Lennan, Richard When Pope Francis appeared on the papal balcony for the first time, I was sitting in a television studio in Boston, doing some commentary for a local cable-news network. As an 'expert analyst', I'm afraid that I was, to quote a memorable expression from Paul Keating, 'a bit of a fizzer'. Not only did I have no idea who Jorge Maria Bergolio was, I managed to confuse Buenos Aires, where Bergolio had been archbishop, with Rio de (...) Janiero, where he had not been archbishop, and also muddled Argentina, Bergolio's homeland, with Brazil, not Bergolio's homeland. While I do not expect to be invited back to comment on the next conclave, it is not my spotty performance or even the whiz-bang technology of a modern television studio that most stays with me from that afternoon in March 2013. Rather, what is most vivid in my memory is a comment from one of the news anchors, a comment he repeated a number of times, both on-air and off-camera: 'He's so old', he said of the new pope. 'Why would they choose someone so old?'. (shrink)

I bring you greetings from the United States, where its citizens have been closely following the events of the past three weeks. There has been a great change in the feelings of common American people towards the Russian people. Many have expressed their sense of identity and solidarity with the people of Moscow and St. Petersburg as they witnessed the resistance for the attempted coup. Americans have enormous respect for constitutional government as well as for democracy, and they saw the (...) coup as unconstitutional from the start. A major factor was the television news service. The major American broadcast networks  NBCD, CBS, ABC  and the cable networks, especially CNN  provided often live coverage throughout the days and nights of events in the streets and squares of Moscow, and later in the halls of the Soviet and Russian Parliaments. We witnessed press conferences, from one with the committee of 8 to one 3 nights ago in which Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev spoke with the American people. We made our individual judgments about events, often listening to debates between experts and scholars on Soviet affairs  some Russian, some Ukrainian, some from the Baltic states  and we spoke frequently and freely with one another  even some of discussions with our friends were televised. We experienced fear and dread as it seemed great military forces were being brought to bear on your White House. We wept with grief and rage as the deaths of Russians confronting tanks were reported. We cheered to see Russian women scolding soldiers in the streets. In the aftermath, there has been much discussion of Russia’s needs and how Americans might help. In that curious mixture of avarice and beneficence that is the way of American business, discussions were held on starting a restaurant, and import service, on how to use rubles to pay for local expenses and hard currency for profit-taking. (shrink)

Government has played a pervasive and largely overlooked role in journalists' ethical decision making. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rules governing program content, and a libel law system run amok, are only two wats government influences journalists' behavior. This substitution of government ethics for private ethics creates minimum standards of conduct rather than challenging journalists to an ethical ideal. More subtly, government erects structural barriers to the development of the very technologies (like cable TV) that can offer journalists a more (...) ethically hospitable environment. In the information age, ethicists will need to be aware of, and wary of, government attempts to control development of the very media that hold the greatest ethical promise. (shrink)

This book is a succinct introduction to the orienting of attention.

Early in the first volume of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomeno logie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Edmund Husserl stated concisely the significance and scope of the problem with which this present study is concerned. When we reflect on how it is that consciousness, which is itself absolute in relation to the world, can yet take on the character of transcendence, how it can become mundanized, We see straightaway that it can do that only by means of a certain participation in (...) transcendence in the first, originary sense, which is manifestly the transcendence of material Nature. Only by means of the experiential relation to the animate organism does consciousness become really human and animal (tierischen), and only thereby does it achieve a place in the space and in the time of Nature. l Consciousness can become "worldly" only by being embodied within the world as part of it. In so far as the world is material Nature, consciousness must partake of the transcendence of material Nature. That is to say, its transcendence is manifestly an embodiment in a material, corporeal body. Consciousness, thus, takes on the characteristic of being "here and now" (ecceity) by means of experiential (or, more accurately, its intentive) relation to that corporeal being which embodies it. Accordingly, that there is a world for consciousness is a conse quence in the first instance of its embodiment by 2 that corporeal body which is for it its own animate organism. (shrink)

Richard Sorabji, a noted philosopher in his own right, here offers a new edition of his 1972 translation of "De Memoria" here with commentary, summaries, and three essays comparing Aristotle's accounts of memory and recollection. For this edition, Sorabji has also provided a substantial new introduction taking into account scholarly debates over the intervening thirty years, particularly those over the role of mental images in the imagination. "Sorabji has produced a first-class book on an important topic. All Aristotelians, and (...) anyone with an interest in any aspect of memory, will be in his debt."--Jonathan Barnes, "Isis ""Anyone concerned with Aristotle's psychology, theory of mind, or rhetoric, anyone interested in mnemonic systems, and anyone trying to work out for himself a theory of memory, should read Aristotle's treatise "On Memory," with the comments by Richard Sorabji."--"International Studies in Philosophy" "Sorabji's book is a sample of care, intelligence, and subtlety that the Anglo-Saxon philosophers do not hesitate to invest in such enterprises.... The notes seem to leave no detail, no textual difficulty unilluminated."--"Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale ". (shrink)

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art is a clear and compact survey of philosophical theories of the nature and value of art, including in its scope literature, painting, sculpture, music, dance, architecture, movies, conceptual art and performance art. This second edition incorporates significant new research on topics including pictorial depiction, musical expression, conceptual art, Hegel, and art and society. Drawing on classical and contemporary philosophy, literary theory and art criticism, Richard Eldridge explores the representational, formal and expressive dimensions (...) of art. He argues that the aesthetic and semantic density of the work, in inviting imaginative exploration, makes works of art cognitively, morally and socially important. This importance is further elaborated in discussions of artistic beauty, originality, imagination and criticism. His accessible study will be invaluable to students of philosophy of art and aesthetics. (shrink)

Ethnic slurs have recently raised interest in philosophy of language. Consider (1) Yao is Chinese and (2) Yao is a chink. A theory of meaning should take into account the fact that sentence (2) has the property of containing a slur, a feature plausibly motivating an utterance of (2) rather than (1), and conveys contempt because it contains that word. According to multipropositionalism, two utterances can have the same official truth conditions and the same truth-value but differ in cognitive significance (...) (Korta and Perry, 2011). I contend that (1) and (2) have the same official content, and say the same thing, but differ in cognitive significance. I argue that slurs have linguistic meaning as type conveying that the designated group (Chinese for example) is despicable because it is that very group. Knowing the use of a slur is knowing the group it targets and that that group is despicable because it is that group. The idea that that group, Chinese for example, is despicable because of being Chinese is conventionally implicated. Specific prejudices slurs convey are not semantically carried, and cannot be identified by using semantic competence only. My view account for slurs in propositional attitudes, and for the fact that ‘Yao is not a chink, he is Chinese’ is not a contradiction. (shrink)

This article reviews the historical and current controversies about the nature of clinical ethics consultation, as a way to focus on the place and responsibility of ethics consultants within the context of clinical conversation — interpreted as a form of dialogue. These matters are approached through a particularly compelling instance of the controversy that involves several major figures in the field. The analysis serves to highlight very significant questions of the nature and constraints of clinical situations, and the moral responsibility (...) and legal accountability that are especially important for clinical ethics consultants. (shrink)

The idea of legislative intent plays a central role in legal interpretation and constitutional theory, yet is repeatedly challenged as being an illusion. Refuting these challenges, this book develops a robust account of how and why legislatures form intentions, and the importance of these intentions to understanding law and parliamentary democracy.

Physicians have for some time been questioning the prevailing view of medicine as applied biology. It is urged that medicine needs to be reconceived so as to provide appropriate emphasis on the patient's experience and understanding of illness. After reviewing these arguments and the scientific paradigm underlying the received view in light of certain themes in medicine's history and of current thinking, Pellegrino's thesis is analyzed: medicine should be understood as an inherently moral enterprise, a form of praxis focused on (...) "the healing relationship". Understanding the illness experience and the professed healer's "compassion" supports Pellegrino's view, and suggests that the healing relationship is perhaps best conceived as a form of dialogue. Keywords: compassion, dialogue, healing relationship, illness experience, interpretation CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Suppose there are two people having a moral disagreement about, say, abortion. They argue in a familiar way about whether fetuses have rights, whether a woman’s right to autonomy over her body overrides the fetus’s welfare, and so on. But then suppose one of the people says “Oh, it’s all just a matter of opinion; there’s no objective fact about whether fetuses have rights. When we say that something is morally forbidden, all we’re really doing is expressing our disapproval of (...) it.” The other person protests: “No!—that’s totally wrong. Of course there are objective moral truths.” And suppose their dispute now settles on this new matter of whether there are objective moral facts, and the debate continues. They’ve now stopped discussing abortion, and are discussing the nature of any moral debate about abortion; they’ve stopped doing ethics, and started doing metaethics. If wondering about what one morally ought to do is to engage in ethical thought, then wondering about what one is doing when one wonders about what one morally ought to do is to engage in metaethical thought. When we make public moral judgments are we stating facts, or are we just expressing our opinions? And if there are moral facts, then what kind of fact are they? Can moral judgments be true or false? Can moral judgments be justified, and if so how? These kinds of questions are the domain of metaethics. (I’m not saying that there is a crisp and principled line to be drawn between meta-ethics and regular ethical discourse; but it is, if nothing else, a pedagogically useful division of labor.). (shrink)

In his clear-sighted, humane, and provocative way, Richard Falk calls for a revolution in thinking about the future of world order. Explorations at the Edge of Time develops the idea that a major cultural shift from modernism to postmodernism is under way, creating both new difficulties and new opportunities in the domain of global public policy. The author observes, "A postmodem possibility implies the human capacity to transcend the violence, poverty, ecological decay, oppression, injustice, and secularism of the modern (...) world." Recognizing that the concepts of "progress" and "development" have changed due to the breakdown of the modernist consensus, Falk contends that most problems have transnational dimensions. He proposes a commitment to grassroots globalism, and he challenges aspiring "citizen pilgrims" to think and act in ways that will enhance their feeling of identity with the rest of creation. Falk's "rooted utopianism" challenges our political imagination in relation to pressing global problems and helps forge an overall vision of the future. What is at stake is the building of political understanding amidst the appreciation of unity and diversity for a hopeful entry upon the 21st Century. Author note: Richard Falk is Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice at Princeton University. He has published more than twenty books, including The Promise of World Order (Temple). (shrink)

Can any of us ever really be free? Do we follow the rules our society gives us because we want to, or because we are forced to? Discipline, Freedom, Resistance challenges the received wisdom that discipline and freedom are opposite and mutually exclusive. Though it is typically argued that a well-ordered liberal society must discipline its more unruly citizens to maintain freedom for all, Flathman shows how resistance to rules can mean more than criminals breaking laws. Resistance can also mean (...) political protest and political dialogues about what the rules can be. Discipline, Freedom, Resistance draws on Foucault's theories of the self to describe the inner discipline it takes to resist authority-declaring that individuals must sometimes resist forces that wish to destroy freedom, to ensure freedom. (shrink)

Husserl's marginal remarks in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik clearly do not reflect the same intense effort to penetrate Heidegger's thought that we find in his marginal notes in Sein und Zeit. Merely in terms of length, Husserl's comments in the published German text occupy only one-third the number of pages.2 Pages 1-5, 43-121, and 125-1673 contain no reading marks at all-over half of the 236 pages of KPM. This suggests that Husserl either read these pages with no intention (...) of returning to the text or skipped large parts of the middle of the text altogether.4 His remarks often express frustration or a resigned recognition of the now unbridgeable, irrevocable gap between himself and Heidegger. (shrink)

Hegel’s account of the unconscious and his broader philosophy of mind offer us a well worked out form of non-dualist, non-reductionist, non-eliminativist, non-representationalist naturalism. Hegel describes the development of discursively structured thought (and responsiveness to norms) in ethological terms as emerging from initial somatic-sensory states, from states and processes of bodily activity on the part of a feeling soul, and from structured habituation in relation to other subjects. Importantly, earlier, less organized states of sensory awareness and feeling persist as residues (...) underneath cognitive development in “the pit of imagination.” Imagistic and sensory-somatic materials from this pit can burst out, among other things, in dreams, madness, somnambulism, witty conversation, and puns. In the face of the permanent possibility of regressions from cognitive development, a continual activity of self-formation (Bildung) through art and participation in second nature is essential to maturity. (shrink)

RECENT SCHOLARSHIP ON HEGEL’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY has stressed its place in the modern tradition of reflection on autonomy and rights, thus rejecting negative assessments of Hegel as an authoritarian, post-Napoleonic “Prussian” opponent of liberalism as well as revising sympathetic readings of him as a “communitarian” critic of “atomistic” individualism. A group of eminent writers argues that Hegel, deeply indebted to Rousseau and Kant as turning away from early modern “negative freedom,” rethinks their accounts of “positive freedom” of self-determination based on (...) the principles of the general will or moral law, and embeds those accounts in the customary and institutional framework of the modern constitutional-monarchical state. Hegel understands citizenship in this state as realizing the highest aspirations of modernity for universal recognition of the autonomous personality as secured by the rule of law, systems of impartial justice, suffrage rights, and freedoms of religion, publication, teaching, and so on—under the sovereignty of the patriotic state. Furthermore, this scholarly approach to Hegel regards his conception of politically realized freedom as the heart of his whole philosophical endeavor, and it construes the dialectical arguments as providing chiefly the terms for explicating the rational will’s or practical reason’s inherent striving to actualize itself in ethically, politically, and publicly “mediated” forms of recognition. (shrink)

L'« ère auguste » qui a été en usage en Thessalie n'est en aucune manière une « ère d''Actium » commémorant la victoire d'Octave sur Antoine, comme c'est le cas en Achaïe ou en Macédoine. L'ἒτος σεβαστόν thessalien a été adopté en 10/1 apr. J.-C., pour une raison qui reste inconnue, et a servi pendant plus d'un demi-siècle. Cette nouvelle chronologie permet de mieux rendre compte de la complexité des relations qu'a entretenues la Thessalie avec le pouvoir impérial : pendant (...) tout le règne d'Auguste des périodes de bonne entente, qui se traduisaient par l'octroi de privilèges aux Thessaliens (stratégie fédérale assumée par Auguste, droit de battre monnaie) qui, en retour, rendaient grâce au pouvoir sous diverses formes (culte impérial, utilisation d'une épithète) formée sur le nom de l'empereur, ont alterné avec des moments plus sombres, aux conséquences dramatiques (émeutes, procès devant l'empereur ou privation de liberté), sans que l'enchaînement des causes et des effets soit toujours assuré. C'est donc une ébauche d'histoire politique qu'on propose. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper identifies some of the ethical problems encountered when Western-led military forces conduct operations designed to improve the condition of women in modern conflict zones. We rely on examples from recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, where commanders were required to direct some of their capabilities toward female-based initiatives. Critics have charged that such initiatives were not adequately linked to doctrine-based training, and also that the methods used to build relationships with women were unsuccessful because they were not properly (...) integrated into the broader mission. We go further, and reveal how female-based initiatives essentially contributed to instability because they created multiple ethical pitfalls faced by the primary agents of change; military commanders, male leaders in conflict zones, and the women intended to be beneficiaries of those initiatives. Arguably, if Western-led military forces can address the ethical concerns we identify, then they will be in an im... (shrink)