Results for 'Reasonable person'

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  1.  20
    Reasonable Persons, Autonomous Persons, and Lady Hale: Determining a Standard for Risk Disclosure.John Banja - 2020 - Hastings Center Report 50 (2):25-34.
    Among various kinds of disclosures typically required in research as well as in clinical scenarios, risk information figures prominently. A key question is, what kinds of risk information would the reasonable person want to know? I will argue, however, that the reasonable person construct is and always has been incapable of settling this very question. After parsing the nebulous if not “contentless” character of the reasonable person, I will explain how Western courts have actually (...)
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  2. (1 other version)Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity.S. L. Hurley - 1990 - Philosophy 65 (254):528-530.
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  3.  22
    The Reasonable Person Standard for Research Disclosure: A Reasonable Addition to the Common Rule.Rebecca Dresser - 2019 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 47 (2):194-202.
    The revised Common Rule adopts the reasonable person standard to guide research disclosure. Some members of the research community contend that the standard is confusing and ill-suited to the research oversight system. Yet the revised rule is not as radical as it might seem. During the 1970s, judges started using the standard to evaluate negligence claims brought by injured patients who said doctors had failed to obtain informed consent to the harmful procedures. In its influential Belmont Report, the (...)
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  4. Natural reasons: personality and polity.Susan L. Hurley - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Hurley here revives a classical idea about rationality in a modern framework, by developing analogies between the structure of personality and the structure of society in the context of contemporary work in philosophy of mind, ethics, decision theory and social choice theory. The book examines the rationality of decisions and actions, and illustrates the continuity of philosophy of mind on the one hand, and ethics and jurisprudence on the other. A major thesis of the book is that arguments drawn from (...)
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  5. Individualizing the Reasonable Person in Criminal Law.Peter Westen - 2008 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 2 (2):137-162.
    Criminal law commonly requires judges and juries to decide whether defendants acted reasonably. Nevertheless, issues of reasonableness fall into two distinct categories: (1) where reasonableness concerns events and states, including risks of which an actor is conscious, that can be justly assessed without regard to the actor’s individual traits, and (2) where reasonableness concerns culpable mental states and emotions that cannot justly be assessed without reference to the actor’s capacities. This distinction is significant because, while the reasonable person (...)
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  6.  8
    The Reasonable Person: A Legal Biography.Valentin Jeutner - 2024 - Cambridge University Press.
    Jeutner argues that the reasonable person is, at heart, an empathetic perspective-taking device, by tracing the standard of the reasonable person across time, legal fields and countries. Beginning with a review of imaginary legal figures in the legal systems of ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome, the book explains why the common law's reasonable person emerged amidst the British industrialisation under the influence of Scottish Enlightenment thinking. Following the figure into colonial courts, onto battlefields and (...)
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  7.  32
    Reincarnation and Karma.Paul Reasoner - 1997 - In Charles Taliaferro & Philip L. Quinn (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 639–647.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Reincarnation/Rebirth Karma Causality Problem of Evil Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility Karma and Release Transfer of Merit Recent Developments Works cited.
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  8. The "Reasonable Person" and the Psychopath.Jeffrey Bedrick - 2014 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1):13-15.
    I have great sympathy for what seem to be two main goals in Michelle Ciurria’s (2014) “Moral Responsibility and Mental Health: Applying the Standard of the Reasonable Person,” although I am not sure the reasonable person standard achieves either of the goals. These central goals seem to be to preserve an objective standard of moral responsibility and to do so in a way that “does not depersonalize the target individual” (Ciurria 2014, 7). In this commentary, I (...)
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  9.  29
    The common rule's ‘reasonable person’ standard for informed consent.Jacob Greenblum & Ryan Hubbard - 2018 - Bioethics 33 (2):274-277.
    Laura Odwazny and Benjamin Berkman have raised several challenges regarding the new reasonable person standard in the revised Common Rule, which states that in‐ formed consent requires potential research subjects be provided with information a reasonable person would want to know to make an informed decision on whether to participate in a study. Our aim is to offer a response to the challenges Odwazny and Berkman raise, which include the need for a reasonable person (...)
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  10.  12
    Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity.S. L. Hurley - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
    This provocative study revives a classical idea about rationality by developing analogies between the structure of personality and the structure of society in the context of contemporary work in the philosophy of mind, ehtics, decision theory, and social choice theory.
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  11. Parsing the Reasonable Person: The Case of Self-Defense.Andrew Ingram - 2012 - American Journal of Criminal Law 39 (3):101-120.
    Mistakes are a fact of life, and the criminal law is sadly no exception to the rule. Wrongful convictions are rightfully abhorred, and false acquittals can likewise inspire outrage. In these cases, we implicitly draw a distinction between a court’s finding and a defendant’s actual guilt or innocence. These are intuitive concepts, but as this paper aims to show, contemporary use of the reasonable person standard in the law of self-defense muddles them. -/- Ordinarily, we can distinguish between (...)
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  12.  30
    Would a Reasonable Person Now Accept the 1968 Harvard Brain Death Report? A Short History of Brain Death.Robert M. Veatch - 2018 - Hastings Center Report 48 (S4):6-9.
    When The Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death began meeting in 1967, I was a graduate student, with committee member Ralph Potter and committee chair Henry Beecher as my mentors. The question of when to stop life support on a severely compromised patient was not clearly differentiated from the question of when someone was dead. A serious clinical problem arose when physicians realized that a patient's condition was hopeless but life support perpetuated (...)
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  13.  49
    Is the Reasonable Person a Person of Virtue?Michele Mangini - 2020 - Res Publica 26 (2):157-179.
    The ‘reasonable person standard’ is often called on in difficult legal cases as the last resource to be appealed to when other solutions run out. Its complexity derives from the controversial tasks that people place on it. Two dialectics require some clarification: the objective/subjective interpretation of the standard and the ideal/ordinary person controversy. I shall move through these dialectics from the standpoint of an EV approach, assuming that on this interpretation the RPS can perform most persuasively its (...)
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  14.  50
    The “Reasonable Person” Standard for Research Informed Consent.Laura M. Odwazny & Benjamin E. Berkman - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics 17 (7):49-51.
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  15.  14
    Reasons, Persons, Eugenics and an Argument in Favour of Gene Editing.Rebecca Bennett - 2024 - American Journal of Bioethics 24 (8):37-40.
    Volume 24, Issue 8, August 2024, Page 37-40.
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  16.  80
    Against Personifying the Reasonable Person.Matt King - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):725-732.
    One way in which fact finders are supposed to determine the reasonableness of a defendant is via a counterfactual test that personifies the reasonable person. We are to imagine the reasonable person being in the defendant’s circumstances. Then we are to determine whether the reasonable person would have done as the defendant did. This paper argues that, despite its prevalence, the counterfactual test is a hopeless guide to determining defendant reasonability. In brief, the test (...)
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  17. Practical Reasons, Person, and Common Good.Alejandra Carrasco - 2000 - Vera Lex 1 (1/2):73-98.
     
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  18.  31
    Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity.Ross Harrison - 1991 - Philosophical Books 32 (4):229-231.
  19.  57
    The Standard of the Reasonable Person: An Objective, Intuitive Account That Treats People as Persons.Michelle Ciurria - 2014 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1):21-25.
    In my paper on moral responsibility and mental health disabilities, I defended the use of the standard of the reasonable person (SRP), adapted from W.O. Holmes’ famous account of responsibility in The Common Law (1881). This theory is meant to be applicable to all cases of moral responsibility assessment, but it is particularly apt for ascribing moral responsibility in cases of mental illness on a realist basis. This is because it has three distinctive advantages over the alternatives, that (...)
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  20. The many faces of the reasonable person.John Gardner - unknown
    In this paper I attempt a general explanation of the role played by the reasonable person in law, especially but not only in the common law. I relate my explanation to some problems about the very nature of law, and some problems about the ideal of the rule of law.
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  21. Implicit Bias, Self-Defence, and the Reasonable Person.Jules Holroyd & Federico Picinali - 2022 - In Matt Matravers & Claes Lernestedt (eds.), The Criminal Law's Person. Hart Publishing.
    The reasonable person standard is used in adjudicating claims of self-defence. In US law, an individual may use defensive force if her beliefs that a threat is imminent and that force is required are beliefs that a reasonable person would have. In English law, it is sufficient that beliefs in imminence and necessity are genuinely held; but the reasonableness of so believing is given an evidential role in establishing the genuineness of the beliefs. There is, of (...)
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  22. Autonomous Action: Self-Determination in the Passive Mode Autonomous Action: Self-Determination in the Passive Mode (pp. 647-691). [REVIEW]Two-Level Eudaimonism, Second-Personal Reasons Two-Level Eudaimonism, Second-Personal Reasons, Anita L. Allen, Jack Balkin, Seyla Benhabib, Talbot Brewer, Peter Cane, Thomas Hurka & Robert N. Johnson - 2012 - Ethics 122 (4).
     
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  23.  34
    Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity By S. L. Hurley Oxford University Press, 1990, xii + 462 pp., £40.00. [REVIEW]Martin Hollis - 1990 - Philosophy 65 (254):528-.
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  24. Lomasky on Practical Reason: Personal Value and Metavalues.Shane Courtland - 2007 - Reason Papers 29:83-104.
     
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  25.  65
    Second-Personal Reasons and Moral Obligations.Wenwen Fan - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (1):69-86.
    Stephan Darwall (2006, 2010) claims that a conceptual connection exists between moral obligation and what he calls ‘second-personal reasons.’ In particular, he (2006) claims that, “moral obligation is an irreducibly second-personal concept. That an action would violate a moral obligation is…a second-personal reason not to do it.” A second-personal reason, according to him (2006), is “a distinctive kind of (normative) reason for acting,” a reason made on one’s will and purportedly given by an authority’s demand or address. This paper argues (...)
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  26.  80
    S. L. Hurley, Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. xii + 462.John Charvet - 1993 - Utilitas 5 (2):321.
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  27.  22
    Rescuing Informed Consent: How the new “Key Information” and “Reasonable Person” Provisions in the Revised U.S. Common Rule open the door to long Overdue Informed Consent Disclosure Improvements and why we need to walk Through that door.Mark Yarborough - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (3):1423-1443.
    There is substantial published evidence showing that countless people enroll each year in ethically deficient clinical trials. Many of the trials are problematic because the quality of the science used to justify their launch may not be sufficiently vetted while many other trials may lack requisite social value. This poses the question: why do people volunteer for them? The answer resides in large part in the fact that informed consent practices have historically masked, rather than disclosed, the information that would (...)
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  28. Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
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  29.  90
    (1 other version)Moral Responsibility and Mental Health: Applying the Standard of the Reasonable Person.Michelle Ciurria - 2014 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1):1-12.
    It is contested whether and to what extent moral responsibility can be ascribed to persons with mental health disabilities. Will Cartwright (2006) evaluates two prevalent theories of responsibility in terms of their suitability for morally appraising sociopathic personality disorder, particularly as embodied in the famous homicidal bank robber Robert Harris. Cartwright argues that our intuitions about Harris conflict because we are instantly horrified by Harris’ actions, but we are forced to reconsider our initial moral reaction when we reflect on Harris’ (...)
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  30. Fitting the people they are meant to serve: Reasonable persons in the american legal system.P. S. - 2003 - Law and Philosophy 22 (1):75-110.
    What does the law demand when it requires citizens to conform to standards of reasonableness? I propose and defend the view that the law should demand that citizens conform their behavior to some actual conduct in society. I contrast this idea against what might be called the ``empty vessel'' view of reasonableness, where the standard is understood to function like an empty vessel in the law, allowing courts to use various norms and moral judgments to determine what seems reasonable (...)
     
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  31. The meaning of ‘reasonable’: Evidence from a corpus-linguistic study.Lucien Baumgartner & Markus Kneer - 2025 - In Kevin Tobia (ed.), The Cambridge handbook of experimental jurisprudence. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
    The reasonable person standard is key to both Criminal Law and Torts. What does and does not count as reasonable behavior and decision-making is frequently deter- mined by lay jurors. Hence, laypeople’s understanding of the term must be considered, especially whether they use it predominately in an evaluative fashion. In this corpus study based on supervised machine learning models, we investigate whether laypeople use the expression ‘reasonable’ mainly as a descriptive, an evaluative, or merely a value-associated (...)
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  32. Reason and the First Person u knjizi Wright, C., Smith, B: C. and Macdonald, C.T. Burge - 2002 - In Michael McKinsey (ed.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Wiley-Blackwell.
  33.  54
    Reasons Without Persons: Rationality, Identity, and Time.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.
    Brian Hedden defends a radical view about the relationship between rationality, personal identity, and time. On the standard view, personal identity over time plays a central role in thinking about rationality, because there are rational norms for how a person's attitudes and actions at one time should fit with her attitudes and actions at other times. But these norms are problematic. They make what you rationally ought to believe or do depend on facts about your past that aren't part (...)
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  34. Practical Reason and Respect for Persons.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (1):53-79.
    My project is to reconsider the Kantian conception of practical reason. Some Kantians think that practical reasoning must be more active than theoretical reasoning, on the putative grounds that such reasoning need not contend with what is there anyway, independently of its exercise. Behind that claim stands the thesis that practical reason is essentially efficacious. I accept the efficacy principle, but deny that it underwrites this inference about practical reason. My inquiry takes place against the background of recent Kantian metaethical (...)
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  35.  3
    In Praise of Logical Inconsistency: World Athletics and the Evidence Bar of the “Reasonable Person in Good Faith”.Silvia Camporesi & Sarah Teetzel - 2024 - American Journal of Bioethics 24 (11):21-23.
    Jennings and Braun (2024) suggest that if World Athletics (WA) is fully committed to a vision of fairness based on “talent, dedication, and hard work” the federation would need to endorse and adopt...
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  36. Reason and the first person.Tyler Burge - 1998 - In C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    The first part of the paper focuses on the role played in thought and action by possession of the first‐person concept. It is argued that only one who possesses the I concept is in a position to fully articulate certain fundamental, a priori aspects of the concept of reason. A full understanding of the concept of reason requires being inclined to be affected or immediately motivated by reasons—to form, change or confirm beliefs or other attitudes in accordance with them—when (...)
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  37.  51
    Fitting the people they are meant to serve: Reasonable persons in the american legal system. [REVIEW]Steven P. Scalet - 2003 - Law and Philosophy 22 (1):75 - 110.
    What does the law demand when it requirescitizens to conform to standards ofreasonableness? I propose and defend theview that the law should demand thatcitizens conform their behavior to someactual conduct in society. I contrast thisidea against what might be called the``empty vessel'' view of reasonableness,where the standard is understood tofunction like an empty vessel in the law,allowing courts to use various norms andmoral judgments to determine what seemsreasonable in the circumstances. Theempty vessel account is the more commonapproach for understanding reasonableness,but (...)
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  38.  6
    Certainty, Truth and Tolerance: Constraints and implications of "Any 'reasonable' person behaves like this". 김화경 - 2012 - 동서철학연구(Dong Seo Cheol Hak Yeon Gu; Studies in Philosophy East-West) 66 (66):369-390.
    본고에서는 비트겐슈타인이 우리의 사고와 탐구의 출발점이자, 언어활동을 가능하게 하는 근본토대로서 제시하고 있는 ‘확실성’의 개념이 과연 그가 의도한대로 의심의 부재, 정당화의 부재에도 불구하고 인식론적인 차원에서만이 아니라 실천적인 차원에서도 그 역할을 제대로 담당하고 있는지를 고찰한다. 우리에게 주어진 과제는 서로 경쟁하면서 갈등 관계에 있는 세계상이 충돌했을 경우에 그것으로부터 벌어질 수 있는 긴장 관계를 해소하기 위한 구체적인 대안에 대한 고찰이다. 이 대안은 무엇보다도 관용의 가능성을 위해서 행위의 규범성이나 진리성의 정의에 전적으로 의존하지 않으면서도 어떤 과정을 통해서 우리가 한 행동을 옳거나 그르다고 판단할 수 있는지에 대한 (...)
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  39.  83
    Golden opportunity, reasonable risk and personal responsibility for health.Julian Savulescu - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (1):59-61.
    In her excellent and comprehensive article, Friesen argues that utilising personal responsibility in healthcare is problematic in several ways: it is difficult to ascribe responsibility to behaviour; there is a risk of prejudice and bias in deciding which behaviours a person should be held responsible for; it may be ineffective at reducing health costs. In this short commentary, I will elaborate the critique of personal responsibility in health but suggest one way in which it could be used ethically. In (...)
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  40.  54
    Practical Reasoning and the First Person.David Hunter - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):677-700.
    I argue that while practical reasoning is essentially first personal it does not require having essentially first personal thoughts. I start with an example of good practical reasoning. Because there is debate about what practical reasoning is, I discuss how different sides in those debates can accommodate my example. I then consider whether my example involves essentially first personal thoughts. It is not always clear what philosophers who would claim that it must have in mind. I identify two features of (...)
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  41. Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
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  42.  89
    Reasons to Expect Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) to Vary Across Cultures.Rachel V. Cooper - 2021 - In Luca Malatesti, John McMillan & Predrag Šustar (eds.), Psychopathy: Its Uses, Validity and Status. Cham: Springer. pp. 253-268.
    I present two philosophical arguments that Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) and Psychopathy can be expected to be culturally variable. I argue that the ways in which people with ASPD and psychopaths can be expected to act will vary with societal values and culture. In the second part of the chapter, I will briefly review some of the empirical literature on cross-cultural variation in ASPD and psychopathy and argue that it is consistent with my philosophical claims. My conclusion in this chapter (...)
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  43. (1 other version)Reasonableness on the Clapham Omnibus: Exploring the outcome-sensitive folk concept of reasonable.Markus Kneer - 2022 - In P. Bystranowski, Bartosz Janik & M. Prochnicki (eds.), Judicial Decision-Making: Integrating Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives. Springer Nature. pp. 25-48.
    This paper presents a series of studies (total N=579) which demonstrate that folk judgments concerning the reasonableness of decisions and actions depend strongly on whether they engender positive or negative consequences. A particular decision is deemed more reasonable in retrospect when it produces beneficial consequences than when it produces harmful consequences, even if the situation in which the decision was taken and the epistemic circumstances of the agent are held fixed across conditions. This finding is worrisome for the law, (...)
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  44.  32
    Religious Reasoning in the Liberal Public from the Second-Personal Perspective.Patrick Zoll - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20 (3).
    There is a constant dissent between exclusivist public reason liberals and their inclusivist religious critics concerning the question whether religious arguments can figure into the public justification of state action. Firstly, I claim that the stability of this dissent is best explained as a conflict between an exclusivist third-personal account of public justification which demands restraint, and an inclusivist first-personal account which rejects restraint. Secondly, I argue that both conceptions are deficient because they cannot accommodate the valid intuitions of their (...)
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  45. Reason explanation and the second-person perspective.Johannes Roessler - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):346-357.
    On a widely held view, the canonical way to make sense of intentional actions is to invoke the agent's ‘motivating reasons’, where the claim that X did A for some ‘motivating reason’ is taken to be neutral on whether X had a normative reason to do A. In this paper, I explore a challenge to this view, drawing on Anscombe's ‘second-personal’ approach to the nature of action explanation.
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  46. Moral Reasoning and Personal Decision.James E. Bayley - 1986 - In Martin Tamny & K. D. Irani (eds.), Rationality in thought and action. New York: Greenwood Press. pp. 29--19.
  47. Elusive reasons: A problem for first-person authority.Krista Lawlor - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):549-565.
    Recent social psychology is skeptical about self-knowledge. Philosophers, on the other hand, have produced a new account of the source of the authority of self-ascriptions. On this account, it is not descriptive accuracy but authorship which funds the authority of one's self-ascriptions. The resulting view seems to ensure that self-ascriptions are authoritative, despite evidence of one's fallibility. However, a new wave of psychological studies presents a powerful challenge to the authorship account. This research suggests that one can author one's attitudes, (...)
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  48.  64
    Moral Reasoning in the Climate Crisis: A Personal Guide.Arthur R. Obst - 2024 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 11 (2):371-395.
    This article substantiates the common intuition that it is wrong to contribute to dangerous climate change for no significant reason. To advance this claim, I first propose a basic principle that one has the moral obligation to act in accordance with the weight of moral reasons. I further claim that there are significant moral reasons for individuals not to emit greenhouse gases, as many other climate ethicists have already argued. Then, I assert that there are often no significant moral (or (...)
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  49.  40
    Seriously Personal: The Reasons that Motivate Entrepreneurs to Address Climate Change.Katharina Kaesehage, Michael Leyshon, George Ferns & Catherine Leyshon - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 157 (4):1091-1109.
    Scholars increasingly argue that entrepreneurs and their small- and medium-sized enterprises should play a central role in reducing the rate and magnitude of climate change. However, evidence suggests that while some entrepreneurs recognize their crucial role in addressing climate change, most do not. Why some entrepreneurs nevertheless concern themselves with climate change has largely been overlooked. Some initial work in this area tentatively suggests that these entrepreneurs may engage with climate change because of their personal values, which either focus on (...)
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  50. (1 other version)Reasons and Conscious Persons.Christian Coseru - 2020 - In Andrea Sauchelli (ed.), Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 160-186.
    What justifies holding the person that we are today morally responsible for something we did a year ago? And why are we justified in showing prudential concern for the future welfare of the person we will be a year from now? These questions cannot be systematically pursued without addressing the problem of personal identity. This essay considers whether Buddhist Reductionism, a philosophical project grounded on the idea that persons reduce to a set of bodily, sensory, perceptual, dispositional, and (...)
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