning were available to parents who lost a child the possibility of replication of the child would lead to its devaluation. This argument seems to presuppose a view of the relationship between parents and children according to which parental love is loosely linked to children’s identities. The value of a child for a parent, it is assumed, stems from its being a person or genetically linked to its parents. Against this view I (...) offer a more adequate account of parental relationship. It is based on the idea that the value of a child to its parents is grounded in how it shapes their lives and personalities. If reproductive cloning were ever available it would be no viable option for parents who lost a child. Parents who value their child for who it is, and not just for its being a person or a progeny genetically related to them, value the child too much to want to replicate it when it dies. Parents who value their child for reasons other than who it is, value it too little to clone it when it is lost. (shrink)

The discussion paper synthesises the insights shared during a keynote panel at the 26th International Philosophy of Nursing Conference, themed “Reimagining a nursing ecosystem in an uncertain world.” It delves into the substantial impact uncertainty has on nursing, offering innovative strategies for reconceptualization. Through a critical examination of evidence‐based practice, the tendency to homogenise nursing is discussed, prompting advocacy for a Nietzschean political framework as a form of resistance and emancipation. Drawing inspiration from Donna Haraway, a transition from individualistic to (...) relational approaches is needed, especially amidst social and economic instability. Furthermore, the integration of caritas and Indigenous epistemologies underscore the significance of cultural sensitivity in nursing. Meanwhile, Ubuntu philosophy champions empathy and collective values, while a convergence of Eastern and Western philosophical traditions promises to enrich nursing practice. Ultimately, the panellists advocate for overcoming rigid ideologies in favour of a pluralistic approaches, ontologies, epistemologies and ethics to address contemporary challenges, and signal for a philosophical reorientation to engage uncertainty and reshape nursing roles in an ever‐evolving and world. (shrink)

In this paper, I use the predictive processing theory of perception to tackle the question of how perceptual states can be rationally involved in cognition by justifying other mental states. I put forward two claims regarding the epistemological implications of PP. First, perceptual states can confer justification on other mental states because the perceptual states are themselves rationally acquired. Second, despite being inferentially justified rather than epistemically basic, perceptual states can still be epistemically responsive to the mind-independent world. My main (...) goal is to elucidate the epistemology of perception already implicit in PP. But I also hope to show how it is possible to peacefully combine central tenets of foundationalist and coherentist accounts of the rational powers of perception while avoiding the well-recognized pitfalls of either. (shrink)

This book presents a new approach to semantics based on Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Directival Theory of Meaning, which in effect reduces semantics of the analysed language to the combination of its syntax and pragmatics. The author argues that the DTM was forgotten because for many years philosophers didn’t have conceptual tools to appreciate its innovative nature, and that the theory was far ahead of its time. The book shows how a redesigned and modernised version of the DTM can deliver a new (...) solution to the problem of defining linguistic meaning and that the theory can be understood as a new type of functional role semantics. The defining feature of the DTM is that it presents meaning as a product of constraints on the usage of words. According to the DTM meaning is not use, but the avoidance of misuse. Readers will see how the DTM was shelved for reasons that we don’t find so dramatic anymore, and how it contains enough original ideas and solutions to warrant developing it into a full-blown contemporary account. It is shown how many of the underlying ideas of the theory have been embraced later by philosophers and treated simply as brute facts about natural languages or even as new philosophical discoveries. Philosophers of language and researchers with an interest in how languages and the mind work will find this book a fascinating read. (shrink)

Bilinear Logic of Lambek amounts to Noncommutative MALL of Abrusci. Lambek proves the cut–elimination theorem for a one-sided sequent system for this logic. Here we prove an analogous result for the nonassociative version of this logic. Like Lambek, we consider a left-sided system, but the result also holds for its right-sided version, by a natural symmetry. The treatment of nonassociative sequent systems involves some subtleties, not appearing in associative logics. We also prove the PTime complexity of the multiplicative fragment of (...) NBL. (shrink)

Our conscious experience seemingly involves the subjective sense or feeling of the passage of time. However, in recent years, several authors have denied that such an aspect or feature of experience can be found. If the experience of the flow of time exists, it remains elusive and intangible. My aim here is to try to pin it down. For this purpose, I will investigate acute disturbances of normal temporal experience that accompany deep meditative and psychedelic states. I will argue that (...) these experiences of altered temporality provide phenomenal contrast cases to ordinary passage phenomenology, allowing us to establish the existence of the latter and making it amenable to theorizing. (shrink)

The paper traces how disappointment with the notion of linguistic meaning has led to a shift towards the new, technical term of “narrow content”. In the first part of the paper I analyze the ways “narrow content” is understood in the literature. I show two important distinctions which have to be applied to the term in order to avoid confusion – the difference between context and functional theories of narrow content, and the difference between mental and linguistic narrow content. I (...) argue that the most controversial combination of both distinctions is the idea of functional linguistic narrow content. In the second part of the paper I show that, contrary to the initial impression, this controversial, cut back notion of narrow content sheds some much needed light on several key semantic phenomena which we might otherwise be unable to explain – and because of this can be seen as a rightful descendant of the notion of meaning. (shrink)

According to the methodology of cognitive science we consider a hypothesis (justified partially by cognitive applications of computer science), that the mind functions similarly to a computer. Philosophical consequences of this thesis are as follows: (1) there exists a mental code (similar to the code of computer program); (2) this code can be represented as one unique number; (3) this number can be computable or non-computable.

Błąd genetyczny to nieformalny błąd w rozumowaniu (fallacy) polegający na pomieszaniu kontekstu odkrycia i kontekstu uzasadniania oraz przyjęciu, że deskryptywne przesłanki dotyczące genezy danego twierdzenia mają znaczenie normatywne, przesądzają jego wartość logiczną lub mogą być wykorzystywane w celu jego uzasadniania bądź obalania. Błąd genetyczny stanowi więc podstawowy i być może „śmiertelny” zarzut wobec metod filozoficznych, które koncentrując się na badaniu genezy przekonań, nie rezygnują zarazem z normatywnych ambicji. Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie możliwych strategii obrony przed tym zarzutem, wypracowanych (...) w niedawnej anglosaskiej filozofii (post) analitycznej w ramach refleksji nad relatywnie nową formą takiej metody, jaką jest tak zwana genealogia uzasadniająca (wykorzystywana i analizowana w pracach między innymi E. Craiga, B. Williamsa, M. Fricker, M. Queloza). Artykuł składa się z trzech części. Część pierwsza służy prezentacji metody genealogii uzasadniającej. W części drugiej omawiam zagadnienie błędu genetycznego. W części trzeciej analizuję trzy strategie uchylania zarzutu błędu genetycznego, sformułowane w kontekście genealogii uzasadniającej: 1) strategię normatywnej skromności, 2) strategię logiczną, 3) strategię funkcjonalistyczno-pragmatyczną. W ramach konkluzji twierdzę, że zarzut błędu genetycznego nie musi skutecznie podważać normatywnych ambicji genealogii uzasadniającej. (shrink)

Any serious attempt to give an account of the cognitive aspect of science – as contrasted with e.g. its social or cultural aspects – cannot ignore the automation revolution. In the conception presented in this paper the results of computer science are taken seriously and integrated with many of the ideas concerning what constitutes scientific inquiry that have been proposed at least since the early Middle Ages. The central idea is that of reliable inquiry. Science makes explicit and elaborates on (...) the methods of acquiring beliefs in our daily life. The central question a scientific method applied to inquiry needs to face is if it is reliable in getting to the truth. On the reliabilist criteria presented here, if a method is logically warranted to get to the right answer – given data and background knowledge available – and to stick to it afterwards, then it is reliable. This is a normative theory, but the standard of reliability is adjusted to the domain of the inquiry at hand. This paper presents the central tenets of the reliabilist conception of science and briefly outlines the main results underlying it. Roughly, the aim of science is interesting truth about the world around us (scientific realism) and reliabilist epistemology affords us precise answers as to how far science can succeed in this task – given the methods, goals and background assumptions available. The philosophical task to deliver an adequate understanding of science is taken to be continuous with scientific research itself (naturalism), a major part of which is concerned with delivering causal explanations (causality) and can only be carried out with limited resources (computability). Many of the ideas integrated into the reliabilist conception of science and precisely articulated therewith have appeared earlier in both philosophy and science (history of ideas). I conclude the exposition of the ideas integrated into the reliabilist conception of science with discussions of sample case studies where the reliabilist conception of science has been applied to actual scientific research. For obvious reasons none of the grand conceptions of science from the distant past is adequate. Towards the end of this paper I give some substance to the claim that among the few contemporary conceptions of science reliabilist epistemology is the the most comprehensive account. For only it systematically elaborates the ideas of reliability and computability accompanying science from its inception. None of the past or contemporary alternatives to a thoroughly revised understanding of science offered by the reliabilist approach can embrace the recent outburst of new sciences such as computer science, Bayesian statistics and cognitive science. An outline of open problems and directions for future research concludes the paper. (shrink)