I defend Gary Watson's Platonic Model of free agency against two arguments by counterexample, one by J. David Velleman and the other by Michael Bratman. I claim that these arguments are unconvincing for three reasons. First, they do not accurately target the Platonic Model. Second, they do not convincingly present cases of self-governed action. Third, they call attention to issues about theoretical commitments that are not fit to be settled by appeal to cases. On the basis (...) of this discussion, I draw some general lessons for the debate about which theory of self-governance is the best. (shrink)

Sarah Buss has recently argued that endorsement theories of autonomy face three problems: they conflate autonomous agency with agency simpliciter, they face a vicious regress, and they get the extension of autonomous actions wrong. I argue that one such theory, Gary Watson’s Platonic Model, is not subject to any of these problems. I conclude that Buss has not given us reason to reject the Platonic Model and that it may be compatible with her own theory of (...) accountability. (shrink)

Educators are conflicted about whether school provides an appropriate space to teach ethics. Still, they want to develop the moral character of their students, and most of these efforts have used various citizenship values to address our frustration with students’ ‘lack of character’. Recently, a wave of work in the philosophy of education has rejuvenated discussion of Aristotelian virtue ethics, which forms the backbone for programmes that many schools are now adopting. Mark Jonas and Yoshiaki Nakazawa, however, argue that schools (...) should revisit Plato’s pedagogical methods, as well. If educators want to develop virtue in students, they need to understand the mechanism behind moral development. Guided by Plato, they argue that expert teachers use psychological, pedagogical, and philosophical reasoning to induce epiphanies in students, then guide them through virtue-oriented rehabituation. The goal of this article is to explore the legitimacy of Jonas and Nakazawa’s Platonic theory. I begin by describing the state of modern democratic education and its relationship to teaching ethics. I argue that character development is the appropriate route educators should take but that Jonas and Nakazawa’s theory only gives educators a partial understanding of how to do so. They give a plausible model for how our best educators are effective, but we are left wanting a much more robust, instructive picture. I suggest that we need a broader overhaul of the way we view education in a modern democratic society; character development must proceed from a different normative picture of the individual’s place in society. (shrink)

In several late dialogues, Plato uses the paradeigma of the letters to illustrate the methods of dialectics. This study examines why letters in particular represent suitable models, and explores important themes of Plato's late ontology and epistemology from this viewpoint. The author thereby reveals the nature of the paradeigma and its central role as a method.

This report deals with one of the most popular trends in modern scientific theoretical thinking, that of building meta-conceptions of existing theories. All these meta-conceptions follow the method of building meta-mathematics for formalized mathematical calculi. The essence and forms of various types of metatheories are discussed. The author of this report has suggested the idea of metatheoretical models – Platonic and Rhodesian models of metatheories – a completely new approach in philosophical publications on the subject. These models allow separating (...) two different sets of metatheoretical constructions taking into account the level of formalization of object-theories. The Rhodesian model allows finding out those methods that are helpful in building certain type theories as well as suggesting and examining theories that have special metatheoretical features and revealing their common features and differences in regard of other theories. The paper discusses the complicated problem of metaphilosophy in the light of the Platonic and Rhodian models. The general conclusion is that philosophy is its own metaphilosophy. (shrink)

In part 1 of the paper, I develop a Platonic business ethic, emphasizing Plato’s Republic. I approach business ethics from a virtue ethics position, and I attempt to show that a Platonic craftsmanship model infuses a corporation with a type of managerial wisdom and justice, molds temperate and courageous corporate characters, and entails a morally fine type of self-interest. I also show that it is basic to two influential management theories.In part 2, I use Amartya Sen’s Development (...) as Freedom to show that the craftsmanship model is central to the concept of development. This concept is important in ethical discussions of both globalization and transnational corporations. Thus, I attempt to globalize Platonic business ethics using a craftsmanship model.In my concluding remarks, I attempt to show that the Plato/Sen position on development can be illustrated by both American and non-American capitalist firms functioning in our globalized world. (shrink)

Die Beschäftigung mit Platon hat eine lange Geschichte, Rezeptionen seines Denkens sind so prägend für die Philosophiegeschichte geworden, dass diese verständlicherweise zuweilen als eine Sammlung von Fußnoten zu seinem Werk begriffen wurde. Das gilt besonders für einen durchgängigen metaphysischen Zug des abendländischen Denkens, ein grundsätzliches Ordnungsmodell aus der Antike, das, christlich gewendet, die Theoriebildung bis in unsere Tage fundiert. Aber mit einer Reihe anderer Gewissheiten ist auch dieser erfolgreiche Platonismus Gegenstand der Kritik geworden. Kann und soll man den metaphysischen Platon (...) retten oder muss man Platon vielmehr gegen die metaphysische Tradition neu verstehen? Muss man Platon gegen die Platonisten verteidigen, ist er der Anfang einer philosophischen Verirrung? -- Dorothea Frede, Ekkehard Martens, Arbogast Schmitt, Gernot Böhme, Hermann Schmitz, Wolfgang Detel und andere entdecken – auch durch ihre Kritik – Platon als Gesprächspartner der Gegenwart neu. (shrink)

The subject of the book is a reconsideration of the internalistic model of composition of the Platonic type, and its application in the ontology of quantum theory. Nonseparability is at the centre of quantum ontology. Quantum wholes are atemporal wholes governed by internalistic logic, requiring a relativization of fundamental notions of mechanics.

Brown (The laboratory of the mind. Thought experiments in the natural science, 1991a , 1991b ; Contemporary debates in philosophy of science, 2004 ; Thought experiments, 2008 ) argues that thought experiments (TE) in science cannot be arguments and cannot even be represented by arguments. He rest his case on examples of TEs which proceed through a contradiction to reach a positive resolution (Brown calls such TEs “platonic”). This, supposedly, makes it impossible to represent them as arguments for logical (...) reasons: there is no logic that can adequately model such phenomena. (Brown further argues that this being the case, “platonic” TEs provide us with irreducible insight into the abstract realm of laws of nature). I argue against this approach by describing how “platonic” TEs can be modeled within the logical framework of adaptive proofs for prioritized consequence operations. To show how this mundane apparatus works, I use it to reconstruct one of the key examples used by Brown, Galileo’s TE involving falling bodies. (shrink)

The scope of Platonism is extended by introducing the concept of a “Platonic computer” which is incorporated in metacomputics. The theoretical framework of metacomputics postulates that a Platonic computer exists in the realm of Forms and is made by, of, with, and from metaconsciousness. Metaconsciousness is defined as the “power to conceive, to perceive, and to be self-aware” and is the formless, con-tentless infinite potentiality. Metacomputics models how metaconsciousness generates the perceived actualities including abstract entities and physical and (...) nonphysical realities. It is postulated that this is achieved via digital computation using the Platonic computer. The introduction of a Platonic computer into the realm of Forms thus bridges the “inverse explanatory gap” and therefore solves the “inverse hard problem of consciousness” in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

How does Jung model his psychology on Plato's philosophy? The Platonic Jung looks at similarities between the two, particularly in the structure of the cosmos and psyche and in the nature of the self. The book reunites philosophy and psychology and expresses the message these men imparted-the soul is the true self and worth finding.

This paper examines Plato’s later model of civic participation in relation to contemporary civic theories. It argues that, although the Platonic model satisfies such common criteria for civic theories as equality, autonomy, and empowerment, the key concept to understand this project is moderation. It is moderation that structures and unifies the constituent elements of this model (the rule of law, the persuasion of the preambles, the empowering economy and education). It also explains what kind of personal (...) disposition is central to achieving a stable and rational political order. (shrink)

I argue that Plato holds a medical model of virtue as health which does not have themorally unacceptable implications which have led some to describe it as authoritarian.This model, which draws on the educational virtues of the elenchos, lacks anyimplication that all criminals are mad or all mad people criminals – this implication beingat the source of many criticisms of Plato’s analogy of virtue and health. After setting upthe analogy and the model, I defend my argument against (...) two objections. The firstclaims that Plato's picture of virtue as health is unacceptable because it entails that vice isa defect and therefore that criminals are all mad. The second resists Kenny'sinterpretation but does so by attacking its first premise, i.e. that Plato believes virtue issome kind of health. I reply that both objections are misguided. (shrink)

Le démiurge de Platon et l'atome primitif de Lemaître sont deux intuitions inédites, artifices théoriques d'astronomie anti-observationnelle. La genèse de ces artifices remonte à la thématisation présocratique de l'unité cosmique. Platon institutionnalise les Formes intelligibles et platonise les présocratiques. Lemaître, contemporain d'Einstein, est tributaire d'une unité cosmique marquée par la gravitation relativiste, qui disqualifie le système classique ayant, en son temps, déclassé les substances et le mouvement aristotéliciens. La théorisation montre comment Platon fait du démiurge le concept axial de son (...) astronomie géométrique. L'univers est conforme aux normes mathématiques. La perspective dynamique de Lemaître émerge contre le modèle stationnaire d'Einstein/De Sitter, aristotélicien en son fond. Au bout, deux configurations apparaissent : sphérique et homogène, l'univers de Platon repose sur le triangle. L'« âme du monde » en assure la dynamique. D'interprétation quantique, la singularité cosmique de Lemaître développe le modèle d'un univers issu de l'explosion (big bang) d'un atome primitif : l'isotope du neutron. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche’s writing, which is distinguished by a wide variety of forms and ongoing beginnings, bears an unmistakable imprint of Plato’s writing-in-becoming. The work begins with the area of correspondence, primarily from the philologist Erwin Rohde’s recognition of Plato as a model for Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but also from Nietzsche’s testimony that his Zarathustra is platonizing, the work points to the motif of death as a place where Plato’s (...) and Nietzsche’s poetics meet, given their transformations of the Homeric idea of the hero’s fate. The illuminating power of the atmosphere of death also points to Aesop’s character as a foundation upon which Plato bases his Socrates, which directs this paper toward demonstrating that Nietzsche’s assessment of Plato’s writing as an “infinitely accentuated Aesopian fable” turns out to be a self-assessment. (shrink)

In their attempt to connect the workings of the human mind with their neural realizers, cognitive neuroscientists often bracket out individual differences to build a single, abstract model that purportedly represents (almost) every human being’s brain. In this paper I first examine the rationale behind this model, which I call ‘Platonic Brain Model’. Then I argue that it is to be surpassed in favor of multiple models allowing for patterned inter-individual differences. I introduce the debate on (...) legitimate (and illegitimate) ways of mapping neural structures and cognitive functions, endorsing a view according to which function-structure mapping is context-sensitive. Building on the discussion of the ongoing debate on the function(s) of the so-called Fusiform “Face” Area, I show the necessity of indexing function-structure mappings to some populations of subjects, clustered on the basis of factors such as their expertise in a given domain. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a reading of one of Plato's later works, the Sophist, that reveals it to be informed by principles comparable on the face of it with those that have emerged recently in the field of critical thinking. As a development of the famous Socratic method of his teacher, I argue, Plato deployed his own pedagogical method, a ‘mid‐wifely’ or ‘maieutic’ method, in the Sophist. In contrast to the Socratic method, the sole aim of this method is (...) not to disabuse the reader or learner of her false opinions. Rather, its purpose is to supply her with the skills and dispositions as well as the claims and counter‐claims she needs to critically evaluate a view, and so facilitate knowledge acquisition, for herself. But the text does not merely teach critical thinking in this indirect manner. One of the strategies its author employed was to encourage the reader/learner to consider under what conditions a claim or idea would be false. To the extent that it achieves this, the Sophist provides both a model and an application of that particular kind of critical thinking in the learning environment that Jonathan Baron has described as ‘active open‐mindedness’. (shrink)

This essay utilizes Plato's insights into the role of shame in dialogical interactions to illuminate the aesthetic dimensions of deliberative democracy. Through a close analysis of the refutation of Polus in Plato's dialogue, the "Gorgias", I show how the emotion of shame is central to the unsettling, dynamic, and transformative character of democratic engagement and political judgment identified by recent aesthetic critics of Habermas' model of communicative action and democratic deliberation. Plato's analysis of shame offers a friendly amendment to (...) these aesthetic critiques by showing how the psychological forces at the heart of shame make the outcome of our political engagements with others uncertain and unsettling, even while they make possible the kind of self-reflexivity necessary to foster the deliberative virtue of sincerity or truthfulness. (shrink)

The conflict between Platonic realism and Constructivism marks a watershed in philosophy of mathematics. Among other things, the controversy over the Axiom of Choice is typical of the conflict. Platonists accept the Axiom of Choice, which allows a set consisting of the members resulting from infinitely many arbitrary choices, while Constructivists reject the Axiom of Choice and confine themselves to sets consisting of effectively specifiable members. Indeed there are seemingly unpleasant consequences of the Axiom of Choice. The non-constructive nature (...) of the Axiom of Choice leads to the existence of non-Lebesgue measurable sets, which in turn yields the Banach-Tarski Paradox. But the Banach-Tarski Paradox is so called in the sense that it is a counter-intuitive theorem. To corroborate my view that mathematical truths are of non-constructive nature, I shall draw upon Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems. This also shows the limitations inherent in formal methods. Indeed the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem and the Skolem Paradox seem to pose a threat to Platonists. In this light, Quine/Putnam’s arguments come to take on a clear meaning. According to the model-theoretic arguments, the Axiom of Choice depends for its truth-value upon the model in which it is placed. In my view, however, this is another limitation inherent in formal methods, not a defect for Platonists. To see this, we shall examine how mathematical models have been developed in the actual practice of mathematics. I argue that most mathematicians accept the Axiom of Choice because the existence of non-Lebesgue measurable sets and the Well-Ordering of reals open the possibility of more fruitful mathematics. Finally, after responding to Benacerraf’s challenge to Platonism, I conclude that in mathematics, as distinct from natural sciences, there is a close connection between essence and existence. Actual mathematical theories are the parts of the maximally logically consistent theory that describes mathematical reality. (shrink)

Aristotle's syllogistic theory, as developed in his Prior Analytics, is often regarded as the birth of logic in Western philosophy. Over the past century, scholars have tried to identify important precursors to this theory. I argue that Platonic division, a method which aims to give accounts of essences of natural kinds by progressively narrowing down from a genus, influenced Aristotle's logical theory in a number of crucial respects. To see exactly how, I analyze the method of division as it (...) was originally conceived by Plato and received by Aristotle. I argue that, while Plato allowed that some divisions fail to rigorously investigate the essence, he began a program continued by Aristotle (and others in antiquity and the middle ages) of seeking norms for division that would apply in any domain whatsoever. This idea of a rigorous, general method was taken up and developed by Aristotle in his syllogistic. Aristotle also used Plato's conception of predication as parthood in his semantics for syllogistic propositions. As part of my argument, I prove that a semantics based on Platonic divisional structures is sound and complete for the deduction system used in the literature to model Aristotle's syllogistic. (shrink)

Plato seeks to establish in _Phaedrus_ a close link between poetry and the eidetic sphere to which philosophical knowledge belongs, or which the philosopher accesses through a practiced synoptic-dialectic understanding. This type of philosophical poetry is perfectly illustrated in the Socratic palinode itself, which Socrates –and ultimately Plato – establishes as a paradigm of the poet philosopher, a palinode by necessity must be uttered “with certain poetic terms”. Working from that palinode as a model, Plato seeks to approach the (...) subject of _éros_ with philosophical discourses fed with poetical terms, that is, through an explicit blend of philosophical and poetic elements, the clearest example of which is the _Phaedrus_ as a whole, or, in more general terms, the Platonic dialogical genre in as much as this puts forward an interaction between the philosophical and poetic registers. Taking into account this relationship of compatibility that Plato establishes in _Phaedrus _between the poetic-philosophical paradigm and the traditional paradigm – which in books I, III and X of the _Republic_ clearly appeared in tension–in this paper I’m interested in supporting such a relationship in the dream anecdote as told by Socrates at the start of the _Phaedo_. In this anecdote, the philosopher confesses to Simmias and Cebes that since his time in prison, although he had never done such a thing before before, he has been composing poems based on the versification and musicalization of Aesop’s fables and a hymn to Apollo. (shrink)

This dissertation concerns Plato's theory of education and the problem of how one can actually acquire knowledge of the Forms. Plato's theory of education aims to make one a good person, which requires knowledge of the Form of the Good. Yet, how exactly one would acquire such knowledge has remained a mystery. Various models of learning are presented by Plato: elenctic refutation ; hypothesis; recollection; the mathematical, dialectical, and political studies of the Republic's curriculum; and diairesis to name just those (...) that are explicit. I have argued here that as rich as these learning strategies are we need to augment our examination of Socratic pedagogy with a full exegesis of Platonic epistemology. ;In order finally to appreciate how they, Socratic education and Platonic epistemology, are meaningfully inseparable, I have explored the following questions: what kind of teacher Socrates is and the way in which he struggles against the sophistic methods of teaching; why Plato has Socrates include ten years of mathematical study in the ideal philosophical curriculum and how we can take the Republic's paradoxical curriculum seriously; how the philosopher utilizes the mathematical training in coming to know a Platonic Form; what role opposites play in Plato's metaphysical imagination; and what kind of person would one be if one actually knew the Form of the Good. I have shown that if one were to partake of a Socratic education, to pursue the requisite mathematical training, and to arrive finally at knowledge of the Platonic Forms, then one would be the sort of person that Socrates has in mind when he articulates the principles of Socratic intellectualism. ;What has been novel about this approach is its demonstration of how, despite the fact that Socratic learning and Platonic epistemology have separately been the object of perennial scholarly attention, the two taken genuinely together have been in need of fresh critical engagement. This inquiry reveals the metaphysical constraints on knowledge and in so doing reconciles Plato's theory of knowledge with Socrates' style of educating potential philosophers. (shrink)

This paper examines Plutarch's treatment of education in the Parallel Lives. Beginning with a close reading of Them. 2, it identifies two distinct ways in which Plutarch exploits the education of his subjects: in the first, a subject's attitude to education is used to illustrate a character presented as basically static (a 'static/illustrative' model); in the second, a subject's education is looked at in order to explain his adult character, and education is assumed to affect character (a 'developmental' (...) class='Hi'>model). These two models are often associated with two different forms of discourse: anecdotal for the static/illustrative model and analytical for the developmental. The developmental model, furthermore, is closer to Plutarch's thinking in theoretical discussions of character in the Moralia; the static/illustrative model to Plutarch's treatment of character in the Lives more generally, where anecdotal treatments predominate. The coexistence of these two models is probably to be seen as the result of a tension between Plutarch's philosophical thinking and his biographical practice: those few passages in the Lives which assume a developmental model occur in contexts where either Platonic texts or the activity of philosophers are being discussed. (shrink)

The characterization of the poetic act as a state of irrationality and ecstasis does not, as Plato pretends (followed by many interpreters until today), correspond to the oldest ancient Greek tradition – allegedly documented by the earlier poets as well –, but is Plato’s invention. As part of this invention Plato identifies for the first time in history poetical inspiration with divine possession. Plato’s subversive invention of the mad poet is the basis for his model of the philosopher who (...) himself shall dispose of enthusiasm, as the poet does, but who shall moreover dispose of intellectuality. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est de présenter un modèle formel des processus dichotomiques platoniciens. Cette méthode, déjà utilisée dans le Gorgias et décrite dans le Phèdre, reçoit une grande extension dans les dialogues ultérieurs. Elle s'efforce d'obtenir une définition à partir des divisions successives d'un ensemble de concepts. Nous montrons que les chaînes de dichotomies ne fonctionnent pas comme des classifications, mais comme des « filtres convergents » sur l'espace des Idées. Cela veut dire que cet espace est, formellement (...) parlant, un espace topologique compact, donc fini. Mais, dans d'autres textes, Platon semble indiquer que les Idées sont en nombre infini. Dans cette hypothèse, il resterait possible d'atteindre, au moins à l'infini, quelque chose comme une définition, en considérant l'Idée du Bien comme une sorte de principe de compactification de l'univers platonicien. The purpose of this article is to present a formal model of platonician dichotomic processes. This method, already used in Gorgias and described in Phaedrus, takes a great development in further dialogues. It tries to get a definition from successive divisions of a set of concepts. We show that the chains of dichotomies do not work as classifications but as "convergent filters "on the space of Ideas. It means that this space is, formally speaking, a compact and therefore, finite, topological space. But in some other texts, Platon seems to specify that there is an infinite number of Ideas. In this case, it will remain possible to reach, at least in the infinite, something like a definition, by regarding the Idea of Good as a sort of compactness principle of the platonician universe. (shrink)

This is a shorter presentation of my commentary on the Meno of 2018. The German translation is here accompanied by a Greek text.

The paper reconsiders Aristotle’s criticism of Platonic forms as causes together with its wider implications for the differences but also similiarities between the two philosophers. Analyzing the relevant texts of Metaphysics A 9 and Generation and Corruption II, 9, where Aristotle addresses the hypothesis of forms as put forward in the Phaedo, it discusses two interpretative options : that Aristotle takes these forms for an imperfect anticipation of formal causes, and that he sees them as an aborted attempt at (...) grasping the efficient causation whose proper discovery Aristotle claims to be uniquely his own. Although both readings have their virtues and can be defended from the Aristotelian perspective, their check against the text of the Phaedo reveals that, in this context, efficient causation distinct from material causation is quite plausibly the issue Aristotle has in mind first and foremost. This, however, is only one side of Aristotle’s broader critical stance towards forms as causes : while he seems to detect a split in Plato’s own understanding of the relation between the forms and causation, he is equally critical of the craft-like model as personified by the demiurge of the Timaeus. However, other passages from the Metaphysics suggest that some features of precisely this model, once it is carefully stripped of its personal aspect, may ultimately bear on Aristotle’s own conception of efficient cause. (shrink)

The first, critical part of the paper summarizes J. R. Brown’s Platonic view of thought experiments (TEs) and raises several questions. One of them concerns the initial, particular judgments in a TE. Since they seem to precede the general insight, Brown’s Platonic intuition, and not to derive from it, the question arises as to the nature of the initial particular judgment. The other question concerns the explanatory status of Brown’s epistemic Platonism. The second, constructive descriptive-explanatory part argues for (...) an alternative, i.e. the view of TE as reasoning in, or with help of, mental models which can accommodate all the relevant data within a non-aprioristic framework (or, at worst, within a minimally “aprioristic”, nativist one). The last part turns to issues of justification and argues that the mental model proposal can account for justification of intuitional judgments and can also support the view of properly functioning intuition as an epistemic virtue, all within a more naturalist framework than the one endorsed by Brown. (shrink)

Is Machiavelli an Epicurean in his political and religious thought? Recent scholarship has identified him as the foremost representative of Epicureanism in Renaissance Florence. In particular, his incomplete epic poem, The Ass, is read as an expression of his adherence to Lucretian naturalism. This article offers a new reading of the poem and shows that its teaching reveals that Machiavelli is closer to a Platonic variant of classical naturalism linked with the idea of a natural virtue modelled on the (...) lives of animals which has been lost through human civilization and progress and to which it is necessary to return periodically. The article focuses on the poem’s claim that civil religion is a necessary component for good laws that maintain a free republic and argues that Machiavelli offers a poetic reflection on the role of Numa as the founder of Roman religion on the model of a neo-Pythagorean philosophical religion that was instrumental in the rise of constitutional government. More than Lucretius’s critique of religion, Machiavelli’s poem can be read as an extended reflection on Plutarch’s texts – above all, his Life of Numa. (shrink)

Opening on Olympus and concluding with two trials involving ‘the Syrian’ (an obvious Lucianic persona), Lucian'sDouble Indictment(=Bis Acc.) presents a fantastical scenario that draws on Old Comic, Platonic and biographical models. In the first of the Syrian's two trials, a personified Rhetoric accuses the Syrian of abandoning her, his legitimate wife, for his lover, Dialogue. Dialogue, in turn, accuses the Syrian ofhubris, asserting that the Syrian rendered him a generic freak when he forced him to accept ‘jokes,iambos, cynicism, and (...) Eupolis and Aristophanes’ (ὁ σκῶμμα καὶ τὸν ἴαμβον καὶ κυνισμὸν καὶ τὸν Εὔπολιν καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη,Bis Acc.33). Amidst this literary fantasy, Lucian seemingly adds an element of realism when the Syrian specifies that he was ‘almost forty’ (τετταράκοντα ἔτη σχεδὸν γεγονότι,Bis Acc.32) at the time he left Rhetoric for Dialogue. This is notably not the only instance in which we find this age attributed to a Lucianic alter-ego: Lycinus in theHermotimus(=Hermot.) is likewise described as being ‘almost forty’ at the time of the dialogue. This is strikingly also the same age at which the dialogue's eponymous interlocutor—he is sixty at the time of the dialogue—began his own philosophical education (αὐτὸς κατὰ σὲ γεγονὼς ἠρξάμην φιλοσοφεῖν τετταρακοντούτης σχεδόν,Hermot.13). (shrink)

This article analyzes the value of geometric models to understand matter with the examples of the Platonic model for the primary four elements (fire, air, water, and earth) and the models of carbon atomic structures in the new science of crystallography. How the geometry of these models is built in order to discover the properties of matter is explained: movement and stability for the primary elements, and hardness, softness and elasticity for the carbon atoms. These geometric models appear (...) to have a double quality: firstly, they exhibit visually the scientific properties of matter, and secondly they give us the possibility to visualize its whole nature. Geometrical models appear to be the expression of the mind in the understanding of physical matter. (shrink)

: Plato's founding position in the tradition of epistemological nativism has been underestimated. In addition to his notorious, naively non-dispositional model of learning as recollection, Plato offers several neglected dispositional models of innate ideas, including Diotima's model of mental pregnancy in the Symposium, in which maturing mental embryos begin not with the actual content of the knowledge to be acquired, but with a specific potentiality that must be actualized through series of specific kinds of experience and mental activity. (...) A survey of dialogues from Meno to Phaedrus shows that Plato typically favors such dispositional models, and that he raises doubts about the non-dispositional details of the recollection model where it occurs. (shrink)

Is a neo-Platonic theory of moral education better than a neo-Aristotelian one, because the former offers a dialogue method that teachers can use in universities to induce epiphanies in students, in order to jump-start the moral development of those with a rather vicious character? In this paper, this claim, put forward by Jonas and Nakazawa in their book A Platonic Theory of Moral Education, is evaluated. Admittedly, the Nicomachean Ethics, which came to us in the form of a (...) collection of edited lecture notes, gives the impression that Aristotle was not interested in dialogue. But by looking at the dialogical form of the Ethics and by consulting some of his ideas on logic, I show that Aristotle’s oeuvre does include valuable ideas about how teachers may conduct dialogues with their students. These dialogues may not yield epiphanies and will not convert vicious adults, but they are suitable for reaching most students and can appeal to their emotions and practical wisdom. While Jonas and Nakazawa argue that Plato and Aristotle only agree on the centrality of habituation, imitation, and role-modelling in their accounts of moral education, I conclude that dialogue should be added to that list. (shrink)

The article brings under scrutiny an understudied dialogical account about the deposition of the patriarch of Constantinople Nicholas IV Mouzalon (1147-51). A close reading shows that this is not an official record of the proceedings but a piece of fiction that deliberately inverts the generic conventions of the two types of texts indicative of the 12th-century literary landscape, namely 1) minutes of church councils and 2) syllogistic theological dialogues. The anonymous author invites the reader to recognize the all-familiar scheme of (...) the Socratic interrogation but eventually departs from it investing the protagonists (Manuel I Komnenos and Mouzalon) with features that distance them from their Platonic models. The text seems to be inextricably linked to Mouzalon’s canonical dilemma: can an archbishop who previously voluntarily fled from his office be appointed archbishop once again? In fact, the author’s primary concern is not the patriarch but the emperor, a judge-logician who is at one and the same time Socrates and more than Socrates, and the new language able to reflect the changing balance between the imperial and ecclesiastical powers in mid- 12th-century Byzantium. (shrink)

The primary function of the Platonic dialogue is not the communication of philosophical doctrines but the transformation of the reader's character. This article takes up the question of how, or by what means, the Platonic dialogue accomplishes its transformative goal. An answer is developed as follows. First, the style of reading associated with analytical philosophy is not transformative, on account of its hermeneutical attachment and epistemic equality in the relationship between reader and author. Secondly, the style of reading (...) associated with the genre of commentary is transformative because it is governed by a principle of authority. When the commentary model is applied to the Platonic dialogue, it can be seen that the dialogue mimics the function of the authority principle in transforming the reader into a commentator, that is, someone who reads from a position of detachment and accepts responsibility for himself as moral and epistemic agent. (shrink)

This article presents the editio princeps of a Life of Plato modelled on Diogenes Laertius' third book which can be found in two fifteenth-century manuscripts. It consists of a presentation of the two manuscripts ; a discussion of their relationship ; a discussion of the author of the Life, which I argue was Georges Scholarios ; a presentation of the text, with a short critical apparatus, and a series of notes largely focused on indicating the parallels between Scholarios' Life of (...) Plato and Diogenes' version. (shrink)

In order to account for the actual function of analogue models in extending theories to new domains, we argue that it is necessary to analyze the inference involved into a complex two dimensional form. This form must go horizontally from descriptions of entities used as a model to redescriptions of entities in the new domain, and it must go vertically from an observation language to a theoretical language having a different and exclusive logical syntax. This complex inference can only (...) be intelligible if we interpret theoretical terms in a platonic manner, a la Körner. (shrink)

La critique platonicienne de la démocratie est résolument philosophique, contestant le modèle anthropologique et épistémologique sous-jacent au nom des aberrations historiques auxquelles il est condamné. Cet article examine les deux principaux moteurs de l’analyse platonicienne : 1) l’absence d’unité, qui se traduit par une oligarchie de fait et par une dispersion des citoyens, plus soucieux de leur liberté individuelle que de l’intérêt de la cité ; 2) une théorie de la connaissance qui, aussi implicite soit-elle, dissocie savoir et pouvoir. Il (...) en résulte une prise de distance à l’égard d’un modèle où l’homme démocratique serait jugé compétent par nature à exercer des responsabilités. (shrink)

The anecdote recounted by Aristoxenus, who claims to be reporting Aristotle’s words, has been used by several interpreters to maintain the existence of a doctrine of the Good reserved for the members of the Academy, and transmitted orally, after the model of Pythagorean teaching. Yet a close analysis of these few lines shows that this interpretation has no basis : instead, what is at issue is a reading, for a broad audience, of a text corresponding to a doctrine of (...) the good that can be found in the Republic and the Laws. (shrink)

This article explores the interplay between technê and hermeneutics within Platonic philosophy. It begins by delving into the origins of hermeneutics, stemming from the Greek term hermeneutikê technê, and how Plato’s dialogues serve as a model for philosophical hermeneutics. It discusses the practical nature of Socratic knowledge and the role of technê in Plato’s works, emphasizing the unity and diversity of virtues and the ethical implications of professional and virtuous knowledge. The article also examines the hermeneutical significance of (...) technê in Plato’s works and its influence on philosophers like Schleiermacher and Heidegger. Schleiermacher’s mistranslation of poiêsis as poetry instead of creation is highlighted, along with Heidegger’s interpretation of technê as a bringing-forth, revealing the deeper hermeneutical dimension of Platonic poiêsis. The article concludes by reflecting on the relevance of hermeneutics in our technological society, emphasizing the need to incorporate modern technology into our understanding of the world. (shrink)

Limits of the Conversation about Forms. Types of Knowledge and Necessity of Forms in Plato's "Parmenides". - Forms (ideas) are among the things that Plato is serious about. But about these things he says in his "Seventh Letter": "There neither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on the subject." (341c, transl. J. Harward). Plato's statement suggests the question, why one does not and never can do justice to the Platonic forms by means of a written text (...) about the forms. Another big question of Plato research is whether the conversations documented in the Platonic dialogues are also affected by this verdict. This paper aims to provide, as far as possible, newly substantiated answers to these two questions. To this end, the systematic limits of the discussion about forms, which are particularly evident in Plato's dialogue "Parmenides", are examined in eight steps: First, two types of knowledge are presented that play an important systematic role in Plato's philosophy with regard to the limits of conversation: knowledge-how (practical knowledge) and knowledge-that (propositional knowledge) (I). Then the Socratic model of these two types of knowledge is interpreted, which is drafted in the tenth book of the "Republic". This model uses the example of bridle, bridlemaker and rider to explain the primacy of practical knowledge and the limits of propositional knowledge (II). Subsequently, it will be shown how the dialogues "Republic" and "Parmenides" are connected with each other in content and form (III). The gradation of the two types of knowledge, which is indicated by the motifs of the bridle and the horse on the image level of the "Parmenides", proves to be the structure that systematically underlies the structure of the entire dialogue (IV). It also makes clear why the conversation about the forms in the first part of the "Parmenides" has to fail (V). The assumption that the two parts of the "Parmenides" express two different types of knowledge in dealing with forms is supported by the results of a logical analysis of the last defence of the acceptance of forms (135b-c). This analysis shows why, for reasons of principle, it is impossible to speak adequately about forms (VI). Forms have the function of being presuppositions of 'talking about something'. Thus forms are always presupposed in conversation when one talks about them, and thus elude appropriate discussion in conversation (VII). That this is not only a methodical insight of the Platonic Parmenides, but can also be attributed to Plato himself, is demonstrated by the concluding reinterpretation of the central sentence of the critique of writing in Plato's "Seventh Letter". It will become apparent that, contrary to the now widespread view of the representatives of the Tübingen school, philosophical and also good philological reasons speak for the fact that Plato related his criticism only to the communicability of forms through treatises, i.e. tract-like writings (VIII). (shrink)

Seeking a Mnemonic Turn: Interior Reflections in Gadamer's Post-Platonic Thought This paper reflects on trajectories and pathways for philosophical hermeneutics, now, after the death of its founder, Hans-Georg Gadamer in 2002. More specifically, it challenges the notion that Gadamer's thought is simply tied to the linguistic turn of the 20th century. Instead, it considers the possibility that Gadamer's thinking makes for an implicit declaration of its own kind, calling for a mnemonic turn in modern philosophy and present day hermeneutics. (...) Some reference will be made to both rationalist and empiricist models of inquiry insofar as Gadamer attempts to take philosophy beyond, for example, the Ur-grammar of Chomsky's linguistic theories, and into a world of post-Platonic memory. (shrink)

While the early Platonic dialogues have often been explored and appreciated for their ethical content, this is the first book devoted solely to the epistemology of Plato's early dialogues. Author Hugh H. Benson argues that the characteristic features of these dialogues- -Socrates' method of questions and answers, his fascination with definition, his professions of ignorance, and his thesis that virtue is knowledge- -are decidedly epistemological. In this thoughtful study, Benson uncovers the model of knowledge that underlies these distinctively (...) Socratic views. What emerges is unfamiliar, yet closer to a contemporary conception of scientific understanding than ordinary knowledge. (shrink)

I develop a form of explanation that justifies exegetic monism, Viz., The view that the platonic dialogue as work of philosophy and as artwork are in essence one. The explanation is developed in four stages: plato's conception of products of image-Craft, Plato's uses of models in philosophical inquiry, Micro-Dialogues within the finished macro-Dialogues, And the emergence of the macro-Dialogue itself as a model and a constraining frame. I further argue that no weaker explanation than the one offered could (...) justify exegetic monism. (shrink)