In the wake of Peter Frederick Strawson’s landmark essay Freedom and Resentment (1962), much of the theorizing about moral responsibility has centered around the reactive attitudes – with a particular emphasis on guilt, resentment, and indignation. Although philosophical interest in previously unexamined reactive attitudes has grown rapidly in recent years, remarkably little has hitherto been said about fear as a candidate reactive attitude. The aim of this chapter is to explore the phenomenon of fearing other human agents qua agents. Drawing (...) on P.F. Strawson’s seminal work on the reactive attitudes, I aim to develop an account of agent-directed fear as a distinct reactive attitude (which I refer to as reactive fear). In order to pave the way for such an account, I shall in the first part of this chapter consider a potential objection to the central claim that people can fear other agents. The objection has its roots in a propositionalist view of mental states according to which fear is a propositional attitude and thus essentially about potential events, or state of affairs (something that is, was, or will be the case). I will provide reasons for why we should reject such a restrictive view of fear, and more specifically, why we need to embrace the idea that fear can be directed towards other human agents. In the second part of the chapter, I contrast my proposed account of reactive fear to some existing views of fear, according to which fear is seen as reactive in a very general sense, as a reaction to any number of objects. On the account I propose, reactive fear is a distinct fearing attitude vis-à-vis human agents qua agents. As I aim to show, this kind of attitude is a particular mode of engagement which reflects an underlying concern of the fearing agent not to have her practical identity harmed by the feared agent. I will conclude by discussing the upshot and importance of recognizing fear as a bona fide reactive attitude. (shrink)

A standard analysis of moral responsibility states that an agent A is morally responsible for ɸ-ing if and only if it is fitting to have – depending on the nature of ɸ – a negative or positive reactive emotion vis-à-vis A on account of A’s ɸ-ing. Proponents of Alethic views of moral responsibility maintain that the relevant notion of fittingness in the analysis should be understood in terms of accurate representation. The allure of understanding emotional fittingness as representational accuracy arguably (...) stems from the widespread idea that emotions are representational mental states with a mind-to-world direction of fit. Accordingly, defenders of Alethic views argue that the fittingness of a potential reactive emotion is a matter of whether the representational content of that emotion accurately matches the targeted agent. The aim of this paper is to argue against Alethic views of moral responsibility by means of exposing various problems that these accounts face in virtue of their inherent commitment to understand emotional fittingness in terms of representational accuracy. (shrink)

The system B+ is the minimal positive relevant logic. B+ is trivially extended to B+T on adding a greatest truth (Church constant) T. If we leave ∨ out of the formation apparatus, we get the fragment B∧T. It is known that the set of ALL B∧T theories provides a good model for the combinators CL at Level-I, which is the theory level. Restoring ∨ to get back B+T was not previously fruitful at Level-I, because the set of all B+T theories (...) is NOT a model of CL. It was to be expected from semantic completeness arguments for relevant logics that basic combinator laws would hold when restricted to PRIME B+T theories. Overcoming some previous difficulties, we show that this is the case, at Level I. But this does not form a model for CL. This paper also looks for corresponding results at Level-II, where we deal with sets of theories that we call propositions. We adapt work by Ghilezan to note that at Level-II also there is a model of CL in B∧T propositions. However, the corresponding result for B+T propositions extends smoothly to Level-II only in part. Specifically, only some of the basic combinator laws are proved here. We accordingly leave some work for the reader. (shrink)

For almost 400 years, it has been a struggle to find the right words to describe Katherine Jones, Lady Ranelagh. When she died in 1691, followed a week later by her youngest brother, Sir Robert Boy...

Robert Burch describes Peircean Algebraic Logic as a language to express Peirce's “unitary logical vision” , which Peirce tried to formulate using different logical systems. A “correct” formulation of Peirce's vision then should allow a mathematical proof of Peirce's Reduction Thesis, that all relations can be generated from the ensemble of unary, binary, and ternary relations, but that at least some ternary relations cannot be reduced to relations of lower arity.Based on Burch's algebraization, the authors further simplify the mathematical (...) structure of PAL and remove a restriction imposed by Burch, making the resulting system in its expressiveness more similar to Peirce's system of existential graphs. The drawback, however, is that the proof of the Reduction Thesis from Burch no longer holds. A new proof was introduced in Hereth Correia, and Pöschel and was published in full detail in Hereth .In this paper, we provide proof of Peirce's Reduction Thesis using a graph notation similar to Peirce's existential graphs. (shrink)

In this book, Robert Talisse critically examines the moral and political implications of pluralism, the view that our best moral thinking is indeterminate and that moral conflict is an inescapable feature of the human condition. Through a careful engagement with the work of William James, Isaiah Berlin, John Rawls, and their contemporary followers, Talisse distinguishes two broad types of moral pluralism: metaphysical and epistemic. After arguing that metaphysical pluralism does not offer a compelling account of value and thus cannot (...) ground a viable conception of liberal politics, Talisse proposes and defends a distinctive variety of epistemic pluralism. According to this view, certain value conflicts are at present undecidable rather than intrinsic. Consequently, epistemic pluralism countenances the possibility that further argumentation, enhanced reflection, or the acquisition of more information could yield rational resolutions to the kinds of value conflicts that metaphysical pluralists deem irresolvable as such. Talisse’s epistemic pluralism hence prescribes a politics in which deep value conflicts are to be addressed by ongoing argumentation and free engagement among citizens; the epistemic pluralist thus sees liberal democracy is the proper political response to ongoing moral disagreement. (shrink)

In a style that is both philosophically sophisticated and accessible to general readers, Robert Almeder introduces readers to the vigorous debate in the scientific community about the possibility of personal survival after death. He argues that belief in some form of personal survival is as empirically justifiable as our belief in the past existence of dinosaurs. Drawing on 21 of the best case studies in reincarnation, apparitions of the dead, ostensible possession, out-of-body experiences, and trance mediumships, Death and Personal (...) Survival offers a comprehensive discussion of the best empirical evidence in each of these areas and refutes alternative explanations offered by sceptics. (shrink)

How are truths about physical and mental states related? Robert Kirk articulates and defends 'redescriptive physicalism'--a fresh approach to the connection between the physical and the mental, which answers the problems that mental causation has traditionally raised for other non-reductive views.

This is explained in a new introduction that goes beyond the interpretative enterprise of the rest of the book to assess Marx in relation to contemporary ...

We compare Gödel’s and Brouwer’s explorations of mysticism and its relation to mathematics.

"This book discusses the vast and complex range of choices in between blanket amnesty and total accountability through criminal justice, and does so with ...

In this book, Robert Caper provides the reader with an introduction to psychoanalysis focusing explicitly on whether psychoanalysis is part of the sciences, and if not, where it belongs. Many psychoanalysts, beginning with Freud, have considered their discipline a science. In this book, Caper examines this claim and investigates the relationship of theory to observation in both philosophy and the experimental sciences and explores how these observations differ from those made in psychoanalytic interpretation. _Building Out into the Dark_ also (...) explores topics including: the origins of psychoanalysis in the art of medicine the therapeutic effect of psychoanalysis the archaic superego psychoanalysis with the individual and groups what makes psychoanalytic work unique. _Building Out into the Dark_ offers a thoughtful consideration of the nature of psychoanalytic knowledge and how it is gained. The book's accessible and concise style makes it a useful introductory resource for students studying psychoanalysis, for psychotherapists who are curious about the distinction between psychoanalysis and other forms of therapy as well as those interested in placing psychoanalysis in the context of current cultural and intellectual developments. (shrink)

Examining select high points in the speculative tradition from Plato and Aristotle through the Middle Ages and German tradition to Dewey and Heidegger, _Placing Aesthetics_ seeks to locate the aesthetic concern within the larger framework of each thinker's philosophy. In Professor Robert Wood's study, aesthetics is not peripheral but rather central to the speculative tradition and to human existence as such. In Dewey's terms, aesthetics is “experience in its integrity.” Its personal ground is in “the heart,” which is the (...) dispositional ground formed by genetic, cultural, and personal historical factors by which we are spontaneously moved and, in turn, are inclined to move, both practically and theoretically, in certain directions. Prepared for use by the student as well as the philosopher, _Placing Aesthetics_ aims to recover the fullness of humanness within a sense of the fullness of encompassing Being. It attempts to overcome the splitting of thought, even in philosophy, into exclusive specializations and the fracturing of life itself into theoretical, practical, and emotive dimensions. (shrink)

This article traces the evolution by which in the context of 1930s South Africa the liberal philosopher Alfred Hoernlé came to recognize the inability of classical liberalism to address the problems of a society in which a racial hierarchy had become deeply entrenched. Although he must be criticized for his patriarchal approach and for the pessimism that led him to take White attitudes toward Black South Africans as an unchangeable part of the situation that simply had to be accepted, his (...) insight into the limits of liberalism still resonates. While most White commentators were still thinking of racism in terms of beliefs and attitudes, he already understood that the problem lay in the systemic adoption of “techniques of domination” or what we today might call institutional racism. Although his proposal in 1939 that “Total Separation” was “a legitimate application of sound liberal ideas” was deeply problematic in context and might well have had a serious negative impact, it should be understood that it was intended to highlight the fundamental paradox into which liberalism fell when attempting to solve the problems it had helped to create by its belief in a civilizing mission that began with violence. (shrink)

Chow's account of Bayesian inference logic and procedures is replete with fundamental misconceptions, derived from secondary sources and not adequately informed by modern work. The status of subjective probabilities in Bayesian analyses is misrepresented and the cogent reasons for the rejection by many statisticians of the curious inferential hybrid used in psychological research are not presented.

Despite the fact that Ayn Rand did not influence the best artists, she did leave an important legacy for the American imagination and literary establishment. Rand's influence is arguably more multi-genre than any other author. Some multi-genre authors who were possibly influenced by Rand include: John Steinbeck (literature), Mickey Spillane and Ian Fleming (detective fiction), Ira Levin, Cameron Hawley, Erika Holzer and Kay Nolte Smith (popular fiction) and Terry Goodkind (science fiction). Her influence represents an important balance between many various (...) types of American Literature and is a credit to the hybrid and versatile nature of her fiction. (shrink)

Dans ces conditions, n'est-il pas urgent de s'interroger à nouveau sur ce qui fait la ligne de partage entre des images maîtresses d'erreur et d'errance et des images susceptibles d'éclairer le monde et donc de participer au mieux à l ...

Among the many scholarly surveys of historical and contemporary approaches to Christian eschatology, few treat the relation between eschatology and scientific cosmology. It is the purpose of this essay to do so. I begin with a brief summary of the importance of eschatology to contemporary Christian theology. Next, an overview is given of scientific cosmology, its earlier scenarios for the cosmic far future of “freeze or fry,” and, more recently the discovery that the expansion of the universe is accelerating. These (...) predictions severely challenge those versions of Christian eschatology that are based on the bodily resurrection of Jesus and, by analogy, the transformation of the universe into the new creation. Several recent approaches to this challenge are outlined, including those of Denis Edwards, Jürgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Ted Peters, John Polkinghorne, and my own. I conclude with some suggestions for future research in both theology and science. (shrink)

Defining qualified reasoning as reasoning containing such loose qualifying words as 'probably,' 'usually,' 'probable, 'likely,' 'ceteris paribus,' and 'primafacie, Ennis argues that typical cases of qualified reasoning, though they might be good arguments, are deductively invalid, implying that such arguments fail soundness standards. He considers and rejects several possible alternative ways of viewing such cases, ending with a proposal for applying qualified soundness standards, which requires employment of sufficient background knowledge, sensitivity, experience and understanding of the situation. All of this (...) takes place as part of the process, introduced elsewhere, of successively applying different legitimate sets of standards until one is found that is satisfied, or none is found, the latter calling for rejection of the argument, the former calling for its acceptance. (shrink)