This article proposes a general strategy to overcome normative conflicts, namely, paradoxes represented in Standard Deontic Logic. This solution is based on preference relations between norms that circumvent situations of conflict. Pragmatic justifications of the proposed method are also given.

We investigate in intuitionistic first-order logic various principles of preference relations alternative to the standard ones based on the transitivity and completeness of weak preference. In particular, we suggest two ways in which completeness can be formulated while remaining faithful to the spirit of constructive reasoning, and we prove that the cotransitivity of the strict preference relation is a valid intuitionistic alternative to the transitivity of weak preference. Along the way, we also show that the (...) acyclicity axiom is not finitely axiomatizable in first-order logic. (shrink)

The anti-Specker property, a constructive version of sequential compactness, is used to prove constructively that a pointwise continuous, order-dense preference relation on a compact metric space is uniformly sequentially continuous. It is then shown that Ishihara's principle BD-ℕ implies that a uniformly sequentially continuous, order-dense preference relation on a separable metric space is uniformly continuous. Converses of these two theorems are also proved.

In order to account for non-traditional preference relations the present paper develops a new, richer framework for preference relations. This new framework provides characterizations of non-traditional preference relations, such as incommensurateness and instability, that may hold when neither preference nor indifference do. The new framework models relations with swaps, which are conceived of as transfers from one alternative state to another. The traditional framework analyses dyadic preference relations in terms of (...) a hypothetical choice between the two compared alternatives. The swap framework extends this approach by analysing dyadic preference relations in terms of two hypothetical choices: the choice between keeping the first of the compared alternatives or swapping it for the second; and the choice between keeping the second alternative or swapping it for the first. (shrink)

The basic theory of preference relations contains a trivial part reflected by axioms A1 and A2, which say that preference relations are preorders. The next step is to find other axims which carry the theory beyond the level of the trivial. This paper is to a great part a critical survey of such suggested axioms. The results are much in the negative — many proposed axioms imply too strange theorems to be acceptable as axioms in a (...) general theory of preference. This does not exclude, of course, that they may well be reasonable axioms for special calculi of preference. I believe that many axioms which are rejected here may be plausible if their range of application is restricted by conditions which are possible to formulate only in a language richer than that of the propositional calculus, e.g. in one containing modal operators or probabilistic concepts. (shrink)

According to Wlodek Rabinowicz's fitting-attitude analysis of comparative value, it is possible to analyse both standard and non-standard value relations in terms of the standard preference relations and two levels of normativity. In a recent article, however, Johan Gustafsson has argued that Rabinowicz's analysis violates a principle of value–preference symmetry, according to which for any value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation. Gustafsson has proposed an alternative analysis which respects this principle and which allegedly (...) accounts for the idea that originally motivated Rabinowicz's analysis, namely, that in some cases different preference relations between a pair of items are equally permissible. The goal of my article is to show that the arguments offered by Gustafsson in favour of his account do not succeed. In particular, I argue that Gustafsson faces a dilemma: either he abandons the principle of value–preference symmetry or he cannot make conceptual room for multiple permissible preferences. (shrink)

Preference relations are intensively studied in Economics, but they are also approached in AI, Knowledge Representation, and Conceptual Modelling, as they provide a key concept in a variety of domains of application. In this paper, we propose an ontological foundation of preference relations to formalise their essential aspects across domains. Firstly, we shall discuss what is the ontological status of the relata of a preference relation. Secondly, we investigate the place of preference relations (...) within a rich taxonomy of relations (e.g. we ask whether they are internal or external, essential or contingent, descriptive or nondescriptive relations). Finally, we provide an ontological modelling of preference relation as a module of a foundational (or upper) ontology (viz. OntoUML). The aim of this paper is to provide a sharable foundational theory of preference relation that foster interoperability across the heterogeneous domains of application of preference relations. (shrink)

This paper studies the properties of eight semantic consequence relations defined from a Tarski-logic L and a preference relation ≺. They are equivalent to Shoham’s so-called preferential entailment for smooth model structures, but avoid certain problems of the latter in non-smooth configurations. Each of the logics can be characterized in terms of what we call multi-selection semantics. After discussing this type of semantics, we focus on some concrete proposals from the literature, checking a number of meta-theoretic properties and (...) elaborating on their intuitive motivation. As it turns out, many of their meta-properties only hold in case ≺ is transitive. To tackle this problem, we propose slight modifications of each of the systems, showing the resulting logics to behave better at the intuitive level and in metatheoretic terms, for arbitrary ≺. (shrink)

Joshua Gert and Wlodek Rabinowicz have developed frameworks for value relations that are rich enough to allow for non-standard value relations such as parity. Yet their frameworks do not allow for any non-standard preference relations. In this paper, I shall defend a symmetry between values and preferences, namely, that for every value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation, and vice versa. I claim that if the arguments that there are non-standard value relations are (...) cogent, these arguments, mutatis mutandis, also show that there are non-standard preference relations. Hence frameworks of Gert and Rabinowicz's type are either inadequate since there are cogent arguments for both non-standard value and preference relations and these frameworks deny this, or they lack support since the arguments for non-standard value relations are unconvincing. Instead, I propose a simpler framework that allows for both non-standard value and preference relations. (shrink)

Biochar is a soil—improving substrate made from phytomass pyrolysis. In Southeast Asia, its application decreases due to the long-term growth of biochar cost and thus caused further prolongation of the payback period. In the Euro-American civilization the biochar application is already almost forgotten once it has been much earlier recognized that the crop yields can be increased much faster with higher doses of nutrients and other agrochemicals. The payback period can be expected in decades. Such a long-time investment into soil (...) fertility raises also many ethical questions. The final decision combines issues of social responsibility, risk and other financial indicators as well as personal preferences and more. The attitudes of Western and Central European decision makers in the agriculture business segment were analyzed on the basis of electronic questionnaire survey and a subsequent interview through their local unions. According to the data, most of them did not know about the possibilities of a more environmentally friendly approach to soil enhancement based on the addition of a fertilizer in the form of biochar. Among others, the collected data also shows that the decision makers from Western Europe have a much different ethical approach to the land and financial indicators than the Central Europeans. (shrink)

Millions of children worldwide could benefit from adoption. One could argue that prospective parents have a pro tanto duty to adopt rather than create children. For the sake of argument, I assume there is such a duty and focus on a pressing objection to it. Prospective parents may prefer that their children are genetically related to them. I examine eight reasons prospective parents have for preferring genetic children: for parent-child physical resemblance, for family resemblance, for psychological similarity, for the sake (...) of love, to achieve a kind of immortality, for the genetic connection itself, to be a procreator, and to experience pregnancy. I argue that, with the possible exception of the pregnancy desire, these reasons fail to defeat a duty to adopt a child rather than create one, even assuming that we do have some leeway to favor our own interests. (shrink)

The topological structures imposed on the collection of binary relations on a given set by the symmetric difference metric and the Hausdorff metric provide opportunities for learning about how collections of binary relations with various properties fit into the collection of all binary relations. For example, there is some agreement and some disagreement between conclusions drawn about the rarity of certain properties of binary relations using first the symmetric difference metric and then the Hausdorff metric.

In the first section of this paper I draw, on a purely conceptual level, a distinction between two kinds of reasons: content-related and attitude-related reasons. The established view is that, in the case of the attitude of believing something, there are no attitude-related reasons. I look at some arguments intended to establish this claim in the second section with an eye to whether these argument could be generalized to cover the case of preferences as well. In the third section I (...) argue against such generalizations and present a case in favour of accepting attitude-related reasons for preferences. In the fourth section I present an objection to which I react in the fifth section where I try to strengthen my case for attitude-related reasons for preferences. Finally, I discuss and reject criticisms raised by two opponents of the view defended here. (shrink)

(1) This paper uses the following binary relations: > (is preferred to); ⩽ (is not preferred to); < (is less preferred than); ~ (is indifferent to). (2) Savage used primitive ⩾, postulated to be connected and transitive onA (the set of acts), to define the others: [x ~ y ⇔ (x ⩽ y and y ⩽ x)]; [y < x ⇔ notx ⩽ y]; [x > y ⇔ y < x]. Independently of the axioms, this definition implies that ⩽ (...) and > are complementary relations onA: [x < y ⇔ notx > y]. (3) Pratt, Raiffa and Schlaifer used primitive ⩽, postulated to be transitive onL (the set of lotteries), to define the others with a different expression for <: [x < y ⇔ (x ⩽ y and noty ⩽ x)]. Thus, ⩽ and > are not necessarily complementary onL; since ⩽ is not postulated to be connected onL, but connected ⩽ is necessary and sufficient for such complementarity. Since the restriction of ⩽ to the subsetA ofL is connected, ⩽ and > are complementary onA. (4) Fishburn used primitive < onA to define the others with different expression for ~ and ⩽: [x ~ y ⇔ (notx < y and noty < x)]; [x ⩽ y ⇔ (x < y orx ~ y)]. His version of Savage's theory then assumed that < is asymmetric and negatively transitive onA. Thus, ⩽ and > are complementary, since asymmetric < is necessary and sufficient for such complementarity. (5) This analysis provides a new proof that the same list of elementary properties of binary relations onA applies to all three theories: ⩽ is connected, transitive, weakly connected, reflexive, and negatively transitive; while both < and > are asymmetric, negatively transitive, antisymmetric, irreflexive, and transitive; but only ~ is symmetric. (shrink)

A preference relation is definable in a language if there is a formula in this language which is satisfied precisely for those pairs which satisfy the relation. The paper suggests that definability is a natural category of requirements of preferences in economic models.

Dalālat al-lafẓī al-waḍʿī, is divided into three parts: mutābaqat, taẓam-mun and iltizām. Although there is an agreement among the scholars regar-ding the nature of the mutābaqat, which shows the conformity of the word to its meaning, the indication of taẓammun and iltizām includes certain controversial issues. Among these, some issues related to iltizām, which plays a central role in method and rhetoric, were discussed. Al-Bābertī who wrote al-şurūḥ [commentaries] on the main works that greatly influenced the ones written after him (...) in these two sciences, expressed his opinion on the controversial issues; especially on the issues related to iltizām. These are about whether a mental necessity (al-luzūm al-dhihnī) condition is sought for the rationality and realization of the obligatory indication. In this context, at the beginning of the article, firstly, a general information about dalālat will be given, and in the first part, how the dalālat is handled in works of Bābertī will be explained. Then, in the second part, controversial issues related to dalālat will be discussed; views of Bābertī on these will be revealed after the discussions of scholars are included, especially within the framework of the nature of iltizām. (shrink)

EEGs were analyzed to investigate the effect of experiences in listening to preferred music in dancers and non-dancers. Participants passively listened to instrumental music of their preferred genre for 2 min, alternate genres, and silence. Both groups showed increased activity for their preferred music compared to non-preferred music in the gamma, beta, and alpha frequency bands. The results suggest all participants' conscious recognition of and affective responses to their familiar music, appreciation of the tempo embedded in their preferred music and (...) emotional arousal, and enhanced attention mechanism for cognitive operations such as memory retrieval. The observed alpha activity is considered in the framework of the alpha functional inhibition hypothesis, in that years of experience listening to their favorite type of music may have honed the cerebral responses to achieve efficient cortical processes. Analyses of the electroencephalogram activity over 100s-long music pieces revealed a difference between dancers and non-dancers in the magnitude of an initial alpha event-related desynchronization and the later development of an alpha event-related synchronization for their preferred music. Dancers exhibited augmented alpha ERD, as well as augmented and uninterrupted alpha ERS over the remaining 80s. This augmentation in dancers is hypothesized to be derived from creative cognition or motor imagery operations developed through their dance experiences. (shrink)

Non-compensatory aggregation rules are applied in a variety of problems such as voting theory, multi-criteria analysis, composite indicators, web ranking algorithms and so on. A major open problem is the fact that non-compensability implies the analytical cost of loosing all available information about intensity of preference, i.e. if some variables are measured on interval or ratio scales, they have to be treated as measured on an ordinal scale. Here this problem has been tackled in its most general formulation, that (...) is when mixed measurement scales (interval, ratio and ordinal) are used and both stochastic and fuzzy uncertainties are present. Objectives of this article are first to present a comprehensive review of useful solutions already proposed in the literature and second to advance the state of the art mainly in the theoretical guarantee that weights have the meaning of importance coefficients and they can be summarized in a voting matrix. This is a key result for using non-compensatory Condorcet consistent rules. A proof on the probability of existence of ties in the voting matrix is also developed. (shrink)

According to Wlodek Rabinowicz's (2008) fitting-attitude analysis of value relations, two items are on a par if and only if it is both permissible to strictly prefer one to the other and permissible to have the opposite strict preference. Rabinowicz’s account is subject, however, to one important objection: if strict preferences involve betterness judgements, then his analysis contrasts with the intuitive understanding of parity. In this paper, I examine Rabinowicz’s three responses to this objection and argue that they (...) do not succeed. I then propose an alternative solution. I argue that the objection can be avoided if we ‘relativize’ Rabinowicz’s account and define parity in terms of opposite strict preferences between two items that are only relatively permissible, rather than permissible simpliciter. I argue that this account of parity can be defended if we take seriously the distinction between sufficient and decisive reason for a preference relation. I also show that, on the basis of this distinction, we can arrive at a more extensive taxonomy of value relations than the one proposed by Rabinowicz. (shrink)

Most of us have two strong intuitions (or sets of intuitions) in relation to fairness in health care systems that are funded by public money, whether through taxation or compulsory insurance. The first intuition is that such a system has to treat patients (and other users) fairly, equitably, impartially, justly and without discrimination. The second intuition is that doctors, nurses and other health care professionals are allowed to, and may even in some cases be obligated to give preference to (...) the interests of their particular patients or clients over the interests of other patients or clients of the system. These two intuitions are in potential conflict. One of the most obvious ways in which to ensure impartiality in a health care system is to require impartiality of all actors in the system, i.e. to give health care professionals a duty to treat everyone impartially and to deny them the ‘right’ to give their patients preferential treatment. And one of the possible side-effects of allowing individual health care professionals to give preference to ‘their clients’ is to create inequality in health care. This paper explores the conflict and proposes that it can be right to give preference to ‘your’ patients in certain circumstances. (shrink)

Objective: To study the preferences of patients for information related to elective procedures.Methods: A survey was carried out using a sample of 187 women. The majority of whom were on a low-income, who obtained obstetric or gynaecological services at St Joseph Regional Medical Center in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, while they were in a waiting room.Results: Many of the complications, including those that are uncommon and less serious, were considered to be relevant to the medical decisions of most patients. Average seriousness ratings (...) associated with complications of various elective procedures were in the range of moderate to high. A frequency of complications of 1:100 or higher would factor into most women’s elective treatment decisions. Women indicated a preference for receiving as much or more information pertaining to complications associated with particular elective obstetric or gynaecological procedures as other elective procedures.Conclusion: Most women wish to be informed of risks and treatment alternatives, rate many complications as serious, and are likely to use information provided to make elective treatment decisions. (shrink)

The presented contribution stresses the role of preference ordering and of the logical culture in many spheres of human rational activities, especially in the domains connected with evaluating and decision-making tasks. Since preference relation is conceived as a relation of proposition-like-entities , any construction of preference ordering pre_- supposes the application of comparability principles. Preference expressions can be considered as a special form of propositional attitudes and the concept of preference itsself as an intensional operator.

This thesis consists of an introduction and five essays on decision theory.

A much discussed topic in the theory of choice is how a preference order among options can be derived from the assumption that the notion of ' choice' is primitive. Assuming a choice function that selects elements from each finite set of options, Arrow (Económica 26: 121-127,1959) already showed how we can generate a weak ordering by putting constraints on the behavior of such a function such that it reflects utility maximization. Arrow proposed that rational agents can be modeled (...) by such choice functions. Arrow's standard model of rationality has been criticized in economics and gave rise to approaches of bounded rationality. Two standard assumptions of rationality will be given up in this paper. First, the idea that agents are utility optimizers (Simon). Second, the idea that the relation of ' indifference' gives rise to an equivalence relation. To account for the latter, Luce (Econometrica 24: 178-191, 1956) introduced semi-orders. Extending some ideas of Van Benthem (Pac Philos Q 63: 193-203, 1982), we will show how to derive semi-orders (and so-called interval orders) based on the idea that agents are utility satisficers rather than utility optimizers. (shrink)

Both economists and psychologists are interested in understanding decision making under uncertainty. Yet, they rely on different concepts to analyse human behaviour: economists use economic preference parameters rooted in utility theory, while psychologists use personality traits to describe responses to uncertain situations. Using a large sample of university students, this study examines and contrasts five economic preference parameters and six psychological personality traits that are commonly used to study individuals’ attitudes towards uncertainty. A novelty of this paper is (...) including both the economic concept of ambiguity aversion as well as the personality trait of ambiguity intolerance. We find that standard economic preference measures based on incentivized choice tasks seem to capture rather different characteristics than psychological personality traits. In contrast, economic preference measures obtained from self-assessment questions appear more related to personality traits, especially ambiguity intolerance. (shrink)

An individual is said to have a taste for a particular menu, i.e. a subset of available commodities, if he is indifferent between all commodity bundles that contain the same quantity for each commodity which actually is in the menu, whatever the rest of the bundle. Then, a taste is directly defined as a deep property of preferences. As a first result, it is shown that a complete and transitive preference relation over the commodity bundles is equivalent to regular (...) tastes where regularity means that tastes can be derived from a pure qualitative relation between the different commodities. Besides, a preference family based on preference relations corresponding to each particular commodity is said to be rationalizable if there exists a metapreference over commodity bundles which consistently summarizes the preference family and then allows to decide. As a second result, it is shown that if a preference family is rationalizable, then the tastes are organized thanks to a reflexive and transitive qualitative relation between the different commodities. (shrink)

Patient preference predictors aim to solve the moral problem of making treatment decisions on behalf of incapacitated patients. This commentary on a case of an unrepresented patient at the end of life considers 3 related problems of such predictors: the problem of restricting the scope of inputs to the models (the “scope” problem), the problem of weighing inputs against one another (the “weight” problem), and the problem of multiple reasonable solutions to the scope and weight problems (the “multiple reasonable (...) models” problem). Each of these problems poses challenges to reliably implementing patient preference predictors in important, high-stakes health care decision making. This commentary also suggests a way forward. (shrink)

The moral self-concept has been proposed as a central predictor of prosocial behaviour. In two experiments (one preregistered), we explored the nature of the relation between the moral self-concept (explicit and implicit) and prosocial behaviour. Specifically, we investigated the role of emotions associated with prosocial behaviour (consequential or anticipated) and preference for consistency. The results revealed a relation between the explicit moral self-concept and sharing behaviour. The explicit moral self-concept was linked to anticipated and consequential emotions regarding not-sharing. Importantly, (...) anticipated and consequential emotions about not-sharing mediated the relation between self-concept and behaviour. Yet, the relation was independent of preference for consistency. The implicit moral self-concept was neither related to prosocial behaviour nor to emotions associated with behaviour. Overall, our study demonstrates the interplay between cognitive and emotional processes in explaining prosocial behaviour. More specific, it underlines the link between the moral self-concept and prosocial behaviour and highlights the role of emotions about the omission of prosocial behaviour. (shrink)

This paper focuses on a specific challenge for welfarist theories of intergenerational justice. Subjective welfarism permits and even requires that a generation, G1, inculcates cheap preferences in the next generation, G2. This would allow G1 to deplete resources instead of saving them, which seems to contradict the ideal of sustainability. The aim of the paper is to show that, even if subjective welfarism requires the cultivation of cheap preferences among future generations, it can accommodate two major objections to cheap preferences (...) engineering, the Autonomy Objection and the Fairness Objection. The paper argues that teaching autonomy-related abilities is compatible with cheap preferences engineering insofar as autonomy is understood as an end-state and not as a precondition. Furthermore, teaching autonomy-related abilities could even be required in order to improve G2’s prospects for well-being. However, since being autonomous renders G2 able to revise their initially cheap preferences, G1 should also save enough resources to enable members of G2 to do so. Therefore, cultivating cheap preferences among G2 does not allow G1 to deplete the available resources. (shrink)

Socioemotional selectivity theory (SST), an influential life-span theory, suggests that older adults prefer persuasive messages that appeal to emotionally-meaningful goals over messages that appeal to knowledge-related goals, whereas younger adults do not show this preference. A mixed-factorial experiment was conducted to test whether older adults (≥65 years) differ from younger adults (25–45 years) in their preference for emotionally-meaningful appeals over knowledge-related appeals, when appeals are clearly developed in line with SST. For older adults we found the expected (...) class='Hi'>preference for emotionally-meaningful appeals for cancer centers but not for grocery stores and travel organizations. As expected, in most cases, younger adults did not show a preference. Implications for SST-based communication research and for practice are discussed. (shrink)