Economic markets are not morally free zones. Contrary to popular misconceptions, market functioning rests on the ethical principles of fairness and voluntariness. This ethical foundation can be traced back at least to moral philosopher Adam Smith, one of the founders of modern economics. In the inconspicuous form of microeconomic axioms, these moral foundations are preserved. Thus, virtually all “neo-classic” economic concepts presuppose a market ethics of fairness and voluntariness. In a world of pervasive uncertainty on the long-term development of the (...) human-environment interaction, the protection of the global life-support systems is an important test case for the scope of the ethical content of market ethics. We review risk protection strategies in the face of this uncertainty that are (i) based on the insurance effect of biological diversity, and (ii) that employ a safe minimum standard (SMS). Because the fairness principle of market ethics requires that economic agents who cause “external” costs must, at least, compensate those who are burdened with these costs, the interests of future generations have to be included in responsible economic decision-making. The market and market ethics approach is applied to the analysis of a SMS for biological diversity, and to the inherent problems of such an approach. At the microeconomic level of individual decision-making, an unconditional protection is supported by market ethics neither for the putative interests of future generations nor for biological diversity: Poor people who struggle to cover their basic needs cannot not be required to care for biological diversity. In all other cases, the protection of biological diversity in favour of future generations is supported—if costs are not “unacceptably high”. At which cost level this point is approached, market ethics is not designed to decide. (shrink)

In The Value Gap, Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen addresses the distinction between what is finally good and what is finally good-for, two value notions that are central to ethics and practical deliberation. The first part of the book argues against views that claim that one of these notions is either faulty, or at best conceptually dependent on the other notion. Whereas these two views disagree on whether it is good or good-for that is the flawed or dependent concept, it is argued, as (...) against both approaches, that goodness and goodness-for are independent value notions that cannot be fully understood in terms of one another. The second part provides an analysis of good and good-for in terms of a fitting-attitude analysis. By elaborating a more nuanced understanding of the key elements of this analysis—reasons and pro-attitudes—Rønnow-Rasmussen challenges the widespread idea that there are no genuine practical and moral dilemmas. The result is that the gap between favouring for a reason what is good and favouring for a reason what is good for someone appears insurmountable. (shrink)

This classic biography of Nietzsche, first published in the 1960s, was enthusiastically reviewed at the time. The biography is now reissued with its text updated in the light of recent research. Hollingdale's biography remains the single best account of the life and works for the student or non-specialist. The biography chronicles Nietzsche's intellectual evolution and discusses his friendship and breach with Wagner, his attitude towards Schopenhauer, and his indebtedness to Darwin and the Greeks. It follows the years of his maturity (...) and his mental collapse in 1889. The final part of the book considers the development of the Nietzsche legend during his years of madness. R. J. Hollingdale, one of the preeminent translators of Nietzsche, allows Nietzsche to speak for himself in a translation that transmits the vividness and virtuosity of Nietzsche's many styles. This is the ideal book for anyone interested in Nietzsche's life and work to learn why he is such a significant figure for the development of modern thought. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What Emotional Responding Is to Blame It Might Not Be to ResponsibilityR. J. R. Blair (bio)Keywordsblame, responsibility, emotional responses, psychopathyIn this interesting paper, Levy argues that by failing the moral/conventional distinction task (Blair 1995), individuals with psychopathy show a fundamental inability to categorize moral harms and as such their moral responsibility for their actions is reduced. He argues that, although we might still wish to incarcerate such individuals to (...) prevent them inflicting further harm on others, we should be less enthusiastic to blame them for their actions.In many respects, I agree with much of Levy's treatise. I certainly do not regard ascriptions of blame as useful in my own work with this population. I believe that our goal should be to fully understand the nature of their emotional deficit to be able to treat it similarly to other researchers who work to treat other emotional disorders. To me, Levy's argument appears sound.However, I offer three considerations and raise questions within these considerations that might further the debate. First, not all rules involve care-based emotional responses to victims. As Levy notes, this is the origin of the moral/conventional distinction. The problem here is that we do consider someone responsible if they break a conventional transgression. The student talking in class is generally considered blameworthy for this action as long as they knew that the rule of not talking during the lesson applied to that classroom. Yet, there is no victim and no care-based emotional response. Here, the only thing necessary to ascribe blame and responsibility is that the individual knew that a rule exists. Given this holds for conventional transgressions, why must we necessarily make a special case, with respect to responsibility, for moral transgressions?I believe that Levy is fully aware of this concern. He specifically makes reference to moral responsibility and writes that:the kind and degree of wrongness, and therefore blame, which attaches to infringements of the rules [against double parking or line-jumping] is very different, and usually much less significant, than the kind and degree attaching to moral wrongs. For psychopaths, all offences are merely conventional, and therefore—from their point of view—none of them are all that serious.(2007, p. 132)But the danger here is that issues of blame and responsibility may become highly relativistic and hinge on the strength of the emotional reaction. This is a problem because, although we might judge someone as more blameworthy if he intentionally [End Page 149] runs over five people rather than one, do we really consider that there is a distinction in moral responsibility between these two cases? If not, might not responsibility relate to factual knowledge of the existence of the rule against the transgression rather than the emotional response to the transgression?Second, there is considerable debate regarding whether psychopathy represents a taxon or a continuum (e.g., Vasey et al. 2005; Edens et al. 2006). Assuming it does represent a continuum, then we have an additional concern. How little of an emotional response to the transgression reduces one's moral responsibility and blame? Is it only the very reduced (although usually not absent) levels of emotional response that are shown by individuals with psychopathy? Or should we consider moral responsibility and blame proportional to the level of the emotional response? If this latter option is adopted, then what should we do about individuals who show heightened emotional responses, for example, patients with specific anxiety disorders (Rauch, Shin, and Wright 2003)? There are already some data that inhibited children (a developmental precursor to some anxiety disorders; Kagan and Snidman 1999) show heightened conscience development (Asendorpf and Nunner-Winkler 1992). If such children commit moral transgressions, should we regard them as more morally responsible and more blameworthy than regular folks?Third, the issue of intention received little attention in this paper. I have been considered to show a similar lack of attention to intention in the past (Nichols 2002) and, moreover, in some respects the issue was of limited concern given Levy's main goals. However, I mention it because so much of whether we consider someone responsible for their actions and... (shrink)

Famous for the number-theoretic first-order statement known as Goodstein's theorem, author R. L. Goodstein was also well known as a distinguished educator. With this text, he offers an elementary treatment that employs Boolean algebra as a simple medium for introducing important concepts of modern algebra. The text begins with an informal introduction to the algebra of classes, exploring union, intersection, and complementation; the commutative, associative, and distributive laws; difference and symmetric difference; and Venn diagrams. Professor Goodstein proceeds to a detailed (...) examination of three different axiomatizations, and an outline of a fourth system of axioms appears in the examples. The final chapter, on lattices, examines Boolean algebra in the setting of the theory of partial order. Numerous examples appear at the end of each chapter, with full solutions at the end. (shrink)

Thomas Hill Green was one of the most influential English thinkers of his time, and he made significant contributions to the development of political liberalism. Much of his career was spent at Balliol College, Oxford: having begun as a student of Jowett, he later acted effectively as his second-in-command at the college. Interested for his whole career in social questions, Green supported the temperance movement, the extension of the franchise, and the admission of women to university education. He became Whyte's (...) professor of moral philosophy at Oxford in 1878, and his lectures had a lasting influence on a generation of students. Much of Volume 1, edited by Green's pupil R. L. Nettleship and published in 1885, consists of Green's work on David Hume. In his essay, 'Introductions to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature', Green gives a detailed critique of Hume's metaphysical thought. (shrink)

In 1962 appeared one of the classic articles in Anglo-Saxon manuscript studies, the publication of two eleventh-century fragments of leaves of Old English found in the binding of a seventeenth-century printed book in the library of the University of Kansas, Lawrence. The fragment that more nearly concerns the present article now carries the shelf mark Pryce MS C2:1 in the Kenneth Spencer Research Library . It is a large part of a single leaf from The Legend of the Holy Cross (...) before Christ, an edifying work known in full only in a twelfth-century copy, Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 343, fols. 14v–20v . Working from a photograph the great paleographer and codicologist N. R. Ker attributed the hand of the Kansas fragment to the scribe who also wrote the texts of two bits of the same work found in the library of Matthew Parker, archbishop of Canterbury , at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, now MS 557 . He concluded, no doubt rightly, that all three are part of one manuscript. (shrink)

It has come to be expected that collections issued by the Royal Institute of Philosophy will contain work that has quality or is otherwise interesting. This volume runs true to form and presents plenty of both. It gives the proceedings of the conference arranged by the Institute at Exeter in 1973, consisting of five symposia together with Chairman's remarks of about eight pages or so for each symposium, and in three cases postscripts by the first speaker. The contributors and topics (...) are: R. F. Dearden and Elizabeth Telfer on ‘Autonomy as an Educational Ideal’ with R. M. Hare as Chairman; R. K. Elliott and Glenn Langford on ‘Education and the Development of the Understanding’ with Paul Hirst as Chairman; David Cooper and Timothy O'Hagan on ‘Quality and Equality in Education’ with R. F. Atkinson as Chairman; Mary Warnock and Richard Norman on ‘The Neutral Teacher’ with Alan Montefiore as Chairman; Stuart Brown and A. Phillips Griffiths on ‘Academic Freedom’ with R. S. Peters as Chairman. (shrink)

I would like to develop a few critical observations on some substantive moral ideas propounded in Professor R. M. Hare's Freedom and Reason a work where formal and substantive moral arguments are blended in an attractive and plausible, though at times somewhat exasperating, mixture. Hare's formal doctrines, the celebrated theses of prescriptivity and universalizability, will not as such interest me here, though I shall have to take notice of at least one of them, viz. universalizability, in so far as it (...) has a bearing on what I take to be Hare's substantive position. The arguments in Freedom and Reason are compounded of Kantian and utilitarian elements, and culminate in Hare's conceptualization of two antithetical types of person, whom he calls respectively the ‘liberal’ and the ‘fanatic’. This distinction itself is based on a rigid and uncompromising dichotomy of ‘interest’ and ‘ideal’, and it is on this dichotomy that Hare's substantive moral doctrine hinges. Hare's argument is that the morally good person is one who subordinates his ideal to a moral principle that takes interests into account, in contradistinction to the fanatic who allows interests to be overridden by his ideal. There is much to recommend in this doctrine, and distinctions of this nature can and ought to be drawn. But the way in which it is done in Hare's work opens up fresh doubts and fails to solve some fundamental problems. As I do not think that his distinction between ‘interest’ and ‘ideal’ is tenable, I cannot agree wholly to the predominantly formal manner in which Hare deals with the important question of distinguishing between liberalism and fanaticism. The upshot of my arguments is that this distinction can only be made intelligible in substantive terms. Although I cannot here offer a positive alternative to Hare beyond some oblique hints at the end, my critical remarks on Hare's doctrine ought at least to go some way in establishing the need for such an alternative. (shrink)

An extended version of the James W. Richard Lectures delivered by the author at the University of Virginia in the fall of 1951. The first six chapters develop the seemingly irreconcilable contrast between Biblical personalism and the categories of ontology. The last two chapters indicate briefly how they supplement each other. Theologians accuse Tillich of slighting Biblical concepts; philosophers taunt him for too readily despairing of ontology. In this book he tries to do justice to both.--D. R.

A defence of the idea that there are sui generis duties of love: duties, that is, that we owe to people in virtue of standing in loving relationships with them. I contrast this non‐reductionist position with the widespread reductionist view that our duties to those we love all derive from more generic moral principles. The paper mounts a cumulative argument in favour of the non‐reductionist position, adducing a variety of considerations that together speak strongly in favour of adopting it. The (...) concluding section connects this debate with larger issues in moral theory concerning the general idea of obligation. (shrink)

We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...) Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. (shrink)

Since the publication of Edmund Gettier's challenge to the traditional epistemological doctrine of knowledge as justified true belief, Roberts and Wood claim that epistemologists lapsed into despondency and are currently open to novel approaches. One such approach is virtue epistemology, which can be divided into virtues as proper functions or epistemic character traits. The authors propose a notion of regulative epistemology, as opposed to a strict analytic epistemology, based on intellectual virtues that function not as rules or even as skills (...) but as habits of the heart. To that end, they divide the task of clarifying and expounding their notion in the book's two parts.In the first part, Roberts and Wood examine various components that constitute their notion of regulative epistemology. The first are the epistemic goods or goals that drive the epistemic process. What is needed, claim Roberts and Wood, is an enriched notion of these goods rather than the restricted notion of justified true belief. Epistemic agents are more than calculating devices in that …. (shrink)

The key word in the title of this book is "essay," for Strawson has not written an introduction to Kant, nor a commentary on the Critique. It would be closer to truth to say that Strawson has attempted to extract and to translate into a contemporary idiom what he takes to be philosophically important in the Critique. Kant's major positive achievement, according to Strawson, is the partial carrying out of a certain program, viz., "that of determining the fundamental general structure (...) of any conception of experience such as we can make intelligible to ourselves." But this program can be dissociated from the Kantian motif that the structure of experience is "imposed by our capacities." Thus Strawson speaks of the "doctrinal fantasies of transcendental idealism." Given Strawson's concern with what he takes to be Kant's positive achievement, he doesn't hesitate to expose the weakness of some of Kant's arguments, to restate many of them in a more convincing way, or even to supply new arguments. But Strawson also exhibits a remarkable sensitivity to many recondite aspects of the Critique, e.g., the role of "pure intuition" in Kant's theory of geometry, and the status of "self-consciousness." The result of Strawson's essay is a philosophically exciting encounter where one can learn as much about Kant as he can about Strawson's own central concerns, and indeed about some of the most central issues of philosophy, both past and present.—R. J. B. (shrink)

A collection of essays by a group of international scholars from Israel, England, the United States, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, and Argentina testify to the humane influence of Baumgardt. There is little that unites the subject matter of these essays and only one deals explicitly with the thought of Baumgardt. A bibliography of Baumgardt's writings is included.—R. J. B.

This second volume in the series designed to review the work done in various areas of philosophy during the period 1956-1966 is concerned with the philosophy of science. There are forty essays on a variety of topics in the philosophy of science describing the work done in that area in the past decade and a bibliography covering the same period. Most are in English, some in French or German. Some representative topics and their authors are: Laws, Models, Causality, Induction and (...) Probability, Scientific Methodology, Time, Space, Cosmology, Philosophy and Physics, Quantum Theory, Biology and Philosophy. In addition there are several general essays on the influence of various philosophers and scientists on current developments in the philosophy of science, on the ethical and philosophical implications of science, on Cybernetics, Information Theory, Game theory and a number of essays on the development of philosophy of science in different countries of Western and Eastern Europe and Japan. Like the first volume of this series, this book is an indispensable guide to anyone interested in the field, and a place should be made for it on every library shelf---where there is an interest in philosophy of science.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The Rector of the University of Buenos Aires here briefly outlines and criticizes some of the present-day subjectivist and objectivist positions, and suggests a means of reconciling the two. --R. D. G.

A rich collection of essays in honor of Msgr. Mansion, including a study of Mansion's work, several essays on Plato, studies of various aspects of Aristotle's philosophy--textual and systematic analyses of his metaphysics, logic, psychology and ethics--and some essays on the influence of Plato and Aristotle on medieval philosophy. Contributors include Diès, Wilpert, Ross, and Minio-Palaello.--A. R.

A collection of previously printed but newly revised essays. The author holds that "art both creates and discovers values and meanings," because it reveals its object both in itself and through itself, because it is, as it were, an opaque sign. Art is semi-autonomous; the world of art organizes experience, yet does not find its validation in it. There are some essays in and about literary criticism, but the author is primarily concerned with the "manner in which art informs culture," (...) and only secondarily with works of art themselves. The book is important and illuminating.--A. R. (shrink)

A fairly routine work of Thomist scholarship which argues that, though both Aquinas and Aristotle regard prudence as a virtue, Aristotle cannot and Aquinas must analyze the vice of imprudence. The difference is found to depend on Aquinas' stress on the liberty of the will.--A. R.

An interesting study of Croce's political philosophy, its relation to his ethics and metaphysics, as well as its place in the political milieu of pre-war Europe. The author argues that Croce's political philosophy, unlike Hegel's, is both humanistic and liberal. --A. R.

An application of Einsteinian physics to biology and psychology, in the hope of developing a "unified ethical theory."--A. R.

A critical analysis of Hegel's aesthetics, both in its relation to his dialectical phenomenology and in its use as a foundation for criticism. The author holds that Hegel's aesthetics is more a philosophy of the history of art than a philosophy of art, properly speaking. There is an annotated bibliography.--A. R.

As an extremely technical study of Heidegger's revision of the history of ontology this work has the value of tying together, through paraphrase and quotation, the core of Heideggerian opinion on the subject, from Sein und Zeit up to his latest works. Nuño sees two grand stages in Heidegger's thought, a first and systematic stage and a second or historical stage, which represents the works coming after Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. The author sees Heidegger's initial destruction of the (...) history of ontology arising out of its own ashes into a reconstruction of the foundations of ontology.--A. R., Jr. (shrink)

A study of post-Hegelian German historicism. There are chapters on Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, Weber, Spengler, Troeltsch, and Meinecke. The development of historicism as a form of Romanticism which treats history as a realization of an absolute principle, to its use as a justification for the relativity of values is traced, and its return to "the affirmation of the absolute" in the work of Troeltsch and Meinecke analyzed.--A. R.

An attempt, by a Rosmini scholar, to develop a contemporary metaphysics capable of accounting for the spiritual crisis of our time. Beginning with the theoretical problems of "the ethics of the spirit," the author moves dialectically to the existential problems of the relation between choice and situation.--A. R.

A collection of essays on metaphysics and the philosophy of religion. Among the contributors are J. B. Lotz, J. Danielou, and R. Lazzarini.--A. R.

This book attempts to place the problems of logic, epistemology, science, history, and ethics on a new scientific basis.--A. R.

A discussion of some experiments concerning subjective attitudes toward games, gambling, risk-taking, guessing, etc. Some of the experiments described are novel and interesting; but insufficient account is taken of previous experimental results, and the reports in general fail to meet current standards of clarity and completeness. The theory of games, obviously relevant to the topics discussed, is nowhere mentioned. --A. R. A.

An informative study of the conditions, the strengths, and the weaknesses of Russian totalitarianism by an expert on Russian affairs. The "Keys" are: the necessity of a struggle for power within the totalitarian regime, the necessity for secrecy and the complete control of all activity, the proscription of labor, the contempt for democratic election, the constant need for colonial expansion, and the subordination of the people to the state.--A. R.

A detailed exposition of what the author considers to be the few fundamental principles in the theology of St. Bonaventure: the continuity between theology and revealed scripture, the preeminence of faith, the discontinuity between theological and philosophical reason, and the development of theology as "the progression of... spiritual life."--A. R.

An analysis of the treatment of time in literature and its relationship to science and philosophy. Since the consciousness of time seems to the author to have greatly increased in contemporary culture, he refers primarily to such twentieth-century authors as Proust, Joyce and Mann.--A. R.

This book consists of three parts: a general theory of descriptive ethics, a general theory of ethical discourse, and an application of II to the ethical discourse of the Navaho Indians, based on the writer's own field studies. The work is careful, clear, thorough, and detailed, and the inclusion of field notes is helpful in understanding and evaluating Ladd's reconstructions. There are questions of detail where one might cavil, but the book is an important contribution to the relatively unexplored area (...) where philosophy and the social sciences overlap. --A. R. A. (shrink)

A study of Blake's poetry and its use of Kabalistic imagery to depict the fall of man to selfhood and the hope of regeneration through the "sweet science" of imagination.--A. R.

This is the first complete translation of the second part of Hegel's Encyclopaedia. It is based on the recent German text edited by Nicolin and Pöggeler and contains the Zusätze from Michelet's text. Findlay is to be congratulated for encouraging the publication of this book which is part of a project of completing the translation of the three parts of Hegel's Encyclopaedia together with their Zusätze. A. V. Miller who has already provided a new translation of Hegel's Science of Logic (...) has again undertaken the difficult task of translating this work. Among Anglo-Saxon philosophers there has been the grossest ignorance and the wildest prejudices concerning Hegel's views of the natural sciences and the philosophy of nature. For the first time, we now have a helpful text to understand exactly what Hegel did say and why. The most impressive fact about this volume is the seriousness with which Hegel reflected on the current state of the natural sciences of his own time. Indeed it is difficult to grasp many of his points without understand the specific developments that he has in mind. While much of what Hegel says is obscure and outdated, Hegel is not attempting to legislate for natural science, but to provide us with a philosophic understanding of the significance of our understanding of nature. In this respect, the spirit of Hegel's endeavor is not so foreign from that of contemporary philosophy of science. The publication of this part of Hegel's system will enable us to come to a more balanced understanding of Hegel's philosophy. Findlay's forward is helpful both in explaining and justifying the sources for this translation and for singling out the major themes of Hegel's philosophy of nature.--R. J. B. (shrink)

It is difficult to see the point of putting this book together. Presumably, it is intended to serve as an introduction to basic issues concerning the nature and status of Marxism. As such it fails miserably. The introductions to the various chapter headings, as well as the initial introduction, tend to be simplistic, dogmatic, and inaccurate. The selection of material and its organization is quixotic. It doesn't succeed in presenting the best of international Marxist interpretation and scholarship or in presenting (...) the material needed for a depth understanding of any of the topics treated. Most of the selections--even from eminent scholars on Marx--are so brief that it is difficult to grasp the logic of their arguments and positions. One can buy several paperback books of Marx's original writings for the price of this anthology, and certainly learn a great deal more about Marxism.--R. J. B. (shrink)

This is the first new edition of the Meno with English commentary and annotation since Thompson's in 1901. Dr. Bluck brings to bear more recent scholarship in his commentary and notes, which are judicious and thorough; and his new collations help to make the text the best available. Any account of the Meno's truth and meaning should begin with the careful textual, philological, logical, and historical considerations of the commentary and introduction of this new edition.--R. S. B.

It is good to have this fine English translation of the second German edition of Kelsen's Reine Rechtslehre, which has heavily influenced so much contemporary thought on jurisprudence and the philosophy of law. Reading Kelsen now one is struck by the stilted and naïve positivism that pervades his thought. At the same time, one is also impressed by the clarity that he brings to what is normally a very muddled area. There is a bold statement of the "pure" theory, a (...) sharp distinction between the legal and the moral orders, a reiteration of the "dualism" of the is and the ought, and a defense of legal norms as the object of the science of law. While Kelsen's quasi-dogmatic pronouncements can provoke disagreements at almost every stage of his argument, the book is certainly one which must be directly encountered by any serious student of the philosophy and theory of law.—R. J. B. (shrink)

As seen by Professor Capek, Bergson’s views about the nature of matter were either misunderstood or ignored in the decades following their publication at the turn of the century. The explanation for this attitude of both Bergson’s opponents and his disciples lies in the fact that, at that time, although there were rumblings under the foundations of classical physics, "hardly anybody could then guess even remotely the extent of the coming scientific revolution." One of the main stumbling blocks for Bergson’s (...) readers was the non-pictorial character of his ‘model’ of matter, which was conceived as consisting of imageless events. In Bergson and Modern Physics, Capek attempts to remove this stumbling block and to evaluate the relation between Bergson’s thought and modern physics as it stands today. The book consists of three parts: Bergson’s biological theory of knowledge, his theory of duration, and his theory of the physical world and its relations to contemporary physics. Three appendices deal with Russell’s complex relation to Bergson, with the much discussed relation of microphysical indeterminancy to freedom, and with Bergson’s views on entropy and modern cosmogony, respectively. The book is indexed and carries extensive references to the scientific and philosophical literature. With this book Capek provides a competent exposition and historical perspective of Bergson’s philosophy and its relation to modern physics.—D. R. P. (shrink)

A model of German scholarship comprehensive and carefully written. The first part is devoted to an exposition of the views of the symbol taken by such thinkers as Goethe, Cassirer, Tillich, and Jaspers. The second part is a more systematic discussion of the symbol as it functions in theology and religion.--D. R.

A sympathetic and knowledgeable discussion of Freud in relation to literature and the present state of our culture. The crisis to which the title refers concerns the "progressive deterioration of accurate knowledge of the self and of the right relation between the self and the culture." Freud's contribution to our understanding of the self in culture is deftly outlined, and it is suggested that his theories of culture are not so fantastic as has often been supposed.--D. R.

A posthumous study of "Russia's greatest philosopher." The problems that so vitally concerned Solovyev seem strangely irrelevant today. Nevertheless he is a neglected figure and deserves this renewed attention.--D. R.

The author's own translation of the original Dutch edition published in 1950. His general standpoint is that of a phenomenologist, but he makes good use of the whole philosophical tradition as well as of recent work in psychology.--D. R.

Based on the Gallahue Conference on Religion and Psychiatry which was held at Princeton Theological Seminary in 1963, and which took as its topic "Will and Willing," this book sets out from the fact that although for a long time unfashionable, questions are now being raised which seem to involve some reconsideration of will and willing within the fields of psychology, psychiatry, and theology. It offers a lively presentation of the issues discussed by the twenty four invited participants in small (...) face to face conferences: Modes of Approach; What does "to will" mean? New Light on Willing from Psychoanalysis? and Does the Will have Power? Opening with a historical survey which argues the necessity of an empirical base, a series of papers by scholars in the fields of psychology, clinical psychiatry, and theology who participated in the conference deal with the problem of will and willing successively within the framework of Heidegger's existentialist philosophy, as handled in traditional and contemporary theology, and as newly approached via the findings of the behavioral sciences; a long and intriguing study of the computer under the title "Willing in Androids" argues that willing and acts of choosing by humans are like the selecting and execution of complicated subroutines in computers; and a final chapter by editor James N. Lapsley of Princeton Theological Seminary, drawing together the threads of discussion in the context of a historical and psychological study of the "self," argues that the whole conception of will and willing is of sufficient scope and significance to warrant renewed consideration.--R. D. (shrink)

Four lectures, delivered at Allahabad and Benares in 1953. They present a straightforward summary of the basic principles of Saiva-Siddhanta, with emphasis on its versions of the cosmological and moral arguments for the existence of God and on the highest function of God as the redeemer of Souls.--D. R.

A cooperative study of the development of Buddhism by eleven top Buddhist scholars. It is about as comprehensive in scope and accurate in detail as one could hope for within any one volume. While each contributor is responsible for his own chapter, the book forms a single, homogeneous whole.--D. R.

An introductory text. Designed "to whet the appetite, not to sate it," the selections are interesting in their own right, and the author's discussions, while kept separate, serve to relate the material rather well. One might wonder at the fact that 35 selections, ranging from Plato to Tillich, including nothing between Aristotle and Descartes, nothing of Hegel or the existentialists, while Mill and James each appear three times. The question must be raised whether the outcome is to whet the appetite (...) or to frustrate it. --D. R. (shrink)

A brilliant scholarly study of the rival Zoroastrian cosmologies, with particular attention to the Zervanite sect. The author shows that their supreme god, Zurvän, was tetramorphous, and appeared as either Time, Space, Wisdom, or Power. The latter part of the book is devoted to texts, notes, and translations of a great body of relevant material from various sources.--D. R.

This is a collection of essays, most being reprints or revisions of works which have appeared elsewhere, focusing on aspects of Rawls’ treatise. The intent of the volume is to furnish a "guide to the problems and lines of criticism which must be pursued" in the furtherance of a "full scholarly assessment of Rawls’ achievement." Additionally, the editor hopes that the collection may serve as "an aid to the education of advanced students" who may be reading Rawls in graduate seminars. (...) The volume is organized around four main themes: 1) contractarianism and the original position, 2) the attack on utilitarianism and the attempt to avoid intuitionism, 3) the doctrines of justice as fairness and the difference principle, and 4) criticisms from the social sciences. The contributors are: Thomas Nagel, Ronald Dworkin, Milton Fisk, R. M. Hare, Joel Feinberg, Gerald Dworkin, David Lyons, T. M. Scanlon, Richard Miller, H. L. A. Hart, Norman Daniels, A. K. Sen, Benjamin Barber, and Frank Michelman. Daniels has also provided an excellent introduction summarizing the issues and criticisms which are debated within: it furnishes a helpful overview of the volume’s contents as well as a conspectus of Rawls criticism generally. Finally there is a selected bibliography of further criticism, and a name index. (shrink)

A re-evaluation of modern naturalism, intuitionism, emotivism, and of the linguistic approaches to the epistemology of ethics, followed by a study of the meaning of ethical sentences through the use of five categories: descriptive, emotive, evaluative, directive, and critical. The contrast developed between emotive and evaluative language, and the discussion of the bearing of critical meaning on the analysis of "ought" sentences are the most interesting.--E: R. G.