1880년대를 전후로 일본은 종래의 계몽적 과학의 도입을 넘어, 과학(科學) 즉 분과(分科)의 학(學)에 대한 전면적인 수용을 시작했다. 그것은 각종 과학학회들의 설립과 더불어 동경대학을 비롯한 고등 교육기관의 창립을 통해 제도적으로 뒷받침되었다. 그런데 메이지 초기 계몽적 지식으로서의 ‘과학’과는 달리, 분과의 학으로서의 과학 각 분야의 수용은 종래보다 전문적인 과학기술 어휘들의 제정과 통일를 필요로 했다. 본고에서 다룬 물리학 역어회는 메이지 초기 난립 상태에 있던 물리학 술어들의 통일과 표준화를 목적으로 탄생한 것이다. 물리학 역어회는 1883년 동경대학 교수 야마카와 겐지로와 그 졸업생들의 발기에 의해 당시 일본의 물리학 관련자들을 (...) 대부분 망라한 단체로, 약 4년간에 걸쳐 일본에서 물리학 역어들의 통일과 표준화라는 임무를 담당했다. 그 결실로 탄생한 것이 『물리학술어･화영불독대역자서』(1888)라는 물리학 전문 술어 사전이었다. 이 같은 물리학 역어회의 활동은 메이지 초기 난립 상태에 있던 물리학 역어들의 통일을 획기적으로 진전시켰음은 물론, 물리학이라는 학문을 신속하게 일본화하는데 기여했다. 나아가 일본제 물리학 술어가 근대화시기 중국, 조선 등 동아시아의 인국으로 전파되는데 중요한 역할을 담당했다. 그러나 한편으로 그 같은 물리학 술어의 조직적인 제정과 통일 작업은 전통적 술어들과의 급격한 단절은 물론, 메이지 후기 물리학이 계몽적 지식으로서의 성격을 넘어 국가적 요구가 반영된 거대과학으로 재탄생하는 출발점이 되었다는 점도 지적하지 않으면 안 된다. (shrink)

This book offers substantial insight into students’ conceptualization of scientific terminology. The current book explores the commonalities and distinctions between Arabic and French physics terms, and the impact of the language disparities on students’ understanding of physics terms. This book adopts a novel approach to the problem of scientific terminology by exploring physics terms’ polysemy, prototypical meanings, and conceptual metaphor and metonymy, which motivates their extension of meaning. The book also investigates how the linguistic discrepancies (...) and other variables affect the learning of physics by Arab students (Moroccan students, in this book). Concepts in Physics: A Comparative Cognitive Analysis of Arabic and French Terminologies, whether you are a student of science, a science teacher or lecturer, a translator, or a linguist, is what you need. The book will help you comprehend the linguistic and cultural differences between western and non-western physics terminologies (in this book, French and Arabic physics terminologies) and the factors influencing the learning of physics concepts, and thus address the multiple challenges in learning scientific terms and concepts. (shrink)

By 1933, the class of generally accepted elementary particles comprised the electron, the photon, the proton as well as newcomers in the shape of the neutron, the positron, and the neutrino. During the following decade, a new and poorly understood particle, the mesotron or meson, was added to the list. By paying close attention to the names of these and other particles and to the sometimes controversial proposals of names, a novel perspective on this well-researched line of development is offered. (...) Part of the study investigates the circumstances around the coining of “positron” as an alternative to “positive electron.” Another and central part is concerned with the many names associated with the discovery of what in the late 1930s was generally called the “mesotron” but eventually became known as the “meson” and later again the muon and pion. The naming of particles in the period up to the early 1950s was more than just a matter of agreeing on convenient terms, it also reflected different conceptions of the particles and in some cases the uncertainty regarding their nature and relations to existing theories. Was the particle discovered in the cosmic rays the same as the one responsible for the nuclear forces? While two different names might just be synonymous referents, they might also refer to widely different conceptual images. (shrink)

In selecting the papers for this volume I have excluded all physics papers proper. I have further omitted all book rev.iews. Instead, I have included two papers not published previously; they are marked by an asterisk (*) in the table of contents. Since many of the papers were occasioned by Symposia or similar gatherings their chronological order is rather accidental. Hence I have tried to group the papers thematically into four parts. Within each part the order of sequence is (...) from the more general to the more special, or from a more popular to a more technical treatment. The same principle has been applied to the sequential order of the parts. The foundational papers on quantum mechanics have been arranged in a somewhat dif ferent manner. Chapters XVI-XIX are concerned with the logic of complementarity while in Chapters XX-XXII a more radical recon ceptualization is carried out. Two of the older papers (Chapters VI and VIII) have been revised to bring them more into line with present terminology. Other papers have been corrected by additions and omissions. Additions are marked by square brackets [ ], while double square brackets [[ II signify omis sions or parts to be omitted. Hence [[A]] [B] means that 'A' should be replaced by 'B'. The heading of one paper (Chapter XX) has been changed to make it more descriptive. (shrink)

The concept of similar systems arose in physics, and appears to have originated with Newton in the seventeenth century. This chapter provides a critical history of the concept of physically similar systems, the twentieth century concept into which it developed. The concept was used in the nineteenth century in various fields of engineering, theoretical physics and theoretical and experimental hydrodynamics. In 1914, it was articulated in terms of ideas developed in the eighteenth century and used in nineteenth century (...) mathematics and mechanics: equations, functions and dimensional analysis. The terminology physically similar systems was proposed for this new characterization of similar systems by the physicist Edgar Buckingham. Related work by Vaschy, Bertrand, and Riabouchinsky had appeared by then. The concept is very powerful in studying physical phenomena both theoretically and experimentally. As it is not currently part of the core curricula of STEM disciplines or philosophy of science, it is not as well known as it ought to be. (shrink)

The current paper expands on previous work done on the influence of learners’ language and preexisting knowledge on understanding physics terminology by exploring the concept of ACCELERATION in Arabic and English. The study attempts to answer two questions: (1) what are the similarities and differences between the polysemy of Arabic تَسَارُع (tasāruʿ) (acceleration) and the polysemy of English acceleration, and (2) to what extent do prototypes and factors motivating the conceptualization of تَسَارُع (tasāruʿ) and the conceptualization of acceleration (...) converge or diverge? To this end, Arabic and English dictionaries and corpora, the ArabiCorpus (Arabic Corpus Search Tool) and the British National Corpus (BNC), were employed. The dictionaries were surveyed to explore the various meanings of تَسَارُع (tasāruʿ) and acceleration, while the ArabiCorpus and the BNC were employed to investigate the senses and to identify the most frequent collocates and so the prototypes of these terms. The meaning extension of the terms is examined on the basis of the cognitive mechanisms which appear in the corpora. Theoretically, the paper is informed by the prototype theory (Rosch, 1973; 1975), image schemas (Johnson, 1987), and conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003). The results show that تَسَارُع (tasāruʿ) (acceleration) and acceleration generally overlap in terms of polysemy, prototype, and images schemas as well as conceptual metaphor that organize the conceptualization of these terms. It was also found that both Arab and English speakers mix ACCELERATION up with SPEED and so misunderstand them in a scientific setting. The present findings have several implications for science curriculum design, education, and research on universal and culture-specific properties of language. (shrink)

The recent proposition to eliminate eponyms from physical publications is discussed. The role of eponyms in research and education is analyzed. We show that eponyms constitute an integral part of physical texts and ensure the continuity of scientific research. Their proposed elimination is dangerous for science and the entire human culture and must be rejected.

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It is usual to identify initial conditions of classical dynamical systems with mathematical real numbers. However, almost all real numbers contain an infinite amount of information. I argue that a finite volume of space can’t contain more than a finite amount of information, hence that the mathematical real numbers are not physically relevant. Moreover, a better terminology for the so-called real numbers is “random numbers”, as their series of bits are truly random. I propose an alternative classical mechanics, which (...) is empirically equivalent to classical mechanics, but uses only finite-information numbers. This alternative classical mechanics is non-deterministic, despite the use of deterministic equations, in a way similar to quantum theory. Interestingly, both alternative classical mechanics and quantum theories can be supplemented by additional variables in such a way that the supplemented theory is deterministic. Most physicists straightforwardly supplement classical theory with real numbers to which they attribute physical existence, while most physicists reject Bohmian mechanics as supplemented quantum theory, arguing that Bohmian positions have no physical reality. (shrink)

Symmetries play a major role in physics, in particular since the work by E. Noether and H. Weyl in the first half of last century. Herein, we briefly review their role by recalling how symmetry changes allow to conceptually move from classical to relativistic and quantum physics. We then introduce our ongoing theoretical analysis in biology and show that symmetries play a radically different role in this discipline, when compared to those in current physics. By this comparison, (...) we stress that symmetries must be understood in relation to conservation and stability properties, as represented in the theories. We posit that the dynamics of biological organisms, in their various levels of organization, are not just processes, but permanent (extended, in our terminology) critical transitions and, thus, symmetry changes. Within the limits of a relative structural stability (or interval of viability), variability is at the core of these transitions. (shrink)

B a c k g r o u n d. According to the genre characteristics, the article is a form of publicizing analytical conclusions from the experience of research in the field of the history of philosophy in the local community of philosophers of Ukraine. The material for understanding was supplied from the environment of educational and scientific professional activity of the authors and was based on the long experience of using a certain type of historical and philosophical sources, which (...) even now constitute the main resource of sources of Ukrainian philosophical education. The article explores the concept of "physical object" in the context of the history of philosophy and examines its relevance for philosophical reflections. It is noted that the variety of interpretations of the term in the history of philosophy creates the need for new methods of revealing its essence M e t h o d s. Problems with establishing the authenticity and verifiability of such sources prompted the search for methods and techniques of source studies in related fields of knowledge, in particular analytical philosophy and philosophy of science. The article uses an analytical approach based on the study of historical and philosophical sources. Methods of source studies are used to solve problems related to the authenticity and reliability of sources R e s u l t s. With this in mind, the purpose of scientific research was to justify the appropriateness of using such a phenomenon as a "physical object" in historical-philosophical research. It was established that, despite the significant unusualness of the presence of a terminological counterpart to this phenomenon in the historical-philosophical realm, its implementation and application has significant creative potential. C o n c l u s i o n s. After a concise inquiry, the authors have reached a consensus that, in contemporary research on the history of philosophy within the Ukrainian philosophical community, it is pertinent and essential to develop a methodology. This methodology should be founded on the imperative of establishing the initial point for comprehensively studying the philosophical primary source, treating it as a "physical object". (shrink)

The question of bias in methodology and terminology is a problem that faces researchers east, west, north and south; however, it faces Third World intellectuals with special keenness. For although they write in a cultural environment that has its own specific conceptual and cultural paradigms, they nevertheless encounter a foreign paradigm which attempts to impose itself upon their society and upon their very imagination and thoughts. When the term “developmental psychology” for instance is used in the West Arab scholars (...) also say “developmental psychology”, when “applied psychology” is mentioned they hurry to use the same term etc. Why not establish a new science with its own mechanisms, methodologies and points of reference to deal with epistemological biases and open up the gate of ijtihad with respect to them? This collection of papers aims to discover some of the biases latent in our terminology, methodologies, research tools, and conceptual principles, and to propose alternative ones marked by a greater degree of independence and neutrality. This is not to belittle the human value of the West’s creative contributions but to emphasize the danger of making it the ultimate point of reference and then trying to continuously play “catch up” with it. (shrink)

I discuss Aristotle's anomalous terminology in Physics A.1 (involving "universals" and "particulars") and its coherence with Aristotle's notion of scientific demonstration.

Thomas Reid thinks of natural philosophy as a purely nomothetic enterprise but he maintains that it is proper for natural philosophers to employ causal terminology in formulating their explanatory claims. In this paper, I analyze this puzzle in light of Reid's distinction between efficient and physical causation – a distinction he grounds in his strict understanding of active powers. I consider several possible reasons that Reid may have for maintaining that natural philosophers ought to employ causal terminology and (...) suggest that the underlying rationale for his views is his understanding of the aims of explanation and their connection to the interests of human agents. The ultimate aim of knowing the causes of phenomena is to mollify the natural intellectual curiosity of human inquirers and provide guidance that insures successful action. The discovery of laws governing phenomena fulfills this aim and, as such, it is appropriate for natural philosophers to employ causal terminology. (shrink)

Even though there is a general presence of aesthetics in school curricula in most of western countries, both at the level of terminology and at the level of choice and definition of contents, objectives and skills to be developed, the approach to sports and physical education potential for the development of aesthetic education of students still does not seem to be a reality in the agenda of this subject. Moreover, it is not transversal in terms of its different didactic (...) contents. In order to explore its relevance, the aim of this work was to deepen how aesthetics is internal and central to sports experience, and which elements of sports and physical education lived experiences can be relevant in the promotion and development of the aesthetic sensibility of students. We propose the deepening of the subject through an hermeneutical qualitative research approach, confronting the content collected in 19 semi-structured interviews that enabled the thematic analysis of its content, and through it, the discussion of viewpoints of representative subjects among those that are the main players in the consideration of an aesthetic education through sport, namely physical education teachers and researchers in the context of aesthetics and sports sciences. With the information gathered and after its processing, we could conclude that there are aesthetic elements of sport's experience that should be taken into account in an aesthetic educational point of view of physical education, namely: complexity, diversity, playability, tension between drama and accuracy, overcoming experience, risk and vulnerability, unpredictable storylines and uncertainty, technique and effectiveness. (shrink)

As Jaegwon Kim points out in his excellent new book, “reductionism” has become something of a pejorative term in philosophy and related disciplines. But originally (eg, as expressed in Ernest Nagel’s 1961 The Structure of Science) reduction was supposed to be a form of explanation, and one may wonder whether it is reasonable to reject in principle the advances in knowledge which such explanations may offer. Nagel’s own view, illustrated famously by the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, was that (...) reduction is a relation between theories: theory A is reduced to theory B by formulating “bridge laws” which link the terminology of the theories, and using them to derive A from B. (An additional reductive claim is that Aphenomena are identical with certain B-phenomena—as when the temperature of a gas is identified with its mean molecular kinetic energy—but this kind of identity claim is, strictly speaking, independent of the claim about theories.) Applied to the case of mental states and brain states, a reduction would provide explanatory relations between psychology and neuroscience, normally supplemented with the claim that mental properties are identical with physical properties in the brain. (shrink)

In this essay, I begin by observing that dialectic is the method Aristotle explicitly associates with the activity of philosophizing, both when he introduces dialectic in the Topics and also, with some refinements and developments, in the methodological discussions of later works, the opening pages of the Physics being taken as exemplary. I then interpret these passages, attending very closely to the argument, the imagery, and the etymological resonances of Aristotle’s terminology. This leads me to argue that dialectic, (...) in both its earlier and later forms, is best understood as a proto-phenomenological method, which is to say, a method of clarifying what is already presenting itself in the initial, especially promising, pre-philosophical ‘appearances’ of one’s subject matter, for which Aristotle’s term is ἔνδοξα. Finally, given that this proto-phenomenological dialectic is a method for arriving at an understanding of ‘what is,’ its employment seems to entail a quite radical underlying Aristotelian ontology. That is, Aristotelian thought would seem to be aimed not at objective being, but rather at phenomenal being. (shrink)

The problem of Philo's ambivalence about the physical world -- The context for Philo's ambivalence toward the physical world -- Philo's negative terminology for the physical world : [ousia, hylē, genesis, genētos] -- Philo's positive terminology for the physical world : [kosmos] -- Philo's positive terminology for the physical world : [physis] part 1 -- Philo's positive terminology for the physical world : [physis] part 2 -- Higher and lower approaches to God -- The ambiguity of (...) the physical world : a multiperspectival approach -- Conclusions. (shrink)

This paper, the first of two on science and technology in Modern China, sets out to estimate the success of China's technology strategy since 1949. It focuses on a clarification of such key terms as ‘appropriate technology’ and ‘alternative technology’. We argue that any statement about technology policy or its success involves an analysis of institutions as well as physical artifacts or production processes. A review of Chinese economic development in terms of technological phases suggests that recent changes designed to (...) improve the capacity of the Chinese technological system to absorb advanced technology from outside are not, in fact, a denial of the past, but are one measure of the reasonable success of past technological strategies. (shrink)

The mathematical description of the three distinct fundamental notions of “individual sample” of “preparing procedure,” and of “Piron's state” of a physical entity are precisely introduced in the framework of the Piron's “preparation-question structure” (without specific axioms C, P, A) based on Ludwig's “selection structure.” We compare our realization of the above notions with a similar use of the standard terminology of the “Geneva School” adopted by Pykacz and Santos in a recent paper.

Over and above differences in terminology and cultural background, we try to show that the quantum physicist, David Bohm, and poststructuralist philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, shared a common aim in thought: to replace the classical image of reality, which is still dominant in our time, with a metaphysics finally in agreement with the concepts and results of relativity, quantum mechanics andcontemporary biology. For these two thinkers, the world of things that are well individuated in space and time, and ordered according (...) to mechanical relations of cause and effect, are nothing but the momentary expression of an “undivided wholeness in flowing movement” that constitutes its true ontological ground. By means of this new metaphysics, the world of daily experience and classical science appears as the explicit manifestation or development of implicate order that undivided wholeness contains virtually in itself at deeper and deeper levels of envelopment and imbrication. The explicit world is the result of a process of repetition, deceleration and temporal stabilization, triggered by the interaction of our measuring instruments – technical devices, sensory organs and motors, a priori forms and categories of the understanding – with moving wholeness, the thinking and observing subject of which represents a momentary and partial reflection rather than a solitaryand autonomous fragment. By criticizing the classical image of thecorrespondence/adequation of being and thought, Bohm and Deleuzeshow that the thought seeking to grasp this wholeness in flowingmovement inevitably interacts with it – by modifying, recreating andaccomplishing it in one direction rather than another. Thought thusresembles a dance that tries to harmonize with the universal flux thatgenerates and carries it away in a single movement with matter. **************************************************************************************************** ***********************Para além das diferenças de terminologia e de background cultural, tenta-se aqui mostrar que o físico quântico David Bohm e o filósofo pós-estruturalista Gilles Deleuze tiverem um objetivo comum de pensamento: substituir a imagem clássica da realidade, ainda dominante em nossa época, por uma metafísica finalmente de acordo com os conceitos e resultados da relatividade, da mecânica quântica e da biologia contemporânea. Para estes dois pensadores, o mundo das coisas bem individuadas no espaço e no tempo, e ordenadas conforme as relações mecânicas de causa e efeito, não é nada outro que a expressão momentânea de uma “Totalidade indivisa em devir” que constitui seu verdadeiro fundamento ontológico. Pelo meio desta nova metafisica, o mundo da experiência cotidiana e da ciência clássica aparece como a manifestação explicita ou desenvolvida da ordem implícita que a totalidade indivisa contém virtualmente nela mesma em níveis de envolvimento e de imbricação sempre mais profundos. O mundo explícito é o resultado de um processo de repetição, desaceleração e estabilização temporal, desencadeado pela interação de nossos instrumentos de medição -- aparelhos técnicos, órgãos sensoriais e motores, formas “a priori” e categorias do entendimento – com uma totalidade movente no qual o sujeito pensante e observante representa um reflexo momentâneo e parcial ao invés de um fragmento solitário e autônomo. Ao criticar a imagem clássica da correspondência/adequação entre o ser e o pensamento, Bohm e Deleuze mostram finalmente que o pensamento que intenta capturar esta Totalidade em devir interage inevitavelmente com ela, modificando-a, recriando-a e realizando-a em uma direção ao invés de outra. O pensamento se aparenta assim a uma dança que tenta se harmonizar com o flux universal que o gera e o leva em um movimento só com a matéria.Palavras-chave: Bohm; Deleuze; totalidade indivisa em devir; física quântica; pós-estruturalismo; ontologia. (shrink)

The intersection between quantum theory, metaphysical spirituality, and Indian-inspired philosophy has an established place in speculative scientific and alternative religious communities alike. There is one term that has historically bridged these two worlds: “Akasha,” often translated as “ether.” Akasha appears both in metaphysical spiritual contexts, most often in ones influenced by Theosophy, and in the speculative scientific discourse that has historically demonstrated a strong affinity for the brand of monistic metaphysics that Indian-derived spiritualities tend to foster. This article traces the (...) relationship between these groups with special attention to the role of Indian concepts and terminology. More specifically, it argues that Akasha-as-ether comes to operate in a manner that bridges gross matter with the notion of a subtle material and transpersonal mind—a version of panpsychism allowing for a coherent quantum monism. (shrink)

The persisting conception of Hegel's criticism of Newton's physics as an irrational or at least hopelessly exaggerated one partly has its roots mainly in Hegel's terminology and in his style. This does not mean that a mere translation of Hegel's arguments into any contemporary philosophical language be sufficient to immediately convince every Newtonian scientist. However, a non-Hegelian way of rephrasing the core of Hegel's anti-Newtonian philosophy of nature can help to understand to which extent the latter does satisfy (...) any scientist's criteria for a rational and self-consistent theory. To demonstrate this is the central aim of my talk, which is structured as follows: In the first part, I'm trying to highlight basic features of Hegel's criticism of Newton's optics and celestial mechanics, eventually focussing on his concept of a "sense of nature". This part has the character of a review. Second -­ and that is supposed to be the "reconsideration" part of my paper -­ I'll try to highlight the fundamental difference between Newton's and Hegel's ideas of natural laws and of the relation between mathematics and physics. Third, the metaphysical background of this difference will be analyzed. It is by the analysis of this metaphysical background that I hope to render Hegel's criticism of Newton's scientific revolution more understandable. (shrink)

Science is a process, through which theoretical frameworks are developed, new phenomena defined and discovered, and properties of entities tested. The goal of this dissertation is to illustrate how high-energy physics exemplified the process of theory construction from the 1950s to 1970s, and the promising ways in which it can continue to do so today. The lessons learned from the case studies examined here can inform future physics, and may provide methodological clues as to the best way forward (...) today. I examine the discovery of parity nonconservation in weak interactions, the emergence of Yang-Mills theories as the foundation of the standard model, and contemporary precision testing of quantum electrodynamics. In each of these cases, I examine the details of the physicists’ practice to draw conclusions regarding the epistemology behind successful episodes of theory construction. I reconstruct the methodology of each episode in order to find generalizable lessons to apply to contemporary issues at the frontiers of the search for a theory of quantum gravity. In order to understand the many moving parts in each case study, I introduce a new terminology to distinguish the “parts” of a scientific discipline, inspired by the literature on scientific modelling. These terms—theoretical framework, dynamical model, phenomenological model, experiment, and mathematical tools—are meant to aid in investigating other quantitative scientific disciplines beyond high-energy physics. Ultimately, high-energy physics is at its best when various avenues of theoretical ideas are being pursued, spurring the development of new mathematical techniques to use as tools, and new ideas are quickly and vigorously tested experimentally. Proliferation of new ideas in response to theoretical developments is characteristic of the era of construction of the standard model, and is still ongoing in precision testing of quantum electrodynamics today. (shrink)

It has been shown by several authors that in operations involving information a quantity appears which is the negative of the quantity usually defined as entropy in similar situations. This quantity ℜ = − KI has been termed “negentropy” and it has been shown that the negentropy of information and the physical entropy S are mirrorlike representations of the same train of events. In physical terminology the energy is degraded by an increase in entropy due to an increased randomness (...) in the positions or velocities of components, wave functions, complexions in phase space; in informational terminology some information about the same components has been lost or the negentropy has been decreased. In equilibrium the system has for a given energy content maximum randomness. One consequence of this dual aspect was the idea to apply the methods of statistical mechanics to problems of communication and Brillouin showed that Fermi-Dirac statistics or generalized Fermi statistics are applicable for example to a transmission of signals such as telegrams. (shrink)

In this paper we distinguish two issues that are often run together in discussions about physicalism. The first issue concerns levels. How do entities picked out by non-physical terminology, such as biological or psychological terminology, relate to physical entities? Are the former identical to, or metaphysically supervenient on, the latter? The second issue concerns physical parts and wholes. How do macroscopic physical entities relate to their microscopic parts? Are the former generally determined by the latter? We argue that (...) views on these two issues are independent of one another and should not be conflated. (shrink)

: Xunzi borrows several significant ideas originating in the Zhuangzi and the ''Neiye'' chapter of the Guanzi, adapting them to solve problems in his own theories of mind and self-cultivation. This reworking occurs in three main areas. First, he uses some of the psycho-physical terminology of the ''Neiye'' but alters its cosmological background and thus its implications for selfcultivation. Second, largely for rhetorical effect he adopts the language of shen and shenming from both texts, but uses them to argue (...) for the potency of the Confucian Way rather than some ineffable cosmic Dao. Third, and most significantly, he takes and transforms the terminology of emptiness, unity, and tranquility, using them in new ways within his own Confucian vision to solve important philosophical problems generated by his own positions. (shrink)

With the rise of the coronavirus crisis, "social distancing," has emerged as a new buzzword. Politicians, journalists, commentators, news readers, senior executives, and experts use this term blindly. However, scrutinizing the word reveals a terminological mismatch between "physical distancing" and "social distancing." While revisiting the history of physical distancing and social distancing, this article attempts to show how the term "social distancing" moved through time and winded up floating in the atmosphere. This study is based on Critical race theory, which (...) has as its aim to uncover the ideologies that have been constructed to perpetuate the oppression of some social categories on the fallacious pretext of race superiority and purity. After going down to the ancient roots of physical distancing practices, this work will recall social distancing behaviors during the slave trade era before delving into the current confusion between both terms in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. This work stresses the importance of social scientists to assess some official terminologies before their popularization. Keywords: Social distancing, physical distancing, buzzwords, Black, racism, smell. (shrink)

We presented a contextual statistical model of the probabilistic description of physical reality. Here contexts (complexes of physical conditions) are considered as basic elements of reality. There is discussed the relation with QM. We propose a realistic analogue of Bohr’s principle of complementarity. In the opposite to the Bohr’s principle, our principle has no direct relation with mutual exclusivity for observables. To distinguish our principle from the Bohr’s principle and to give better characterization, we change the terminology and speak (...) about supplementarity, instead of complementarity. Supplementarity is based on the interference of probabilities. It has quantitative expression trough a coefficient which can be easily calculated from experimental statistical data. We need not appeal to the Hilbert space formalism and noncommutativity of operators representing observables. Moreover, in our model there exists pairs of supplementary observables which cannot be represented in the complex Hilbert space. There are discussed applications of the principle of supplementarity outside quantum physics. (shrink)

Distortion of Scientific Terms by Supposed Modernizing Translations: The Example ‘orbis’ (sphere)/‘orbita’ (orbit). The use of modern terminology and thinking hinders to understand historic astronomical and physical texts and often misleads the reader, because between celestial physics from Aristotle and Ptolemy to Copernic on the one side and since Kepler and Newton on the other side a fundamental change of paradigm had taken place. The former started from the assumption that planets are indirectly moved by large equally rotating (...) etherical spheres combined with each other to form every kind of unequally apparent planetary motion as a resultant, whereas the later started from Kepler's idea that every motion of a planet is directly caused by two forces moulding his (naturally unequal) ‘orbit’. ‘orbita’ was Kepler's new specific term for the way of the planet coined in late 1604; in contrast, the Latin term of the elder paradigm has been ‘orbis’ (‘sphere’), on the one hand as concentric ‘orbis totalis’ of a planet (or the fixed stars), on the other hand as non‐concentric ‘orbes particulares’ (of the eccenters and epicycles) within the space of an ‘orbis totalis’. These terms were interpreted and translated in accordance with modern dynamic (as the supposed ‘true’) thinking as if they were ‘orbits’ (German: ‘Bahn’). But you cannot bring the two paradigms into line. As a result, the texts of seemingly ‘modern’ translations become incomprehensible, absurd and wrong. The study shows this on thinking (1st) about Aristotelian physics of former times using terms and ideas of modern dynamics, and on thinking (2nd) about the former explanation of apparent motions of heavenly bodies using these dynamics and ignoring the different special Aristotelian and Ptolemaic physics of ‘orbes’ (spheres). (shrink)

This article gives an overview of the visual culture shared by a number of scientists studying human variation in the first half of the 20th century. This was a time when most scientists shared the conceptual and terminological framework of ‘racial classifications’ to capture the structure of human variation. Clearly, drawings – and later photographs – of people from all over the world constituted a crucial part of the well-established visual culture concerned with human variation. The article, however, focuses on (...) the representational tools for visualizing aspects of human variation that were not so obvious to the eye of the observer. It contextualizes researchers’ strategies of visualizing human diversity within the pictorial traditions of relevant fields, particularly physical anthropology and human genetics. Starting from 1900, the article demonstrates how scientists built up a rich visual repertoire for understanding human diversity, one that integrated maps, tables, photos, drawings, diagrams, family and phylogenetic trees. The representations included abstract and non-abstract elements, but increasingly rested on diagrammatic visualizations. Notably, although these diagrammatic visualizations grew in sophistication and methodological rigor, they were rarely used in academic textbooks. More often, mixed strategies of visualizations – diagrammatic elements integrated into non-diagrammatic images – were chosen as representations for human diversity. In the postwar period, most of those visualizations disappeared from scientific publications, but not from popular media. For the scientific publications, one can argue that a number of scientists paid specific attention to visualizations and their deterministic potential. Some argued that particularly maps and trees were altogether problematic in their visualization of human evolution and human diversity. Others sought out new and better ways of constructing trees and maps to visualize truth-claims about human diversity. Here, diagrammatic elements played a key role. Notably, researchers who employed typological approaches for physical anthropology, and who admitted that there was a moment of intuition in their practices, aspired to meet the demands of mechanical objectivity by establishing abstract inscriptions of their typological assessments. (shrink)

We revisit the concept of de Sitter (dS) ‘tachyonic’ scalar fields, characterized by discrete negative squared mass values, and assess their physical significance through a rigorous Wigner-inspired group-theoretical analysis. This perspective demonstrates that such fields, often misinterpreted as inherently unstable due to their mass parameter, are best understood within the framework of unitary irreducible representations (UIRs) of the dS group. The discrete mass spectrum arises naturally in this representation framework, offering profound insights into the interplay between dS relativity and quantum (...) field theory. Contrary to their misleading nomenclature, we argue that the ‘mass’ parameter associated with these fields lacks intrinsic physical relevance, challenging traditional assumptions that link it to physical instability. Instead, any perceived instability originates from mismanagement of the system’s inherent gauge invariance rather than the fields themselves. A proper treatment of this gauge symmetry, particularly through the Gupta–Bleuler formalism, restores the expected characteristics of these fields as free quantum entities in a highly symmetric spacetime. This study seeks to dispel misconceptions surrounding dS ‘tachyonic’ fields, underscoring the importance of precise terminology and robust theoretical tools in addressing their unique properties. (shrink)

"Couched in the terminology of traditional physical chemistry, this book is accessible to chemists, engineers, materials scientists, mathematicians, mathematical biologists - indeed to anyone with a command of first year calculus.

The word “model” is highly ambiguous, and there is no uniform terminology used by either scientists or philosophers. Here, a model is considered to be a representation of some object, behavior, or system that one wants to understand. This article presents the most common type of models found in science as well as the different relations—traditionally called “analogies”—between models and between a given model and its subject. Although once considered merely heuristic devices, they are now seen as indispensable to (...) modern science. There are many different types of models used across the scientific disciplines, although there is no uniform terminology to classify them. The most familiar are physical models such as scale replicas of bridges or airplanes. These, like all models, are used because of their “analogies” to the subjects of the models. A scale model airplane has a structural similarity or “material analogy” to the full scale version. This correspondence allows engineers to infer dynamic properties of the airplane based on wind tunnel experiments on the replica. Physical models also include abstract representations which often include idealizations such as frictionless planes and point masses. Another, but completely different type of model, is constituted by sets of equations. These mathematical models were not always deemed legitimate models by philosophers. Model-to-subject and model-to-model relations are described using several different types of analogies: positive, negative, neutral, material, and formal. (shrink)

The study of biodiversity spans many disciplines and includes data pertaining to species distributions and abundances, genetic sequences, trait measurements, and ecological niches, complemented by information on collection and measurement protocols. A review of the current landscape of metadata standards and ontologies in biodiversity science suggests that existing standards such as the Darwin Core terminology are inadequate for describing biodiversity data in a semantically meaningful and computationally useful way. Existing ontologies, such as the Gene Ontology and others in the (...) Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Foundry library, provide a semantic structure but lack many of the necessary terms to describe biodiversity data in all its dimensions. In this paper, we describe the motivation for and ongoing development of a new Biological Collections Ontology, the Environment Ontology, and the Population and Community Ontology. These ontologies share the aim of improving data aggregation and integration across the biodiversity domain and can be used to describe physical samples and sampling processes (for example, collection, extraction, and preservation techniques), as well as biodiversity observations that involve no physical sampling. Together they encompass studies of: 1) individual organisms, including voucher specimens from ecological studies and museum specimens, 2) bulk or environmental samples (e.g., gut contents, soil, water) that include DNA, other molecules, and potentially many organisms, especially microbes, and 3) survey-based ecological observations. We discuss how these ontologies can be applied to biodiversity use cases that span genetic, organismal, and ecosystem levels of organization. We argue that if adopted as a standard and rigorously applied and enriched by the biodiversity community, these ontologies would significantly reduce barriers to data discovery, integration, and exchange among biodiversity resources and researchers. (shrink)

We are often told that quantum phenomena demand radical revisions of our scientific world view and that no physical theory describing well defined objects, such as particles described by their positions, evolving in a well defined way, let alone deterministically, can account for such phenomena. The great majority of physicists continue to subscribe to this view, despite the fact that just such a deterministic theory, accounting for all of the phe nomena of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, was proposed by David Bohm (...) more than four decades ago and has arguably been around almost since the inception of quantum mechanics itself. Our purpose in asking colleagues to write the essays for this volume has not been to produce a Festschrift in honor of David Bohm or to gather together a collection of papers simply stating uncritically Bohm's views on quantum mechanics. The central theme around which the essays in this volume are arranged is David Bohm's version of quantum mechanics. It has by now become fairly standard practice to refer to his theory as Bohmian mechanics and to the larger conceptual framework within which this is located as the causal quantum theory program. While it is true that one can have reservations about the appropriateness of these specific labels, both do elicit distinc tive images characteristic of the key concepts of these approaches and such terminology does serve effectively to contrast this class of theories with more standard formulations of quantum theory. (shrink)

Sceptics of informational terminology argue that by attributing content to signals, we fail to address nonhuman animal communication on its own terms. Primarily, we ignore that communication is sender driven: i.e. driven by the intrinsic physical properties of signals, themselves the result of selection pressures acting on signals to influence receivers in ways beneficial for senders. In contrast, information proponents argue that this ignores the degree to which communication is, in fact, receiver driven. The latter argue that an exclusive (...) focus on the intrinsic mechanical properties of signals cannot explain why receivers respond as they do. This is because receivers are not prisoners of sender influence. They possess response flexibility, and so we can only explain why receivers respond to signals as they do by positing that receivers ‘derive information’ from signals. I argue that, while basically true, this response flexibility can take one of two forms depending on the causal-explanatory role of information in understanding the response of the receiver: diachronic, on the one hand; and synchronic, on the other. In species with diachronic response flexibility only, information is derived by receivers from signals in a minimal sense. In such cases, information is an ultimate explanatory construct: one underpinned by historical facts at the population level. Alternatively, in species with synchronic response flexibility, information is derived by receivers from signals in a richer sense. Here, information is a proximate explanatory construct: one underpinned by cognitive-mechanistic facts at the level of the individual organism. Without recognising the different ways information can be derived from signals, and the different causal-explanatory roles information can play in understanding alternate kinds of receiver flexibility, proponents of information leave themselves open to the charge of anthropomorphising some signalling systems. (shrink)

In 1927, Paul Dirac first explicitly introduced the idea that electrodynamical processes can be evaluated by decomposing them into virtual (modern terminology), energy non-conserving subprocesses. This mode of reasoning structured a lot of the perturbative evaluations of quantum electrodynamics during the 1930s. Although the physical picture connected to Feynman diagrams is no longer based on energy non-conserving transitions but on off-shell particles, emission and absorption subprocesses still remain their fundamental constituents. This article will access the introduction and the initial (...) reception of this picture of subsequent transitions (PST) by conceiving of concepts, models, and their representations as tools for the practitioners. I will argue for a multi-factorial explanation of Dirac’s initial, verbally explicit introduction: the mathematical representation he had developed was highly suggestive and already partly conceptualized; Dirac was philosophical flexible enough to talk about transitions when no actual transitions, according to the general interpretation of quantum mechanics of the time, occurred; and, importantly, Dirac eventually used the verbal exposition in the same paper in which he introduced it. The direct impact of PST on the conception of quantum electrodynamical processes will be exemplified by its reflection in diagrammatical representations. The study of the diverging ontological commitments towards PST immediately after its introduction opens up the prehistory of a philosophical debate that stretches out into the present: the dispute about the representational and ontological status of the physical picture connected to the evaluation of the perturbative series of QED and QFT. (shrink)

According to tranditional philosophical terminology and to most interpretations of Cartesianism, Descartes is a dualist. This dualism is expressed in his fundamental distinction between two substances—mind and matter—and, though admitted to be full of difficulties and by many to be untenable, it has very generally been regarded as at least a clearly intelligible doctrine, consistently held by Descartes. That this is not so has been shown by Professor Boyce Gibson in his able and careful analysis of Cartesianism. The aim (...) of the present essay is to draw attention to another difficulty that has not been sufficiently noticed; whether it is an actual one or only an apparent one due to a misunderstanding of Descartes is a question that may be left to those who read him differently and who may be able to remove one more charge of inconsistency. The general contention is that Descartes—and this point is conceded in expositions of Descartes—seeks to prove that there are material bodies, that material bodies are necessary for his own account of the physical universe, and that yet his own theory of matter as extension, even combined with motion, makes the existence of bodies impossible and hence any proof of such existence impossible. In fact, the employment of the idea of motion only serves to emphasize the difficulty and inconsistency of the theory. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introductory Remarks The ‘Construction Principles’of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature The Content of Hegel's “Mechanics” and “Physics” in Outline 31 Problems Inherent in the Sciences According to Hegel Conclusions References.

This paper explores the question of Leibniz’s contribution to the rise of modern ‘science’. To be sure, it is now generally agreed that the modern category of ‘science’ did not exist in the early modern period. At the same time, this period witnessed a very important stage in the process from which modern science eventually emerged. My discussion will be aimed at uncovering the new enterprise, and the new distinctions which were taking shape in the early modern period under the (...) banner of the old Aristotelian terminology. I will argue that Leibniz begins to theorize a distinction between physics and metaphysics that tracks our distinction between the autonomous enterprise of science in its modern meaning, and the enterprise of philosophy. I will try to show that, for Leibniz, physics proper is the study of natural phenomena in mathematical and mechanical terms without recourse for its explanations to metaphysical notions. This autonomy, however, does not imply for Leibniz that physics can say on its own all that there is to be said about the natural world. Quite the opposite. Leibniz inherits from the Aristotelian tradition the view that physics needs metaphysical roots or a metaphysical grounding. For Leibniz, what is ultimately real is reached by metaphysics, not by physics. This is, in my view, Leibniz’s chief insight: the new mathematical physics is an autonomous enterprise which offers its own kind of explanations but does not exhaust what can (and should) be said about the natural world. (shrink)