Argues that the only way to understand the Confucian vision of the consummate moral life is to take the tradition on its own terms.

‘To translate’ means quite literally ‘to carry across, to bring across,’ that is, ‘to remove from one place to another.’ The questions I want to address in this essay are: To what extent have we been successful in, first, understanding the Chinese philosophical narrative and, then, in ‘carrying it across’ into the western academy? To what extent have we been able to grow and ‘appreciate’ our own philosophical parameters by engaging with this antique tradition? The self-conscious strategy of translation, then, (...) must be to go beyond word-for-word translation and attempt to enable students of Chinese philosophy to read the seminal texts by providing them with a means of developing their own sophisticated understanding of a set of critical Chinese philosophical terms. The premise is that there is no real alternative but to cultivate a nuanced familiarity with the key Chinese vocabulary itself. It is in this effort to take Chinese philosophy on its own terms, then, that we must begin from the interpretive context by taking into account the tradition’s own indigenous presuppositions and its own evolving self-understanding. We must be aware of the ambient, persistent assumptions that have given the Chinese philosophical narrative its unique identity over time. (shrink)

(1) is an example of an adjectival comparative. In it, the adjective important is flanked by more and a comparative clause headed by than. This article is a survey of recent ideas about the interpretation of comparatives, including (i) the underlying semantics based on the idea of a threshold; (ii) the interpretation of comparative clauses that include quantifiers (brighter than on many other days); (iii) remarks on differentials such as much in (1) above: what they do in the comparative and (...) what they do elsewhere in the language; (iv) the relationship between comparatives and other Degree constructions (e.g. as important, too impor- tant); and (v) the types of phrases in which comparatives are found (adjective: tighter versus noun: more water). Given the nature and purpose of this essay, I have tried not to presuppose background in formal semantics and I have departed from standard practice in journal articles by, as much as possible, not interrupting the flow with footnotes and references. There are two appendices. The first provides more analytical detail and there I do rely on formal techniques of natural language semantics. The second covers the sources for the ideas surveyed here. (shrink)

Following his celebrated book The Aesthetics of Music, Scruton explores the fundamental elements that constitute a great piece of music.

Anyone with a serious interest in analytical psychology or existential phenomenology will need to take account of this book.

This paper concerns the relation between goodness, or value, and practical reasons, and in particular the so-called ‘buck-passing’ account (BPA) of that relation recently offered by T. M. Scanlon, according to which goodness is not reason-providing but merely the higher-order property of possessing lower-order properties that provide reasons to respond in certain ways. The paper begins by briefly describing BPA and the motivation for it, noting that Scanlon now accepts that the lower-order properties in question may be evaluative. He also (...) insists that the BPA is not biconditional (wisely, since otherwise goodness becomes a ‘Cambridge property’), which leaves him with the task of explaining why goodness arises only in a sub-set of cases in which lower-order properties ground reasons. Having rejected two attempts to do this, based on elucidation of the responses and of the reasons, I suggest that Scanlon may claim that goodness arises in, and only in, cases where the lower-order properties are evaluative and that goodness itself provides us with a way of distinguishing the evaluative from the non-evaluative. In other words, he should retain the negative component of BPA, according to which being good is not itself reason-providing, while surrendering the positive, according to which the property of goodness is merely the higher-order property of having lower-order properties that provide reasons to respond. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Contrasts classical Greek ontology ("the science of being in itself") with classical Chinese "zoetology" ("the art of living").

Three topics are discussed concerning the application probability and explanation to the confirmation of theories. The first concerns the debate over prediction versus accommodation. I argue that we typically have reason to be more confident of a theory given that it was constructed independently of the knowledge of certain data than if it was designed to accommodate those data. The second concerns the puzzle of the apparent 'fine-tuning' of the universe for life. I argue that the fact that our universe (...) meets the extremely improbable yet necessary conditions for life provides no evidence for the thesis that there are, or have been, very many universes. The third chapter concerns the need to explain the existence of life. I argue that if life's existence needs an explanation at all, the place to look is in a teleological explanation. If this option is rejected, we should be content to see the origin of life as an extremely improbable fluke. (shrink)

Many philosophers consider favouritism toward humans in the context of moral choice to be a prejudice. Several terms are used for it – ' speciesism ', 'human chauvinism', 'human racism', and 'anthropocentrism' – with somewhat varying and often blurred meanings, which brings confusion to the issue. This essay suggests that only one term, ' speciesism ', be used, and it attempts a conceptual clarification. To this end it proposes a set of conditions of adequacy for a concept that would be (...) acceptable to the parties of the controversy. Through an examination of various forms of alleged speciesism it eventually proposes a rather precise concept. On this definition some positions believed not to be speciesist perhaps should be so called, and some positions believed to be speciesist perhaps should not be so called. The latter would better be referred to as 'humanistic ethics' or 'non-speciesist humanism'. (shrink)

This book explores contemporary continental philosophy and aesthetics. It addresses the problem of post-Kantian reason in relation to the pathologies of experience, alienation, the transformative and ethical import of aesthetic experience, the relation between philosophy and social critique, and language as disclosure rather than correspondence.

Reid thought that testimony possesses positive epistemic value. Epistemic autonomy is not necessarily the royal road to truth; nor is credulity a systematic epistemic fault and indeed, it can be an intellectual virtue. Even though the notion of epistemic virtue does not explicitly appear in Reid’s epistemology, it seems inherent to his views that what will give a heteronomous agent exercising the social operations of the mind the best chance to acquire and develop true beliefs is the epistemic virtues that (...) permit her to recognize reliable authorities. This is why it seems to me possible to associate Reid with to the virtue epistemology tradition. (shrink)

In his own time, Lao Sze-Kwang formulated his own intra-cultural approach to the philosophy of culture that begins from the interdependence and organic nature of our cultural experience. In this essay, I address three questions: Why did Lao abandon his early reliance on the Hegelian model of philosophy of culture and formulate his own “two- structured” theory? Again, given Lao’s profound commitment and contribution to Chinese philosophy and its future directions, why is it not proper to describe him as a (...) “Chinese philosopher?” And why is the much accomplished Lao Sze- Kwang not installed in the CUHK pantheon as yet one more of the great “New Confucian” philosophers (xinruxuejia 新儒學家) to be associated with this institution? (shrink)

Grâce aux œuvres, qui amplifient notre expérience du monde, des êtres et des choses qui le peuplent, nous découvrons que notre attention n'est pas uniforme dans ses accueils et ses inflexions, mais qu'elle se constelle autour de foyers. Certains de ces foyers sont établis, partagés. D'autres sont singuliers, labiles, résultats d'une élaboration subjective qui opère par rapprochements et découpages au sein des catégories artistiques, esthétiques, historiques. Le présent essai porte sur l'un de ces foyers, que le néologisme « intranquillité » (...) est venu nommer, autour duquel se groupent les écrits du poète portugais Fernando Pessoa et de ses « hétéronymes », une série de dessins réalisés par Tatiana Trouvé, la pensée poéthique selon Jean-Claude Pinson et le Monsieur Hulot de Jacques Tati. Il s'attache à restituer l'enquête menée auprès de ce foyer, afin d'éclairer les raisons de sa formation, et d'en dégager un sens susceptible, à son tour, d'être partagé. (shrink)

Does economics hold the key to everything or does the recent financial crisis show that it has failed? This book provides an assessment of modern economics that cuts through the confusion and controversy on this question. Case studies of the creation of new markets, the Russian transition to capitalism, globalization, and money and finance establish that economics has been very successful where problems have been well defined and where the world can be changed to fit the theory, but that it (...) has been less successful in tackling bigger problems. The book then offers a historical perspective on how economists have, since the Second World War, tried to make their subject scientific. It explores the evolving relationship between science and ideology and investigates the place of heterodoxy and dissent within the discipline. (shrink)

When young children first begin to ask 'why?' they embark on a journey with no final destination. The need to make sense of the world as a whole is an ultimate curiosity that lies at the root of all human religions. It has, in many cultures, shaped and motivated a more down to earth scientific interest in the physical world, which could therefore be described as penultimate curiosity. These two manifestations of curiosity have a history of connection that goes back (...) deep into the human past. Tracing that history all the way from cave painting to quantum physics, this book sets out to explain the nature of the long entanglement between religion and science: the ultimate and the penultimate curiosity. (shrink)