This paper explores some interactions between normative/ philosophical/theoretical theorizing about causation and empirical research into causal reasoning and judgment of the sort conducted by psychologists and others. I attempt to extract some general morals regarding the kinds of interactions between the empirical and the more traditionally philosophical that in my experience have been most fruitful. I also compare the experimental work on which I focus with some of the research strategies employed in experimental philosophy.

Critical Reasoning & Philosophy is an innovative and clearly written handbook that teaches studnets how to read critically, think critically while they read, and write thoughtful, sound arguments in response.

Philosophy is a reflective activity. So perhaps it is unsurprising that many philosophers have claimed that reflection plays an important role in shaping and even improving our philosophical thinking. This hypothesis seems plausible given that training in philosophy has correlated with better performance on tests of reflection and reflective reasoning has correlated with demonstrably better judgments in a variety of domains. This article reviews the hypothesized roles of reflection in philosophical thinking as well as the empirical evidence for these roles. (...) This reveals that although there are fairly reliable links between reflection and philosophical judgment among both laypeople and philosophers, the role of reflection in philosophical thinking may nonetheless depend in part on other factors, some of which have yet to be determined. So progress in research on reflection in philosophy may require further innovation in experimental methods and psychometric validation of philosophical measures. (shrink)

In May 2010, philosophers, family and friends gathered at the University of Notre Dame to celebrate the career and retirement of Alvin Plantinga, widely recognized as one of the world's leading figures in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Plantinga has earned particular respect within the community of Christian philosophers for the pivotal role that he played in the recent renewal and development of philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. Each of the essays in this volume engages with some (...) particular aspect of Plantinga's views on metaphysics, epistemology, or philosophy of religion. Contributors include Michael Bergman, Ernest Sosa, Trenton Merricks, Richard Otte, Peter VanInwagen, Thomas P. Flint, Eleonore Stump, Dean Zimmerman and Nicholas Wolterstorff. The volume also includes responses to each essay by Bas van Fraassen, Stephen Wykstra, David VanderLaan, Robin Collins, Raymond VanArragon, E. J. Coffman, Thomas Crisp, and Donald Smith. (shrink)

Many philosophres have attempted to argue from the "Humean Theory of Motivation" (HTM) and the "Internalism Requirement" (IR) to the "Humean Theory of Practical Reason" (HTPR). This argument is familiar, but it has rarely been stated with sufficient precision. In this paper, I shall give a precise statement of this argument. I shall then rely on this statement to show two things. First, the HTPR is false: it is incompatible with some extremely plausible assumptions about weakness of will or (...) akrasia. Second, this argument for the HTPR is invalid: even if the HTM and the IR are true, they do not provide any support whatsoever to the HTPR. (shrink)

Tanney challenges not only the cognitivist approach that has dominated philosophy and the special sciences for fifty years, but metaphysical-empirical approaches to the mind in general. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge advocates a return to the world-involving, circumstance-dependent, normative practices where the rational mind has its home.

_ Source: _Volume 31, Issue 2, pp 166 - 187 The connection that Hobbes makes between reason, method, and science renders reason a faculty that is not only natural but also acquired and even somewhat exclusive. This idea might pose a serious problem to Hobbes’s political theory, as it relies heavily on the successful use of reason. This problem is demonstrated in Hobbes’s account of the laws of nature, for which some equality in human reason is (...) clearly needed, but Hobbes is not explicit about the relationship between that and the more advanced form of reason that eventually leads to science. This article suggests that Hobbes’s account of reason is developmental. The seed of natural reason is common to everyone, and is sufficient for the establishment of the commonwealth. Thereafter, peace and leisure provide the necessary conditions for developing the rational skill, that is, fulfilling the human potential for rationality. Consequently, under the right circumstances, knowledge and science are expected to progress dramatically for the benefit of society, an open-ended vision which Hobbes nevertheless leaves implicit. Following Hobbes’s account of reason and philosophy closely can therefore show that he might have had great hopes for humankind, and that in this sense he was a key member of an English Enlightenment. (shrink)

Mandelbaum believes that views regarding history and man and reason pose problems for philosophy, and he offers critical discussions of some of those problems at the conclusions of parts 2, 3, and 4.

Reason's Traces is a collection of essays by one of the foremost authorities on Indian and Tibetan Buddhism.

This collection of essays by the prominent American philosopher George Santayana includes the famous "The Birth of Reason," "The Philosophy of Travel," "Bertrand Russell's Searchlight," "Appearance and Reality," and "On the False Steps of Philosophy." Also included are essays on Hellenism, Goethe's "Faust," the politics of religion, friendship, and Tom Sawyer as a latterday Don Quixote.

Who gets to decide what it means to live a healthy lifestyle, and how important a healthy lifestyle is to a good life? As more governments make preventing obesity and diet-related illness a priority, it's become more important to consider the ethics and acceptability of their efforts. When it comes to laws and policies that promote healthy eating--such as special taxes on sugary drinks and the banning of food deemed unhealthy--critics argue that these policies are paternalistic, and that they limit (...) individual autonomy over food choices. In Healthy Eating Policy and Political Philosophy: A Public Reason Approach, Anne Barnhill and Matteo Bonotti show that both paternalistic justifications for healthy eating efforts and anti-paternalistic arguments against them can be grounded in perfectionist views that overly prioritize some values over others. The authors therefore propose a more inclusive, public reason approach to healthy eating policy that will be appealing to those who take pluralism and cultural diversity seriously, by providing a framework through which different kinds of values, including but not limited to autonomy and health, can be factored into the public justification for healthy eating efforts. Additionally, the book adopts a 'farm to fork' approach to the ethics of healthy eating efforts: it engages with theories and debates in political philosophy, considers the implications of different theoretical positions for healthy eating efforts, and then develops a concrete tool for assessing policies that will be of interest to both scholars and policymakers. As well as offering a novel normative analysis of healthy eating policy, the authors offer a new theoretical framework that will be applicable to a wide range of public policy scenarios. (shrink)

Talking Philosophy is as much a recollection of Sorabjis childhood and his scholarly life at Oxford as it is a philosophical reflection on issues as varied and complex as whether animals have reason or whether Gandhi could be considered an ethical role model.

If the philosophers of the Enlightenment had hoped to establish, once and for all, that reason is the primary source of human orientation, twentieth century philosophy has demonstrated all too clearly that reason is far from having clear boundaries. In this respect, Immanuel Kant's contemporaries and critics, Johann Georg Hamann and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, look surprisingly modern. Faith is now increasingly recognized as intrinsic to social identity and thus no more capable of taking a permanently subordinate role to (...) reason--whatever that may be--than reason is capable of an existence free from social embodiment. This collection of thirteen essays focuses upon major philosophical and theological debates from the past three hundred years. Written by leading international scholars, this remarkable text takes the reader through major transitions in the modern understanding of faith and reason. It thus provides an invaluable guide to the history of modern philosophical theology whilst informing readers why the relationship between faith and reason remains an issue of major social and philosophical importance."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

Argument is a pervasive feature of human interaction, and in its natural contexts of occurrence, it is organized around the management of disagreement. Since disagreement can occur around any kind of speech act whatsoever, not all arguments involve a claim supported by reasons; many involve standpoints attributed to someone but claimed by no one. And although truth and validity are often at issue in naturally occurring arguments, these do not exhaust the standards to which arguers are held. Arguers hold one (...) another accountable for cooperating in the management of disagreement, infusing argumentation with a natural normativity that exists apart from any theorized appraisal standard applied to the claim-reason relationship. Argumentation’s natural normativity is visible not only in how arguments unfold in interaction but also in how humanity continuously strives to improve its methods of disagreement management. (shrink)

This book offers new insights into the nature of human rational capacities by engaging inferentialism with empirical research in the cognitive sciences. Inferentialism advocates that humans' unique kind of intelligence is discursive and rooted in competencies to make, assess and justify claims. This approach provides a rich source of valuable insights into the nature of our rational capacities, but it is underdeveloped in important respects. For example, little attempt has been made to assess inferentialism considering relevant scientific research on human (...) communication, cognition or reasoning. By engaging philosophical and scientific approaches in a productive dialogue, this book shows how we can better understand human rational capacities by comparing their respective strengths and weaknesses. In this vein, the author critically revisits and constructively develops central themes from the work of Robert Brandom and other language rationalists: the nature of the assertoric practice and its connection to reasoned discourse, the linguistic constitution of the shared space of reasons, the social nature and function of reasoning, the intersubjective roots of social-normative practices and the nature of objective thought. Practices of Reason will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and philosophy of logic. (shrink)

The subject of this article is Leibnizian interpretation of the principle of reason. Although the German philosopher called it principium grande of his philosophy, we do not find its systematic exposition in Leibniz’s works. The main aim of my paper is to present a short exposition of the principle. The article consists of three parts: in the first I present systematic exposition of the principle of reason with particular emphasis on explication of terms “principle” and “reason,” in (...) the second, I show the origins of the principle, finally, in the third part, I discuss in detail three forms of it: the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of determining reason and the principle of rendering reason. I accept two main theses: firstly, a proper interpretation of this principle requires taking into account the whole context of Leibnizian philosophy, i.e. one cannot limit oneself (as it is usually happens among researchers) to only one discipline, e.g. logic. Secondly, the ultimate methodological and heuristical foundation of the principle of reason is Leibnizian metaphysics, especially natural theology. (shrink)

Since the seventeenth century, Western society has had a turbulent relationship with Reason. Descartes set out to reorganize all his opinions in the light of Reason, allowing, as Pascal bitterly reproached him, nothing else. In the course of the centuries which followed, the relationship with Reason became the object of a vigorous, often passionate debate. David Hume declared Reason to be impotent; Immanuel Kant observed that men suffered from "misology" as the result of their disappointed expectations (...) of Reason; G. W. F. Hegel declared that the main insight of philosophy consisted of the realization that reason masterminded and guided all history. The debate has not remained restricted to philosophy. Max Weber, the most influential modern sociologist, was obsessed with the distinctive role of Reason in Western society, and the part it played in engendering industrialism. Social anthropologists have been preoccupied both with the universality and the diversity of conceptual thought. Emile Durkheim taught them to ask why all men were rational, whilst Max Weber taught sociologists to ask why some men were more rational than others. This book brings together the philosophical, historical and sociological discussions of rationality and strives to make clear the underlying issues and the continuity of the debate under the various idioms. (shrink)

Introduction: the question of reason -- The Frankfurt School critique of reason -- Habermas's communicative rationality -- Macintyre's tradition-constituted reason -- A substantive reason -- Beyond relativism: reasonable progress and learning from -- Conclusion: toward a Thomistic-Aristotelian critical theory of society.

In this paper, I argue that the notion of ‘reasonableness’ that is, for many, at the heart of the Philosophy for Children approach particularly and education for democratic citizenship more broadly, is constituted within the epistemology of ‘white ignorance’ and operates in such a way that it is unlikely to transgress the boundaries of white ignorance so as to view it from without. Drawing on scholarship in critical legal studies and social epistemology, I highlight how notions of reasonableness often include (...) consensus, ‘racialised common sense’ and the ‘typical’ view. In addition the promotion of particular dispositions on the grounds of ‘reasonableness’ both promotes stability and limits how one may think otherwise. Thus, P4C practices that fail to historicise, examine and challenge prevailing notions of reasonableness establish an epistemically ‘gated’ community of inquiry. (shrink)

LOCKE IS FREQUENTLY CALLED AN EMPIRICIST. HOWEVER, THE\nROLES OF REASON AND EXPERIENCE IN LOCKE'S EPISTEMOLOGY\nHAVE, THEREBY, BEEN OBSCURED. IN THIS PAPER, DIFFERENT\nSENSES OF "EMPIRICISM" AND "RATIONALISM" ARE DISTINGUISHED,\nAND RELEVANT PASSAGES FROM LOCKE'S WRITINGS ARE SCRUTINIZED\nFOR PURPOSES OF EXPLICATING HIS EPISTEMOLOGY. THROUGH THIS\nEXAMINATION, IT IS SEEN THAT LOCKE, LIKE KANT, SEEKS A\n"REASON-EXPERIENCE SYNTHESIS" AND THAT THE BLANKET LABEL\n"EMPIRICIST," AS APPLIED TO LOCKE, IS MOST UNFORTUNATE.

From sex and music to religion and politics, a history of irrationality and the ways in which it has always been with us—and always will be In this sweeping account of irrationality from antiquity to the rise of Twitter mobs and the election of Donald Trump, Justin Smith argues that irrationality makes up the greater part of human life and history. Ranging across philosophy, politics, and current events, he shows that, throughout history, every triumph of reason has been temporary (...) and reversible, and that rational schemes often result in their polar opposite. Illuminating unreason at a moment when the world appears to have gone mad again, Irrationality is timely, provocative, and fascinating. (shrink)

At the same time, the book is a contribution to recent philosophical debates, in particular on the prospects for a successful nominalist reconstruction of .

ABSTRACTThis essay argues that in spite of the powerful arguments by Kolodny and Broome there is a reason to be rational. The suggested reason to be rational is that if an agent complies with ratio...

The contribution of food and diet to health is much disputed in the background culture in the US. Many commercial or ideological advocates make claims, sometimes with health as a primary goal, but often accompanied by commercial or ideological interests. These compete culturally with authoritative recommendations made by publicly funded groups. For public policy concerning diet and health to be legitimate, not only should it not be inconsistent with the scientific evidence, but also it should not be inconsistent with the (...) political environment. Healthy Eating Policy and Political Philosophy (HEPPP), by Barnhill and Bonotti (2022), addresses how policy in this complex area might be justified. In the present essay I highlight some important strengths of their work and also make some points about how it might be clarified or enlarged in scope. The great strength of HEPPP is that it emphasizes the role of a political philosophy in evaluating the legitimacy of public policy. They presume a well-off liberal democratic state, and specifically they draw on Rawls’ political liberalism, as developed in Political Liberalism (PL). One of several interlocking technical concepts developed in this book, public reason speaks to the boundaries of what should be acceptable in public deliberation about constitutional essentials and basic justice. HEPPP explores the application of an extension of public reason to the justification of policies related to “healthy eating.“ Public reason has two components, both of which pertain to a common understanding among citizens: (1) a common understanding of the principles and ideals that are the foundation of the political society, and (2) a common understanding of the standards that govern reason and evidence, including common sense. HEPPP argues that even though for diet and health the complexity of the scientific evidence goes far beyond anything like common sense for a typical citizen, the technical idea of “accessibility” of the scientific evidence justifies reliance on it within the concept of public reason. I question this accessibility argument about scientific evidence and public reason because the nature of the population-level epidemiological evidence about diet and health is that it often includes judgments that are based on arguable interpretations, framing incidence in terms of risk and prevention; thus the issue is more than one of potential accessibility of scientific evidence. Nevertheless, evaluation and consideration of the scientific evidence is of obvious practical importance in policy deliberation concerning policy related to what Rawls call “ordinary legislation.“ Even though public reason applied to healthy eating policy may not be as pertinent as it is for constitutional essentials and basic justice, and even though it is unlikely to result in a “correct outcome,“ invoking reasons based on political values and principles held in common has important value even in these deliberations about more ordinary questions. That value applies not to the specifics of the particular issue, but to the larger context for the particular policy being deliberated, as a potential contribution to an overlapping consensus that is stable for the right reasons. If this vision of political liberalism were achieved, then contentious debate about health eating policy and its scientific basis could occur within that context and be resolved within the basic political structure. Because public health and political liberalism have a common concern for a good at the population level, they have an underlying affinity. Healthy eating policies could be evaluated in two not-unrelated ways: based on their instrumental contribution to the good of the public body of citizens as population-level health, and according to their stabilizing contribution to an overlapping consensus among citizens. In this latter way a policy would contribute to a conditional integral common good a la Sulmasy, one that has the prospect of conditioning a political system, and by doing so create the conditions of the possibility of a constitutive integral common good that is constituted on the right reasons for allegiance to an overlapping consensus. To conclude with reference to HEPPP, public reason may play an important function with respect to the political common good, even as debates about the weight and meaning of scientific evidence from epidemiology play out in deliberation of ordinary legislation concerning healthy eating. (shrink)

Most public reason theorists believe that citizens are under a ‘duty of restraint’. Citizens must refrain from supporting laws for which they have only non-public reasons, such as religious reasons. The theo-ethical equilibrium argument purports to show that theists should accept this duty, on the basis of their religious convictions. Theists’ beliefs about God’s nature should lead them to doubt moral claims for which they cannot find secular grounds, and to refrain from imposing such claims upon others. If successful, (...) this argument would defuse prominent objections to public reason liberalism. This paper assesses the theo-ethical equilibrium argument, with a specific focus on Christian citizens. I argue that Christians should seek theo-ethical equilibrium, but need not endorse the duty of restraint. I establish this in part through examining the important theological concept of natural law. That discussion also points to more general and persistent problems with defining ‘public reasons’. (shrink)

The Force of Reason and the Logic of Force investigates the concept of force through various "episodes" in the history of philosophy. The author argues that force arises on the basis of the distinction of reality and mere appearance. The book looks at figures who reduce force to something other than itself as well as figures who develop a "logic of force" that allows them to trace the operation of force without such a reduction.

This article considers the justification of laws to religious citizens. It does via a consideration of the debate surround the teaching of Intelligent Design. It argues that one widely held view of political morality, public reason liberalism, requires that schools should allow teaching ID. This is contrary to the views of many defenders of this theory. I show that this argument reveals a deep problem with public reason liberalism, and that it undermines the judgement of the court in (...) the high profile case of Kitzmiller vs Dover. (shrink)

This paper defends strong internalism about reasons, the view that reasons must relate to pre-existing motivational states, from several kinds of counterexamples, supposed desire independent reasons, that have been proposed. A central distinction drawn is that between there being a reason and an agent's having a reason. For an agent to have an F reason, she must be F-minded. Reasons, as what motivate us, are states of affairs and not themselves desires or motivational states, but they must (...) connect to existing motivational states. It has been claimed that rationality itself requires us to recognize certain reasons independent of our desires, that we acquire new desires by learning what is valuable, by acquiring desire-independent reasons to pursue certain values. It is claimed also that prudential and moral reasons are desire independent. By offering an account of rationality as coherence, by appealing to broader concerns as opposed to specific desires, and by appealing to the distinction noted above, the paper exposes weaknesses in recent arguments for desire independent reasons by Millgram, Smith, Korsgaard, and Searle. the reasons they propose can be interpreted as internal (not desire independent) or dismissed as nonexistent. (shrink)

Introduction -- Suspension -- Hegel and Schelling -- Outline of the whole -- The surge of reason : faculty epistemology in Kant and Fichte -- The first critique's basic distinction -- The third critique -- Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre -- Ascendant reason : the early Schelling -- Of the I -- The treatises -- Metastatic reason : Schelling's nature philosophy -- Organic reason : ideas for a philosophy of nature -- Rational nature : on the world-soul -- Inhibition (...) of nature : the Erster entwurf -- Synthetic reason : the system of transcendental idealism -- The idea of system -- The synthetic method -- History and art -- Reason as reflection and speculation : Hegel's collaboration with Schelling -- The differenzschrift -- Krug's pen -- The sacred abyss : Schelling's identity philosophy -- The darstellung -- System of philosophy in general -- Space, time, and suspension : Hegel's absolute knowing -- The phenomenology's critique of Schelling -- Absolute knowing -- Suspended reason : Hegel on the certainty and truth of reason -- Empty idealism -- Observing nature -- Observing self-consciousness -- Self-actualizing reason -- The project of individuality -- Reason on the periphery : Schelling's freedom essay -- Reason as peripheral -- Pantheism and freedom -- God as existing -- Longing for ground -- The possibility of evil -- The actuality of evil -- System, ground, and indifference -- Reason's systematic excess -- Hegel's system -- The myth of totalizing reason -- The philosophy of nature -- History -- Reason's systematic excess -- Schelling's positive philosophy -- The natural history of reason -- The critique of Hegel -- Now what? (shrink)

Darrow Schecter explores the most important theoretical and political debates about the relation between reason and legitimacy.

I BEGIN with a summary. The mind-body problem is one of a group of four and cannot be adequately understood without some understanding of the others. It deals with the relation of an individual mind to an individual body. But there is also a question of how an individual mind is related to an impersonal body that is a part of a world; how an individual body is related to an impersonal mind that is part of a reason; and, (...) finally, how the world and reason are related. I think all can be resolved by taking account of a mediator in which both extremes are interfused in an epitomized form. A mind and body are related by means of an individualized human nature; mind and world by a body; body and reason by a mind; and reason and world by a self. (shrink)