This paper explores principles governing the rational balance among an agent's beliefs, goals, actions, and intentions. Such principles provide specifications for artificial agents, and approximate a theory of human action (as philosophers use the term). By making explicit the conditions under which an agent can drop his goals, i.e., by specifying how the agent is committed to his goals, the formalism captures a number of important properties of intention. Specifically, the formalism provides analyses for Bratman's three characteristic functional roles played (...) by intentions [7, 9], and shows how agents can avoid intending all the foreseen side-effects of what they actually intend. Finally, the analysis shows how intentions can be adopted relative to a background of relevant beliefs and other intentions or goals. By relativizing one agent's intentions in terms of beliefs about another agent's intentions (or beliefs'), we derive a preliminary account of interpersonal commitments. (shrink)

When we are faced with a choice among acts, but are uncertain about the true state of the world, we may be uncertain about the acts’ “choiceworthiness”. Decision theories guide our choice by making normative claims about how we should respond to this uncertainty. If we are unsure which decision theory is correct, however, we may remain unsure of what we ought to do. Given this decision-theoretic uncertainty, meta-theories attempt to resolve the conflicts between our decision theories...but we may be (...) unsure which meta-theory is correct as well. This reasoning can launch a regress of ever-higher-order uncertainty, which may leave one forever uncertain about what one ought to do. There is, fortunately, a class of circumstances under which this regress is not a problem. If one holds a cardinal understanding of subjective choiceworthiness, and accepts certain other criteria, one’s hierarchy of metanormative uncertainty ultimately converges to precise definitions of “subjective choiceworthiness” for any finite set of acts. If one allows the metanormative regress to extend to the transfinite ordinals, the convergence criteria can be weakened further. Finally, the structure of these results applies straightforwardly not just to decision-theoretic uncertainty, but also to other varieties of normative uncertainty, such as moral uncertainty. (shrink)

The following syllogism is considered: a string is not an expression unless it is tokenable; no one can utter, write, or in anyway token an infinite string; so no infinite string is an expression. The second premise is rejected. But the tokenability of an infinite sentence is not sufficient for it being an infinite expression. A further condition is that no finite sentence expresses that sentence’s truth-conditions. So it is an open question whether English contains infinite expressions.

"_Heidegger and Modernity_ is an intervention in the Heidegger debate in France which many may see as decisive. Its central claim is that the responses of left Heideggerians to continuing disclosures regarding Heidegger's Nazi affiliations fail to come to terms with central ambiguities in his philosophical responses, both early and late, to modernity and technology.... Incisive and hard hitting, Luc Ferry and Alain Renault have condensed in a short and tightly organized book both a judicious and well-informed account of the (...) Heidegger question and an implicit defence of humanism which has a strong political resonance."—Liam O'Sullivan, _Political Studies_. (shrink)

The present account, based on introspective comments, deals with motivation and hedonic tone as subjective factors which affect continuous work at high speeds. Actual introspective reports are given. The earlier papers in the series described the experimental procedure and presented objective data.

Engaging variously with the legacy of Paul L. Lehmann, these essays argue for a reorientation in Christian theology that better honours the formative power of ...

This paper examines how we are to understand the goodness of neighbourly love, using the example of the parable of the Good Samaritan. Engaging with the philosophical discussion concerning the parable's moral significance that ensued in the wake of Peter Winch's 1987 paper ‘Who is my Neighbour?’, the paper argues that framing the goodness of the Samaritan in terms of a perceived necessity—as Winch and others do—runs the risk of simplifying and thus distorting it. The proposed alternative claims that goodness (...) is better understood when framed in terms of what Kierkegaard describes as purity of heart. Developing this claim, it is shown that while the one who is pure of heart does good deeds without perceiving them as necessary, the notion of necessity may nonetheless be of moral significance for the one who witnesses such purity. (shrink)

I review three problems that have historically motivated pessimism about artificial intelligence: (1) the Problem of Consciousness, according to which artificial systems function without the right sort of conscious oversight; (2) The Problem of Global Relevance, according to which artificial systems cannot solve fully general theoretical and practical problems; (3) The Problem of Semantic Irrelevance, according to which artificial systems cannot be guided by semantic comprehension. I connect the dots between all three problems by drawing attention to non-syntactic inferences—inferences that (...) are made on the basis of insight into the rational relationships among thought-contents. Consciousness alone affords such insight, I argue, and such insight alone confers positive epistemic status on the execution of the inferences. Only when artificial systems can execute inferences that are rationally guided by phenomenally conscious states will such systems count as intelligent in a literal sense. (shrink)

Several interesting and important quantum field theories must contain the coupling constant in the boundary conditions. The theories considered include quantum electrodynamics of spin-1/2 fermions and gauge field theories.

This paper shows that the non-Boolean logic of quantum measurements is more naturally represented by a relatively new 4-operation system of Boolean fractions—conditional events—than by the standard representation using Hilbert Space. After the requirements of quantum mechanics and the properties of conditional event algebra are introduced, the quantum concepts of orthogonality, completeness, simultaneous verifiability, logical operations, and deductions are expressed in terms of conditional events thereby demonstrating the adequacy and efficacy of this formulation. Since conditional event algebra is nearly Boolean (...) and consists merely of ordered pairs of standard events or propositions, quantum events and the so-called “superpositions” of states need not be mysterious, and are here fully explicated. Conditional event algebra nicely explains these non-standard “superpositions” of quantum states as conjunctions or disjunctions of conditional events, Boolean fractions, but does not address the so-called “entanglement phenomena” of quantum mechanics, which remain physically mysterious. Nevertheless, separating the latter phenomena from superposition issues adds clarity to the interpretation of quantum entanglement, the phenomenon of influence propagated at faster than light speeds. With such treacherous possibilities present in all quantum situations, an observer has every reason to be completely explicit about the environmental–instrumental configuration, the conditions present when attempting quantum measurements. Conditional event algebra allows such explication without the physical and algebraic remoteness of Hilbert space. (shrink)

In my introduction to Kontinuität und Mechanismus, I expressed surprise at the lack of work which was being done at the time on the young Leibniz in spite of the fact that conditions for investigating the period up to 1676 are almost ideal—certainly in Leibnizian terms. Most of the letters and papers from this period of immediate philosophical significance have now been published in the Akademie-Ausgabe so that there is here an incomparably better starting point for detailed studies than in (...) the case of his later work. (shrink)

Physiological evidence predicts a model of concept categorisation that evolves through direct interaction with object feature selection. The requirement stated by Schyns et al. for feature plasticity is supported, but important caveats raise a question about the level at which feature identification can occur. Visual attribute selection for feature creation is likely to be directed by top-down and attentional processes.

In the wake of the financial crisis, many developed countries have embarked upon ambitious fiscal consolidation programs. While the success of austerity programs is still unclear, it is also an open question what success would mean for activist government in the long run. This study rejects the progressive belief that successful fiscal consolidation will strengthen fiscal capacity, arguing that consolidations transform the political context in which fiscal policy is made. By analyzing public expenditure in six countries with sustained budget surpluses, (...) we show that surpluses were mostly achieved through expenditure cuts but predominantly used for tax cuts. While fiscal crises abated, their collateral damage to public expenditure remained. This result is further elaborated by a case study of the Swedish budget surplus. We conclude that consolidations can create a new fiscal regime and thus have long-term consequences for the fiscal capacity of the state. (shrink)