The aim of this paper is to assess the relevance of somatic evolution by natural selection to our understanding of cancer development. I do so in two steps. In the first part of the paper, I ask to what extent cancer cells meet the formal requirements for evolution by natural selection, relying on Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) framework of Darwinian populations. I argue that although they meet the minimal requirements for natural selection, cancer cells are not paradigmatic Darwinian populations. In the second (...) part of the paper, I examine the most important examples of adaptation in cancer cells. I argue that they are not significant accumulations of evolutionary changes, and that as a consequence natural selection plays a lesser role in their explanation. Their explanation, I argue, is best sought in the previously existing wiring of the healthy cells. (shrink)

La définition platonicienne du philosophe; la philosophie comme mode de vie; rupture et continuité, le Moyen Age et les temps modernes. [SDM].

Health Care professionals working in disaster situations have to face urgent choices which diverge from their normal deontological ethos and are more utilitarian. Such is the triage system used to choose whom to treat. Instead of entering a crisis these professionals should be thought that ethics is not harmonizable to all situations and that there are situations in which saving as many lives as possible mean sacrificing others. This calls for defining a perimeter zone in which such choices occur, and (...) a time frame (a space–time niche) in which it ought to be considered ethical and legitimate to use such value laden choices. (shrink)

In a paper published in Psychological Review, Tyler Burge has offered a unified non-mentalistic account of a wide range of social cognitive developmental findings. His proposal is that far from attributing mental states, young children attribute to humans the same kind of internal generic states of sensory registration that biologists attribute to e.g. snails and ticks. Burge’s proposal deserves close attention: it is especially challenging because it departs from both the mentalistic and all the non-mentalistic accounts of the data so (...) far. Moreover Burge has been one of the leading philosophers of mind of the past 40 years and some of his writings on the objectivity of perception display a deep understanding of the relevance of science for sharpening our understanding of the mind. After taking a close look at the developmental evidence, in particular at false-belief studies, I argue that Burge’s, 409–434, 2018) account faces severe obstacles. To give one telling example: if young children can only attribute to others sensory registrations, then it is hard to explain the evidence showing that they respond differently to an agent’s ignorance and to her false belief. (shrink)

This paper reviews Deleuze’s theory of language in Logic of Sense, and Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of language in A Thousand Plateaus. In the ontology informed by the Stoics described in those books, human being and language do not exist separately but in a mixture of words and things. The author argues that this flattened ontology of surfaces is incommensurable with the ontology of depth used in conventional humanist qualitative methodology and recommends beginning new empirical inquiry with a concept instead (...) of with method and methodology. (shrink)

In this article, we develop tame topology over dp-minimal structures equipped with definable uniformities satisfying certain assumptions. Our assumptions are enough to ensure that definable sets are tame: there is a good notion of dimension on definable sets, definable functions are almost everywhere continuous, and definable sets are finite unions of graphs of definable continuous “multivalued functions.” This generalizes known statements about weakly o-minimal, C-minimal, and P-minimal theories.

Cet article propose une interprétation de la métaphysique de Jankélévitch telle qu’elle se présente dans Philosophie première (1953). L’élaboration d’une déontologie métaphysique conduit Jankélévitch, par-delà le destin onto-théologique des métaphysiques classiques, à déployer une théologie « désontologisée », c’est-à-dire un discours sur Dieu dépouillé de l’être et de l’existence. Une telle détermination théologique de la métaphysique met alors nécessairement le métaphysicien à l’épreuve de l’expression de ce qui n’existe pas et qui pourtant fait exister. Ce que nous comprenons ainsi comme (...) un échec du discours métaphysique sur son objet théologique, dans l’ordre de la métaphysique, possède toutefois une fonction dans l’œuvre de Jankélévitch : fournir son modèle à l’action morale humaine. Dans un double mouvement, cette lecture achemine donc la métaphysique vers la théologie, avant de redéployer la morale depuis cette théologie. (shrink)

In our critical review of Doing without Concepts, we argue that although the heterogeneity hypothesis (according to which exemplars, prototypes and theories are natural kinds that should replace ‘concept’) may end fruitless debates in the psychology of concepts, Edouard Machery did not anticipate one consequence of his suggestion: Definitions now acquire a new status as another one of the bodies of information replacing ‘concept’. In order to support our hypothesis, we invoke dual-process models to suggest that prototypes, exemplars and theories (...) are ‘Type 1’ concepts (automatic, implicit) and definitions ‘Type 2’ concepts (controlled, explicit). In the context of this argument, we suggest that one must better distinguish between Type 1 theories (e.g., Bayesian causal nets) and Type 2 theories (e.g., scientific) that explicitly control definitions. (shrink)

How can we best understand human cognitive architectural variability? We believe that the relationships between theories in neurobiology, cognitive science and evolutionary biology posited by evolutionary psychology’s Integrated Causal Model has unduly supported various essentialist conceptions of the human cognitive architecture, monomorphic minds, that mask HCA variability, and we propose a different set of relationships between theories in the same domains to support a different, non-essentialist, understanding of HCA variability. To set our case against essentialist theories of HCA variability, we (...) detail the general notion of an ICM and the specific ICM at the heart of evolutionary psychology. We briefly illustrate the type of essentialism fostered by evolutionary psychology’s ICM by showing how it grounds essentialist theories of cognitive gender. We shall not criticize these theories here since the literature is replete with compelling objections to them, but shall instead focus on motivating a replacement ICM to destabilize evolutionary psychology’s ICM wholesale. ICMs usually span larger than the models they support, hence larger than arguments against these models, and one reason the essentialist theories addressed here have the kind of staying power they do is that they are partly supported by the ICM in which they are grounded. In short, we offer “A New Hope” against the essentialist empire. True to the Hollywood trope, this new hope rests on an alliance between a young theory, cognitive network neuroscience, and two older, but still quite young, epistemic rebels: enactive cognitive science and developmental systems theory. Accordingly, we detail and discuss the proposed emerging ICM and test-drive it by sketching the multimorphic view of gender it grounds. (shrink)

Le mal est une notion qui s’étend au moins sur trois champs disciplinaires : la théologie, la philosophie et l’art. Il connaît un même traitement dans chacun de ces trois champs, motivé par des systèmes différents : le mal n’est jamais pris comme objet causa sui mais toujours considéré dans sa relativité à un objet premier dont il contribue à définir la limite. Nous proposons un rapide tour d’horizon de cette situation afin d’ouvrir les pistes de réflexion d’une intelligibilité du (...) comportement de cette notion dans l’histoire des idées. Nous suivons un ouvrage de Paul Ricœur et saisissons certains textes clefs de l’histoire de la pensée au travers de l’objet problématique qu’est le mal, évoquant notamment les travaux plus récits avec la méthode herméneutique proposée par Hans Blumenberg afin de percevoir la figure du diable comme l’objet pratique d’une telle observation dans le fil de l’histoire des idées. (shrink)

Besides the application of the notion of complementarity to psychological and physical descriptions of the individual, this paper explores the possibility of defining complementary observables in the same phenomenal domain. Complementary emotional observables are defined from experimental data on experienced emotions reported by subjects who have been prepared in a state of induced emotion. Complementary physiological observables are defined in correspondence with conjugate, physiological quantities that can be measured. -/- Keywords: Complementarity, Psychophysics, Emotional observables, Induced emotion, Physiological observables, Conjugate physiological (...) quantities. (shrink)

RESUMEN El artículo examina el consuelo como una cuestión filosófica en cuanto que concreción de la solicitud, y muestra los recursos que aporta para comprender al ser humano como sujeto sufriente y respondiente. Se analiza el consuelo en cuanto que fenómeno de acceso a otras dimensiones constitutivas del ser humano, como la afectividad, la apelación y el cuidado. ABSTRACT The article examines consolation as a philosophical issue insofar as it is a materialization of attentiveness, and explains the resources it offers (...) to understand human beings as suffering and caring subjects. It analyzes consolation as a phenomenon that provides access to other constitutive dimensions of the human being, such as affectivity, appeal, and care. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que penser? Qu'est-ce que la pensée? À quelles conditions un être est-il conscient? Une douleur, une expérience olfactive, une perception visuelle, une intention, une croyance et un remords ont-ils une nature mentale commune? Si oui, la science peut-elle la découvrir? Le concept d'intentionnalité a été introduit en philosophie afin de clarifier le contenu de ces questions. Il désigne la capacité de viser mentalement des objets et de se représenter mentalement des états de choses. Ce livre analyse les problèmes soulevés (...) par l'introduction du concept d'intentionnalité dans la philosophie contemporaine. Il montre d'abord comment la philosophie du langage du XXe siècle a tenté de résoudre les énigmes logiques et ontologiques engendrées par la définition de l'intentionnalité. Il montre ensuite que la question centrale de la philosophie de l'esprit du XXe siècle a été de savoir si l'intentionnalité est la caractéristique distinctive des phénomènes mentaux : de tous les phénomènes mentaux et d'eux seuls. Remerciements Introduction Chapitre premier. L'ordre mental cartésien Chapitre 2. L'héritage ontologique de Brentano Chapitre 3. La logique et le défi des objets inexistants Chapitre 4. La référence directe Chapitre 5. L'intensionnalité est-elle un critère de l'intentionnalité? Chapitre 6. Les variétés de l'intentionnalité Chapitre 7. L'intentionnalité est-elle la propriété exclusive des phénomènes mentaux? Chapitre 8. Peut-on naturaliser l'intentionnalité? Chapitre 9. À quoi sert l'intentionnalité? Chapitre 10. Tous les phénomènes mentaux possèdent-ilsl'intentionnalité? Conclusion Bibliographie Index. (shrink)

This paper discusses the issue of whether we have responsibilities to future generations with respect to genetic screening, including for purposes of selective abortion or discard. Future generations have been discussed at length among scholars. The concept of ‘Guardianfor Future Generations’ is tackled and its main criticisms discussed. Whilst germ-line cures, it is argued, can only affect family trees, genetic screening and testing can have wider implications. If asking how this may affect future generations is a legitimate question and since (...) we indeed make retrospective moral judgements, it would be wise to consider that future generations will make the same retrospective judgements on us. Moreover such technologies affect present embryos to which we indeed can be considered to have an obligation. (shrink)

A Bell-type strategy of decision for the long-standing question of the nature of psychophysical correlations has been previously presented in a recent article published in Mind and Matter. This strategy of decision is here applied to experimental data on psychophysiological correlations, namely, correlations between cardiovascular and emotional variables that have been reported in several independent publications. This statistical analysis shows that a substantial majority of these correlations cannot be interpreted as an exchange of signals or a mere “interaction”, whatever its (...) form, but that these correlations could a priori be explained classically, as the result of a common preparation during the evolution process. A discussion on the scope and the limitations of this result will then be provided. In particular, alternative explanations of the psychophysical correlations that do not appeal to a notion of signalling will be discussed. (shrink)

Inscriptions from Amathous X. Greek and latin inscriptions from the agora of Amathous. The riches of this batch of inscriptions reflect the importance of its find spot. If of three building dedications there exists nothing but the most banal elements, that of a probable mausoleum dedicated to Germanicus reveals an unrecognized aspect of the cult of this prince. Statuary dedications uncover two new proconsuls and a new proquestor, as well as two hitherto unencountered documents from Cyprus : a bronze statue (...) of Gordian III, and that of a doukenarion, interim governor of the island. Together, with proof of the city’s status as metropolis, and a document unique in its type, the plan of a sacred asylum zone, the inscriptions shed new light on the economic and political panorama of Amathous in imperial times, which until recently appeared rather lustreless. (shrink)

La Polonaise Apolline Hélène Massalska (1763-1815) n’est pas une inconnue en France. Née en Lituanie, orpheline de père et de mère dès 1764, elle est conduite à Paris en 1771 par son oncle qui la place au couvent très huppé de l’Abbaye-aux-Bois, rue de Sèvres, jusqu’à son mariage en 1779. Elle épouse alors le prince Charles de Ligne puis, en 1794, le prince Vincent Potocki, moyennant quelques années de concubinage, pour elle, et de bigamie, pour lui. Elle connaitra une vie (...) mondaine en Belgiqu... (shrink)