This essay attempts to describe the neo-Lamarckian atmosphere that was dominant in French biology for more than a century. Firstly, we demonstrate that there were not one but at least two French neo-Lamarckian traditions. This implies, therefore, that it is possible to propose a clear definition of a (neo)Lamarckian conception, and by using it, to distinguish these two traditions. We will see that these two conceptions were not dominant at the same time. The first French neo-Lamarckism (1879–1931) was structured by (...) a very mechanic view of natural processes. The main representatives of this first period were scientists such as Alfred Giard (1846–1908), Gaston Bonnier (1853–1922) and Félix Le Dantec (1869–1917). The second Lamarckism – much more vitalist in its inspiration – started to develop under the supervision of people such as Albert Vandel (1894–1980) and Pierre-Paul Grassé (1895–1985). Secondly, this essay suggests that the philosophical inclinations of these neo-Lamarckisms reactivated a very ancient and strong dichotomy of French thought. One part of this dichotomy is a material, physicalist tradition, which started with René Descartes but developed extensively during the 18th and 19th centuries. The other is a spiritual and vitalist reaction to the first one, which also had a very long history, though it is most closely associated with the work of Henri Bergson. Through Claude Bernard, the first neo-Lamarckians tried to construct a mechanical and determinist form of evolutionary theory which was, in effect, a Cartesian theory. The second wave of neo-Lamarckians wanted to reconsider the autonomy and reactivity of life forms, in contrast to purely physical systems. (shrink)

Is a policy of economic growth compatible with the neutrality of the State? Some liberals (Rawls, Dworkin, Ackerman, Larmore, Kymlicka) think so. I do not. I begin by explaining and discussing the different meanings of the neutrality thesis, then I show that, whatever meaning we give to the idea of neutrality, it is very difficult to argue convincingly that a policy of economic growth does not favour some conceptions of the good.

Nothing has yet been done, and, here, in the middle of the twentieth century, it is fast becoming too late to draw up a suitable catalogue of the works of human wisdom. We are forced to project for the future the complete realization of our desires. This future will no doubt discover a conscious and effective organization of thought and action—a constant good fortune in the pursuit of legitimate satisfactions through a total mastery of natural forces—in a word, a perfect (...) and reciprocal adaptation between man and that part of the universe in which he lives. All this, or most of it, still remains to be done; but much has already been said in the five thousand years that men have been writing. An intelligent observer arriving from Sirius would doubtless be especially struck by the extraordinary gap separating here on earth what is so well said from what is so badly carried out. Or rather he would wonder how it is that beings as highly gifted as men, judging from the knowledge and wisdom they have accumulated, still make such ineffective and even harmful use of the means at their disposal. The most indulgent hypothesis would be to see in this the result of a temporary misunderstanding owing to the great speed with which human thought evolves. Our observer would resume his journey then, resolved to return after a hundred years or two, sure that he would then find that man had bridged the gap and become as great in what he does as in what he knows. (shrink)

“All that we require, and which can only be given us by the present advance of the single sciences, is a chemistry of the moral, religious, aesthetic ideas and sentiments, as well as of those impulses which we experience in ourselves both in the great and in the small phases of cultural and societal intercourse, and even in solitude.” In this passage from the opening paragraph of Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche prepares the ground for the transvaluation of modern culture (...) by means of a call for a renewed and enlarged understanding of chemical science. The need is a response to the dulling of modern culture: whereas the classical world-view attempted in vain to overcome such opposites as truth and error, or life and death, by seeing them from the perspective of an immutable standpoint, the more recent historical method has merely tended to dilute them in some supposedly fundamental element. Why does chemistry provide the model for the forthcoming transvaluation? (shrink)

La philosophie est comme un casse-noix : certaines personnes ne réussissent qu'à se pincer les doigts avec, les professionnels le retournent dans tous les sens, et puis - quand même - il se trouve des gens qui s'en servent pour ouvrir ces merveilleuses noix qu'on appelle les pensées. Philosopher, c'est bien ; philosopher soi-même, c'est mieux. Philosopher soi-même chaque jour sur le quotidien, sur du banal, c'est le mieux, quand on ne compte plus sur la religion ou l'idéologie politique. Le (...) maître à penser, c'est toi. A quoi ressemble un petit-déjeuner? As-tu assez de courage pour te reconnaître dans le miroir et te reconnaître sur le " trône "? Que se passe-t-il quand tu es tenté au bureau? Une fois réveillé, vas-tu interpréter et utiliser tes rêves? Finalement, rien de tel qu'un simplissime " Où, quand, comment, pourquoi? " devant un gros problème. Chaque jour est un beau jour pour philosopher... (shrink)

This chapter distinguishes Just Peace from its closest ‘moral’ neighbours — a stable peace and positive peace. Drawing on both consequentialist and deontological considerations, Allan develops an international ethical scale to evaluate different acts from a moral standpoint, with different levels of conflict as the baseline of ethical behavior. The more extreme the discord, the worse it is considered on the scale; the more harmonious, the better. Arguing that absolute unhappiness and absolute happiness are not of this world, Allan presents (...) eight intermediary moral situations, each being superseded by the next one in ethical terms: genocide, war, non-war, Just War, stable peace, Just Peace, positive peace, and Global Care. He develops an ethic of ‘global care’ based on feminist theories of care, religious and secular declarations on a global ethic, evolutionary theory arguments, and a critique of a liberal human rights approach. (shrink)

En 1534, le grand chancelier d'Angleterre, sir Thomas More, refuse de prêter serment à l'Acte de Suprématie par lequel Henri VIII d'Angleterre, s'opposant à l'Eglise de Rome, se proclame chef de l'Eglise anglicane. Condamné par le tribunal royal à la décapitation publique, Thomas More demeure pourtant fidèle : fidèle au roi, fidèle à la foi, et fidèle à sa conscience au prix de sa vie. En effet, s'il ne reconnaît pas le roi comme chef de l'Eglise nationale, il n'a jamais (...) remis en cause son autorité temporelle. Sir Thomas More, humaniste, juriste, théologien, diplomate, homme d'Etat et finalement martyr, est devenu un modèle pour ceux qui se dévouent au bien commun. L'Europe troublée du XVIe siècle n'est pas sans rappeler notre époque soumise à la difficile gestion des affaires publiques, aux scandales financiers et à l'avidité de quelques puissants. Ce livre, qui présente la vie de Thomas More et les valeurs fondatrices de son action, peut nous aider à trouver de nouveaux repères pour devenir ferment dans la pâte du monde. Le lecteur saisira alors toute la vérité des paroles adressées par l'humaniste anglais Roger Ascham à la petite- fille de More : "Par cet homme seul, c'est toute l'Angleterre qui s'est trouvée anoblie.". (shrink)

Comments on two recently published tripod bases. — Modifications to the slope of the Acropolis above the Theatre of Dionysos: stair-heads cut into the rock, choregic columns dating from the 4th or 3rd c. BC (and not the Roman period), Thrasyllos Monument and Chapel of the Virgin. — Lysicrates Monument: the tripod rested on the roof of the monument (and not on the finial which crowned it). — As an appendix: The Lysicrates Monument and France, the role of the Capuchin (...) fri- ars in the welcome to travellers and the protection of the monument, the interchange of correspon- dence between the French and Greek governments and the religious authorities according to the archive documents. (shrink)

En Éthique à Nicomaque II 4-6, Aristote entend donner une définition cohérente de la vertu éthique. Cependant, de manière assez surprenante, la dernière étape de la définition mentionne le phronimos et par son intermédiaire la sagesse pratique ( phronêsis ), qui est une vertu intellectuelle et non une vertu éthique : la vertu éthique est « une disposition à décider ( hexis proairetikê ), située dans un juste milieu relatif à nous, déterminé par la raison, et comme le déterminerait le (...) prudent ». Pour résoudre cette énigme, on soutient ici que la recherche d’une définition de la vertu éthique est en partie motivée par le débat autour de l’unité de la vertu. En disant que la vertu éthique est proairetikê, Aristote réserve une place à la sagesse pratique dans sa définition. Ce faisant, il renforce sa propre conception de l’unité (ou réciprocité) des vertus : une distinction sans séparation. (shrink)

Xenophon's interest in the art of command has never diminished. This article analyzes his ambivalent relationship with “tactics”, an art he sometimes dissociates himself from, because he considers it to take the place of a much more important knowledge that ultimately encompasses it. This is also demonstrated by his subtle use of -ikos adjectives in both the Memorabilia and the Hellenica. The list of terms, often attested for the first time, confirms that the suffix suggests a specialization and an approach (...) to a limited body of knowledge, but above all demonstrates Xenophon's singular place in the transmission of military knowledge: he is both close to Aeneas the Tactician, as well as anxious to distinguish himself from these professionals of the military art. (shrink)

To improve on the argument presented by classical economists, many authors have tried to rely as much as possible on a value-free approach. In this paper, reasons to reject the propositions made by neoclassical economists are briefly recalled. We then turn toward Kirzner’s proposition which is to evaluate a policy, or a rule, according to the extent to which it promotes coordination. This proposition, however, must also be rejected because, if it introduces some dynamics in the picture, it is a (...) dynamics towards equilibrium, while real life, entrepreneurial dynamics can either be towards coordination or discoordination. Coordination is not monotonously linked to progress. It therefore appears preferable to rely on Hayek’s notion of order; a notion specifically designed to allow progress to take place, while maintaining a ‘satisfactory’ level of coordination. For such an order to prevail, any rule or policy deliberately introduced must be compatible with the existing order, that is, it must protect legitimate expectations. Following a reflection on the definition of ‘legitimacy’ we then reach the conclusion that the quest for a value-free welfare economics is lost, and that even the quest for a value-free economics will have, in a certain sense, to be left, or at least reconsidered.Afin d’améliorer l’argument présenté par les économistes classiques, beaucoup d’auteurs ont essayé de se reposer autant que possible sur une approche sans jugements de valeur. Dans cet article, nous rappelons brièvement les raisons de rejeter les propositions faites par les économistes néoclassiques. Nous nous tournons donc vers la proposition de Kirzner qui est d’évaluer une politique, ou une règle, par rapport à la manière dont elle promeut la coordination. Cependant, cette proposition doit aussi être rejetée car si elle introduit une dynamique dans l’analyse, c’est une dynamique du côté de l’équilibre, alors que dans la vie réelle, la dynamique entrepreneuriale peut initier plus de coordination ou plus de discoordination. La coordination n’est pas liée de manière monotone au progrès. Il apparaît aussi préférable de se rattacher à la notion d’ordre de Hayek, notion construite précisément pour permettre au progrès d’avoir lieu, tout en maintenant un niveau “satisfaisant” de coordination. Pour qu’un tel ordre existe, toute règle ou politique délibérément introduite doit être compatible avec l’ordre existant, c’està- dire, qu’elle doit protéger les anticipations légitimes. Après une réflexion sur la définition de “légitimité”, nous arrivons à la conclusion que la quête d’une science économique du bien-être sans jugement de valeur est un échec, et que la quête d’une science économique sans jugement de valeur doit être, dans un certain sens, abandonnée ou au mieux reconsidérée. (shrink)

The contributions presented in this special issue bring to light the complexity of fiscal decentralization and consequently the need for a better understanding of the dynamics of fiscal federalism. This is precisely what that paper attempts to do by first reviewing briefly the standard arguments in favour of decentralization as well as the arguments against it. What is most missing, however, in these standards arguments is a reflection on the dynamics of fiscal federalism and, more generally, on the dynamics of (...) fiscal systems. A large part of the paper is therefore devoted to the identification of the main forces governing such dynamics. A parallel with the market processes helps us to single out features which are shared by both process: the use of local knowledge, the possibility of comparing different products, and more generally, the incentive to discover new paths. Surely, it is more costly to citizens to change the fiscal regime than it is to change goods or services; but precisely, decentralization should reduce these costs hence accelerate the discovery process. Hence, because of the dynamics to which it gives birth, fiscal decentralization appears desirable even if its benefits might arise only after some learning process takes place and even if some fiscal incoherency might prevail during that process.Les contributions présentées dans ce numéro spécial mettent en lumière la complexité de la décent- ralisation du système fiscal et donc la nécessité pour une meilleure compréhension de la dynamique du fédéralisme fiscal. C’est précisément ce que cet article essaie de faire dans un premier temps en passant en revue brièvement les arguments standards en faveur de la décentralisation aussi bien que les arguments opposés. Ce qui manque le plus, cependant, dans ces arguments standards, c’est une réflexion sur la dynamique du fédéralisme fiscal et plus généralement sur la dynamique des systèmes fiscaux. Une grande partie de l’article est ainsi consacrée à l’identification des principales forces qui gouvernent une telle dynamique. Un parallèle avec le processus de marché nous aide à établir des modèles partagés par ces processus : l’utilisation de la connaissance locale, la possibilité de comparer différents produits et plus généralement, le stimulant de la découverte de nouveaux sentiers. Evidemment, il est plus coûteux pour les citoyens de changer de régime fiscal que de changer de bien ou de service ; mais précisément, la décentralisation devrait réduire ces coûts en accélérant le processus de découverte. Désormais, grâce à la dynamique à laquelle elle donne naissance, la décentralisation fiscale apparaît désirable même si les bénéfices peuvent ne venir qu’à la suite de processus d’apprentissage et même si quelques incohérences fiscales subsistent durant ce processus. (shrink)

Self-deceptions of the legal mind are the foundation Schlag (law, U. of Colorado) finds underlying the vast disparity between images of the law by professionals working in it and by citizens who get tangled up in it. He argues that such cognitive deficits as anti-intellectualism, reductionism, and arrogant pretenses translate into an impoverished form of life. The ten essays were written between 1987 and 1995, and have been previously published in slightly different forms. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, (...) OR. (shrink)