This ar ti cle has as ob jec ti ve for mu la tes a cri tic to Ri chard Rorty`s an ti mar xism and his de fen se of the po li ti cal li be ra lism. The ar ti cle tries to do it, in first pla ce, des cri bing the phi lo sop hi cal cri tic of Rorty to Marx; in se cond pla ce iden tif ying two in t..

This paper traces the seminal notion of khora back to its birthplace text of Plato's Timaeus. At the same time, it develops a critique of Jacques Derrida's reading of khora in the context of apophatism, or negative theology. John Caputo's reading as well as Richard Kearney's criticism of the latter are presented and discussed in this text. Finally, the article suggests that the image of khora could provide continental philosophy with an example of wliat the author calls "Hermeneutics of Hyphenation", (...) where an attempt to overcome the binary structure of traditional metaphysics, especially in our thinking of God, is accomplished. /// O presente artigo traça a genealogia da noção seminal de khora até ao seu local de nascimento no Timeu de Platão. Para além disso, o autor apresenta uma crítica da leitura que Jacques Derrida faz da noção de khora no contexto do apofatistmo, ou teologia negativa. A leitura que desta noção faz John Caputo bem como a crítica que desta por sua vez faz Ri-chard Kearney são igualmente apresentadas e discutidas no presente texto. Por fim, o autor sugere que a imagem de khora pode dotar a filosofia continental europeia com um exemplo daquilo a que neste texto se designa por "Hermenêutica da hifenização", na qual se procede justamente a uma tentativa de superação da estrutura binária própría da metafísica tradicional, particularmente no que se refere ao nosso pensamento acerca de Deus. (shrink)

"This book brings together articles, which I previously published on my blog, Barrarsīhā-ye Tārīkhī, about the history of kalām and falsafa (Islamic theology and philosophy). Many of the articles contain research on the history of Muʿtazilī kalām, especially among the Shīʿa, whether Zaydīs or Imāmīs. Some articles also discuss the history of philosophical theology in Islam, the Avicennian tradition in Khurāsān and the relationship between the theologians and the philosophers, especially in the sixth and seventh centuries hijrī. A chapter about (...) the maktab-e tafkīk is also included, in which the relationship between the Akhbārī position and the philosophical approach among the Imāmiyya, is discussed. In addition, some of the articles treat the concept of imāma according to Zaydī and Muʿtazilī thinkers, and the genre of imāma in their literature, as well as the refutations that were written between Zaydīs and Muʿtazilīs, and also Imāmīs. Some articles on the history of Sunnī kalām are also included. Part of the book takes a bibliographical approach, or is based on texts, and part takes a historical approach to study the history of kalām and falsafa as well as the relationship between both. The purpose of this book is to provide readers a historical reading of the history of kalām and falsafa —mostly within the Shīʿī and Muʿtazilī traditions. Even at present, many Muʿtazilī texts have not been edited and studied. Although most of the texts of Ibn Sīnā and his students have already been edited, we still need to provide a historical approach to the falsafa of Ibn Sīnā in order to situate the philosophical questions in the Avicennian tradition in a broader context, among the theologians and the philosophers. Many of the topics which are discussed in the Avicennian tradition are also approached in theological texts by the Muʿtazilīs and the Ashʿarīs, and I hope that this book provides a basic foundation in preparation for future studies on this topic." -- from publishers. (shrink)

Women; ethics; religious aspects; ethics.

Verse and prose commentaries, with text, on Nyāyāvatārasūtra, verse treatise on Jain logic, by Siddhasena Divākara.

Increasing computational power and improving deep learning methods have made computer vision technologies pervasively common in urban environments. Their applications in policing, traffic management, and documenting public spaces are increasingly common (Ridgeway 2018, Coifman et al. 1998, Sun et al. 2020). Despite the often-discussed biases in the algorithms' training and unequally borne benefits (Khosla et al. 2012), almost all applications similarly reduce urban experiences to simplistic, reductive, and mechanistic measures. There is a lack of context, depth, and specificity in these (...) practices that enables semantic knowledge or analysis within urban contexts, especially within the context of using and occupying urban space. This paper will critique existing uses of artificial intelligence and computer vision in urban practices to propose a new framework for understanding people, action, and public space. This paper revisits Geertz's (1973) use of thick descriptions in generating interpretive theories of culture and activity and uses this lens to establish a framework to approach evaluating the varied uses of computer vision technologies that weigh meaning. By discussing cases of implemented examples of urban computer vision—from LinkNYC and Numina's urban measurements to the Detroit Police's use of DataWorks Plus's facial recognition technology—it proposes a framework for evaluating the thickness of the algorithm's conclusions against the computational method's complexity required to produce that outcome. Further, we discuss how the framework's positioning may differ (and conflict) between different users of the technology, from engineer to urban planner and policymaker, to citizen. This paper also discusses how the current use and training of deep learning algorithms and how this process limits semantic learning and proposes three potential methodologies toward gaining a more contextually specific, urban-semantic, description of urban space relevant to urbanists. This paper contributes to the critical conversations regarding the proliferation of artificial intelligence by challenging the current applications of these technologies in the urban environment by highlighting their failures within this context while also proposing an evolution of these algorithms that may ultimately make them sensitive and useful within this spatial and cultural milieu. (shrink)

Bioethics, clinical ethics, and professional ethics are mature, well-developed fields of applied ethics that focus on medical research, patient autonomy and patient care, patient–healthcare professional relationships, and issues that arise in clinical and other medical settings. However, despite these developments, little attention has been paid to the organizational aspects of healthcare in these fields. This is surprising, because in the last 30 years healthcare has become more and more institutionalized in provider, management, and insurer organizations. Despite JCAHO's preoccupation with organizational (...) ethics during the last decade, the philosophical underpinnings of their requirements have been less explored in the literature. Clinical ethics remains preoccupied with clinical patient care and professional ethics with individual professional guidelines; even the American College of Healthcare Executives focuses primarily on healthcare managers, not on healthcare organizations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.2 (2002) 369-396 [Access article in PDF] Worlds or Words Apart?The Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies:An Interview with Richard Rorty Richard Rorty, with E. P. Ragg ER: I WANTED TO ASK YOU first about holism. Clearly holism doesn't just mean being interdisciplinary. Nor, as you argue in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, is it merely a question of antifoundationalist polemic. Rather, you (...) say it marks "a distrust of the whole epistemological enterprise." 1 Could you explain what you mean by that?RR: If you weren't some kind of foundationalist you wouldn't bother to get into epistemology. Epistemology only looks attractive if you think that there is a topic called knowledge whose nature can be studied. The idea is that once you have learned its nature, you might get more of it than you had before. Only someone who thinks that knowledge has foundations located in sense perception, or pure reason, or divine revelation, or something, would take the idea of studying knowledge, its nature and limits, seriously. I think of holism as just the view that people change their beliefs in such a way as to achieve coherence with their other beliefs, to bring their beliefs and desires into some sort of equilibrium—and that that is about all there is to be said about the quest for knowledge. There are no rules for which beliefs you sacrifice in order to accommodate other beliefs, or which desires you change to accommodate changed beliefs. Because there aren't any rules, there aren't any methods you can study in order to improve the way you achieve equilibrium. The whole idea of studying how belief is changed is pretty hopeless. It's just too holistic a process to be an appropriate topic of study. [End Page 369]ER: Holism is obviously a natural corollary of pragmatism because pragmatists urge bringing as many different useful vocabularies to discussion as we can. This reminds me of your definition of "literariness." In Contingency, irony, and solidarity you describe literary skill as the ability to effect "surprising gestalt switches by making smooth rapid transitions from one terminology to another." 2 Would it be fair to say, then, that thinking holistically is, to some degree, literary?RR: No, I don't think so. It would be more appropriate to say thinking holistically, in the sense of not being limited to a given context or disciplinary framework, is a matter of thinking imaginatively. Politicians and theologians and engineers think imaginatively just as much as literary people do. To call it literary would be unduly to privilege literature.ER: Would you say that, as a writer, your own work has been treated holistically: first in the sense that your texts are seen as a growing body of thought—that is, that there is a difference between the writer of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and the author of Contingency, irony, and solidarity—and, second, in the sense that people have thought holistically about your ideas, have brought them to bear on literature, philosophy, social science, the very demarcations you want to transcend?RR: I think that the stuff I do is more interesting to people outside of philosophy than those inside it. This is an example of the same phenomenon that led Kuhn to be much more read by people outside the hard sciences than by people within them. My stuff, like Kuhn's, debunks certain views that various earlier philosophers, especially the positivists, had tried to impose on the culture. My readers are people who are looking for a way out from the view they absorbed, without much liking it, when they were young. People inside of philosophy, however, often regard all this debunking as endangering the problems to the solution of which they have devoted their lives. They do not want the problems dissolved, because that would dissolve their solutions as well. So they welcome it less than do outsiders.ER: One of the markers of your... (shrink)

This set of four volumes brings together seminal essays spanning the career of Richard Rorty, one of the most creative and influential anglophone philosophers of recent decades. The essays range widely over the concerns of philosophy, politics, science, religion, and culture, engaging with thinkers from Hilary Putnam to Catherine McKinnon and challenging readers to re-examine many traditional tenets in philosophy and elsewhere. They will be essential reading for anyone with a serious interest in contemporary philosophy and what it can (...) do for us in the modern world. (shrink)

Classical commentary on Tantrasārasaṅgraha of Madhva, work on Vedanta philosophy.

Richard Rorty's collected papers, written during the 1980s and now published in two volumes, take up some of the issues which divide Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophers and contemporary French and German philosophers and offer something of a compromise - agreeing with the latter in their criticisms of traditional notions of truth and objectivity, but disagreeing with them over the political implications they draw from dropping traditional philosophical doctrines. The second volume pursues the themes of the first volume in the context (...) of discussions of recent European philosophy focusing on the work of Heidegger and Derrida. (shrink)

Nystrom and Puckett's pamphlet gives us the most comprehensive picture available of Richard Rorty's political views. This is Rorty being avuncular, cranky, and straightforward: his arguments on patriotism, the political left, and philosophy—as usual, unusual—are worth pondering. This pamphlet will appeal to all those interested in Rorty's distinct brand of pragmatism and leftist politics in the United States.

Prakrit work, with Sanskrit commentary, on Jaina ethics, by Devaguptasūri, 10th cent., alias Jinacandragaṇi.

Study of Tārkikarakṣā of Varadarāja Miśra, 11th cent., work on Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

The essays in this volume form a commentary on Descartes' _Meditations_. Following the sequence of the meditational stages, the authors analyze the function of each stage in transforming the reader, to realize his essential nature as a rational inquirer, capable of scientific, demonstrable knowledge of the world. There are essays on the genre of meditational writing, on the implications of the opening cathartic section of the book on Descartes' theory of perception and his use of skeptical arguments; essays on the (...) theory of ideas and their role of Descartes' reconstructive analytic method; essays on the proofs for the existence of God, on the role of the will in the formation and malformation of judgments; and the essays on the foundations of the science of extension and on Descartes' account of the union of mind and body. (shrink)

Biography of Madhva, 13th cent. Hindu religious leader and founder of Mādhva sect.

Two Sanskrit texts on Jaina logic and epistemology with autocommentary and commentary by Sheelchandra Vijaya Gani.

The aim of this paper is to argue that Richard Rorty’s claim that pragmatism is opposed to all varieties of metaphysics is fundamentally mistaken. After detailing pragmatist reasons for thinking Rorty’s proposal is justified, I argue that there are more compelling pragmatist reasons to think Rorty’s metaphilosophical interpretation of pragmatism is rather problematic: firstly, Rorty has a narrow understanding of ‘metaphysics’ and he does not take into account Peirce’s argument that it is impossible to eliminate metaphysical (...) concepts from ordinary language and our scientific practices; secondly, Rorty’s Sellarsian philosophical anthropology and his proto-Brandomian theory of the constitution of norms are in fact instances of metaphysical positions. I conclude the paper by claiming that given that pragmatism is in fact supportive of a specific variety of metaphysics, the relationship between idealism and pragmatism ought to be seen as involving more convergence rather than great contestation. (shrink)

Treatise, with autocommentary on Jaina ethics.