Material traces of the past are notoriously inscrutable; they rarely speak with one voice, and what they say is never unmediated. They stand as evidence only given a rich scaffolding of interpretation which is, itself, always open to challenge and revision. And yet archaeological evidence has dramatically expanded what we know of the cultural past, sometimes demonstrating a striking capacity to disrupt settled assumptions. The questions we address in Evidential Reasoning are: How are these successes realized? What gives us confidence (...) in the credibility and robustness, the trustworthiness, of the evidential claims based on archaeological data? And, what constitute best practices in building evidential claims, critically scrutinizing them and putting them to work in archaeological contexts? Rather than retreat to abstractions about how how science operates in the ideal, we approach this question by interrogating a number of close-to-the-ground case studies with the aim of teasing out the wisdom embodied in archaeological practice. The cases we consider – of fieldwork, strategies for working with old evidence, and the role of external resources – illuminate the role of various types of inferential scaffolding and bring into focus practice-grounded epistemic norms that we believe serve archaeologists better than the all-or-nothing ideals of truth and objectivity that dominate programmatic debate. (shrink)

Material evidence: learning from archaeological practice / Alison Wylie and Robert Chapman -- Part I. Fieldwork and recording conventions -- Repeating the unrepeatable experiment / Richard Bradley -- Experimental archaeology at the cross roads: a contribution to interpretation or evidence of xeroxing / Martin Bell -- Proportional representation: multiple voices in archaeological interpretation at çatalhöyük / Shahina Farid -- Integrating database design and use into recording methodologies / Michael J. Rains -- The tyranny of typologies: evidential reasoning in (...) romano-egyptian domestic archaeology / Anna Lucille Boozer -- Part II. Cross-field trade: archaeological applications of external expertise and technologies -- The archaeological bazaar: scientific methods for sale? or: putting the "arch" back into archaeometry / A. M. Pollard and P. Bray -- Radiocarbon dating and archaeology: history, progress and present status / Sturt W. Manning -- Using evidence from natural sciences in archaeology / David Killick -- Working the digital: some thoughts from landscape archaeology / Marcos Llobera -- Crafting knowledge with (digital) visual media in archaeology / Sara Perry -- Part III. Multiple working hypotheses, strategies of elimination, and triangulation -- Uncertain on principle: combining lines of archaeological evidence to create chronologies / Alex Bayliss and Alasdair Whittle -- Lessons from modelling neolithic farming practice: methods of elimination / Amy Bogaard -- Evidence, archaeology and law: an initial exploration / Roger M. Thomas -- Law and archaeology: modified wigmorean analysis / Terence Anderson and William Twining -- Traditional knowledge, archaeological evidence, and other ways of knowing / George Nicholas and Nola Markey -- Part IV. Broader perspectives: material culture as object and evidence -- Evidence of what? on the possibilities of archaeological interpretation / Gavin Lucas -- Meeting pasts halfway: a consideration of the ontology of material evidence in archaeology / Andrew Meirion Jones -- Matter and facts: material culture and the history of science / Simon Werrett. (shrink)

Social contract theory offers a powerful method and metaphor for the study of organizational ethics. This paper considers the variant of the social contract that has arguably gained the most attention among business ethicists: integrative social contracts theory or ISCT [Donaldson and Dunfee: 1999, Ties That Bind (Harvard Business School Press, Boston)]. A core precept of ISCT - that consent to membership in an organization entails obligations to follow the norms of that organization, subject to the moral minimums of basic (...) human rights - is a reasonable and appealing notion. One potential challenge for those attempting to apply this idea, however, lies in the dynamic nature of social norms. Organizational norms evolve, often through the conscious efforts of community members and leaders. As currently formulated, ISCT offers a framework that under-appreciates the evolving nature of moral norms. In this paper, we extend ISCT by considering the circumstances under which the terms of and parties to social contracts change. We also consider a number of principles that should be considered as the terms and parties to organizational social contracts change. (shrink)

Completed shortly before her death in 2019, _Tragedy and Philosophy. A Parallel History_ is the sum of Agnes Heller’s reflections on European history and culture, seen through the prism of Europe’s two unique literary creations: tragedy and philosophy.

In Discovering Alabama Forests, ecologist-educator Doug Phillips and photographer Robert Falls celebrate the current health and diversity of Alabama woodlands while sounding a call for their wise management and protection in the future.

Will stakeholder theory continue to transform how we think about business and society? On the occasion of this journal’s 60th anniversary, this review article examines the journal’s role in shaping stakeholder theory to date and suggests that it still has transformative potential. We conducted a bibliometric analysis of co-citations in the literature from 1984 to 2020. Reporting these results, we examine the field’s evolving structure. Contextualized theoretically as an accomplishment of institutional work—the creation of a meaningful and innovative field ideology—this (...) structure is remarkable for how it integrates ethical and behavioral arguments, invites engagement from adjacent domains, and arrives at important insights for business and society. We advance a research agenda consistent with this larger institutional project. (shrink)

Television pictures of starvation and depredation are not the only way that famine and political instability in the horn of Africa have affected the United States. Many people from that region of the world are seeking political or economic refuge here, and they are exposing us to a culture that is in some ways — most notably, in the practice of female circumcision – so radically different from the prevailing American cultures that we have been stunned. They are also forcing (...) hospital ethics committees to face issues that cannot be resolved by the facile application of the settled principles that have guided those institutions for the past several years. Autonomy and multiculturalism, long the foundations of most ethics committee decision making, have started to give way to a list of formally articulated rights and wrongs – perhaps to a restatement and adoption of rules said to be based in natural law. Female circumcision, argues one newspaper letter writer, “is just a sickening display of male power disguised as legitimate dogma. (shrink)

The non-financial effects (NFE) antitakeover amendment addresses the duties of company directors and management when faced with a possible takeover bid. The NFE amendment either permits or requires managers to consider the interests of the company's stakeholders during takeover bids. Other types of antitakeover devices have been viewed as protecting either stockholder or management interests. The NFE amendment would appear to protect a broad spectrum of interests including those of company employees, creditors, and the community in which the company operates. (...) Positive market returns to the adoption of NFE amendments provide some evidence that investors approve. The percent of both management and institutional ownership are positively related to the market reaction to the NFE amendment adoption. To the extent that institutional ownership proxies for the broad spectrum of stakeholder interest, NFE devices, unlike some other amendments that have been studied, appear to be in the interests of more than a single interest group. (shrink)

Community-based participatory research (CBPR) focuses on specific community needs, and produces results that directly address those needs. Although conducting ethical CBPR is critical to its success, few academic programs include this training in their curricula. This article describes the development and evaluation of an online training course designed to increase the use of CBPR in mental health disciplines. Developed using a participatory approach involving a community of experts, this course challenges traditional research by introducing a collaborative process meant to encourage (...) increased participation by special populations and narrow the parity gap in effective mental health treatment and services delivery. (shrink)

Analyzed F. Galton's data on the sensory, psychomotor, and physical attributes of 1,639 females and 4,849 males. The reliability of the measures, developmental trends in mean scores, correlations of the measures with age, correlations among measures, occupational differences in scores, and sibling correlations are described. Developmental trends during later childhood, adolescence, and early maturity are compared to those described in contemporary developmental psychological literature.

How do archaeologists make effective use of physical traces and material culture as repositories of evidence? Material Evidence is a collection of 19 essays that take a resolutely case-based approach to this question, exploring key instances of exemplary practice, instructive failures, and innovative developments in the use of archaeological data as evidence. The goal is to bring to the surface the wisdom of practice, teasing out norms of archaeological reasoning from evidence. -/- Archaeologists make compelling use of an enormously diverse (...) range of material evidence, from garbage dumps to monuments, from finely crafted artifacts rich with cultural significance to the inadvertent transformation of landscapes over the long term. Each contributor to Material Evidence identifies a particular type of evidence with which they grapple and considers, with reference to concrete examples, how archaeologists construct evidential claims, critically assess them, and bring them to bear on pivotal questions about the cultural past. -/- Historians, cultural anthropologists, philosophers, and science studies scholars are increasingly interested in working with material "things" as objects of inquiry and as evidence – and they acknowledge on all sides just how challenging this is. One of the central messages of the book is that close analysis of archaeological best practice can yield constructive guidelines for practice that have much to offer practitioners within archaeology and well beyond. (shrink)

Is there any moral obligation to improve oneself, to foster and develop various capacities in oneself? From a broadly Kantian point of view, Self-Improvement defends the view that there is such an obligation and that it is an obligation that each person owes to him or herself. The defence addresses a range of arguments philosophers have mobilized against this idea, including the argument that it is impossible to owe anything to yourself, and the view that an obligation to improve onself (...) is overly 'moralistic'. Robert N. Johnson argues against Kantian universalization arguments for the duty of self-improvement, as well as arguments that bottom out in a supposed value humanity has. At the same time, he defends a position based on the notion that self- and other-respecting agents would, under the right circumstances, accept the principle of self-improvement and would leave it up to each to be the person to whom this duty is owed. (shrink)

Much recent work on Kant's argument that the Categorical Imperative is the fundamental principle of morality has focused on the gap in that argument between the conclusion that rational agents conform to laws that apply to every rational agent, and the requirement contained in the Universal Law of Nature formula.1 While it seems plausible – even trivial– that a rational agent, insofar as she is a rational agent, conforms to whatever laws there are that are valid for all rational agents, (...) there does not appear to be any obvious route from this seemingly trivial claim to the controversial and substantive principle of acting only on maxims that one can at the same time rationally will every rational agent to act on.2 In what follows, I argue that the connection between rational agency and mere conformity to universally valid laws is not as trivial as it may seem. Many readers, I suspect, assume that Kant makes the trivial claim about rational agency because rational agency is rational, and being rational requires conforming to those laws that apply to all rational beings. For instance, this assumption is implicit in Onora O'Neill claim that "the interest of a Kantian universality test is that it aims to ground an ethical theory on notions of consistency and rationality rather than upon considerations of desire and preference."3 But, as I contend in what follows, the requirement to conform to laws valid for all rational agents is based on the fact that rational agency is, not rational, but agency. Indeed, the arguments leading to the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative rely on the idea of rational willing as a kind of causation in order to show this. And, as it turns out, the claim that the concept of causation contains the idea of conformity to universally valid laws is not a trivial claim. (shrink)

I consider the direct product algebra formed from two isomorphic Clifford algebras. More specifically, for an element x in each of the two component algebras I consider elements in the direct product space with the form x ⊗ x. I show how this construction can be used to model the algebraic structure of particular vector spaces with metric, to describe the relationship between wavefunction and observable in examples from quantum mechanics, and to express the relationship between the electromagnetic field tensor (...) and the stress-energy tensor in electromagnetism. To enable this analysis I introduce a particular decomposition of the direct product algebra. (shrink)

opposed ways. 6:408-9 Understood as "moral apathy", to be indifferent is to be uninfluenced..

"Moves step by step from basic concepts to categorical and truth-functional logic, inductive reasoning, and informal fallacies. Includes sample problems, explanatory charts, diagrams, and exercises"--Cover.

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) argued that moral requirements are based on a standard of rationality he dubbed the “Categorical Imperative” (CI). Immorality thus involves a violation of the CI and is thereby irrational. Other philosophers, such as Locke and Hobbes, had also argued that moral requirements are based on standards of rationality. However, these standards were either desirebased instrumental principles of rationality or based on sui generis rational intuitions. Kant agreed with many of his predecessors that an analysis of practical reason (...) will reveal only the requirement that rational agents must conform to instrumental principles. Yet he argued that conformity to the CI (a non-instrumental principle) and hence to moral requirements themselves, can nevertheless be shown to be essential to rational agency. This argument was based on his striking doctrine that a rational will must be regarded as autonomous, or free in the sense of being the author of the law that binds it. The fundamental principle of morality — the CI — is none other than the law of an autonomous will. Thus, at the heart of Kant's moral philosophy is a conception of reason whose reach in practical affairs goes well beyond that of a Humean ‘slave’ to the passions. Moreover, it is the presence of this self-governing reason in each person that Kant thought offered decisive grounds for viewing each as possessed of equal worth and deserving of equal respect. (shrink)

This article draws upon clinical experience of GPs working in a deprived area of the North East of England to examine the potential contribution of Universal Basic Income to health by mitigating ‘patient-side barriers’ among three cohorts experiencing distinct forms of ‘precariousness’: 1) long-term unemployed welfare recipients with low levels of education (lumpenprecariat); 2) workers on short-term/zero-hours contracts with low levels of education (‘lower’ precariat); 3) workers on short-term/zero-hours contracts with relatively high levels of education (‘upper’ precariat). We argue that (...) any benefits must be accompanied by robust institutions capable of promoting health. (shrink)

Kantian ethics can at times appear to defend the position that there is a unique sort of value that plays a foundational role in morality. For instance, Kant's most well known work in ethics, the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, begins by trying to establish that a good will is good without qualification' and then ends with a first statement of the fundamental principle that divides right from wrong, the Categorical Imperative.1 This presentation can make it seems as if (...) Kant believes the authority carried by the Categorical Imperative is somehow supposed to be grounded in the value of a good will. Again, the humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative, the formulation that tell us we must respect the humanity in ourselves and others by treating it as an end in itself, appears to allude to a special value possessed by some feature of persons, their humanity, and then explain the authority of moral obligation by way of that value.2 This extolling of the value of humanity and the dramatic refrain about the unique value of a good will both appear to portray Kant as telling us to notice the peculiar value that they possess and see that this value demands that we adjust our deliberation and actions. We appear to be told that the good will and humanity are bits of metaphysical glitter, jewels carrying their... (shrink)

Kant held that “an incentive can determine the will [Willkür] to action only so far as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim”, a view dubbed the “Incorporation Thesis” by Henry Allison (hereafter, “IT”). Although many see IT as basic to Kant’s views on agency, it also seems irreconcilable with the possibility of a kind of weakness, the kind exhibited by a person who acts on incentives that run contrary to principles she holds dear. The problem is this: According (...) to IT, if an incentive determines the will of the weak person when she acts contrary to her principles, then it must be the case that she incorporated that incentive into her maxim. But that in turn means that she has made it her principle to act on the wayward incentive, and so is not, after all, exhibiting weakness in failing to follow her own principles, but at best simply dropping one principle in favor of another. So either the weak person does not incorporate the wayward incentive into her maxim and IT is false, or she does incorporate it and weakness is impossible. (shrink)

It is standard to attribute to Kant the view that actions from motives other than duty deserve no positive moral evaluation. I argue that the standard view is mistaken. Kant's account of merit in the Metaphysics of Morals shows that he believes actions not performed from duty can be meritorious. Moreover, the grounds for attributing merit to an action are different from those for attributing moral worth to it. This is significant because it shows both that his views are reasonably (...) consistent with our ordinary views, and that he recognized a variety of purposes in evaluating actions, many of which are not furthered by determining whether they were motivated by duty. (shrink)

Friedrich Nietzsche's complex connection to Charles Darwin has been much explored, and both scholarly and popular opinions have tended to assume a convergence in their thinking. In this study, Dirk Johnson challenges that assumption and takes seriously Nietzsche's own explicitly stated 'anti-Darwinism'. He argues for the importance of Darwin for the development of Nietzsche's philosophy, but he places emphasis on the antagonistic character of their relationship and suggests that Nietzsche's mature critique against Darwin represents the key to understanding his (...) broader Darwinian position. He also offers an original reinterpretation of the Genealogy of Morals, a text long considered sympathetic to Darwinian naturalism, but which he argues should be taken as Nietzsche's most sophisticated critique of both Darwin and his followers. His book will appeal to all who are interested in the philosophy of Nietzsche and its cultural context. (shrink)

This achievement of democracy was frankly admitted by its opponents. Among the works attributed to Xenophon is a short essay on Athenian democracy. ...

The Kantian theory of moral worth, because it emphasizes the role of reason, has been universally castigated for being disaffecting, impersonal and alienating. My thesis is that, to the contrary, it is through its emphasis on reason that the Kantian view is able to give a full-blooded place to our sentiments, partial ties and projects in morality. ;My first task is to show how standard interpretations of Kant's theory misrepresent his true concerns. Typically, his views are treated as nothing more (...) than a theory of moral praise. Since only actions from duty are praiseworthy, on this interpretation, actions from sympathy or friendship are not. At the core of my thesis is a rejection of this interpretation. Kant's account is, I maintain, addressed first and foremost to moral agents deliberating about alternative actions, policies and plans of life. Their concern is not to determine the praiseworthiness of these alternatives, but their prudential and moral worth. And to say, along with Kant, that actions from duty alone are of moral worth is simply to say that they alone express what any moral deliberator, on proper reflection, will recognize that she must preserve and promote in all contexts, namely, a good will. ;My second task is to disentangle moral worth from other kinds of evaluation. Moral worth cannot be adequately captured by the ideas of merit, virtue or ethical action, I argue. Indeed, these all allow for motives other than duty. This itself shows that Kant's views are not overly disaffecting. Of course, Kant is famous for holding that we must strive to act from duty. But this need not be impersonal or alienating. In many ways, I argue, quite the opposite is the case. Even though acting from duty requires an impartial perspective, it is also deeply personal. For only that impartiality which we recognize as imposed by our own reason is required by morality. So ultimately it is out of respect for what are our own deepest commitments that Kant maintains that we ought to act. And while this could require setting aside important interests, I show that this is not as problematic as some have thought. (shrink)

Since Plato wrote of political obligation in his dialogue Crito, obligation in general has been of ongoing interest to philosophers. In that dialogue, Socrates argues that he was under an obligation to obey the laws of Athens and comply with a sentence of death. During the course of the argument, he raises and offers solutions to many of the central issues about obligation that philosophers still puzzle over. For instance, how can obligations have the grip on us that they do—in (...) some cases, so that we are willing to die rather than not fulfill them? What is the nature and justification of moral and legal obligations? Do we have an obligation to obey the state, and if so, why? (shrink)

This paper defends a model of the internalism requirement against Michael Smith's recent criticisms of it. On this "example model", what we have reason to do is what we would be motivated to do were we rational. After criticizing the example model, Smith argues that his "advice model", that what we have reason to do is what we would advise ourselves to do were we rational, is obviously preferable. The author argues that Smith's criticisms can quite easily be accommodated by (...) the example model. Moreover, to the extent that his model connects reasons to advice, it is not a model of the internalism requirement at all. Yet, to the extent that it connects reasons to motivation, his model collapses into the example model. The author ends by arguing that Smith's view simply proposes an unambitious conception of practical rationality, not an alternative construal of the internalism requirement. (shrink)

Alas, you were at a Kant conference—or many philosophers’ idea of one—and if you are shocked, perhaps you are not a Kantian. For this scenario illustrates two fundamental criticisms of Kant’s vision of morality as “duty”: It is outrageous to hold that even for the hero “all the good he can ever perform still is merely duty”. And those who, like these parents, are moved to every morally significant action by a sense of duty are, far from exemplary, morally repugnant. (...) Surely many actions are good but not one’s duty, and surely it is morally better sometimes not to be moved by the thought of duty. (shrink)

This study investigates the connection of moral reasoning to demographic and performance variables in business education, especially business and technical writing. The moral reasoning construct serves as the foundation for one''s decision making when confronted with moral dilemmas. Significant relationships are reported between subjects'' writing skill and their moral reasoning scores. This research serves as a foundation for questions about writers'' moral reasoning and the ethical decisions each writer makes in written communication. In addition, this study supports further research into (...) the connection between moral reasoning and written communication, given the significant relationships reported and the noticeable shortage of related, data-based research. (shrink)

In an earlier paper I identified two desiderata of a theory of practical reasons which favour internalism, and then argued that forms of this doctrine which are currently on offer lose either one or the other in trying to avoid the conditional fallacy. Michael Brady, Mark van Roojen and Josh Gert have separately attempted to respond to my argument. I set out reasons why all fail.

'You ought to make something of yourself.' That certainly has the ring of truth about it. But is there really any obligation to develop yourself? Those who let abilities lie idle are shortsighted, of course. But are they guilty of anything more than imprudence? It is easy to think that there could be a moral fault in failing to help others such as your children to develop their talents and abilities. But what about not developing your own? And if this (...) is a moral failing, is the fault solely in your having let others down in some way? Or is there fault in having let yourself down as well? (shrink)