Economic markets are not morally free zones. Contrary to popular misconceptions, market functioning rests on the ethical principles of fairness and voluntariness. This ethical foundation can be traced back at least to moral philosopher Adam Smith, one of the founders of modern economics. In the inconspicuous form of microeconomic axioms, these moral foundations are preserved. Thus, virtually all “neo-classic” economic concepts presuppose a market ethics of fairness and voluntariness. In a world of pervasive uncertainty on the long-term development of the (...) human-environment interaction, the protection of the global life-support systems is an important test case for the scope of the ethical content of market ethics. We review risk protection strategies in the face of this uncertainty that are (i) based on the insurance effect of biological diversity, and (ii) that employ a safe minimum standard (SMS). Because the fairness principle of market ethics requires that economic agents who cause “external” costs must, at least, compensate those who are burdened with these costs, the interests of future generations have to be included in responsible economic decision-making. The market and market ethics approach is applied to the analysis of a SMS for biological diversity, and to the inherent problems of such an approach. At the microeconomic level of individual decision-making, an unconditional protection is supported by market ethics neither for the putative interests of future generations nor for biological diversity: Poor people who struggle to cover their basic needs cannot not be required to care for biological diversity. In all other cases, the protection of biological diversity in favour of future generations is supported—if costs are not “unacceptably high”. At which cost level this point is approached, market ethics is not designed to decide. (shrink)

The End of the Timeless God considers two approaches to the philosophy of time, presentism and eternalism. It is often held that God cannot be timeless if presentism is true, but can be if eternalism is true. R. T. Mullins draws on recent work in the philosophy of time as well as the work of classical Christian thinkers such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas to contend that the Christian God cannot be timeless in either case.

The death of Imre Lakatos on February 2, 1974 was a personal and philosophical loss to the worldwide circle of his friends, colleagues and students. This volume reflects the range of his interests in mathematics, logic, politics and especially in the history and methodology of the sciences. Indeed, Lakatos was a man in search of rationality in all of its forms. He thought he had found it in the historical development of scientific knowledge, yet he also saw rationality endangered everywhere. (...) To honor Lakatos is to honor his sharp and aggressive criticism as well as his humane warmth and his quick wit. He was a person to love and to struggle with. PAUL K. FEYERABEND ROBERT S. COHEN MARX W. WARTOFSKY TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface VII JOHN WORRALL / Imre Lakatos : Philosopher of Mathematics and Philosopher of Science JOSEPH AGASSI / The Lakatosian Revolution 9 23 D. M. ARMSTRONG / Immediate Perception w. W. BAR TLEY, III/On Imre Lakatos 37 WILLIAM BERKSON / Lakatos One and Lakatos Two: An Appreciation 39 I. B. COHEN / William Whewell and the Concept of Scientific Revolution 55 L. JONATHAN COHEN / How Can One Testimony Corroborate Another? 65 R. S. COHEN / Constraints on Science 79 GENE D'AMOUR/ Research Programs, Rationality, and Ethics 87 YEHUDA ELKANA / Introduction: Culture, Cultural System and Science 99 PA UL K. (shrink)

This provocative collection of essays written by the influential Greek scholar E. R. Dodds between 1929 and 1971. represents the wide range of his literary and philosophical interests. Insightful and learned, the essays combine profound scholarship with the lucid humanity of a teacher awareof the special value of Greek studies in the modern world.

İ‘câzü’l-Kur’ân literatürüne bakıldığında ilim adamlarının i‘câzın ne anlama geldiği, tehaddînin mâhiyeti ve bu olgunun ne şekilde tahakkuk ettiği konusunda birtakım çözüm yolları bulmaya çalıştıkları; bu konuyu nazm, fesâhat ve belâgatla ilişkilendirerek çok sayıda teori ortaya koydukları görülmektedir. Bu bağlamda Kur’ân metninin ne kadarının mu‘ciz olduğu, muârızlarına müteveccih tehaddînin asgari miktarı meselesinde serdedilen görüşlerden biri, Kur’ân’ın iç düzenin en küçük birimi olan âyetle tehaddîdir. İslâm düşünce tarihinin klasik ve modern dönemlerinde savunucusu bulunan bu yaklaşıma göre Kur’ân’ın en küçük birimi olan âyet (...) veya âyet eczâsı, mu‘ciz olmakta ve muarızlara bunlarla meydan okunmaktadır. Konuya ilişkin daha önce bir çalışmanın yapılmamış olmasından hareketle i‘câzü’l-Kur’ân literatürüne katkı sunmayı amaçlayan bu çalışmada, tehaddînin âyetle tahakkuk ettiğini belirten ilim adamlarının istidlâl yöntemleri önce deskriptif bir üslupla aktarılmakta, akabinde bunlar analitik bir bakış açısıyla irdelenmektedir. Son olarak da âyetle tehaddî teorisinin Kur’ân’ın bütünlüğüne riayet ilkesine uyup uymadığı test edilmekte ve bu bağlamda i‘câz olgusunun mâhiyeti incelenmektedir. Sonuç olarak mezkûr ilke esas alındığında fesâhat ve belâgat yönlerinin her âyette eşit düzeyde tahakkuk ettiğini söylemek mümkün gözükmemektedir. Zira Kur’ân’da iki harften ya da tek kelimeden oluşan âyetlerin tehaddîye veya mu‘cizeye konu olduğunu aklen ileri sürmek mümkün değildir. Bu durumda tehaddînin kısa veya uzun olmasına bakılmaksızın âyet veya âyet parçacıklarında değil de her bir sûrenin bütünlüğünde gerçekleştiğini savunmanın daha isabetli bir yaklaşım olduğu kanaatine ulaşılmaktadır. (shrink)

Implicit processes almost certainly preceded explicit processes in our evolutionary history, so they are likely to be more resistant to disruption according to the principles of evolutionary biology [Reber, A. S. . The cognitive unconscious: An evolutionary perspective. Consciousness and Cognition, 1, 93–133.]. Previous work . Knowledge, nerves and know-how: The role of explicit versus implicit knowledge in the breakdown of a complex motor skill under pressure. British Journal of Psychology, 83, 343–358.]) has shown that implicitly learned motor skills remain (...) stable under psychological pressure and concurrent cognitive demands, and recently [Poolton, J. M., Masters, R. S. W., & Maxwell, J. P. . Passing thoughts on the evolutionary stability of implicit motor behaviour: Performance retention under physiological fatigue. Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 456–468.] showed that they also remain stable under conditions of anaerobic fatigue that would have significantly challenged the survival skills of our ancestors. Here we examine the stability of an implicitly learned motor skill under fatigue conditions that primarily tax a different physiological system , but which have equally strong evolutionary connotations. Participants acquired a throwing task by means of an errorless learning method or an errorful method. Motor performance in the errorless condition, but not the errorful condition, remained stable following an exhaustive VO2 max. running test. Our findings replicate and extend the work of Poolton et al., providing further support for Reber’s evolutionary distinction between implicit and explicit processes. (shrink)

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1975, given by R. M. Hare, a British philosopher.

The Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology, edited by Guillaume R. Fréchette and Andrew Schotter, aims to confront and debate the issues faced by the growing field of experimental economics. For example, as experimental work attempts to test theory, it raises questions about the proper relationship between theory and experiments. As experimental results are used to inform policy, the utility of these results outside the lab is questioned, and finally, as experimental economics tries to integrate ideas from other disciplines like psychology (...) and neuroscience, the question of their proper place in the discipline of economics becomes less clear.This book contains papers written by some of the most accomplished scholars working at the intersection of experimental, behavioral, and theoretical economics talking about methodology. It is divided into four sections, each of which features a set of papers and a set of comments on those papers. The intention of the volume is to offer a place where ideas about methodology could be discussed and even argued. Some of the papers are contentious---a healthy sign of a dynamic discipline---while others lay out a vision for how the authors think experimental economics should be pursued. This exciting and illuminating collection of papers brings light to a topic at the core of experimental economics. Researchers from a broad range of fields will benefit from the exploration of these important questions. (shrink)

The old question whether or no the doctrine of ‘intermediate mathematical objects’ ascribed to Plato by Aristotle is to be found in the Divided Line of Republic vi, has been recently raised again in a careful and lucid discussion by Mr. W. F. R. Hardie. I may clear the ground by saying at once that I agree with that part of Mr. Hardie's chapter which deals with those criticisms of the traditional view that have been put forward by Prof. Ferguson (...) and the late Prof. Stocks; nevertheless I do not believe that the objects of the third segment are intermediate between Forms and Sensibles: I propose to argue that they, like the objects of the highest segment, are Forms. (shrink)

Asırlarca Tevrat’ın Musa tarafından yazılan vahiy mahsulü bir eser olduğuna inanıldı. Geleneksel Yahudiliğin günümüzde de devam ettirdiği bu inanç Batı dünyasında yapılan eleştirel çalışmalarla sorgulanmaya başlandı. Bu araştırmalarda, Tevrat’ın değişik zamanlarda yaşayan farklı isimler tarafından kaleme alınan bir eser olduğu ortaya konuldu. Bu eleştirel araştırmaların zirve noktasını Julius Wellhausen tarafından son şekli verilen ve Tevrat’ın dört farklı kaynaktan oluştuğunu ileri süren Dört Kaynak Hipotezi oluşturur. Çoğunlukla kabul gören bu görüşe, 1970’lerden itibaren yapılan bazı çalışmalarla ciddi anlamda itiraz edildi. Bu makalenin (...) konusu, Dört Kaynak Hipotezi’ne büyük ölçüde karşı çıkan ve Tevrat’ın üç temel kaynaktan oluştuğunu ileri süren Kanadalı araştırmacı John Van Seters’in (d. 1935) Tevrat eleştirisidir. Van Seters’in en dikkat çekici iddiası, Tevrat’ın kaynaklarından Yahvist metnin milattan önce altıncı yüzyılda Babil Sürgünü’nde yaşamış bir tarihçi yazar tarafından başta Tesniye olmak üzere Tesniyeci Tarih, peygamber kitapları ve Antik Yakın Doğu anlatıları dikkate alınarak yazıldığıdır. Çalışmada, Van Seters’in bu iddiası üzerinde durulacaktır. (shrink)

A Brief Description of Neoplatonism R. Baine Harris Old Dominion University There are essentially three ways in which Neoplatonism may be considered to be ...

Changes being introduced to deregulate the Dutch health care system after decades of extensive state control are to be welcomed, and will in future require consumers to be ‘well‐informed, cost‐conscious and assertive patients, who are aware of their responsibility for their own health.’ R.B. Kool MD, PhD and E.J.J.M. Kimman PhD are attached to the Department of Business Ethics in the Faculty of Economics and Econometrics at The Free University, P.O. Box 7161, 10107 MC Amsterdam.

Thomas Hill Green was one of the most influential English thinkers of his time, and he made significant contributions to the development of political liberalism. Much of his career was spent at Balliol College, Oxford: having begun as a student of Jowett, he later acted effectively as his second-in-command at the college. Interested for his whole career in social questions, Green supported the temperance movement, the extension of the franchise, and the admission of women to university education. He became Whyte's (...) professor of moral philosophy at Oxford in 1878, and his lectures had a lasting influence on a generation of students. Much of Volume 1, edited by Green's pupil R. L. Nettleship and published in 1885, consists of Green's work on David Hume . In his essay, 'Introductions to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature' , Green gives a detailed critique of Hume's metaphysical thought. (shrink)

Thomas Hill Green was one of the most influential English thinkers of his time, and he made significant contributions to the development of political liberalism. Much of his career was spent at Balliol College, Oxford: having begun as a student of Benjamin Jowett, he later acted effectively as his second-in-command at the college. Interested for his whole career in social questions, Green worked on the commission which led to the Endowed Schools Act of 1869, and supported the temperance movement, the (...) extension of the franchise, and the admission of women to university education. He became Whyte's professor of moral philosophy at Oxford in 1878, and his lectures had a lasting influence on a generation of students of philosophy and political thought. This collection of Green's writings, published in three volumes from 1885 to 1888, was edited by R. L. Nettleship, one of his Balliol students. (shrink)

In 1962 appeared one of the classic articles in Anglo-Saxon manuscript studies, the publication of two eleventh-century fragments of leaves of Old English found in the binding of a seventeenth-century printed book in the library of the University of Kansas, Lawrence. The fragment that more nearly concerns the present article now carries the shelf mark Pryce MS C2:1 in the Kenneth Spencer Research Library . It is a large part of a single leaf from The Legend of the Holy Cross (...) before Christ, an edifying work known in full only in a twelfth-century copy, Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 343, fols. 14v–20v . Working from a photograph the great paleographer and codicologist N. R. Ker attributed the hand of the Kansas fragment to the scribe who also wrote the texts of two bits of the same work found in the library of Matthew Parker, archbishop of Canterbury , at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, now MS 557 . He concluded, no doubt rightly, that all three are part of one manuscript. (shrink)

_History, the Human, and the World Between_ is a philosophical investigation of the human subject and its simultaneous implication in multiple and often contradictory ways of knowing. The eminent postcolonial theorist R. Radhakrishnan argues that human subjectivity is always constituted “between”: between subjective and objective, temporality and historicity, being and knowing, the ethical and the political, nature and culture, the one and the many, identity and difference, experience and system. In this major study, he suggests that a reconstituted phenomenology has (...) a crucial role to play in mediating between generic modes of knowledge production and an experiential return to life. Keenly appreciative of poststructuralist critiques of phenomenology, Radhakrishnan argues that there is still something profoundly vulnerable at stake in the practice of phenomenology. Radhakrishnan develops his rationale of the “between” through three linked essays where he locates the terms “world,” “history,” “human,” and “subject” between phenomenology and poststructuralism, and in the process sets forth a nuanced reading of the politics of a gendered postcolonial humanism. Critically juxtaposing the works of thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Adrienne Rich, Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, Michel Foucault, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin Heidegger, David Harvey, and Ranajit Guha, Radhakrishnan examines the relationship between systems of thought and their worldly situations. _History, the Human, and the World Between _is a powerful argument for a theoretical perspective that combines the existential urgency of phenomenology with the discursive rigor of poststructuralist practices. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.4 (2005) 301-305 [Access article in PDF] The Beauty of Psychotherapy R. D. Hinshelwood Keywords awe, psychotherapy, representation, self-esteem The Enlightenment was devoted to clear uncontaminated reason; its success has given us the terrific achievements of science and technology. However, it has bequeathed problems too. Untrammeled reason has led to the devaluing and exclusion of emotions. Emotions are irrational—self-deception, akrasia, and so on. They were (...) a problem for the eighteenth-century philosopher Kant and right through to the modern therapist Aaron Beck. Callender rightly looks around the edges of rationalist thought to see what can be said about the emotional and subjective side of mankind. He argues that there is more to the human mind than cognition. Something has been left out. What can be found to fill the gap?Callender has searched for the missing link that might complete our view of human nature. And he came back with aesthetics. Meaning The Enlightenment failing is writ large for therapists who are confronted with people who feel things. So we need to ask what place the emotions have in understanding the nature of man? It is not a hypothetical question, but a very practical one for a therapist. Emotions, Callender says, and most people would agree with him, are what gives meaning to life, a sense of purpose in living, even an ill-defined or delusional purpose.He presents Kant's description of aesthetics. Aesthetic judgements have a number of features, the most enigmatic and perhaps profound is a "purposiveness without purpose." A work of art, say a portrait, may have a purpose insofar as it represents a person for his aggrandizement or for his descendents through many generations, but the aesthetic quality does not come from that purpose. The aesthetic purpose involves a different set of judgements. They are about the painting as a piece of art in itself. If it is possible to compare this kind of aesthetic judgement with a judgement of a person's life, then I find myself reminded of Wollheim's definition of a person: The simplest way of putting the matter, which is not to be taken as a metaphysical claim, is this: There are persons, they exist; persons lead lives; and as a result, in consequence—in consequence that is, of the way they do it—there are lives, of which those who lead them may, for instance, be proud, or feel ashamed. So there is a thing, and there is a process, and there is a product. (Wollheim 1984, 2) Although many things do not lead lives, we do. And our lives have a process and a product. Like an aesthetic product, our lives have a sense of emotional meaning, without it having a clear purpose.Aesthetic judgements are therefore of a particular and somewhat peculiar kind. They judges talent for producing "that for which no determinate [End Page 301] rules can be given," as the paper quotes Kant. Other kinds of judgements do have determinate rules. First are empirical judgements for getting practical things done; and moral judgements for assessing ethical good from bad. Aesthetic beauty does not have clear rules, although many systems of rules have been proposed starting with the rules of perspective as they were laid out by renaissance painters, through to systems of color, such as that proposed by Paul Klee, once color was correlated with electromagnetic wavelengths. However, artists have always kept one jump ahead and evaded imprisonment in codified rules. So too it is with leading a life, perhaps. The really creative life is not lead according to rules. The art of life is to live meaningfully without simply running along tramlines. Although moral conduct and the practicalities of life remain significant, perhaps leading a life implies simply a "flare for living." Representation Of these three kinds of judgements that a mind makes, two do have sets of rules. Only one based on rationality, empirical evidence, and reason. Reason judges what can be done and achieved in the real physical world. It is about pragmatics and the usefulness of action. Moral judgements, about what... (shrink)

The supervenience thesis about value customarily expresses two intuitions: (i) that there is some kind of dependence between the value and the natural properties of the value bearer; (ii) that if you assert that x is valuable and if you agree that y is relevantly similar to x, with regard to natural properties, you must be prepared to assert that y too is valuable. R M Hare’s account of supervenience is problematic since it only expresses (ii) but not (i). A (...) solution to this problem is outlined, which ought to be endorsable by a prescriptivist such as Hare. (shrink)

pt. 1. De dicto: Necessary and contingent truths, by G. W. Leibniz. New essays concerning human understanding, by G. W. Leibniz. Introduction to the critique of pure reason, by Immanuel Kant. On the nature of mathematical truth, C. G. Hempel. Two dogmas of empiricism, by W. V. O. Quine. In defense of a dogma, by H. P. Grace and P. F. Strawson. The a priori and the analytic, by A. Quinton. The truths of reason, by R. Chisholm.--pt. 2. De re: (...) Reference and modality, by W. V. O. Quine. De re et de dicto, by A. Plantinga. World and essence, by A. Plantinga.--Bibliography (p. 200-202). (shrink)

Comment l'intention apologétique de Blondel dans L’Action est-elle compatible avec le caractère philosophique de l’œuvre ? Comment éviter le soupçon de préjugé, de pétition de principes ? R. Virgoulay montre comment le projet mis en œuvre dans L’Action et défini dans la Lettre de 1896, ouvrait la philosophie à l'examen du problème religieux par la détermination a priori de la notion de surnaturel. Après avoir exposé « la méthode de L’Action » pour faire passer d'une conviction subjective, d'un témoignage vécu, (...) à une « science », c'est-à-dire à l'exposé qui conjugue nécessité et universalité, il s'attarde sur la cinquième partie de L’Action. Celle-ci, après l'élaboration des quatre autres parties, peut être alors une philosophie de la religion qui porte sur le contenu même du Christianisme, et pour laquelle la notion décisive est celle du surnaturel. Les questions que pose cette notion amènent l'auteur à comparer la problématique blondélienne à celle de Laberthonnière, comparaison qui manifeste la différence entre la démarche théologique de ce dernier et celle, philosophique, de Blondel. Alors que laberthonnière tente de justifier théologiquement l'entreprise philosophique de Blondel, la Lettre distingue rigoureusement la théologie de la philosophie. How is the apologetic intention of Blondel in Action compatible with the philosophical character of the work ? How can one avoid the suspicion of prejudice, of begging the question ? R. Virgoulay shows how the project put to work in Action and defined in the Lettre of 1896, opened philosophy to the examination of the religious problem by the a priori determination of the notion of the supernatural. After discussing « the method of Action » in order to move from a subjective conviction, from a lived witnessing, to a « science », that is to say, to an analyses that conjugate necessity and universality, the author concentrates on the fifth part of Action. This latter, after, the elaboration of the four other parts, could be, then, a philosophy of religion that carries to the very content of Christianity, and for which the decisive notion is that of the supernatural. The questions that this idea brings up led the author to compare Blondel’s field of inquiry to that of Laberthonnière, a comparison that, manifests the difference between a theological approach of the latter and that, philosophical, of Blondel. While Laberthonnière tries theologically to justify the philosophical enterprise of Blondel, the Lettre rigorously distinguishes theology from philosophy. (shrink)

In seeking to understand the development of philosophy in later antiquity it is important to take account of Clement of Alexandria, perhaps the first Christian writer to be greatly influenced by the systems of Greece. Accordingly in this article certain aspects of Clement's doctrine will be selected for examination where his obligations to the philosophers have apparently hitherto received insufficient attention. In a valuable paper Mr. R. P. Casey has dealt with many important points, but there is room for further (...) exploration, both by the philological method and by a careful comparison of corresponding ideas in Clement and Plotinus. I am here concerned to stress resemblances rather than to prove, for instance, that any direct connection exists between Neoplatonism and Alexandrian theology. It is nevertheless not irrevelant to mention that Ammonius Saccas, the professor whose lectures both Origen the Christian and Plotinus were to attend, and who, besides being a Platonist, if not the founder of Neoplatonism, was also an apostate Christian, had probably begun to attract attention in Alexandria at the time when Clement was head of the Christian School there, in which perhaps Ammonius himself had been originally educated. There seems nothing to prevent the assumption that Ammonius and Clement were known at least by name to each other, and perhaps the philosopher under whom Plotinus was to study for eleven years had even sat by the side of Clement at the feet of Pantaenus, the erstwhile Stoic and founder of the Catechetical School. However that may be, both Neoplatonism and Alexandrian theology show a markedly similar tendency, and in the Enneads and the Stromateis there are many equivalent features. (shrink)

A defence of the idea that there are sui generis duties of love: duties, that is, that we owe to people in virtue of standing in loving relationships with them. I contrast this non‐reductionist position with the widespread reductionist view that our duties to those we love all derive from more generic moral principles. The paper mounts a cumulative argument in favour of the non‐reductionist position, adducing a variety of considerations that together speak strongly in favour of adopting it. The (...) concluding section connects this debate with larger issues in moral theory concerning the general idea of obligation. (shrink)

We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...) Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. (shrink)

Since the publication of Edmund Gettier's challenge to the traditional epistemological doctrine of knowledge as justified true belief, Roberts and Wood claim that epistemologists lapsed into despondency and are currently open to novel approaches. One such approach is virtue epistemology, which can be divided into virtues as proper functions or epistemic character traits. The authors propose a notion of regulative epistemology, as opposed to a strict analytic epistemology, based on intellectual virtues that function not as rules or even as skills (...) but as habits of the heart. To that end, they divide the task of clarifying and expounding their notion in the book's two parts.In the first part, Roberts and Wood examine various components that constitute their notion of regulative epistemology. The first are the epistemic goods or goals that drive the epistemic process. What is needed, claim Roberts and Wood, is an enriched notion of these goods rather than the restricted notion of justified true belief. Epistemic agents are more than calculating devices in that …. (shrink)

Karl R. Popper is an important philosopher of science of 20th Century and is known in this field through his theory of falsification. But the critical theory of rationality is indeed his basic theory and it can be seen in his whole idea. Critique of historicism also contains his views on the social and political philosophy in a systematic context in relation to them. Popper embodied his views about the historicism through human-centered thoughts of philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Marx (...) and Hegel who are effective system builders and he raised a number of criticism against the holistic structures. We discuss in this article Popper's critique of historicism, especially his critics related with Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx. (shrink)

Hume scholarship has flourished during the past thirty-five years. In part this has been stimulated by a number of excellent full-scale studies of his philosophy and in part by the affinity of spirit between contemporary analytic philosophy and Hume's investigations. The author has collected a selection of some of the best short studies of Hume ranging over the problems of causation, induction, ethics and natural theology. A number of the articles treat similar problems from different perspectives. The total effect is (...) not only to further our understanding of Hume but also to help clarify central issues in contemporary philosophy. The anthology is one is a new series of Modern Studies in Philosophy under the general editorship of Amélie Rorty.—R. J. B. (shrink)

[R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans gives (...) no adequate account of 'really', and I point to unclarities in Wiggins's similar, but distinct, attempt to use 'really' in the logical form of true negative existentials. /// [David Wiggins] Evans was not wrong (I maintain) to say that the senses of genuine proper names invoke and require objects. Names in fiction or hypothesis mimic such names. Pace Evans, Sainsbury and free logicians, proper names are scopeless. (Evans's 'Julius' is not a name.) Names create a presumption of existential generalization. In sentences such as 'Vulcan does not really exist', that presumption is bracketed. The sentence specifies by reference to story or report a concept identical with Vulcan and declares it be really uninstantiated. (The sentence, which partakes of play, is a kind of palimpsest.) It is explained why this second level view of 'exists' is to be preferred. (shrink)

R. S. Peters on Education and Ethics reissues seven titles from Peters' life's work. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, the books are concerned with the philosophy of education and ethics. Topics include moral education and learning, authority and responsibility, psychology and ethical development and ideas on motivation amongst others. The books discuss more traditional theories and philosophical thinkers as well as exploring later ideas in a way which makes the subjects they discuss still relevant today.

R.G. Collingwood defined historical knowledge as essentially ‘scientific’, and saw the historian's task as the ‘re-enactment of past thoughts’. The author argues the need to go beyond Collingwood, first by demonstrating the authenticity of available evidence, and secondly, using Namier as an example, by considering methodology as well as epistemology, and the need to relate past thoughts to their present context. The ‘law of the consumption of time’ encourages historians to focus on landmark events, theories and generalisations, thus breaking from (...) Collingwood's emphasis on fidelity to past ideas and interpreting the past from the concepts of the present. This conflict can only be reconciled by the study of historiography. (shrink)

A provocative interpretation of Freud's views on civilization, incisively presented. The author offers an extended argument for the possibility, on Freudian grounds, of a civilization which is non-repressive, and he tries to adduce Freudian evidence against Freud's own view to the contrary. Two concepts central to his analysis are surplus-repression, "the restrictions necessitated by social domination," and the performance principle, "the prevailing historical form of the reality principle." Marcuse differentiates his interpretation from that of the traditional neo-Freudians, whom he attacks.--R. (...) B. (shrink)

We show that the c.e. Q1,N\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${Q_{1,N}}$$\end{document}-degrees are not an upper semilattice. We prove that if M is an r-maximal set, A is an arbitrary set and M≡Q1,NA\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M \equiv{}_ {Q_{1,N}}A}$$\end{document}, then M≤mA\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M\leq{}_{m} A}$$\end{document}. Also, if M1 and M2 are r-maximal sets, A and B are major subsets of M1 and M2, respectively, and M1\A≡Q1,NM2\B\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} (...) \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{1}{\setminus} A\equiv{}_{Q_{1,N}}M_{2}{\setminus} B}$$\end{document}, then M1\A≡mM2\B\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{1}{\setminus}A\equiv{}_{m}M_{2}{\setminus} B}$$\end{document}. If M1 and M2 are r-maximal sets and M10,M11\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{1}^{0},\,M_{1}^{1}}$$\end{document} and M20,M21\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{2}^{0},\,M_{2}^{1}}$$\end{document} are nontrivial splittings of M1 and M2, respectively, then M10≡Q1,NM20\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{1}^{0} \equiv{}_{Q_{1,N}}M_{2}^{0}}$$\end{document} if and only if M10≡1M20\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${M_{1}^{0} \equiv{}_{1}M_{2}^{0}}$$\end{document}. From this result follows that if A and B are Friedberg splitting of an r-maximal set, then the Q1,N\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${Q_{1,N}}$$\end{document}-degree of A contains only one c.e. 1-degree. (shrink)

R. Jay Wallace argues in this book that moral accountability hinges on questions of fairness: When is it fair to hold people morally responsible for what they do? Would it be fair to do so even in a deterministic world? To answer these questions, we need to understand what we are doing when we hold people morally responsible, a stance that Wallace connects with a central class of moral sentiments, those of resentment, indignation, and guilt. To hold someone responsible, he (...) argues, is to be subject to these reactive emotions in one's dealings with that person. Developing this theme with unusual sophistication, he offers a new interpretation of the reactive emotions and traces their role in our practices of blame and moral sanction. With this account in place, Wallace advances a powerful and sustained argument against the common view that accountability requires freedom of will. Instead, he maintains, the fairness of holding people responsible depends on their rational competence: the power to grasp moral reasons and to control their behavior accordingly. He shows how these forms of rational competence are compatible with determinism. At the same time, giving serious consideration to incompatibilist concerns, Wallace develops a compelling diagnosis of the common assumption that freedom is necessary for responsibility. Rigorously argued, eminently readable, this book touches on issues of broad concern to philosophers, legal theorists, political scientists, and anyone with an interest in the nature and limits of responsibility. (shrink)

Architect-scientist R. Buckminster Fuller talks about the discovery of the eternal pattern that is operative in the universe.

A text for an undergraduate problems course placing special emphasis on a wide selection of texts for students to evaluate: in a treatment of teleological ethics the authors include Nietzsche, R. B. Perry and G. E. Moore; the section on political philosophy presents a range of authors from Mill to Mussolini. Perhaps its chief virtue is that it relies almost exclusively on modern writers and yet manages not to be parochial.--R.F.T.

A revised and expanded version of studies by McKinsey, Winet and the authors, in axiomatic theories of value, together with a report of experiments designed to test the formal theories. This volume makes an important contribution to the theoretical and experimental investigation of values and decision-making, both of which subjects are still in their infancy. Experimental studies by Mosteller and Nogee and theoretical discussions of von Neumann and Morgenstern are criticized and improved. Ch. IV contains original suggestions for a theory (...) of utility involving incomparable values. -- A. R. A. (shrink)

A theistic study which rejects negative and purely analogical theology. An historical review of the traditional categories applied to the divine nature shows that God's perfection includes an infinity of possibles whose actualization is a matter of free but controlled selection. The argument does not always appear precise or inevitable, but it is suggestive.--A. R.

An analysis of the realism of M. Blondel, with an attempt to distinguish its traditional elements from its novel features. Blondel's emphasis on the inseparability of philosophy and action is argued to be the foundation of his return to Christian realism.--A. R.

An application of Einsteinian physics to biology and psychology, in the hope of developing a "unified ethical theory."--A. R.

A short study of the historical circumstances to which Marxism responded, and of the systematic character of its dialectic. The strength of Marxism the author finds to lie in its comprehensiveness, its weakness in the contradiction which arises from its espousal of humanitarian goals and its rejection of individual freedom.--A. R.

A philosophical diary, bringing together the previously published "Prelude to the Life of an Ordinary Man," "Commentary on Common Sense," and "Common Experience," with a new essay, "The Right Time."--A. R.

A study of post-Hegelian German historicism. There are chapters on Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, Weber, Spengler, Troeltsch, and Meinecke. The development of historicism as a form of Romanticism which treats history as a realization of an absolute principle, to its use as a justification for the relativity of values is traced, and its return to "the affirmation of the absolute" in the work of Troeltsch and Meinecke analyzed.--A. R.

An illuminating discussion of the logic of normative systems. The approach is semantical rather than syntactical, in the sense that the systems are defined by reference to truth-conditions rather than by axioms and rules. The results are substantially in accord with the familiar syntactic systems of deontic logic, but they do diverge in some non-trivial details. A perceptive study.--A. R. A.

This voluminous treatise develops a "temporal" theory of knowledge out of the basic premisses of Sein und Zeit. It depends completely on Heidegger, aping his style as well as his terminology.--A. R.

This book covers ground which authors like Mircea Eliade have treated more adequately, if not as inclusively. The "cosmic cycles" of Mesopotamia and Indian thought are related to the historical cyclic theories of the moderns, Vico, Spengler. Toynbee, and Sorokin. Because of her mystical vision, Cairns fails to see clearly that modern cyclical ideas of history are based on an analogy of the present with the past and are animated by empirical observation. The information used is accumulated rather than analysed, (...) the ideas are opinions, the conclusion science-fiction.--A. R. (shrink)

Diagnosing the "breakdown of modern philosophy" as a result of a neglect of existence and metaphysics, leading to a radical separation of theory and practice, the author examines the attempts of existentialism to correct the shortcomings of post-Cartesian "intellectual subjectivity." The book begins with a short history of existentialism, following which are critical expositions of Jaspers, Sartre, Heidegger and Marcel. The range of topics considered--epistemology, ethics and ontology--prevents detailed discussion of any single problem, and both the exposition and the criticism (...) remain on a very general level. The final chapters of the book are devoted to correcting what the author considers the excesses of the existentialistic reaction to intellectualism by supplementing it with realism. Here, however, he promises more than he delivers. Though sometimes too facile, the book constitutes an important attempt to come to grips with existentialism by relating it to trends in traditional philosophy.--A. R. (shrink)

This book consists of three parts: a general theory of descriptive ethics, a general theory of ethical discourse, and an application of II to the ethical discourse of the Navaho Indians, based on the writer's own field studies. The work is careful, clear, thorough, and detailed, and the inclusion of field notes is helpful in understanding and evaluating Ladd's reconstructions. There are questions of detail where one might cavil, but the book is an important contribution to the relatively unexplored area (...) where philosophy and the social sciences overlap. --A. R. A. (shrink)

Miller has undertaken the difficult task of providing a new translation of Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik sometimes referred to as Hegel's "Greater Logic." Part of the reason for the neglect of Hegel has been the unavailability of good translations. The "first generation" of Hegel translators heroically sought to create an English idiom for Hegel's terminology, but their results left much to be desired in accuracy, readability and intelligibility. Although this is a conservative translation which follows the conventions established by English (...) Hegelians nevertheless the translation is a big improvement over the earlier one by Johnston and Struthers. Since the passing of the English Hegelians, Hegel's Logic has been largely ignored by Anglo-Saxon philosophers. And for those who think that logic really is or ought to be what is found in contemporary symbolic or mathematical logic, Hegel's book will seem old-fashioned and outdated. Yet this book has exerted an enormous influence on both those who have seriously attacked it and those who have devotedly followed it--a group that includes Kierkegaard, Sartre, Heidegger, and the English idealists. The publication of this massive translation not only has historical value for making Hegel's thought more accessible, but it is still a rich source for the philosopher interested in Thought and Being.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Five distinguished philosophers survey the contributions to philosophical scholarship in the United States from 1930 to 1960. For the most part the survey is fair, comprehensive, and informative. Passmore's general survey of the philosophic scholarship during this period is a tour de force written with wit, grace, and insight. But while the contributions are a pleasure to read, one wonders for whom this survey has been written. Philosophers acquainted with the various areas discussed will learn little that is new. And (...) because of the amount of material covered, non-philosophers may be bewildered about what has been really preoccupying American philosophers during this period.—R. J. B. (shrink)

A collection of popular and semi-technical philosophic essays written during the past twenty-five years, in which Hook defends an "experimental or pragmatic naturalism." A large part of the essays are concerned with defending naturalism against its critics and subjecting the recent revival of religion and theology to a devasting polemical attack. Hook's tough-minded intelligence is evident throughout, though he does little toward a careful explication of the knottier problems that cluster about naturalism.--R. J. B.